damentum. Quando autem lex in tali przesumtione sit fun- data, ex legis materia, verbis, et circumstantiis colligendum. Similiter ergo dicemus, "sj promissio fundata sit in pressum- tione quadam faeti quod non ita se habeat, naturaliter nullam ejus esse vim: quia omnino promissor non consensit in pro- missum, nisi sub quadam conditione qus re ipsa non extitit: quo referenda est illa qusstio apud Ciceronem de Oratore primo de eo, qui filium suum mortuum falso credens alium instituerat heredem.
9 Quod si promissor negligens fuit in re exploranda, aut in sensu suo exprimendo, *et damnum inde alter passus sit, tenebitur id resarcire promissor, non ex vl promissionis, sed ex damno per culpam dato, de quo capite infra agemus. Si vero adfuerit quidem error, sed in quo fundata non fuerit promissio, ratus erit actus, utpote non deficiente vero con- sensu: sed hoc quoque casu si js cul promittitur dolo errori causam dederit, quicquid ex eo errore damni promissor fecit, resarcire tenebitur, ex alio illo obligationis capite. Si h Si promissio fundata sit in pra- sumtione quadam facti quod non ita, se habeat] Seneca de Beneficiis 1v. c. 36. Demens est qui fidem praestat errori.
* Alia heic est ratio Promissi mere gratuiti, alia Promissi mutui. In priori, modo bona fide egerit Promissor, ad ni- hil amplius tenetur. In posteriori, ex circumstantiis judicandum, an ob negli- gentiam in re exploranda, aut sensu suo tion of the law is wanting. But wen the law is founded on such a presumption, is to be collected from the matter, words, and circum- stances of the law. In like manner then we shall say, that when a promise is founded on the presumption of some fact which is not really $0, that by Natural Law it has no force: because the Promiser does not agree to the promise except on a certain condition which in reality did not exist: to which we must refer Cicero's question concerning the person who, falsely believing his son to be dead, made another person his heir.
3 But if the promiser has been negligent in inquiring into the matter, or in expressing his intention, and another person has thereby suffered loss,the promiser will be bound to make that loss good; not by the force of his promise, but as having done damage by his fault; of which head we shall hereafter treat. But if there was indeed an error, but one on which the promise was not founded, the act will be valid, a true consent being there not wanting. But in this case also, if he to whom the promise is made, fraudulently give occasion to the error, he will be bound to make good whatever damage the promiser has done from that error, from that other head of obligation. If the Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 41 pro parte fundata erit in errore promissio, valebit pro reli- qua parte.
VII. 1 De eo quod metu fit, non minus implicita trac- tatio est: nam et hie distingui solet inter metum gravem ab- solute, vel ratione habita person: metuentis, et levem; illa- tum juste et injuste; ab eo, cui promitttur, vel ab alio: item inter actus liberales et onerosos: et pro his diversitati- bus alii aetus dicuntur irritij alii ad arbitrium promittentis revocabiles, ali in integrum restituendi: non sine magna sententiarum varietate circa hzc singula.
2 Ego omnino illorum accedo sentent';, qui existimant, seposita lege civili, quz» obligationem potest tolere aut minuere, eum qui metu promisit aliquid, $obligari: quia con- sensus hie adfuit, nee conditionalis, ut modo in errante dicebamus, sed absolutus. Nam ut recte ab Aristotele tra- ditum est, qui naufragii metu res suas jactat, vellet res servare sub conditione, si naufragium non immineret; at absolute vult res perdere, spectata scilicet temporis ac loci circumstantia.
exprimendo, Promissor teneatur. Dix- | PurENDORFIUM, diximus, Je Jure Nat. imus in Notis Gallicis ad hune locum. — et Gent. Lib. 11r. cap. 6. $ 9. et seqq. J.B. J. B.
