Are, therefore, the Gods separated from dae- mons, through the former being incorporeal, but the latter corporeal? If, however, the Gods are incorporeal alone, how will the sun and moon, and the visible celestials, be Gods?
How, likewise, are some of the Gods benefi- cent, but others malefic?
What is it that connects the Gods in the heavens that have bodies, with the incorporeal Gods?
4 AA'hat is it that distinguishes daemons from the visible and invisible Gods, since the visible are connected with the invisible Gods?
In what do a daemon, hero, and soul, differ from each other? Is it in essence, or in power, or in energy?
What is the indication of a God, or angel, or archangel, or daemon, or a certain archon, or soul being present? For to speak boastingly, and to exhibit a phantasm of a certain quality, is common to Gods and daemons, and to all the more excellent genera. So that the genus of Gods will in no respect be better than that of daemons.
Since the ignorance of, and deception about, divine natures is impiety and impurity, but a scientific knowledge of the Gods is holy and beneficial, the ignorance of things honourable and beautiful will be darkness, but the know- ledge of them will he light. And the former, indeed, will fill men with all evils, through the want of erudition, and through audacity; but the latter will be the cause to them of every good. [I wish you, therefore, to unfold to me the truth respecting these particulars.^'] [And, in the first place, I wish you to explain * Gale has omitted to give the original of the sentence contained in the brackets; the translation of which I have added from the answer of lamblichus to this epistle.
5 to me distinctly^'] what that is which is effected in divination? For we frequently obtain a knowledge of future events through dreams, when we are asleep; not being, at that time, in a tumultuous ecstasy, for the body is then quiescent; but we do not apprehend what then takes place, in the same manner as when we are awake.
But many, through enthusiasm and divine inspiration, predict future events, and are then in so wakeful a state, as even to energize according to sense, and yet they are not con- scious of the state they are in, or at least, not so much as they were before.
Some also of those who suffer a mental alienation, energize enthusiastically on hearing cymbals or drums, or a certain modulated sound, such as those who are Corybantically inspired, those who are possessed by Sabazius, and those who are inspired by the mother of the Gods. But some energize enthusiastically by drinking water, as the priest of Clarius, in Colophon; others, by being seated at the mouth of a cavern, as those who prophesy at Delphi; and others by imbibing the vapour from water, as the prophetesses in Branchidse. Some also become enthusiastic by standing on * Here also the original is omitted by Gale, and the translation of it is given by me from the text of lamblichus.
6 characters, as those that are filled from the in- tromission of spirits. Others, who are con- scious what they are doing in other respects, are divinely inspired according to the phan- tastic part; some, indeed, receiving darkness for a cooperator, others certain potions, but others incantations and compositions: and some energize, according to the imagination, through water; others in a wall, others in the open air, and others in the sun, or in some other of the celestial bodies. Some also esta- blish the art of the investigation of futurity through the viscera, through birds, and through the stars.
I likewise ask concerning the mode of divi- nation, what it is, and what the quality by which it is distinguished \ All diviners, indeed, assert, that they obtain a foreknowledge of future events through Gods or daemons, and that it is not possible for any others to know that which is future, than those who are the lords of futurity. I doubt, therefore, whether divinity is so far subservient to men, as not to be averse to some becoming diviners from meal.
But, concerning the causes of divination, it is dubious whether a God, an angel, or a daemon, or some other power, is present in manifesta- tions, or divinations, or certain other sacred 7 energies, as is the case with those powers that are drawn down through you [priests] by the necessities with which invocation is attended.
Or does the soul assert and imagine these things, and are they, as some think, the pas- sions of the soul, excited from small incen- tives?
Or is a certain mixed form of subsistence produced from our soul, and divine inspiration externally derived?
Hence it must be said, that the soul gene- rates the power which has an imaginative per- ception of futurity, through motions of this kind, or that the things which are adduced from matter constitute dsemons, through the powers that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from the matter which is taken from animals.
