Ille quidem ante omnes, per se ipse quid utile, quid non Qui videt, et longe fines prospectat agendi: Qui bene consultis didicit parere, secundus * At qui consiliis pollet nihil ipse, nec audit Suadentes alios, nullos homo vivit ad usus.
(Opus et Dier. vers, 293, et seqq.)
* Vetus dictum proverbiale, quod reperitur apud AuLUM GELLIUM, JVoct. Attic. X11. 18. ubi videri possunt Intt. De re ipsa diximus in Gallicis nostris ad hunclocum Notis. J. 8.
what Hesiod says is true, that the best thing is to be wise one's self, the next best, to be guided by others. Arguments from the subject are taken from the causes, effects, and other adjuncts of it.
IV. 1 But to know them well, a certain practice and skill is neces- sary: and those who have not this, in order rightly to frame their active judgment, are bound to listen to the counsels of wise men. For the probable opinion, as Aristotle says, is that which is held by all, or by the greater part, or the most eminent. And this is the way of judging which kings mostly use, who have not leisure to peruse or to weigh the technical descriptions of such matters. 77e king is wise by the multitude of wise counsellors, as an old proverb says*. So Aris- tides. And so the ancient Romans undertook wars only after they had consulted the College of Feciales, instituted for that purpose, and the Christian Emperors rarely without consulting the bishops; that if * Quoted by Aulus Gellius, Noct. Aitic. xir. 18, J. B.
Vict. de Ind. Rel.1. n.12. et de Jure Belli, i. Topic. 1.
Tom. ii. p.
Terent. Adelph. ii. 1.
400 DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. [Laz. II.
tissimisque nitantur auctoribus. Sic Romani veteres non nisi consulto collegio fecialium ad id instituto, Imperatores Chris- tiani vix nisi auditis episcopis, bella suscipiebant, ut, si quid. esset, quod religionem posset injicere, ejus monerentur.
V. 1 Aeccidere autem in multis controversiis potest, ut ab utraque parte probabilia se ostendant argumenta, sive in- trinseca, sive ab aliorum auctoritate. Id cum accidit, si res mediocres sunt, de quibus agitur, videtur vitio carere posse electio, in utramvis partem cecideret. At, si de re magni momenti, ut de supplicio capitali hominis, agitur, jam propter magnum discrimen, quod est inter eligenda, * przferenda est pars tutior, ut dici solet: In istam partem potius peccato tamen. Ideo satius est nocentem absolvere, quam innocentem con- demnare.
2 Seriptor problematum quz Aristotelis nomen praeferunt: ἕκαστος ἡμῶν μᾶλλον àv προέλοιτο TOU ἀδικοῦντος ἀποψτη- φίσασθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἡ ποῦ μὴ ἀδικοῦντος καταψηφίσασθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ (quibus in verbis vulgo pro ἀδικοῦντος legitur μὴ ἀδικοῦντος, et contra) nemo est nostrum, ait, qui non ma- lit absolvere quamvis nocentem, quam damnare innocentem. Et mox addit rationem, quam jam dedimus: ἔστι γὰρ, ὅταν 5 Preferenda est pars tutior] Am- mianus Marcellinus libro xxvir. ϑὲ implacabiles iracundie sunt, summa, est acerbitas: sin autem exorabiles, summa levitas: que tamen, ut in malis, acerbi- tati anteponenda est. | Cap. i. p. 562. ex Cicerone ad. Q. Fratrem, Epist. 1.] Et hoe explicat Vasquez dicto libro, c. 4.
h Omnia prius experiri quam armis] Dionysius Halicarnassensis in excerptis legationum: μι) πρότερον ἄρξαι τῶν ἔργων πρὶν ἢ πειραθῆναι τῶν λόγων" non ante ad res veniendum est, quam ten- tata, sit verborum via. (Pag. 704. Edit. Oxon.) Menelaus apud Libanium: πρῶ- TOV μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια τῷ λόγῳ πει- ρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς ὅπλοις there were any impediment which religion interposed, they might be warned thereof.
V. 1 It may happen, in many controversies, that probable argu- ments are adduced on both sides, either intrinsic to the subject, or derived from the authority of others. When that happens, if the things in question are of moderate importance, the choice, it would seem, is free from blame, on whichever side it falls. But if there is question of a matter of great moment, as of a capital punishment, then, on account of the great difference between the two sides of the choice, the safer part is to be preferred. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to condemn an innocent.
Car. XXIII] DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. 401 τις ἀμφιδοξῇ, τὰ ἐλάττω τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἱρετέον" nam ubi quis dubitat, eligendum in quo minus delinquitur. Antiphon: εἰ δέοι τι ἁμαρτεῖν; πὸ ἀδίκως ἀπολύσαι ὁσιώτερον, Orat xiv. xv, ἢ TO ἀδίκως ἀπολέσαι. τὸ μὲν "ydp ἁμάρτημά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ Lo. 10, 12] ἀδίκως ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀσέβημα" si errandum, est, sine jure ab- &olvere, quam per injuriam condemnare, est sanctius. Nam in illo error est, in damnatione insontis, facinus.