5 Minime obligatur. Vide quz, post promise was founded partly in error, it will be valid as to the remain- ing part.
VII. 1 Of promises made through fear*, the treatment is no less entangled. For here too a distinction is commonly made be- tween a fear which is grave, either absolutely, or with reference to the person who fears, and a slight fear; between fear impressed justly and unjustly; by the promisee, or by another: also between acts of liberality, and acts of mutual promise. And according to these diversi- ties some acts are declared void; others, revocable at the choice of the promiser; others, cases for entire restitution; not without great variety of opinion on these particular cases.
2 I am entirely of the opinion of those who think that, setting aside the Civil Law, which may either take away or diminish an obli- gation, he who has promised any thing under fear, is bound f: for here was consent, not conditional, as in the case of erroneous promises, but absolute. For as Aristotle says, he, who in fear of shipwreck, * Of Extorted Promises, see E. M. 292. T Obligatur, says Grotius: minime obligatur, says Barbeyrae, and refers to his notes on Puffendorf. See for the reasons why he is bound, Z. M. 295.
Sylv. Verb. Met. q. 8.
42 DE PROMISSIS. [118. II.
Sylv. arb. Sed illud simul verissimum censeo, Sl 15. cui promittitur να, οαγ, metum intulerit non justum, sed injustum, quamvis levem, nee? atque inde secuta sit promissio, eum teneri ad liberandum Tor 4/5, promissorem si promissor velit; non quod inefficax fuerit promissio, sed ob damnum injuria datum, quod quam habeat exceptionem ex jure gentium, "infra suo loco explicabitur.
3 Quod vero quidam actus rescinduntur *ob metum ab alio incoussum, quam quicum actum est, ex lege est civili, quz: sspe etiam actus libere factos ob judicii infirmitatem, aut irritos facit aut revocabiles. Qus autem de legum civi- lium vi atque effieacia supra diximus, eadem hie volumus haberi repetita. At quz ad promissiones firmandas vis sit jurisjurandi, infra videbimus.
VIII. 1 Materiam promissi *quod attinet, eam oportet esse, aut esso posse in jure promittentis, ut promissum sit D. quod. Met. Caus.
efficax. Quare primum non Hliciti: 5quia ad illa nemo jus i Infra suo loco explicabitur| Hoc libro, Tit. x vir. ὃ 19. et libro rrr. c. xix.
k Ob metum ab alio incussum] Se- neca naturam secutus libro rv. contro- versiarum, controversia xxvi. 4Jía re- scinduntur que per vim ei necessitatem valent promissa facti per se habet, nec potest habere. Αὐ gesta. sunt, si vis et necessitas a pacis- cente adhibita est..Nihil enim, inquit, med, an tu cogaris,si non a, me cogeris. Meam culpam oportet esse, μὲ mea poena Jit: confer quae infra libro 111. c. xix.
7 Confer hac de re PuFENDORFIUM, throws his goods overboard, would wish to keep them, conditionally, if there was not the danger of shipwreck; but, absolutely, he is willing to lose them, considering the circumstances of time and place.
But I also think that this is certainly true; that if the promisee has produced a fear, not just, but unjust, even though slight, and if the promise was occasioned by this, he is bound to liberate the pro- miser if the promiser desires it; not because the promise was invalid, but on account of the damage wrongfully done: what exception to a demand this gives rise to, we shall explain in its own place below.
3 'That some of our acts are rescinded on account of fear im- pressed on us by another person than the one with whom we treat, is a matter of Civil Law, which often also makes either void or revocable acts freely done; on account of infirmity of judgment. And what we have said above, of the force and efficacy of Civil Laws, is to be under- stood as repeated here.
What is the efficacy of an Oath in making promises hold, we shall see below.
VIIL 1 As to what concerns the matter of promises, a condition to produce a perfect promise is, that it is, or may be, in the rightful Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 43 promissio, αὖ supra diximus, vim accipit ex jure promittentis, nec ultra extenditur. Agesilaus de promisso interpellatus re- spondit: vai δῆτα, εἰ δ᾽ ἐστι δίκαιον" εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔλεξα μὲν, ὡμολόγησα δ᾽ οὔ" bene, si justum est: sin ηυΐηλιδ, divi tantum, non et promisi.