For in sleep, when we are not employed about any thing, we sometimes obtain a know- ledge of the future.
But that a passion of the soul is the cause of divination, is indicated by this, that the senses are occupied, that fumigations are introduced, and that invocations are employed; and like- wise, that not all men, but those that are more simple and young, are more adapted to pre- diction.
The ecstasy, also, of the reasoning power is 8 the cause of divination, as is likewise the mania which happens in diseases, or mental aberra- tion, or a sober and vigilant condition, or suffu- sions of the body, or the imaginations excited by diseases, or an ambiguous state of mind, such as that which takes place between a sober condition and ecstasy, or the imaginations arti- ficially procured by enchantment.
Nature, likewise, art, and the sympathy of things in the universe, as if they were the parts of one animal, contain premanifestations of certain things with reference to each other. And bodies are so prepared, that there is a presignification of some by others, which is clearly indicated by the works performed in predicting what is future. For those who in- voke the divinities for this purpose, have about them stones and herbs, bind certain sacred bonds, which they also dissolve, open places that are shut, and change the deliberate inten- tions of the recipients, so as from being de- praved to render them worthy, though they were before depraved. Nor are the artificers of efficacious images to be despised. For they observe the motion of the celestial bodies, and can tell from the concurrence of what star with a certain star or stars, predictions will be true or false; and also whether the things that are performed will be inanities, or significant 9 and efficacious, though no divinity or daemon is drawn down by these images.
But there are some who suppose that there is a certain obedient genus of daemons, which is naturally fraudulent, omniform, and various, and which assumes the appearance of Gods and daemons, and the souls of the deceased; and that through these every thing which ap- pears to he either good or evil is effected; for they are not able to contribute any thing to true goods, such as those of the soul, nor to have any knowledge of them, but they abuse, deride, and frequently impede those who are striving to be virtuous. They are likewise full of pride, and rejoice in vapours and sacrifices.
Jugglers likewise fraudulently attack us in many ways, through the ardour of the expec- tations which they raise.
It very much indeed perplexes me to under- stand how superior beings, when invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their inferiors; and they think it requisite that he who worships them should be just, but when they are called upon to act unjustly, they do not refuse so to act. Though the Gods, likewise, do not hear him who in- vokes them, if he is impure from venereal con- nexions, yet, at the same time, they do not re- fuse to lead any one to illegal venery.
10 10 [I am likewise dubious with respect to sacri- fices, what utility or power they possess in the universe, and with the Gods, and on what account they are performed, appropriately in- deed, to the powers who are honoured by them, but usefully to those by whom the gifts are olffered.*] Why also do the interpreters of prophecies and oracles think it requisite that they should abstain from animals, lest the Gods should be polluted by the vapours arising from them; and yet the Gods are especially allured by the vapours of animals?
Why is it requisite that the inspector [who presides over sacred rites] ought not to touch a dead body, though most sacred operations are performed through dead bodies? And why, which is much more absurd than this, are threats employed and false terrors, by any casual person, not to a dsemon, or some de- parted soul, but to the sovereign Sun himself, or to the Moon, or some one of the celestial Gods, in order to compel these divinities to speak the truth? For does not he who says that he will burst the heavens, or unfold the * The paragraph within the brackets is omitted in the original; but I have supplied it from the following answer of lamblichus to this Epistle. This omission is not noticed by Gale.
11 secrets of Isis, or point out the arcanum in the adytum, or stop Baris, or scatter the members of Osiris to Typhon, [or that he will do some- thing else of the like kind *], does not he who says this, by thus threatening what he neither knows nor is able to effect, prove himself to be stupid in the extreme? And what abjectness does it not produce in those who, like very silly children, are possessed with such vain fear, and are terrified at such fictions? And yet Chaeremon, who was a sacred scribe, writes these things, as disseminated by the Egyptians. It is also said, that these, and things of the like kind, are of a most compulsive nature.