VI. Maximi autem momenti est bellum, ut ex quo mala plurima etiam in innocentes sequi soleant. Ideo inter senten- tias alternantes vergendum ad pacem. Laudatur Silio Italico Fabius: Lib. i. v. 679.
Cauta speculator mente futuri, Nec lztus dubiis parvisque lacessere Martem. Tres autem sunt modi, quibus vitari potest, ne controversie in bellum erumpant.
VII. 1 Primum est, colloquium, cwm duo sint genera Viet de Jure disceptand?, ait Cicero, «num per disceptationem, alterum De opi. 1. τι. per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc belluarum, confugiendum est ad. posterius, si uti non licet priore. Et Terentius: PUN, Omnia prius experiri quam armis sapientem decet: Qui scis, an quz jubeam sine vi faciat?
ἐπιπηδᾶν, ἀνθρωπινώτερον δήπουθεν" homini convenientius, prius verborum erperimentum facere, quam statim ad arma prosilire. (Declam. 1. pag. 196 p. ΕΔ. Paris. Morell.) Non abeunt hinc ila chori dicta in Euripidis Jelena τὸ θεῶν "Emos ἀληθὲς εὗρον Ἄφρονες, ὅσοι τὰς ἀρετὰς πολέμῳ Κτᾶσθε, δορὸς ἀλκαίου Λογχαῖσι καταπαυόμενοι Ilóvovs θνατῶν ἀπαθῶς.
Ei γὰρ ἅμιλλα κρινεῖ νιν Αἵματος, οὔ ποτ᾽ ἔρις ΔΛείψει κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων πόλεις. Stulti nimium, queis virtutis Mensura placet unica, ferrum; Quibus humani pausa laboris Non nisi sevo quzritur ense: Nam si virtus sanguine tantum Spectanda venit, nunquam discors Furor infestas deseret urbes.
2 The writer of the Problems which go under the name of Aris- totle's, says this: and adds the reason just given. So Antipho.
VI. War is ἃ very weighty matter, being a thing from which great calamities fall upon the innocent. "Therefore when opinions are balanced, peace must have the preference.
praises Fabius.
So Silius Italicus But there are three ways in which controversies may be prevented from breaking out into war.
VII. 1 The first is, Conference.
There are two ways of settling disputed questions, says Cicero; one by discussion, the other by force: and the first being the character of man, the second of brutes, we are to [cRor. π.} 26 Argon. ii.
Supptic.
Lib. xxxv. 45.
Lib. vii, 9.
402 DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. [Lis. II.
Apollonius Rhodius dixit: μηδ᾽ αὕτως ἀλκῇ πρὶν ἔπεσσί "ye πειρηθῆναι. Τὸ Euripides: Λόγοισι πείσων. εἰ δὲ μὴ, βίᾳ δορός. Verbis id impetrabo: sin nequeo, manu. Idem reprehendit Supplicibus civitates, quze hane viam omit- terent (vers. 748): Et vos quoque, urbes, quz: quod est verbis datum Transigere, potius fertis ad czedem arbitram. Achilles Zphigenia in Aulide (vers. 1017, et seqq.): Si paret vequo, nil mea vobis ope Opus est; salutis est in hoc uno satis. Ego simul amici gratiam servaverim: Minusque vitio vertet omne agmen mihi, Ratione si rem gesserim, non viribus. Quod in PAaenissis apud Euripidem legimus (vers. 519): πᾶν γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖ λόγος ὃ καὶ σίδηρος πολεμίων δράσειεν ἄν" Id auctum sie extulit apud Livium Phzneas:!multa homi- nes, ne bellare necesse sit, voluntate remittere, quc bello et armis cogi non possint.
iMulta homines, ne bellare necesse sit, voluntate remittere, que bello et ar- mis cogi mon possint] Donatus ad Eu- muchum: pervulgatum est enim, quod summa, vi defenderis quum extorquetur, hoc idem postmodum remitti remittenti, ^ Compromissum] Spreta plerumque potentioribus via. Vide Connestagium de Conjunctione regnorum Castelle et Portugalli:e, digna tamen, quam insis- tant squi et pacis amantes. Fecere magni reges ac populi, quorum in textu memoria. Addamus alios. ^ Arbitri sumti inter Magnum Norvagize et Ca- nutum Danis reges de regno utroque certantes: Nempe quomodo Julianus have recourse to the latter, only if the former fails.