2 Quod si res nune non sit in potestate promittentis, sed esse aliquando possit, erit in pendenti efficacia; quia tum promissio facta censeri debet sub conditione, si res in potesta- tem venerit. Quod si conditio, qua res in potestatem pro- missoris venire possit, ipsa quoque sit potestativa, tenebi- tur promissor facere quidquid moraliter:quum est ut ea impleatur.
3 Sed in hoe quoque genere lex civilis utilitatis causa multa irrita solet facere, quz naturaliter obligarent: ut pro- missum futuri matrimonii factum ab eo eave, qui conjugem nune habeat, et non pauca qui a minoribus, aut filiis fami- liarum fiunt.
De Jure Nat. et Gent. Lib. 11r. eap. 7. J. B.
8. De validitate et effectibus Promis- sorum aut pactorum illicitorum fuse et nove egi ad PurENpoRriUM, Ze Jure Nat. et Gentium, dicto Cap. 7. Lib. rrr. Not.2. alterius Editionis. Principiorum autem ibi positorum usum ostendendi, eaque defendendi,in argumento insigni, de Alea nimirum, occasionem postea habui, duabus Epistolis, quz reperiun- tur in JEphemeridibus Eruditorum Pa- risiensibus, Octobr. 1712. et Decembr, 1719. Edit. Amstelod, |J. B.
disposal of the promiser. Whence, first, promises are not valid, to do an aet in itself unlawful; for such a right no one has nor can have. But a promise, as we have said above, receives its force from tho right of the promiser, and cannot be extended further. When Agesi- laus was interrogated concerning a promise which he had made, he said: 7f it be just, well and good: if mot, I said, but I did not promise.
2 Ifthe matter be not now in the power of the promiser, but may at some time be so, the efficacy of the promise will be suspended: because then, the promise must be supposed to be made under the condition, if the thing come into his power. But if the condition under which the thing may come into the power of the promiser, be also potestative [such as he can himself bring about or aecelerate], the promiser is bound to do whatever is morally equitable, in order that the condition may be fulfilled.
3 But in such cases also, the Civil Law is wont to make many things void for the sake of utility, which by Natural Law would be ob- ligatory; as a promise of future marriage, made by a man or woman who has a spouse alive; and not a few things done by minors or sons of families.
Piut. Apoph.
Cajet. 2. 2.
Gen. xxxviii.
41 DE PROMISSIS. [Lis. 11.
IX. Quszri hie solet, an promissio facta ob causam natu- raliter vitiosam ipsa natura valeat, ut si quid promittatur homicidii perpetrandi causa. Hic ipsam promissionem vitio- sam esse satis apparet: in hoc enim adhibetur, ut alter impel- latur ad malum facinus. Sed non quiequid vitiose fit effectu juris earet, quod in prodiga donatione apparet. Hoc interest, quod donatione facta jam cessat vitiositas: nam sine vitio res relinquitur apud donatarium. At in promissis ob causam vitiosam manet vitium, quamdiu non perpetratum est crimen: tamdiu enim impletio ipsa promissi, ut mali illex, labem in se habet, quse cessare incipit peracto crimine. Unde sequitur usque ad id témpus promissionis talis efficaciam esse in pen- denti, ut modo dicebamus in promissa re quz» juris nostri non est: crimine vero perpetrato, jam obligationis vim exseri, qui» ab initio non intrinsecus defuit, sed ab accedente vitio fuit impedita. Ex hujus rei exemplum afferri potest in Juda Jacobi filio, qui Thamari, quam meretricem putabat, pro- missam mercedem, 'tanquam debitam, persolvit. Quod si injustitia promissarii causam promissioni dederit, aut inzequa- Tanquam debitam] Naturascilicet, ^c. xi. n. 2.
