[71] In order to be justified in claiming universal assent for an aesthetical judgement that rests merely on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume, (1) that the subjective conditions of the Judgement, as regards the relation of the cognitive powers thus put into activity to a cognition in general, are the same in all men. This must be true, because otherwise men would not be able to communicate their representations or even their knowledge. (2) The judgement must merely have reference to this relation (consequently to the _formal condition_ of the Judgement) and be pure, _i.e._ not mingled either with concepts of the Object or with sensations, as determining grounds.
If there has been any mistake as regards this latter condition, then there is only an inaccurate application of the privilege, which a law gives us, to a particular case; but that does not destroy the privilege itself in general.
[72] [Kant lays down these three maxims in his _Introduction to Logic_, § vii., as “general rules and conditions of the avoidance of error.”]
[73] We soon see that although enlightenment is easy _in thesi_, yet _in hypothesi_ it is difficult and slow of accomplishment. For not to be passive as regards Reason, but to be always self-legislative, is indeed quite easy for the man who wishes only to be in accordance with his essential purpose, and does not desire to know what is beyond his Understanding. But since we can hardly avoid seeking this, and there are never wanting others who promise with much confidence that they are able to satisfy our curiosity, it must be very hard to maintain in or restore to the mind (especially the mind of the public) that bare negative which properly constitutes enlightenment.
[74] We may designate Taste as _sensus communis aestheticus_, common Understanding as _sensus communis logicus_.
[75] [Peter Camper (1722-1789), a celebrated naturalist and comparative anatomist; for some years professor at Groningen.]
[76] In my country a common man, if you propose to him such a problem as that of Columbus with his egg, says, _that is not art, it is only science_. _I.e._ if we _know_ how, we can _do_ it; and he says the same of all the pretended arts of jugglers. On the other hand, he will not refuse to apply the term art to the performance of a rope-dancer.
[77] [Kant was accustomed to say that the talk at a dinner table should always pass through these three stages--narrative, discussion, and jest; and punctilious in this, as in all else, he is said to have directed the conversation at his own table accordingly (Wallace’s _Kant_, p. 39).]
[78] [Second Edition.]
ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. Cf. also _Rhetoric_, 16. Boileau (_L’art poétique_, chant 3), makes a similar observation: “Il n’est point de serpent ni de monstre odieux Qui, par l’art imité, ne puisse plaire aux yeux.
D’un pinceau délicat l’artifice agréable Du plus affreux objet fait un objet aimable.”
] [80] [Second Edition.]
[82] [In English we would rather say “without _soul_”; but I prefer to translate _Geist_ consistently by _spirit_, to avoid the confusion of it with _Seele_.]
[83] [These lines occur in one of Frederick the Great’s French poems: Épître au maréchal Keith XVIII., “sur les vaines terreurs de la mort et les frayeurs d’une autre vie.” Kant here translates them into German.]
[84] [Withof, whose “Moral Poems” appeared in 1755. This reference was supplied by H. Krebs in _Notes and Queries_ 5th January 1895.]
[85] Perhaps nothing more sublime was ever said and no sublimer thought ever expressed than the famous inscription on the Temple of _Isis_ (Mother _Nature_): “I am all that is and that was and that shall be, and no mortal hath lifted my veil.” _Segner_ availed himself of this Idea in a _suggestive_ vignette prefixed to his Natural Philosophy, in order to inspire beforehand the pupil whom he was about to lead into that temple with a holy awe, which should dispose his mind to serious attention. [J. A. de Segner (1704-1777) was Professor of Natural Philosophy at Göttingen, and the author of several scientific works of repute.]
[86] [Second Edition.]
[87] The three former faculties are _united_ in the first instance by means of the fourth. Hume gives us to understand in his _History of England_ that although the English are inferior in their productions to no people in the world as regards the evidences they display of the three former properties, _separately_ considered, yet they must be put after their neighbours the French as regards that which unites these properties. [In his _Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime_, § iv.
_sub init._, Kant remarks that the English have the keener sense of the _sublime_, the French of the _beautiful_.]
[88] The reader is not to judge this scheme for a possible division of the beautiful arts as a deliberate theory. It is only one of various attempts which we may and ought to devise.
[89] [Second Edition.]
[90] [_I.e._ the case of Plastic art, with its subdivisions of Architecture and Sculpture, as is explained in the next paragraph.]