Mardonius apud Herodotum JPoprimus ejus nominis cum Severo de principatu Romano certante interdicto agere voluit. [SPanriAN. in Vit. Pes- cennii Nigri, cap. 2.] Magnus rex Suediz arbiter sumtus inter Ericos duos Danie et Norvagie reges. In federe Lacedzemoniorum et Árgivorum apud Thucydidem: δίκας διδόντας κατὰ πά- τρια, qui stare arbitris volent more avito, Et mox: ei δέ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων πόλις πόλει ἐρίζοι, ἐς πόλιν ἐλθεῖν ἄντινα ἴσαν ἀμφοῖν ταῖς πόλεσι δοκοίη" si qua sociarum civitatum cum socia civitate controversiam habeat, rem deferant ad civitatem, que utrisque «qua videbitur. Est utrumque apud Thucydidem libro v. (c. 79.) M. Antoninum multi extra So Terence, Apol- So Terence, Apollonius Rhodius, Euripides in several places; and Pheneas in Livy goes further; saying, Zn order to avoid war we are to yield many things which cannot be gained by war. And Mardonius in Herodotus blames the Greeks for not trying negociation before war, being of the same lan- guage.
2 Coriolanus in Dionysius says, 7f a man asks only for his own, ati d.
Car. XXIII.] DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. 403 lymnia Grzcos eulpat hae in parte: τοὺς χρῆν ἐόντας ὁμο- “γλωώσσους: κήρυξί ΖῈ διαχρεωμένους, καὶ ἀγγέλοισι, κα- ταλαμβάνειν τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ παντὶ μᾶλλον ἢ μάχησι" quos oportuit, cum ejusdem essent lingue, caduceatorum et legatorum. opera, non preliis, controversias tractare.
2 Coriolanus apud Halicarnassensem: τὸ μὴ τῶν ἀλ- λοτρίων ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ μὴ τυγχάνοντα τούτου πολεμεῖν, ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἷ- ναι. καλόν" si quis mon aliena cupiat, sed sua postulet, atque, iis non impetratis, bellum moveat, id omnium con- Jessione equum est. Apud eundem Halicarnassensem rex Tullus; quc verbis componi nequeunt, ea armis ait decerni. Apud Tacitum Vologeses: equitate quam sanguine, causa quam armis retinere parta majoribus malueram. — Et rex 'Theodorieus: £unc utile solum est ad. arma concurrere, cum locum apud, adversarios justitia non potest invenire.
VIII. 1 Alterum est inter eos, qui communem judicem nullum habent, *compromissum: ἐπὶ τὸν δίκας διδόντα οὐ νόμιμον ὡς ἐς ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι, ait Thucydides: 2n eum, qui arbitrum accipere paratus est, nefas ut in injuriosum Romanum imperium populi controver- siarum suarum, ut bella vitarent, arbi- trum sumsere: meminit Victor et alii. Apud Frocopium Gotthic. nu. Gepidw Langobardis dicunt: δίκῃ γὰρ διαλύειν σὰ διάφορα ἐν σπουδῇ ἔχομεν. δικάζε- σθαι δὲ οἷς ἂν σπουδάζεται, βιάζεσθαι οὐδαμὴ πρόσεστιν" arbitro sumto diri- mere controversa parati sumus: at qui stare judicio volunt, eos vi impetere ini- quum est, (Cap. 84.) Apud eundem Gotthicorum 1v. "Theudibaldus Franc. rex paratum se ostendit, judicem acci- pere de iis, quz Romani disputabant. (Cap. 24.) Vide et quid olim Romani Philippo significaverint apud Polybium excerpto legationum n. 4, et quod est in federe Antiochi ex eodem Polybio itidem in excerptis n. 55. Rex Anglise judex de Scotis successione: Comes Holsatus inter regem Danis et fratres, Pontano memorante Zistorie Danica, libro viz. Adde exempla apud Maria- nam libro xxrtv. cap. 20. xxix. cap. 23. Parutam libris vir. et xr. DBizarum libro xii, Crantzium libro vr. )Saxo- nicorum c. 15. et nostra infra libro 111. cap. xx. $ 46. [Quod de Marco Anto- nino dicit Auctor, nec in iis, quz no- mine Aurelii Victoris circumferentur, reperio, nec alibi. Certe in Epitome Vietoris id dicitur de Antonino Pio.
and betakes himself. to war only when he cannot get that, all allow that it is just.
Tacitus: and so king Theodoric.
And in the same writer, Tullus says, that what cannot be settled by discussion «ust be decided by arms.
So the Vologeses in VIII. 1 Another way is Compromise, or Arbitration, between parties who have no common judge. As Thucydides says, It is wicked to pro- ceed against him as a wrong doer, who is ready to refer the question to Ant. Rom. viii. 8, Lib. iii. 11.
Ann. xv. 2.
Cass.iii. Var. 1.
Lib. iv. 67. Plut. in Sol.
Orat. Plat. ii. 'Tom. 11r.
Liv. iii. 71.
Xen. Cyrop.
Liv. xl. 17.