secundum cujus legem tunc vivebatur. m Je qua mox videbimus] Cap. xii. Aliter ex jure civili judicavit C. Aqui- — $ 9, 10, 11. lius teste Valerio Maximo, Lib. virr. 9 Confer PureNponRriIUM, De Jure IX. Τὸ is commonly made a question, whether a promise made for a cause naturally vicious is valid by Natural Law; as if any thing be promised for committing homicide. Here it is evident enough that the promise itself is vicious, for it is made that another person may be induced to commit a crime, Βα what is done viciously, is not necessarily void, as to its jural effects; as appears by the case of a prodigal donation. There is however this difference; that when the donation is made, the viciousness ceases: for there is no vice in the thing being left in the hands of the donatary. But in promises made for a vicious cause, the vice remains as long as the crime is not per- petrated: so long, the fulfilment of the promise, as a stimulus to evil, has a taint in it which ceases when the crime is committed. Whence it follows, that up to that time, the efficacy of such a promise is suspended, as we said above, in speaking of promising a thing which is not ours to give: but the crime being perpetrated, the force of the obligation comes into play, having been intrinsically in existence from the first, but barred by the vice which was connected with it. We have an example of this in Judah, who paid to Thamar her hire, deeming her a harlot.
Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 45 litas sit in contractu, hzc quomodo sint resarcienda alia est quasstio, "de qua mox videbimus.
X. Quod vero promittitur ob causam ante debitam, non eo minus debetur, si jus naturale spectemus, secundum ea quz de rei aliene acceptione supra diximus: nam et sine ulla causa promissum naturaliter deberetur. Sed hie quoque damnum per extorsionem datum, aut inzqualitas in contractu reparanda venient, secundum tradendas inferius leges.
XI. Modum promittendi quod attinet, is, ut de dominii translatione diximus, requirit actum externum, id est signum sufficiens voluntatis, quale interdum esse potest nutus, frequen- tius autem vox aut literze.
XII. Sed et per hominem alterum?obligamur, si constet de voluntate nostra qua ilum elegerimus, "ut instrumentum nostrum ad hoe speciatim, aut sub generali notione. Et in: generali przepositione accidere potest, ut nos obliget qui prz- positus est, agendo contra voluntatem nostram sibi soli signifi- catam: quia hie distincti sunt actus volendi: unus quo nos obligamus ratum habituros quiequid ille in tali negotiorum Nat. et Gent. Lib. 11r. cap. 9. J. B. pitio cum jungeret absens, per internun- n Ut instrumentum nostrum] Servius — tios ait, Vide qua supra ad caput vr. ad illud Zzneidos ix. vers. 361. JJos- $2.
But if the wrong of the promisee gave occasion to the promise, or there be an inequality in the contract, how these things are to bo remedied, is another question, hereafter to be considered.
X. What is promised, for ἃ consideration which was due without the promise, is still to be paid, if we look at Natural Law, according to what we have said above of the acceptance of a thing belonging to another. (1. x. 11 and 12.) But here also the damage produced by extortion, or the inequality of the contract, will require to be re- paired, according to rules hereafter to be given.
ΧΙ, As to what concerns the mode of making the promise, that, as we said of the transfer of ownership, requires an external act; that is, a sufficient sign of the will, which sometimes may be a nod, but more frequently, the voice or writing.
XII. We may also be bound by means of another man, if there be clear evidence of our purpose in appointing him as our instrument either for this special purpose, or in ἃ general manner. And in a general appointment, it may happen that the person appointed binds us, when he acts contrary to our will signified to him alone. For here there are two distinct acts of willing: one by which we obliged our- selves to hold valid whatever he does in this kind of business; another, 46 DE PROMISSIS. [118. II.
genere fecerit, alter, quo illum nobis obligamus ut non agat nisi ex przeseripto, sibi non aliis cognito. Quod notandum est ?ad ea, qu: Legati promittunt pro Regibus ex vi instrumenti proeuratorii, exeedendo arcana mandata.