[91] That landscape gardening may be regarded as a species of the art of painting, although it presents its forms corporeally, seems strange. But since it actually takes its forms from nature (trees, shrubs, grasses, and flowers from forest and field--at least in the first instance), and so far is not an art like Plastic; and since it also has no concept of the object and its purpose (as in Architecture) conditioning its arrangements, but involves merely the free play of the Imagination in contemplation, it so far agrees with mere aesthetical painting which has no definite theme (which arranges sky, land, and water, so as to entertain us by means of light and shade only).--In general the reader is only to judge of this as an attempt to combine the beautiful arts under one principle, viz. that of the expression of aesthetical Ideas (according to the analogy of speech), and not to regard it as a definitive analysis of them.
[92] I must admit that a beautiful poem has always given me a pure gratification; whilst the reading of the best discourse, whether of a Roman orator or of a modern parliamentary speaker or of a preacher, has always been mingled with an unpleasant feeling of disapprobation of a treacherous art, which means to move men in important matters like machines to a judgement that must lose all weight for them on quiet reflection. Readiness and accuracy in speaking (which taken together constitute Rhetoric) belong to beautiful art; but the art of the orator (_ars oratoria_), the art of availing oneself of the weaknesses of men for one’s own designs (whether these be well meant or even actually good does not matter) is worthy of no _respect_. Again, this art only reached its highest point, both at Athens and at Rome, at a time when the state was hastening to its ruin and true patriotic sentiment had disappeared. The man who along with a clear insight into things has in his power a wealth of pure speech, and who with a fruitful Imagination capable of presenting his Ideas unites a lively sympathy with what is truly good, is the _vir bonus discendi peritus_, the orator without art but of great impressiveness, as _Cicero_ has it; though he may not always remain true to this ideal.
[93] [From this to the end of the paragraph, and the next note, were added in the Second Edition.]
[94] Those who recommend the singing of spiritual songs at family prayers do not consider that they inflict a great hardship upon the public by such _noisy_ (and therefore in general pharisaical) devotions; for they force the neighbours either to sing with them or to abandon their meditations. [Kant suffered himself from such annoyances, which may account for the asperity of this note. At one period he was disturbed by the devotional exercises of the prisoners in the adjoining jail. In a letter to the burgomaster “he suggested the advantage of closing the windows during these hymn-singings, and added that the warders of the prison might probably be directed to accept less sonorous and neighbour-annoying chants as evidence of the penitent [96] [The First Edition adds “as in the case of a man who gets the news of a great commercial success.”]
[97] [The jest may have been taken from Steele’s play, “The Funeral or Grief _à la mode_,” where it occurs verbatim. This play was published in 1702.]
“Du Dieu qui nous créa la clémence infinie, Pour adoucir les maux de cette courte vie, A placé parmi nous deux êtres bienfaisants, De la terre à jamais aimables habitants, Soutiens dans les travaux, trésors dans l’indigence: L’un est le doux sommeil, et l’autre est l’espérance.”
] [99] We may describe as a rationalising judgement (_judicium ratiocinans_) one which proclaims itself as universal, for as such it can serve as the major premise of a syllogism. On the other hand, we can only speak of a judgement as rational (_judicium ratiocinatum_) which is thought as the conclusion of a syllogism, and consequently as [101] [Second Edition.]
[102] [Antiparos is a small island in the Cyclades, remarkable for a splendid stalactite cavern near the southern coast.]
[103] The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive (not to the symbolical). The former is either _schematical_, by _demonstration_; or _symbolical_ as a representation in accordance with a mere _analogy_.
[104] [I read _Geselligkeit_ with Rosenkranz and Windelband; Hartenstein and Kirchmann have _Glückseligkeit_.]
[105] As in pure mathematics we can never talk of the existence, but only of the possibility of things, viz. of an intuition corresponding to a concept, and so never of cause and effect, it follows that all purposiveness observed there must be considered merely as formal and never as a natural purpose.
[106] [The allusion is to _Vitruvius de Architectura_, Bk. vi.
Praef. “Aristippus philosophus Socraticus, naufragio cum eiectus ad Rhodiensium litus animadvertisset geometrica schemata descripta, exclamavisse ad comites ita dicitur, Bene speremus, hominum enim vestigia video.”]
[107] [Second Edition.]