401 DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. [Lrz. II.
ire. Sie de regno Àrgivo Adrastus et Amphiaraus Eriphylee judicium permiserunt, narrante Diodoro. De Salamine inter Athenienses et Megarenses lecti judices Lacedzemonii quinque. Apud dietum modo Thueydidem Corcyrenses Corinthiis signi- ficant, paratos se disceptare controversias apud Peloponnesi civitates, de quibus inter ipsos convenisset. Et Periclem laudat Aristides, quod, ut bellum vitaretur, voluerit δίκη διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν διαφόρων, de controversiis arbitros sumere. Et Isocrates 5oratione adversus Ctesiphontem lau- dat Philippum Macedonem, quod quas habebat eum Athenien- sibus controversias, de iis paratus esset ἐπιτρέπειν πόλει τινὶ ἴση kai ὁμοίᾳ, arbitrium permittere alicui civitati eque utrique parti.
2 Sie olim Ardeates et Aricini, postea 5 Neapolitani et Nolani, eontroversias suas arbitrio populi Romani permise- runt. Et Samnites in controversia cum lomanis "ad com- munes amieos provocant. Cyrus sibi et Assyrio arbitrum fert regem Indorum. P«ni in controversis cum Masinissa, ut bellum vitent, ad judicia provocant. Komani ipsi de con- 5 Nulla est Oratio Isocratis adversus ^ Auctor noster exscripsit heie Arprni- Ctesiphontem, cujus vel nomen nescio ^ cuw GEwrILEM, De Jure Belli, Lib. τ. an ullibi apud Oratorem illum legatur. ^ cap.iii. pag. m. 28. Sed narratur res a Voluit Auctor dieere /EscuiwEM, in — CrcEnRoNE, De Offic. τ. 10. Et VALER, cujus notissima Oratione hzc reperias, | MaxiMo, vir. 3. num. 4. J. B. pag. 286 A [65,27]. J.B. ᾿ 7 Aut valde fallor, aut idem est, 9 De his nil, nec apud Livium, ^ quod paullo post Auctor refert, sed ita nec apud Dionysium Haliearnassensem. ^ ut in posteriori loco vere tribuat Roan arbitrator. So Adrastus and Amphiaraus referred the question con- cerning the kingdom of Argos to the judgment of Eriphyle. So to decide the question concerning Salamis between the Athenians and the Me- gareans, five Lacedzemonian judges were chosen. So the Corcyreans signify to the Corinthians that they are ready to discuss their respec- tive claims before the cities of Peloponnesus where they might agree toappoint. And Aristides praises Pericles, because to avoid war, he was willing to appoint arbiters. And so ZEschines praises Philip for being willing to submit his controversies with the Athenians to any city equally just to both parties.
2 So the Ardeates and the Aretians in old time, and the Neapoli- tans and the Nolans later, referred their controversies to the decision of the Roman people. And the Samnites in controversy with the Ro- mans appeal to common friends. So do the Carthaginians in their con- troversies with Masinissa to avoid war: and the Romans themselves concerning their controversy with the Samnites, refer to their common Car. XXIII] DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. 405 troversia eum Samnitibus apud Livium ad communes socios. Et Philippus Macedo in controversia cum Grsecis ait se arbitrio usurum populorum, cum quibus pax utrisque fuisset. Parthis e£ Armeniis postulantibus Pompeius finibus regendis arbitros dedit. Fecialium Romanorum hoe przceipuum ait offücium fuisse Plutarchus: οὐκ ἐᾷν στρατεύειν πρότερον ἢ πᾶσαν ἐλπίδα δίκης ἀποκοπῆναι" ne sinerent prius ad bellum veniri, quam spes omnis judicii obtinendi periisset, De Gallorum Druidibus Strabo: ὥστε kai πολέμους διήτων πρότερον καὶ παρατάττεσθαι μέλλοντας ἔπαυον" olim et inter bellantes erant arbitri, ac sepe jam acie congressuros diremerunt. Eodem officio functos in Iberia sacerdotes idem testis est.
3!Maxime autem Christiani reges et civitates tenentur hane inire viam ad arma vitanda. Nam si, ut judicia alieno- rum ἃ vera religione judicum vitarentur, et a Judzis et a Christianis arbitri quidam sunt constituti, et id a Paulo prz- ceptum, quanto magis id faciendum est, ut majus multo vitetur incommodum, id est, bellum? — Sie alicubi Tertulliamanis, quod de Samnitibus nusquam ἀπηνῶς οὕτωσι κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἐπιέγαι, legitur, quantum quidem sciam. Ori- ἐνὸν ὁμοδοξεῖν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρὸς εἰρή- ginem erroris indicavimus in Notis Gal- νὴν καὶ ὁμοῦ κατὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν παρα- licis. J. B. τάττεσθαι" indecorum esse Christianis, Mazime autem Christiani reges et — tanta cum acerbitate inter se armis cer- civitates tenentur hanc inire viam] Gre- — tare, cum rationes sint conveniendi ad goras libro x. de Alerandro Bulgaro: | pacem, et communes vires in impios ver- οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λέγων Χριστιανοῖς — tendi. (Pag.219..Edit. Genev.)
allies. Philip of Macedon in his controversy with the Greeks, says that he will take the judgment of Peoples who are at peace with both. Αὐ the request of the Parthians and Armenians, Pompey gave arbiters to settle their boundaries. Plutarch says tbat this was the main office of the I'oman Feciales, not to allow recourse to be had to arms till all hope of a peaceable decision was gone. And Strabo says of the Druids of the Gauls, that formerly they were arbiters between hostile parties, and often made them part without fighting, who were drawn up in warlike array against each other. "The same writer testi- fies that the priests in Iberia had the same office.