What also is the meaning of those mystic narrations which say that a certain divinity is unfolded into light from mire, that he is seated above the lotus, that he sails in a ship, and that he changes his forms every hour, accord- ing to the signs of the zodiac? For thus, they say, he presents himself to the view, and thus ignorantly adapt the peculiar passion of their owm imagination to the God himself. But if these things are asserted symbolically, being symbols of the powers of this divinity, I re- quest an interpretation of these symbols. For * Here likewise the words within the brackets, which are omitted in the original, are added from lamblichus; but the omission is not noticed by Gale.
12 it is evident, that if these are similar to passions of the Sun, when he is eclipsed, they would be seen by all men who intently survey the God.
What also is the design of names that are without signification? and why, of such, are those that are barbaric preferred to our own? For if he who hears them looks to their signifi- cation, it is sufilcient that the conception re- mains the same, whatever the words may be that are used. For he who is invoked is not of the Egyptian race; nor, if he was an Egyp- tian, does he use the Egyptian, or, in short, any human language. For either all these are the artificial contrivances of enchanters, and veils originating from our passions, which rumour ascribes to a divine nature; or we ignorantly frame conceptions of divinity, contrary to its real mode of subsistence.
I likewise wish you to unfold to me, what the Egyptians conceive the fii'st cause to be; whether intellect, or above intellect? whether alone, or subsisting with some other or others? whether incorporeal, or corporeal; and whether it is the same with the Demiurgus, or prior to the Demiurgus? Likewise, whether all things are from one principle, or from many prin- ciples? whether the Egyptians have a know- ledge of matter, or of primary corporeal quali- ties; and whether they admit matter to be 13 imbegotten, or to be generated? For Chsere- mon, indeed, and others, do not think there is any thing else prior to the visible worlds; but in the beginning of their writings on this sub- ject, admit the existence of the Gods of the Egyptians, but of no others, except what are called the planets, the Gods that give com- pletion to the zodiac, and such as rise together with these; and likewise, the sections into decans, and the horoscopes. They also admit the existence of what are called the powerful leaders, whose names are to be found in the calendars, together with their ministrant offices, their risings and settings, and their significations of future events. For Chseremon saw that what those who say that the sun is the Demi- nrgus, and likewise what is asserted concern- ing Osiris and Isis, and all the sacred fables, may be resolved into the stars and the phases, occultations and risings of these, or into the in- crements or decrements of the moon, or into the course of the sun, or the nocturnal and diurnal hemisphere, or into the river [Nile]. And, in short, the Egyptians resolve all things into physical, and nothing into incorporeal and living essences. Most of them likewise sus- pend that which is in our power from the motion of the. stars; and bind all things, though I know not how, with the indissoluble bonds 14 of necessity, which they call fate. They also connect fate with the Gods; whom, neverthe- less, they worship in temples and statues, and other things, as the only dissolvers of fate.
Concerning the peculiar deemon, it must be inquired how he is imparted by the lord of the geniture, and according to what hind of efflux, or life, or power, he descends from him to us? And also, whether he exists, or does not exist? And whether the invention of the lord of the geniture is impossible, or possible? For if it is possible he is happy, who having learned the scheme of his nativity, and knowing his proper daemon, becomes liberated from fate.
The canons, also, of genethliology [or predic- tion from the natal day] are innumerable and incomprehensible. And the knowledge of this mathematical science cannot be obtained; for there is much dissonance concerning it, and Chseremon and many others have written against it. But the discovery of the lord, or lords, of the geniture, if there are more than one in a nativity, is nearly granted by astrolo- gers themselves to he unattainable, and yet they say that on this the knowledge of the proper dsemon depends.
Farther still, I wish to know whether the peculiar dsemon rules over some one of the parts in us? For it appears to certain persons.
15 that daemons preside over the parts of our body, so that one is the guardian of health, another of the form of the body, and another of the corporeal habits, and that there is one daemon who presides in common over all these. And again, that one daemon presides over the body, another over the soul, and another over the intellect; and that some of them are good, but others bad.