XIIL — Atque hine etiam intelligi potest exercitoriam et institoriam, quz non tam actiones sunt. quam qualitates actio- num, ipso naturali jure niti. Adjiciendum hic est male Roma- nis legibus introductum, ut ex facto magistri exercitores in solidum singuli tenerentur. Nam hoc naturali zequitati con- venit,!qus satis habet si pro suis singuli partibus conveni- antur, nec publice utile est: absterrentur enim homines ab exercendis navibus, si metuant ne ex facto magistri quasi in infinitum teneantur. Atque adeo apud Hollandos, ubi mer- catura pridem maxime viguit, et nunc et olim lex illa Romana observata non est: imo contra, constitutum, ne exercitoria etiam universi amplius teneantur, quam ad cestimationem navis, et, eorum quae in navi sunt. j XIV. Ut autem promissio jus transferat, Paeceptatio hic ? Ad ea que legati promittunt pro regibus ex vi instrumenti procuratorii ercedendo arcana mandaia| Vide ex- emplum apud Marianam xxvii. 19, A- liud apud Guicciardinum, Tom. 1.
At vero qui cum Magistro navis contraxit, censetur non cum hoc vel illo Exercitore, sed cum omnibus in univer- sum contraxisse. Rationi etiam ex utilitate publica petitz, est quod opponi queat, validius forte. Plura diximus in Notis nostris Gallicis, J. B.
in which we put him under an obligation to us, not to act except ac- cording to our directions, known to him and not to others, which is to be noted in those things which Envoys promise for kings in virtue of their written powers, when they go beyond their secret instructions.
XIIL Hence we may understand that an ezercitorian action (one against ship-owners for the contracts of the captain,) and an ínmsti- torian action, (one against the owner of a trading concern for the con- tracts of the acting agent;) depend on Natural Law, being, not so much distinct kinds of action, as qualities of actions. Dut it has been im- properly added by the Roman Law, that all the ship-owners are bound severally, as well as jointly, by the acts of the captain. "This is nei- ther in accordance with natural equity, which is satisfied if each owner is responsible for his own share; nor useful to the publie; for persons are deterred from sending adventures in ships, if they are in fear that they may be indefinitely involved by the acts of the captain. And therefore in Holland, where commerce has long flourished, that Roman law neither prevailed formerly, nor does now; on the contrary, it is the law that, in an exercitorian action, even the whole body of owners are not held responsible, beyond the value of the ship and cargo.
Car. ΧΙ] DE PROMISSIS. 47 non minus quam in dominii translatione requiritur,?ita tamen ut hie quoque przecedens rogatio durare intelligatur, ac vim habere aeceptationis. Nec obstat quod de pollicitationibus faetis civitati jure civili est proditum: qua ratio quosdam induxit, ut jure naturz solum promittentis actum sufficere judiearent: nam lex Romana non hoc dicit, ante acceptationem pollieitationis plenam esse vim; sed revocari vetat, ?ut acceptari semper possit: qui effectus non est naturalis, sed mere legitimus: cui non dissimile est quod pro infan- tibus et amentibus jus gentium introduxit. Nam pro his, ut possidendi res quze possessione quaeruntur, ita et acceptandi animum jus supplet.
XV. Illud etiam quzri solet, an satis sit acceptationem fieri; an vero etiam innotescere debeat promissori, antequam promissio plenum effectum consequatur. Et certum est utro- que modo fieri posse promissionem, aut hoc modo: volo, ut valeat si acceptetur; aut hoc modo: volo, ut valeat si accep- tatum intellexero. Et in his quidem qu: ad mutuam perti- P Zcceptatio hic non minus quam in PurzNponr. de Jure Nat, et Gent. Lib.
lianus, ut Jurisperitus, libro de Jejuniis: 4 Ut acceptari semper possit] Vide Votum cum a Deo acceptatum est, legem — similem legem Wisigotthorum, Lib. v. in posterum facit. (Cap. xi.) Tit. ii. cap. 6.