3 But especially are Christian kings and states bound to try this way of avoiding war. For if, in order to avoid being subject to the judgments of persons who were not of the true religion, certain arbiters were appointed both by the Jews and by the Christians, and the practice is commanded by Paul; how much more is this to be done, in order to avoid a much greater inconvenience, namely, war. So in one place Lib. viii. 23. Idem, xxxii.
Plut. Pomp.
In Num.
Lib.iv. p. 197.
Lib.xi. p. 501.
Viet. de Jure Beili, n. 29.
406 DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. [Lzr. IT.
nus argumentatur, non militandum Christiano, ut eui ne (291 htigare quidem liceat: quod tamen, secundum ea, quze alibi diximus, cum temperamento quodam est intelligendum. Molina, disp. 4 Et tum ob hane, tum ob alias causas utile esset, imo 103. ὃ quando » * ^ti. quodammodo factu necessarium, conventus quosdam haberi superni. Christianarum potestatum, ubi per eos, quorum res non in- m terest, aliorum controversie definiantur: imo et rationes ineantur "cogendi partes, ut sequis legibus pacem accipiant: Büüw.v. quem et ipsum olim apud Gallos "Druidum fuisse usum Dio- θόρε Li.iv doro ae Straboni proditum. Etiam proceribus suis de regni divisione judicium permisisse Francos reges legimus. nia IX. Tertia ratio est?per sortem: quam in hoc com- d ibi Cajet mendat Dion Chrysostomus oratione in Fortunam altera: et multo ante Solomo Prov. xviii. 18. X. 1 Sortis autem affine quid est certamen singulare, 5eujus usus non videtur omnino repudiandus, si duo, Pquorum m (Cogendi partes, ut equis legibus 9 Per sortem| Vide Augustinum de pacem accipiant] Vide exemplum apud. Joctrina Christiana Lib. 1. cap. 28. Cassiodorum 111. 1, 2, 3, 4. et Gailium 8 Vide infra Lib. 11r. cap. xx. ὃ 43. de Pace Publica, 11. cap. xviii. n. 12. et PurEeNponriUM 226 Jure Nat. et n Druidum fuisse usum] Druidibus ^ Gent.Lib. virr. cap. viii. 8 ὅ. J.. B. hac in parte, et meliori cum jure, epi- P Quorum controversie alioqui totos scopi suecessere. "Vide epistolam epi- ^ populos gravissimis malis sint implici- scoporum ad Ludovicum regem in capi- — fure] Scriptor tragceedie 'Phebaidos, tulis Caroli Calvi, et de episcopis His- ^ [P/weniss. vers. 564]:: panie Rodericum "Toletanum libro vir. ies sss cap. 3. Manente regno quzrite.
Tertullian argues that a Christian must not go as a soldier, since he may not even go to law; which latter, however, as we have already shewn, is to be taken with a certain limitation.
4 And both for this reason and for others, it would be useful, and indeed it is almost necessary, that certain Congresses of Christian Powers should be held, in which the controversies which arise among some of them may be decided by others who are not interested; and in which measures may be taken to compel the parties to accept peace on equi- table terms. This was the office of the Druids of old among the Gauls, as Diodorus and Strabo tell us: and we read that the Frank- ish kings left to their nobles the judgment of questions concerning the division of the kingdom.
IX. The third way is by Lot; which method is commended for this purpose by Dio Chrysostom, and much earlier by Solomon, Prov.xviii. 18. [Te lot causeth contentions to cease, and parteth between the mighty.)
X. 1 Closely related to the practice of casting Lots, is the prac- Car. XXIII.] DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. 407 controversis alioqui totos populos gravissimis malis sint im- plieiture, inter se parati sint armis decernere, ut olim de Peloponneso Hyllus et Echemus, de regione ad Inachum Hyperochus et Phemius, de Elide Pyrszcehma JEtolus et Degmenus Epeus, de Iba Corbis et Orsua. Videtur enim id, si non ab ipsis recte fieri, certe a civitatibus posse acceptari, ut minus malum. Apud Livium Metius Tullum sie alloqui- tur: 2neamus aliquam viam, qua utri utris imperent, sine magna clade, sine multo sanguine utriusque populi decerni possit. Strabo vetustam hane fuisse ait Grecorum consue- tudinem: Ἰοὺ apud Virgilium ZEneas sequum fuisse ait, ut inter se et 'Turnum eo modo res definiretur.