I am also dubious whether this daemon is not a certain part of the soul, [such, foi; instance, as the intellectual part;] and if so, he will be happy who has a wise intellect.
I see likewise, that there is a twofold worship of the peculiar daemon; the one being the worship as of two, hut the other as of three. By all men, however, the daemon is called upon by a common invocation.
I farther ask, whether there is a certain other latent way to felicity, separate from the Gods? And I am dubious whether it is requi- site to look to human opinions in divine divi- nation and theurgy? And whether the soul does not devise great things from casual cir- cumstances? Moreover, there are certain other methods which are conversant with the predic- tion of future events. And, perhaps, those who possess divine divination, foresee indeed what will happen, yet are not on this account 16 16 happy; for they foresee future events, but do not know how to use this knowledge properly. I wish, therefore, that you would point out to me the path to felicity, and show me in what the essence of it consists. For with us [Greeks] there is much verbal contention about it, be- cause we form a conjecture of good from human reasonings. But by those who have devised the means of associating with beings more ex- cellent than man, if the investigation of this subject is omitted, wisdom will be professed by them in vain; as they will only disturb a divine - intellect about the discovery of a fugitive slave, or the purchase of land, or, if it should so happen, about marriage, or merchandize. And if they do not omit this subject, but assert what is most true about other things, yet say nothing that is stable and worthy of belief about felicity, in consequence of employing themselves about things that are difficult, but useless to man- kind; in this case, they will not be conversant either with Gods or good daemons, but with that daemon who is called fraudulent; or, if this is not admitted, the whole will be the in- vention of men, and the fiction of a mortal nature.
SambUcIjus* on tlje jffilsstctics, ^c.
THE ANSWER OF THE PRECEPTOR ABAMMON TO THE EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY TO ANEBO, AND A SOLUTION OF THE DOUBTS CONTAINED IN IT.
SECTION I.
CHAP. I.
Hermes, the God who presides over language, was formerly very properly considered as com- mon to all priests; and the power who pre- sides over the true science concerning the Gods * The following testimony of an anonymous Greek writer, prefixed to the manuscript of this treatise, which Gale pub- lished, proves that this work was written by lamblichus: IcTTCov OTt o <^tAocro(^os Hpo/cAos VTro^vrjixari^iov ras rov fieyoXov IIAojTtvou evveaSas, Aeyei on o avnypa^wi/ €ts ttjv C 18 is one and the same in the whole of things. Hence our ancestors dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to this deity, inscribing all their own writings with the name of Hermes. If, therefore, we participate of a portion of this God, adapted and commensurate to our powers, you do well to propose your theological doubts to the priests, as friends, and to make these doubts known to them. I also very properly conceiving that the epistle sent to my disciple Anebo was written to me, shall give you a true answer to your inquiries. For it would not be becoming, that Pythagoras and Plato, De- mocritus and Eudoxus, and many other of TrpoKciixevrjv rov UopcfivpLov eTri’^oX'qv, o decnrecTLOS e«3’tv la/i- l3Xi)(^os’ Kai 8ta TO T7]s v7To0e(re(ji^ olkslov Kat aKoXovOov^ vTroKpi- verai TTpoccoTrov Kiyvimov tivos AjSapuDvos' aXXa Kai to ttjs Ae^ews KO/i/xaTtKov Kat a<f>opL'^iKov, Kat to to)v evvouov irpaypua- riKov, Kai yXacfivpov, Kai evOovv, p^aprypei tov JlpoKXov KaAws Kai Kpivavra, Kai i^oprjcravra, i. e. “ It is requisite to know that the philosopher Proclus,inhisCommentar3. on the Enne- ads of the great Plotinus, says that it is the divine lamblichus who answers the prefixed Epistle of Porphyry, and who as- sumes the person of a certain Egyptian of the name of Abam- mon, through the affinity and congruity of the hypothesis. And, indeed, the conciseness and definiteness of the diction, and the efficacious, elegant, and divine nature of the concep- tions, testify that the decision of Proclus is just.” That this, indeed, was the opinion of Proclus, is evident from a passage in his Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato, which has escaped the notice of Gale, and which the reader will find in a note on the fourth chapter of the eighth section of the following translation.