? De hoe jure.4ccepíationis vide XIV. In order that a promise may transfer a right, acceptance is required here no less than in the transfer of ownership; but in such a way that here also a precedent asking is understood to remain in force, and to have the effect of acceptance. Nor is this contradicted by what is appointed in the Civil Law, that offers made to the Public are binding; which reason has induced some persons to judge that by the Law of Nature, the act of the promiser alone suffices: for the Roman Law does not say this, that the force of such an offer or pollicitation is complete before acceptance; but it forbids it to be recalled, so that it may always be accepted: which effect is not a result of Natural Law, but of Civil Law; very similar to what the jus gentium has intro- duced concerning infants and idiots. For with regard to such persons, both the purpose of taking possession of things which require such a step, and the purpose of acceptance when that is required, are supplied by the law.
XV. The question is also raised, whether it is sufficient that acceptance is made, or whether it must be notified to the promiser before the promise receives its full effect. And it is certain that a promise may be made either way: and also in this way: I desire that L. qui abs. 38. prin. D. Acq. Poss. Gom. Tom.
Molin. Disp. Vid. hoc Lib.
cap. iii. ὃ 6.
quis alt. vel sibi. L. 4. D. de Man. Vind.
Reg. Jur.
Clar. Lib. iv.
48 DE PROMISSIS. [1118. II.
nent obligationem, posterior sensus praesumitur:?in promissis vero mere liberalibus potius est ut prior sensus credatur ad- fuisse, nisi aliud appareat.
XVI. Sequitur hine, ante acceptationem, quippe jure nondum translato, revocari promissum posse sine injustitia, imo et sine inconstantia, si revera eo animo faetum sit, ut ab acceptatione demum valere incipiat. evocari etiam posse mortuo ante acceptationem eo cui promissum erat, quia vide- tur acceptatio in arbitrium ipsius collata, non heredum. Aliud enim est velle dare huie jus ad heredes transiturum, "aliud velle dare heredibus: multum enim refert in quem beneficium conferatur. Et hoc est quod Neratius respondit, non videri sibi principem quod ei, quem vivere existimabat, concessisset, defuncto concessisse.
XVII. 1 Poterit etiam revocari mortuo eo qui lectus erat voluntatis internuncius; quia in illius verbis posita fuerat obligatio. Aliud in tabellario, qui non est instrumentum obli- gationis, sed perlator instrumenti obligatori. Itaque literze 3 Contrarium mihi verius videtur. r Aliud est velle dare heredibus] Ideo Fuse dicemus, Deo dante, in Notis Gal- — ad vitandum ambiguum dici solebat: lieis ad hunc locum. J. 8. llli liberisque ejus. Servius ad rx.
it be valid, if accepted: or in this manner: I desire that it be valid, if I shall understand that it has been accepted. And in matters which regard mutual obligation, the latter sense is presumed: but in promises merely liberal, the former meaning rather is supposed to prevail, except the contrary appear, [Barbeyrac dissents from this. ] XVI. Hence it follows, that before acceptance, since the right has not yet been transferred, a promise can be recalled without injustice, and even without inconstancy, if it were really made with the inten- tion that it should begin to be valid on aeceptance. Also a promise - may be revoked, if the promisee die before acceptance: because the acceptance seemed to be referred to the promiser himself, not his heirs. For it is one thing to wish to give a right which will pass to the heirs; another thing to wish to give it to the heirs: foritmakesa great difference on whom the benefit is conferred. And this was Nerat's answer, that he did not think that the prince had conceded to a person defunct what he had conceded to him supposing him alive.
XVII. 1 A promise may also be revoked by the death of him who was chosen to declare to the promisee the promisers will; for the obligation ended in his words. The case is different in a mes- senger who carries letters merely, and who is not the instrument of Car. XI] DE PROMISSIS. 49 consensus indiees per quemvis perferri poterunt. Distinguen- dum quoque inter ministrum, qui eleetus est ut promissio- nem significet, et inter eum, qui electus est ut ipse promittat. Priore « casu revocatio vim suam habebit, etiamsi ministro non innotuerit: altero vero irrita erit revocatio; quia jus pro- mittendi ab ipsius voluntate pendebat, quae voluntas necdum cognita revocatione omni culpa vacabat. Sic etiam priore casu?mortuo donatore poterit acceptari donatio, ut perfecta 1 ab una parte, quanquam revocabiliter: quod apertius in lega- " tis conspicere est: altero casu non poterit, quia non facta est, sed mandata fieri.