[108] We can conversely throw light upon a certain combination, much more often met with in Idea than in actuality, by means of an analogy to the so-called immediate natural purposes. In a recent complete transformation of a great people into a state the word _organisation_ for the regulation of magistracies, etc., and even of the whole body politic, has often been fitly used. For in such a whole every member should surely be purpose as well as means, and, whilst all work together towards the possibility of the whole, each should be determined as regards place and function by means of the Idea of the whole. [Kant probably alludes here to the organisation of the United States of America.]
[109] [These words are inserted by Rosenkranz and Windelband, but omitted by Hartenstein and Kirchmann.]
[110] In the aesthetical part [§ 58, p. 247] it was said: _We view beautiful nature with favour_, whilst we have a quite free (disinterested) satisfaction in its form. For in this mere judgement of taste no consideration is given to the purpose for which these natural beauties exist; whether to excite pleasure in us, or as purposes without any reference to us at all. But in a teleological judgement we pay attention to this reference, and here we can _regard it as a favour of nature_ that it has been willing to minister to our culture by the exhibition of so many beautiful figures.
[111] The German word _vermessen_ is a good word and full of meaning.
A judgement in which we forget to consider the extent of our powers (our Understanding) may sometimes sound very humble, and yet make great pretensions, and so be very presumptuous. Of this kind are most of those by which we pretend to extol the divine wisdom by ascribing to it designs in the works of creation and preservation which are really meant to do honour to the private wisdom of the reasoner.
[112] We thus see that in most speculative things of pure Reason, as regards dogmatic assertions, the philosophical schools have commonly tried all possible solutions of a given question. To explain the purposiveness of nature men have tried either _lifeless matter_ or only remains for us, if the need should arise, to abandon all these objective _assertions_ and to examine critically our judgement merely in reference to our cognitive faculties, in order to supply to their principle a validity which, if not dogmatic, shall at least be that of a maxim sufficient for the sure employment of Reason.
[113] [That is, the wider concept serves as a universal, under which the particular may be brought; cognition from principles, in Kant’s phrase, is the process of knowing the particular in the universal by means of concepts.]
[114] [This distinction will be familiar to the student of the _Critique of Pure Reason_. See Dialectic, bk. i., _Of the Concepts of Pure Reason_.]
[115] [Second Edition.]
[116] [This principle, that for our intellect, the conception of an organised body is impossible except by the aid of the Idea of design, is frequently insisted on by Kant. Professor Wallace points out (_Kant_, p. 110) that as far back as 1755, in his _General Physiogony and Theory of the Heavens_, Kant classed the origin of animals and plants with the secrets of Providence and the mystical number 666 “as one of the topics on which ingenuity and thought are occasionally wasted.”]
[117] [Second Edition.]
[118] [Second Edition.]
[119] [This is marked as an _Appendix_ in the Second Edition.]
[120] We may call a hypothesis of this kind a daring venture of reason, and there may be few even of the most acute naturalists through whose head it has not sometimes passed. For it is not absurd, like that _generatio aequivoca_ by which is understood the production of an organised being through the mechanics of crude unorganised matter.
It would always remain _generatio univoca_ in the most universal sense of the word, for it only considers one organic being as derived from another organic being, although from one which is specifically different; _e.g._ certain water-animals transform themselves gradually into marsh-animals and from these, after some generations, into land-animals. _A priori_, in the judgement of Reason alone, there is no contradiction here. Only experience gives no example of it; according to experience all generation that we know is _generatio homonyma_.
This is not merely _univoca_ in contrast to the generation out of unorganised material, but in the organisation the product is of like kind to that which produced it; and _generation heteronyma_, so far as our empirical knowledge of nature extends, is nowhere found.
[121] [It is probable that Kant alludes here to Hume’s Essay _On a Providence and a Future State_, § xi of the _Inquiry_. Hume argues that though the inference from an effect to an intelligent cause may be valid in the case of human contrivance, it is not legitimate to rise by a like argument to Supreme Intelligence. “In human nature there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when from any fact we have discovered one intention of any man, it may often be reasonable from experience to infer another, and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a being so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection.”]
[122] [J. F. Blumenbach (1752-1840), a German naturalist and professor at Göttingen; the author of _Institutiones Physiologicae_ (1787) and other works. An interesting account of him is given in Lever’s novel _Adventures of Arthur O’Leary_, ch. xix.]
[123] [Carl von Linné (1707-1778), Knight of the Polar Star, the celebrated Swedish botanist.]