2 Certe "inter ceteros Francorum veterum mores hunc impense laudat Agathias libro primo, cujus ipsa verba (sunt enim insignia) apponam: ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἄρα καί Tiv ἔριν τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἐγγενέσθαι συνενεχθείη, παρατάττονται μὲν Dion Othone: πολὺ γάρ που καὶ κρεῖ- τον καὶ δικαιότερόν ἐστιν ἕνα ὑπὲρ πάντων ἢ πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς ὠπολέ- σθαι" multo enim satius justiusque est, unum pro omnibus, quam multos unius causa perire. [Xiphilin. pag. 204 Β. Ed. H. Steph.]
4 Et apud. Virgilium] ZEneidos x1.
J4Equius huic Turnum fuerat se opponere morti.
Octavium ad singulare certamen pro- vocabat. Plutarchus Antonio. [Non ea de caussa, sed dvrukou aov, ut dicit PrLvrARCHUS, pag. 944 e. J. Β.]
r [nter ceteros Francorum vcterum mores| Vide Caroli Calvi capitulum apud S. Arnulfum, et pactionem Aquis- granensem. ZEquitas eadem apud Lan- gobardos. Vide Paulum "Warnafredi libro 1. cap. 12. 1v. cap. 17. v. cap. 40.
(Vers. 115.) Pari de causa- Antonius tice of Single Combat: of which the use does not appear to deserve altogether to be repudiated, if two persons whose controversies would otherwise involve two peoples in great evils are prepared to decide the question by arms, as formerly Hyllus and Echemus fought for Peloponnesus; Hyperochus and Phemius for the region on the Ina- chus; Pyrzechma the Etolian and Degmenus the Epean for Elis; Cor- bis and Orsua for Ibas. For we may grant that if that be not done by the parties without blame on their part, yet that it may be accepted by the states in question as the lesser evil. So in Livy Metius says to Tullus, Let us take a course by which we may decide with- out great bloodshed in each people which shall govern the other. | Strabo says that this was an ancient custom of the Greeks, and in Virgil, Eneas says it was right that the question between him and Turnus should be so decided.
2 Among the other customs of the Franks, this is especially the object of Agathias's praise. He says that if their kings have any quarrel, the armies on each side are assembled and brought face to face, Herod. Call. sive ix. 26. Plut. qucest. Strab. viii.
Liv. xxviii.
Ubi supra, Cap. 2.
408 DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. [Lis. II.
ἅπαντες ὡς πολεμήσοντες kat τοῖς ὅπλοις διακριθησόμε- νοι, καὶ εἶτα ὁμόσε χωροῦσιν. ἰδόντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ἐκα- τέρωθεν ἢ πληθὺς, αὐτίκα τὸ χαλεπαῖνον ἀποβάλλοντες εἰς ὁμοφροσύνην μεταχωροῦσι, καὶ τοὺς ἠγεμόνας κελεύ- ουσι δίκῃ μᾶλλον τὰ ἀμφίβολα διακρινήσασθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, μόνους ἐκείνους “ἀγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς διακεν- δυνεύειν, ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον ὃν, οὐδὲ πάτριον, ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἕνεκα δυσμενείας, τὰ κοινὰ πημαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀνατετράφ- θαι. εὐθύς τε οὖν τάς τε φάλαγγας διαλύουσι, καὶ τὰ ὅπλα τίθενται, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰρήνη αὖθις καὶ ἡμερότης, ME T€ Tap ἀλλήλους ἀφύλακτοι, καὶ ἐπιμιξίαι, αἱ φροῦδα οἴχεται τὰ δεινά. οὕτως ἄρα αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν ὑπήκοον δίκαιον καὶ φιλόπατρι. τὸ δέ γε ἄρχον εὐμενὲς ἐν δέοντι καὶ πειθήνιον" si quc forte inter reges oriantur controversie, aciem. quidem omnes instruunt, tanquam bel- laturi, ad. rem armis decernendam: et obviam alii aliis procedunt. At ubi conspicati sunt se invicem exercitus, abjecta dra ad concordiam redeunt, εἰ regibus auctores sunt, «t jure polius certent: aut si id nolint, ipsi inter se singulari dimicent certamine, et suo duntavat ipsorum periculo rem transigant: meque enim aut cquo et bono, aut patriis institutis convenire, ut. ipsi ob propria odia bonum publicum labefactent aut evertant. |.Ergo confestim solvunt exercitus, et restituta pace tuto inter se commeant, sublatis malorum eausis. — T'anta in. subditis cura justi- 5. Magis tamen ad id tenetur qui? Videsupra, cap.v. $18. J. B. pelit, quam qui possidet] Vide Herre- t Distinguende sunt varia acceptio- ram tomo 11. nes vocis justi] Sic Gratianus causa Xr, and then the kings are told to fight the matter out between them- selves, and the two armies lay down their arms and mix like friends.