2 In dubio autem mandantis voluntas fuisse censetur, ut impleatur mandatum, nisi magna mutatio inciderit, qualis est mors mandantis. Possunt tamen suppetere conjecturz; quz aliud judieandum suadeant, qus» facile admittendz sunt, ut a subsistat quod pia de causa dari mandatum est. Ac simili modo definiri potest agitata olim controversia, an in here- dem mandati detur actio, qua de re aliud M. Drusum pr:seto- ZEneidos. (vers. 802.) "Vide et legem —— donatio] Vide librum de T'enuris Anglie, Wisigotthorum Lib. v. tit. xi. c. 6. cap. 7. * Mortuo donatore poterit acceptari the obligation, but the carrier of the obligatory instrument; therefore letters indicating consent may be carried by any one. "We must distinguish also between a minister who is elected to make known the promise, and him who is elected to make the promise. In the former case, the revocation will have its force, even if it do not become known to the minister: in the other case, the revocation is void, because the right of promising was dependent on the will of the minister or agent, which will, the revocation not being yet known, was free from all fault. So also in the former case, the donation may be accepted, even the donor being dead; as being perfect on one side, although revocably: as may be seen on a large scale in ambassadors: in the other case, the donation cannot be aecepted, because it was not really made, but only ordered to be made.
2 But in a doubtful case, the will of the person who gives the order is understood to be, that the order be fulfilled, except some great change take place, as the death of the person ordering. But there may be conjectures which may favour another judgment, which are readily to be admitted, in order that a donation which was directed to be made for ἃ pious cause may subsist. And in like manner may a controversy be decided which was once agitated, whether an action will hold against the heir of a person entrusted with such a charge, [cRor. rr.]: He 3 Mand. Marian.
L. dE Amb. de Don.
o Lib. i, L. Si Pat. 4. D. de Man. Vind.
Alex. Cons. et ibi Car. Mol.
50 DE PROMISSIS. [118. II.
rem, aliud Sextum Julium edixisse refert scriptor ad Heren- nium lib. ir.
XVIII. 1 Solent et controversie incidere de accepta- tione *pro altero facta: in quibus distinguendum est inter promissionem mihi factam de re danda alteri, et inter pro- missionem in ipsius nomen collatam cui res danda est. Si mihi facta est promissio, omissa inspectione an mea privatim intersit, quam introduxit jus Romanum, naturaliter videtur mihi acceptanti jus dari efficiendi, ut ad alterum jus perveniat, Si et is acceptet: ita ut medio tempore a promissore pro- missio revocari non possit; sed ego cui facta est promissio eam possim remittere. Nam is sensus Juri natur: non re- pugnat, et verbis talis promissionis maxime congruit: neque nihil mea interest si per me alter beneficium acquirat.
2 Quod si promissio in nomen ejus collata est cui danda res est, distinguendum est, an qui acceptat, aut speciale man- datum habeat aeceptandi, aut ita generale, ut talis acceptatio ei inclusa censeri debeat: an vero non habeat. Ubi man- 4^ Confer PureNpoRrIUM, De Jure | quomodo acceptatio fuerit, quz» tamen Nat. et Gent. Lib.11. cap. 9. ὃ 4, 5. — nullum jus detacceptanti. Revera heic cum Notis nostris. J. 8. est tantum nuda pollicitatio, ut Auctor 5 Diffieile admodum est intellectu, ^ vocat supra, S3. et quidem quz» nullum on which subject M. Drusus the przetor and Sextus Julius gave dif- ferent edicts.