19 19 the ancient Greeks, should have obtained ap- propriate instruction from the sacred scribes of their time, but that you who are our con- temporary, and think conformably to those ancients, should be frustrated of your wish by those who are now living, and who are called common preceptors. I, therefore, thus betake myself to the present discussion; and do you, if you please, conceive that the same person to whom you sent the letter returns you an answer. Or, if it should seem fit to you, admit it to be me who discourses with you in writing, or some other prophet of the Egyptians, for this is of no consequence. Or, which I think is still better, dismiss the consideration whether the speaker is an inferior or a superior character, but direct yoiir attention to what is said, so as readily to excite your mind to survey whether what is. asserted is true or false.
In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of the proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and quality of them. And, in the next place, we shall show from what theologies the doubts are assumed, and according to what sciences they are in- vestigated. For some things that are badly confused, require a certain distinction; others are conversant with the cause through which 20 20 they subsist, and are apprehended; others, which we propose according to a certain con- trariety, draw our decision on both sides; and some things require from us the whole develop- ment of mystic doctrines. Such, therefore, being the nature of the subjects of discussion, they are assumed from many places, and from different sciences. For some things introduce animadversions from what the wise men of the Chaldeans have delivered; others produce ob- jections from what the prophets of the Egyp- tians teach; and there are some that, adhering to the theory of philosophers, make inquiries conformably to them. There are now like- wise some, that from other opinions, which do not deserve to be mentioned, elicite a certain dubitation; and others originate from the com- mon conceptions of mankind. These things, therefore, are of themselves variously disposed, and are multiformly connected with each other. Hence, through all these causes, a certain dis- cussion is requisite for the management of them in a becoming manner.
21 CHAP. II.
21 CHAP. II.
We shall, therefore, deliver to you the peculiar dogmas of the Assyrians; and also clearly develop to you our own opinions; collecting some things from the infinite writings of the ancients, but others from those particulars which were comprehended by the ancients in one treatise, and pertain to the whole know- ledge of divine natures. If also you should propose any philosophic inquiry, we shall dis- cuss it for you, according to the ancient pillars of Hermes, which Plato and Pythagoras knew before, and from thence constituted their phi- losophy. But such things as exhibit foreign inquiries, or which are contradictory and con- tentious, we shall assist mildly and aptly, or we shall demonstrate their absurdity. Such, likewise, as proceed conformably to common conceptions, we shall endeavour to discuss in a way perfectly known and clear. And things, indeed, which require the experience of divine operations to an accurate knowledge of them, we shall explain, as far as this is possible to be effected by words alone; but such as are * In the original Kara ras Kotvas cvvotas, which Gale erroneously translates contra communes opiniones.
22 full of intellectual theory, we shall develop with a view to the purification of the soul. But indications of this theory worthy of notice may be mentioned, by which it is possible for you, and those who resemble you, to be con- ducted by intellect to the essence of [real] beings. And with respect to such things as become known by a reasoning process, we shall leave no one of these without a perfect demonstration. But in all things we shall give to each that which is appropriate. And such questions, indeed, as are theological, we shall answer theologically; such as are the- urgic, theurgically; but such as are philosophi- cal, we shall, in conjunction with you, philo- sophically explore. Of these, also, such as extend to first causes, we shall unfold into light, by following them conformably to first principles. But such as pertain to morals, or to ends, we shall fitly discuss, according to the ethical mode. And, in a similar manner, we shall examine other things methodically and appropriately. Let us, therefore, now betake ourselves to your inquiries.
/ I 23 CHAP. III.