XI. But though in a doubtful case, both parties are bound to seek for conditions of compromise by which war may be avoided, the party which makes a claim is more bound than the party which is in possession. For that in parity of case, possession is a presumption, to be accepted as favourable, is a matter which agrees not only with civil but with natural law: of which we have given the reason from the Problems ascribed to Aristotle, [cap. v. $ 12.] And we may here add, that he who knows himself to have a good cause, but has not sufficient doeuments to convince the possessor of the injustice of his possession, cannot lawfully make war; because he has not the right of compelling the other to give up possession.
NUT ua. cR. 1i mul mm e MM Ή ΉΎΥΥΎΥΥ Car. XXIII.] DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. 409 tic et patrie amor: in regibus vero animus placidus et suis obsequens. XI. Quanquam vero in causa dubia pars utraque tene- tur quzrere conditiones, quibus bellum vitetur, *magis tamen ad id tenetur, qui petit, quam qui possidet. ^ Ut enim in pari causa melior sit possidentis conditio, non civili tantum r i»par;. juri sed et naturali convenit: eujus rei causam alibi etiam ex X1. | Aristotelis quee dieuntur problematibus?attulimus. Atque Bx?" τ. 27. εἰ Emu Vict. de Jure ) hie et illud addendum est, ab eo, qui justam causam habere se 155 7/7 scit, sed documenta non habet sufficientia, quibus possessorem i5 $5 e cundo vero.
de injustitia suz possessionis convincat, bellum licite non Lor 2 2 sumi: quia non habet jus cogendi alterum, ut de possessione n. 4.
decedat.
XII. Ubi vero et jus ambiguum est, et neuter possidet, Load es.
aut ex vquo uterque, ibi iniquus censendus erit, qui oblatam *o» vue, rei controversz divisionem repudiat. art. 7.
XIII. 1 Ex his quz diximus, definiri potest illa a multis agitata quzestio, an bellum, ratione habita eorum, qui covam. ὁ.
principales belli motores sunt, utrinque justum esse possit. ἡ. Ὁ. Alc. 3. CÓ E...ἂ Z pavrad,. 21. "Distinguend:e enim sunt varie acceptiones vocis justi. —Jus- Fuzosi5 tum enim aliquid dieitur aut ex causa, aut secundum effectus. Piccol. vi.
Phil. Civil. x: zal; Tus bibl illa €. 21. Ex causa rursum, aut speciali acceptione justitize aut ila $55. Gu generali qua omnis rectitudo eo venit nomine. Specialis "5 aeceptio iterum dividitur in eam quz ad opus pertinet, et eam, quie pertinet ad operantem; quarum!illa potest dici quzstione iii. post c. Episcopus, 65. tiva,in sola prima Editione leguntur, et distinguit justitiam cause, ordinis, ani- ^in aliis omissa sunt incuria typotheta- mi. rum, ut quivis videt. J. B.
Hxc omnia, quarum illa...nega- XII But when the right is ambiguous, and neither is in posses- sion, or each is equally so, then if one of the parties refuse to divide the matter in question, he is to be reckoned unjust.
XIII. 1 From what we have said, we may decide the question moved by many writers, whether a war, regarded in reference to those who are the principal movers of it, can be just on both sides. We must distinguish various acceptations of the word just. A thing is called just from its cause, or from its effect. And again, from its cause, either in the special acceptation of justice, or in that general acceptation in which all rectitude or rightness comes under that name. Again, the special acceptation is divided into that wbich be- longs to the act itself, and that which belongs to the agent; of which the former may be called posi:ive, the latter negative. For the agent Lib. v. ἘΠῚ. Rhet. i. 13. -Aug. Xv. de Civ. Dei, 5. et Covar. c. Pecc. ὃ 10. n.
D Viet. n. 32. Suar. de Leg., iii. 8.
Alph. de Cast. de Potest. leg. qpanal. ài. 1. et 3.
410 DE CAUSIS DUPIIS. [Liz. II.
positiva, hee negativa: nam ipse operans juste agere inter- dum dicitur, quoties injuste non agit, etiamsi id, quod agit, justum non sit: quomodo recte distinguit Aristoteles, τὸ ἀδι- keiv, et τὸ ἄδικον πράττειν, injuste agere, et agere quod injustum est.
2 Speciali et ad rem ipsam relata aeceptione bellum utrumque justum esse non potest, ut nec lis; quia facultas moralis ad contraria, puta ad agendum et ad impediendum, non datur per rei ipsius naturam. At vero, ut neuter bellan- tium injuste agat, fieri sane potest: injuste enim agit nemo, nisl qui et scit, se rem injustam agere: multi autem id nesciunt. Sie juste, id est, bona fide litigari potest utrimque. Multa enim et in jure et in facto, unde jus oritur, fugere homines solent.