[124] If the once adopted name _Natural history_ is to continue for the description of nature, we may in contrast with art, give the title of _Archaeology of nature_ to that which the former literally indicates, viz. a representation of the _old_ condition of the earth, about which, although we cannot hope for certainty, we have good ground for conjecture. As sculptured stones, etc., belong to the province of art, so petrefactions belong to the archaeology of nature. And since work is actually being done in this [science] (under the name of the Theory of the Earth), constantly, although of course slowly, this name is not given to a merely imaginary investigation of nature, but to one to which nature itself leads and invites us.
[126] [First Edition has _freedom_.]
[127] [These views are set forth by Kant more fully in the essay _Zum [128] [Second Edition.]
[129] [Cf. _The Philosophical Theory of Religion_, Part i., _On the bad principle in Human Nature_, III., where Kant remarks that although war “is not so incurably bad as the deadness of a universal monarchy...yet, as an ancient observed, it makes more bad men than it takes away.”]
[130] The value of life for us, if it is estimated by that _which we enjoy_ (by the natural purpose of the sum of all inclinations, _i.e._ happiness), is easy to decide. It sinks below zero; for who would be willing to enter upon life anew under the same conditions? who would do so even according to a new, self-chosen plan (yet in conformity with the course of nature), if it were merely directed to enjoyment? We have shown above what value life has in virtue of what it contains in itself, when lived in accordance with the purpose that nature has along with us, and which consists in what we do (not merely what we enjoy), in which, however, we are always but means towards an undetermined final purpose. There remains then nothing but the value which we ourselves give our life, through what we can not only do, but do purposively in such independence of nature that the existence of nature itself can only be a purpose under this condition.
[131] It would be possible that the happiness of rational beings in the world should be a purpose of nature, and then also this would be its _ultimate_ purpose. At least we cannot see _a priori_ why nature should not be so ordered, because by means of its mechanism this effect would be certainly possible, at least so far as we see. But morality, with a causality according to purposes subordinated thereto, is absolutely impossible by means of natural causes; for the principle by which it determines to action is supersensible, and is therefore the only possible principle in the order of purposes that in respect of nature is absolutely unconditioned. Its subject consequently alone is qualified to be the _final purpose_ of creation to which the whole of nature is subordinated.--_Happiness_, on the contrary, as has been shown in the preceding paragraphs by the testimony of experience, is not even a _purpose of nature_ in respect of man in preference to other creatures; much less a _final purpose of creation_. Men may of course make it their ultimate subjective purpose. But if I ask, in reference to the final purpose of creation, why must men exist? then we are speaking of an objective supreme purpose, such as the highest Reason would require for creation. If we answer: These beings exist to afford objects for the benevolence of that Supreme Cause; then we contradict the condition to which the Reason of man subjects even his inmost wish for happiness (viz. the harmony with his own internal moral legislation). This proves that happiness can only be a conditioned purpose, and that it is only as a moral being that man can be the final purpose of creation; but that as concerns his state happiness is only connected with it as a consequence, according to the measure of his harmony with that purpose regarded as the purpose of his being.
[132] [Second Edition.]
[133] I say deliberately under moral laws. It is not man _in accordance with_ moral laws, _i.e._ a being who behaves himself in conformity with them, who is the final purpose of creation. For by using the latter expression we should be asserting more than we know; viz. that it is in the power of an Author of the world to cause man always to behave himself in accordance with moral laws. But this presupposes a concept of freedom and of nature (of which latter we can only think an external author), which would imply an insight into the supersensible substrate of nature and its identity with that which causality through freedom makes possible in the world. And this far surpasses the insight of our Reason. Only of _man under moral laws_ can we say, without transgressing the limits of our insight: his being constitutes the final purpose of the world. This harmonises completely with the judgement of human Reason reflecting morally upon the course of the world. We believe that we perceive in the case of the wicked the traces of a wise purposive reference, if we only see that the wanton criminal does not die before he has undergone the deserved punishment of his misdeeds. According to our concepts of free causality, our good or bad behaviour depends on ourselves; we regard it the highest wisdom in the government of the world to ordain for the first, opportunity, and for both, their consequence, in accordance with moral laws. In the latter properly consists the glory of God, which is hence not unsuitably described by theologians as the ultimate purpose of creation.-- It is further to be remarked that when we use the word creation, we understand nothing more than we have said here, viz. the cause of the _being_ of the world or of the things in it (substances). This is what the concept properly belonging to this word involves (_actuatio substantiae est creatio_); and consequently there is not implied in it the supposition of a freely working, and therefore intelligent, cause (whose being we first of all want to prove).