XVIIL 1 Also controversies often occur respecting aeceptance made for another: in which a distinction is to be made between a promise made to me, to give a thing to another, and ἃ promise con- veyed in the name of him to whom the thing is to be given. If the pro- mise is made to me, omitting the consideration whether the performance of the promise is to my private interest, (which was introduced by the Roman law,) it seems, by the Law of Nature, that I acquire the right of effecting, by my acceptance, that the right promised pass to the other person: so that in the intermediate time the promise cannot be revoked by the promiser; but 1, to whom the promise was made, have power to remit it. For that sense is not repugnant to Natural Law, and agrees best with the words of such a promise: nor is it a matter uninteresting to me, that a person should acquire a benefit through me.
2 But if the promise be conveyed in his name to whom the thing is to be given, it is to be distinguished whether he who accepts has either a special mandate to accept, or a commission so general that such aeceptanee may be included in it; or have not such com- Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS, 51 datum tale antecessit, distinguendum ultra non puto, sitne per- sona sui juris necne, quod Roman: leges volunt, sed plane ex tali acceptatione promissionem perfici: quia consensus potest et per ministrum interponi ac significarl. Velle enim censeor quod in alterius voluntate posui, si et ille velit. — Deficiente autem mandato, si alius cui promissio facta non est, acceptet, volente promissore, tunc is erit effectus, ut promissorl revo- care promissionem non liceat, antequam is, quem spectat pro- missio, eam ratam habuerit aut irritam: sic tamen, ut medio illo tempore is, qui acceptavit, remittere promissum non possit, quia hie non adhibitus est ad jus aliquod accipiendum, ὃ 564 ad adstringendam promissoris fidem in sustentando beneficio: ita ut promissor ipse si revocet faciat contra fidem, non contra jus proprium alicujus.
XIX. Ex superioribus intelligi etiam potest, quid senti- endum sit de onere adjecto promissioni Id enim fieri poterit quamdiu promissio completa nondum est per acceptationem, nec.fide interposita facta irrevocabilis: — Onus autem in compotest habere effectum, antequam is, ceptatio requiratur, si promissio imper- quem spectat promissio, eam ratam ha- fecta postea in perfectam mutetur. buerit: quum in pollicitatione facta illi — Plura diximus in Notis Gallicis ad hunc ipsi, quem spectat, nulla alia hujus ac- — locum. J. E.
mission. When such a mandate has proceeded, I do not think that any further distinction is to be made, (as the Roman Laws direct,) whether the person be his own master or not, but that by such acceptance the promise becomes perfect: because consent may be given and signified by a minister. For I am supposed to wish what I have put in the power of another, if he too wishes it. But, failing such a mandate, if another, to whom the promise was not made, accepts, the promiser being willing, the effect will then be this; that the promiser will not have power to revoke his promise, before he whom the promise concerns, has determined that it shall be valid or invalid: but so that, in the intermediate time, he who has accepted the promise cannot remit it, because he was not employed to receive any right, but to bind the good faith of the promiser in maintaining ἃ proposed benefit: so that the promiser, if he revoke, acts against good faith, but not against the right of any one.
XIX. From what has been said, it may be collected what is to be decided concerning a burthen added to a promise. For this may be done, so long as the promise is not yet completed by accept- ance, nor made irrevocable by an especial engagement. But a bur- then, added for the convenience of a third party, may be revoked, as L. Perf. 4. C. deDonat. quc sub modo. Bart. in I. Qui Rome.
ὃ Εἴαυ. de Verb. Oblig.
Navar. c. 22. Lib. iii. Sanc. l. ii. de Mat. Disp. Sonia.
52 DE PROMISSIS. [{18. II.
modum tertii adjectum promissioni revocari poterit, quamdiu à tertio acceptatum non erit: quanquam non desunt tam in hac quam in aliis quzestionibus qui secus sentiant. Sed recte rem inspiclenti facile elucet naturalis zequitas, ut multis pro- bationibus non egeat.