In the first place, therefore, you say, “ it must he granted that there are Gods.” Thus to speak, however, is not right on this subject. For an innate knowledge of the Gods is co- existent with our very essence; and this know- ledge is superior to all judgment and deliberate choice, and subsists prior to reason and de- monstration. It is also counited from the be- ginning with its proper cause, and is consub- sistent with the essential tendency of the soul to the good. If, indeed, it be requisite to speak the truth, the contact with divinity is not know- ledge. For knowledge is in a certain respect separated [from its object] by otherness.^' But prior to the knowledge, which as one thing knows another, is the uniform connexion with divinity, and which is suspended from the Gods, is spontaneous and inseparable from them. Hence, it is not proper to grant this, as * Damascius apywv says, "that difference not ex- isting, there will not be knowledge.” And, " that the con- tact as of one with one is above knowledge.” Likewise, " that the intellectual perception of the first intelligible is without any difference or distinction. ere/ooTr^ros fir] ova-rjSy fi-qSe yvuKTts Et crvva<^rj cos cvos tt/dos ev, virep yvcocrcv.
Alibi, aSia/cpiTos rj tov tt/jcotou votjtov votjctcs.
24 if it might not be granted, nor to admit it as ambiguous (for it is always unically established in energy); nor are we worthy thus to explore it, as if we had sufficient authority to approve or reject it. For we are comprehended in it, or rather we are filled by it, and we possess that very thing which we are, [or by which our essence is characterized] in knowing the Gods.
I shall likewise say the same thing to you, concerning the more excellent genera that fol- low the Gods, I mean dsemons, heroes, and undefiled souls.* For it is necessary to under- stand respecting these, that there is always in them one definite reason of essence, and to remove from them the indefiniteness and in- stability of the human condition. It is like- wise requisite to separate from them that in- * Between souls that always abide on high ^vith purity, such as the souls of essential heroes, and those that de- scend into the regions of mortality, and are defiled Avuth vice, such as the souls of the greater part of mankind, the class of middled souls subsists. These descend into the realms of generation, partly from that necessity by which all human souls are, at times, drawn down to the earth, and partly for the benevolent pui-pose of benefiting those of an inferior class. But they descend without being defiled with vice. They are also called heroes, Kara crx^o-iv, i. e. accord- ing to habitude, in order to distinguish them from essential heroes. And, in the Pythagoric Golden Verses, they are denominated the terrestrial heroes.
I t clination to one side of an argument rather than another, arising from the equilibrium of a reasoning process. For a thing of this kind is foreign from the principles of reason and life, I and rather tends to secondary natures, and to such things as pertain to the power and contra- riety of generation. But it is necessary that the more excellent genera should be appre- hended uniformly.
The connascent perception, therefore, of the perpetual attendance of the Gods, will be assimilated to them. Hence, as they have an existence which is always invariably the same, thus also the human soul is conjoined to them by knowledge, according to a same- ness of subsistence; by no means pursuing through conjecture, or opinion, or a syllo- gistic process, all which originate in time, an essence which is above all these, but through the pure and blameless intellections which the soul received from eternity from the Gods, be- coming united to them. You, however, seem to think, that there is the same knowledge of divine natures as of any thing else, and that one thing, rather than another, may be granted from opposites, in the same manner as it is usual to do in dialectic discussions. There is, however, no similitude whatever between the two kinds of knowledge. For the knowledge of divine natures is different from that of other 26 26 tilings, and is separated from all opposition. It likewise neither subsists in being now granted, or in becoming to be, but was from eternity, uniformly consubsistent with the soul. And thus much I say to you concerning the first principle in us, from which it is necessary those should begin who speak or hear any thing about the natures that are superior to us.
CHAP. lY.
With respect to your inquiry, “ what the 'pecu- liarities are in each of the tnore excellent genera, hy ivhich they are separated from each other f if you understand by peculiarities the specific differences under the same genus, which are distinguished by opposite qualities, as the rational and irrational under animal; we by no means admit peculiarities of this kind, in things which neither have one common essence, nor an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from something common, which is indefinite, and defines the peculiarity. But if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in prior and secondary natures, differing in their whole essence and whole genus, a certain simple con- dition of being, definite in itself; in this case.
27