[134] [Note added in Second Edition.] This moral argument does not supply any _objectively-valid_ proof of the Being of God; it does not prove to the sceptic that there is a God, but proves that if he wishes to think in a way consonant with morality, he must admit the _assumption_ of this proposition under the maxims of his practical Reason.-- We should therefore not say: it is necessary _for morals_ [Sittlichkeit], to assume the happiness of all rational beings of the world in proportion to their morality [Moralität]; but rather, this is necessitated _by_ morality. Accordingly, this is a _subjective_ argument sufficient for moral beings.
[135] [Second Edition.]
[136] [Second Edition.]
[137] In a practical sense that religion is always idolatry which conceives the Supreme Being with properties, according to which something else besides morality can be a fit condition for that which man can do being in accordance with His Will. For however pure and free from sensible images the concept that we have formed may be in a theoretical point of view, yet it will be in a practical point of view still represented as an _idol_, _i.e._ in regard to the character of His Will, anthropomorphically.
[138] [Cf. _Introd. to Logic_, ix. p. 63, “Conviction is opposed to Persuasion, which is a belief from inadequate reasons, of which we do not know whether they are only subjective or are also objective.”]
[139] [Second Edition.]
[140] [_I.e._ _Urtheils_. First Edition had _Urtheilens_, the judging subject.]
[141] _Analogy_ (in a qualitative signification) is the identity of the relation between reasons and consequences (causes and effects), so far as it is to be found, notwithstanding the specific difference of the things or those properties in them which contain the reason for like consequences (_i.e._ considered apart from this relation). Thus we conceive of the artificial constructions of beasts by comparing them with those of men; by comparing the ground of those effects brought about by the former, which we do not know, with the ground of similar effects brought about by men (reason), which we do know; _i.e._ we regard the ground of the former as an analogon of reason. We then try at the same time to show that the ground of the artisan faculty of beasts, which we call instinct, specifically different as it is in fact from reason, has yet a similar relation to its effect (the buildings of the beaver as compared with those of men).--But then I cannot therefore conclude that because man uses _reason_ for his building, the beaver must have the like, and call this a _conclusion_ according to analogy.
But from the similarity of the mode of operation of beasts (of which we cannot immediately perceive the ground) to that of men (of which we are immediately conscious), we can quite rightly conclude _according to analogy_, that beasts too act in accordance with _representations_ (not as _Descartes_ has it, that they are machines), and that despite their specific distinction they are yet (as living beings) of the same genus as man. The principle of our right so to conclude consists in the sameness of the ground for reckoning beasts in respect of the said determination in the same genus with men, regarded as men, so far as we can externally compare them with one another in accordance with their actions. There is _par ratio_. Just so I can conceive, according to the analogy of an Understanding, the causality of the supreme World-Cause, by comparing its purposive products in the world with the artificial works of men; but I cannot conclude according to analogy to those properties in it [which are in man], because here the principle of the possibility of such a method of reasoning entirely fails, viz. the _paritas rationis_ for counting the Supreme Being in one and the same genus with man (in respect of the causality of both). The causality of the beings of the world, which is always sensibly conditioned (as is causality through Understanding) cannot be transferred to a Being which has in common with them no generic concept save that of Thing in general.
[142] We thus miss nothing in the representation of the relations of this Being to the world, as far as the consequences, theoretical or practical, of this concept are concerned. To wish to investigate what it is in itself, is a curiosity as purposeless as it is vain.
[143] [Cf. _Introd. to Logic_, p. 76, where the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis are laid down. See also _Critique of Pure [144] [This illustration is also given in the _Logic_ (p. 57); where the three _modi_ of belief, Opinion, Faith, and Knowledge, are distinguished from each other. Cf. _Critique of Pure Reason_, [145] [The speculations of Swedenborg seem to have always had a strange fascination for Kant. He says of two reported cases of Swedenborg’s clairvoyance that he knows not how to disprove them (Rosenkranz vii.
5); but in his _Anthropology_ §§ 35, 37, he attacks Swedenborgianism as folly. So in an early essay, _Dreams of a Visionary explained by Dreams of Metaphysics_, he avows his scepticism as to the value of the information which “psychical research” can supply about the spirit-world, though he is careful not to commit himself to any dogmatic statement on the subject of ghosts. In the _Critique of Pure Reason_ (when discussing the Postulates of Empirical Thought) he gives, as an instance of a concept inconsistent with the canons of possibility, “a power of being in a community of thought with other men, however distant from us.”]