3 Generali aeceptione justum diei solet, quod omni culpa agentis vacat. Multa autem etiam sine jure fiunt absque culpa, ob ignorantiam inevitabilem: eujus rei exemplum est in his qui legem non observant, quam sine culpa sua ignorant postquam lex ipsa promulgata est, et tempus per se ad scien- iiam sufficiens transit. Sic et in litibus accidere poterit, ut pars utraque non modo injustitis, sed et omni alio vitio is sometimes said to act justly, when he does not act unjustly, although what he does be not just; as Aristotle rightly distinguishes, fo acf unjustljy, and to do an unjust thing.
2 In the special acceptance of justice, as bearing upon the thing itself, ἃ war cannot be just on both sides, as a lawsuit cannot. Because a moral claim to two conirary things, to act and to prevent the action, by the nature of the subject, cannot exist. Dut it may be that nei- ther of the belligerent parties act unjustly: for no one acts unjustly except he who knows that he is doing an unjust thing: and many persons do not know this when it is so. Thus persons may carry on a lawsuit justly, that is, bone fide on both sides. For many points both of law, and of the facts from which the law arise, escape the notice of the parties concerned.
3 In a general aeceptation, that is called just which is free from all fault of the agent. Many things are done without right, or done without fault, on account of inevitable ignorance; of which we have an example in those who do not observe the law, being ignorant of it without any fault of theirs, though it has been promulgated, and a sufficent time for their becoming acquainted with it has elapsed. $So in litigation it may happen that both parties are free not only from injustice, but from all other vices; especially when both parties, or at Car. XXIII.) DE CAUSIS DUBIIS. 411 careat, przserüm ubi pars utraque, aut altera litigat non suo sed alieno nomine, puta ex tutoris officio, cui congruit jus etiam incertum non deserere. Sic Aristoteles in litibus juris controversi, ait neutrum esse improbum, quod ipse dicit zo- vgpov. Cui consentiens Quintilianus posse accidere ait, ut ex utraque parte orator, id est, vir bonus, dicat. Imo et juste judicare judicem ambigue dici ait Aristoteles, significari enim aut judieare ὡς δεῖ, plane ut oportet, sine ulla ignorantia, aut κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ “γνώμην, ev animi sui sententia. — Et alibi ait: εἰ ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, ovk ἀδικεῖ, si quis per igno- rantiam judicaverit, non egit injuste.
4 At in bello vix est, ut temeritas saltem omnis et dilec- tionis defectus absit, ob negotii ipsius gravitatem, quz omnino talis est, ut causis probabilibus non contenta, quam maxime evidentes requirat.
5 At justum si accipimus, quoad effectus quosdam juris, certum est, bellum hoe sensu justum utrimque dari, ut ex iis apparebit, quz» de bello publieo solenni infra a nobis dicentur. Sie enim et sententia non ex jure lata et possessio sine jure habent quosdam juris effectus.
least one, litigates not on his own account, but on that of another; as for instance, in consequence of the office of guardian or trustee, whose business it is not to desert ἃ right which is only doubtful. So Aris- totle says that in a doubtful question of law, neither side is bad; and Quintilian, that there are cases in which a good man may speak as an advocate on either side. Aristotle says too, that there are two senses in which we may say the judge judges rightly; the one, in which he judges as he ought aecording to the case, not making allowance for ignorance; the other, in which he judges sincerely as he thinks. ΤῸ do this, as he says in another place, is not to judge unjustly.
4 But in war it cannot easily happen that there is not, on one side, at least temerity and a lack of charity, the matter being so grave, that we ought not to be content with probabilities, but should require evi- dent causes.
5 If we take just as to some legal effects, it is certain that in this sense a war may be just on both sides; as will appear by what we shall have to say hereafter of a penal publie war. So a sentence of a judge, though given not according to law, and possession without right, have certain legal effects.
ii. RAet. 17.
Lib. ii. 17.
CAPUT UXXIV MONITA DE NON TEMERE ETIAM EX JUSTIS CAUSIS SUSCIPIENDO BELLO.
tetur.
VIL..A ponis ewigendis abstinere debere qui non multo sit vali- dior.
VIII. Restare, wt bellum mon sit suscipiendum, nisi ex mecessi- tate: IX. Aut ex maxima causa cum maaima occasione.
X. Bellorum mala ob oculos po- sita.
I. Jus sepe vemittendwm, ut bel- lum vitetur: IL.Mazime jus ad poenas: 111. Presertim a rege lcso.
IV. Etiam cura sui et suorum abstinendwm sepe bello.
V. Regula prudentice circa elec- tionem bonorum.
VI. E«emplwum in deliberatione inter studium libertatis et pa- cis: qua internecio populi evi- 1.1 UANQUAM. instituti, quod de jure belli inscriptum est, pars proprie non videtur exsequi, quid circa bellum virtutes ali; przecipiant aut suadeant, obiter tamen ob- viam eundum est errorj, ne quis existimet, ubi jus satis comἃ Non ob quamvis causam talem bel- “πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδ᾽ ὑπὲρ