[147] I here extend, correctly as it seems to me, the concept of a thing of fact beyond the usual signification of this word. For it is not needful, not even feasible, to limit this expression merely to actual experience, if we are talking of the relation of things to our cognitive faculties; for an experience merely possible is quite sufficient in order that we may speak of them merely as objects of a definite kind of cognition.
[149] [Second Edition.]
[150] Things of faith are not therefore _articles of faith_; if we understand by the latter things of faith to the _confession_ of which (internal or external) we can be bound. Natural theology contains nothing like this. For since they, as things of faith (like things of fact) cannot be based on theoretical proofs, [they are accepted by] a belief which is free and which only as such is compatible with the morality of the subject.
[151] The final purpose which the moral law enjoins upon us to further, is not the ground of duty; since this lies in the moral law, which, as formal practical principle, leads categorically, independently of the Objects of the faculty of desire (the material of the will) and consequently of any purpose whatever. This formal characteristic of my actions (their subordination under the principle of universal validity), wherein alone consists their inner moral worth, is quite in our power; and I can quite well abstract from the possibility or the unattainableness of purposes which I am obliged to promote in conformity with that law (because in them consists only the external worth of my actions) as something which is never completely in my power, in order only to look to that which is of my doing. But then the design of promoting the final purpose of all rational beings (happiness so far as it is possible for it to be accordant with duty) is even yet prescribed by the law of duty. The speculative Reason, however, does not see at all the attainableness of this (neither on the side of our own physical faculty nor on that of the co-operation of nature). It must rather, so far as we can judge in a rational way, hold the derivation, by the aid of such causes, of such a consequence of our good conduct from mere nature (internal and external) without God and immortality, to be an ungrounded and vain, though well-meant, expectation; and if it could have complete certainty of this judgement, it would regard the moral law itself as the mere deception of our Reason in a practical aspect. But since the speculative Reason fully convinces itself that the latter can never take place, but that on the other hand those Ideas whose object lies outside nature can be thought without contradiction, it must for its own practical law and the problem prescribed thereby, and therefore in a moral aspect, recognise those Ideas as real in order not to come into contradiction with itself.
[152] It is a trust in the promise of the moral law; [not however such as is contained in it, but such as I put into it and that on morally adequate grounds.[153] For a final purpose cannot be commanded by any law of Reason without this latter at the same time promising, however uncertainly, its attainableness; and thus justifying our belief in the special conditions under which alone our Reason can think it as attainable. The word _fides_ expresses this; and it can only appear doubtful, how this expression and this particular Idea came into moral philosophy, since it first was introduced with Christianity, and the adoption of it perhaps might seem to be only a flattering imitation of Christian terminology. But this is not the only case in which this wonderful religion with its great simplicity of statement has enriched philosophy with far more definite and purer concepts of morality, than it had been able to furnish before; but which, once they are there, are _freely_ assented to by Reason and are assumed as concepts to which it could well have come of itself and which it could and should have introduced.]
[153] [Second Edition.]
[154] [Cf. _Introd. to Logic_, ix. p. 60, “That man is morally _unbelieving_ who does not accept that which though _impossible_ to know is _morally necessary_ to suppose.”]
[155] [First Edition.]
[156] [In the _Critique of Pure Reason_, Dialectic, bk. II. c. iii. §§ 4, 5.]
[157] [H. S. Reimarus (1694-1768), the author of the famous _Wolfenbüttel Fragments_, published after the death of Reimarus by Lessing. The book alluded to by Kant is probably the _Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion_ (1754), which had great popularity in its day.]
[158] [These arguments are advanced by Hume, _Inquiry_, § vii. Cf. also Dialectic, c. ii. § vii.]
[160] The admiration for beauty, and also the emotion aroused by the manifold purposes of nature, which a reflective mind is able to feel even prior to a clear representation of a rational Author of the world, have something in themselves like _religious_ feeling. They seem in the first place by a method of judging analogous to moral to produce an effect upon the moral feeling (gratitude to, and veneration for, the unknown cause); and thus by exciting moral Ideas to produce an effect upon the mind, when they inspire that admiration which is bound up with far more interest than mere theoretical observation can bring about.