this end—as, for example, the end of perpetual peace—should be also a duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the formal principle governing the maxims which guide external action.
Now the first principle is the principle of the political moralist; the problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law are mere technical problems (_problema technicum_). The second or formal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral politician who regards it as a moral problem (_problema morale_), differs widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing about perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good, but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts of duty.[151] [151] See Abbott’s trans., pp. 33, 34. [Tr.]
To solve the first problem—that, namely, of political expediency—much knowledge of nature is required, that her mechanical laws may be employed for the end in view. And yet the result of all knowledge of this kind is uncertain, as far as perpetual peace is concerned.
This we find to be so, whichever of the three departments of public law we take. It is uncertain whether a people could be better kept in obedience and at the same time prosperity by severity or by baits held out to their vanity; whether they would be better governed under the sovereignty of a single individual or by the authority of several acting together; whether the combined authority might be better secured merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power of the people within the state; and, finally, whether such conditions could be long maintained. There are examples to the contrary in history in the case of all forms of government, with the exception of the only true republican constitution, the idea of which can occur only to a moral politician. Still more uncertain is a law of nations, ostensibly established upon statutes devised by ministers; for this amounts in fact to mere empty words, and rests on treaties which, in the very act of ratification, contain a secret reservation of the right to violate them. On the other hand, the solution of the second problem—the problem of political wisdom—forces itself, we may say, upon us; it is quite obvious to every one, and puts all crooked dealings to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired end, while at the same time, discretion warns us not to drag in the conditions of perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal gradually as favourable circumstances permit.
This may be expressed in the following maxim:—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” For the science of morals generally has this peculiarity,—and it has it also with regard to the moral principles of public law, and therefore with regard to a science of politics knowable _a priori_,—that the less it makes a man’s conduct depend on the end he has set before him, his purposed material or moral gain, so much the more, nevertheless, does it conform in general to this end. The reason for this is that it is just the universal will, given _a priori_, which exists in a people or in the relation of different peoples to one another, that alone determines what is lawful among men. This union of individual wills, however, if we proceed consistently in practice, in observance of the mechanical laws of nature, may be at the same time the cause of bringing about the result intended and practically realizing the idea of right.
Hence it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people should unite into a state according to the only valid concepts of right, the ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle is not based on expediency, but upon duty. Political moralists, however, do not deserve a hearing, much and sophistically as they may reason about the existence, in a multitude of men forming a society, of certain natural tendencies which would weaken those principles and defeat their intention. They may endeavour to prove their assertion by giving instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen both from ancient and modern times, (as, for example, democracies without a representative system); but such arguments are to be treated with contempt, all the more, because a pernicious theory of this kind may perhaps even bring about the evil which it prophesies. For, in accordance with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class with all other living machines which only require the consciousness that they are not free creatures to make them in their own judgment the most miserable of all beings.
_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus._ This saying has become proverbial, and although it savours a little of boastfulness, is also true. We may translate it thus:—“Let justice rule on earth, although all the rogues in the world should go to the bottom.” It is a good, honest principle of right cutting off all the crooked ways made by knavery or violence. It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing anyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost severity, a course in contradiction to our moral duty; but we must take it to signify an obligation, binding upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to yield anyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of personal feeling or sympathy for others. For this end, in particular, we require, firstly, that a state should have an internal political constitution, established according to the pure principles of right; secondly, that a union should be formed between this state and neighbouring or distant nations for a legal settlement of their differences, after the analogy of the universal state. This proposition means nothing more than this:—Political maxims must not start from the idea of a prosperity and happiness which are to be expected from observance of such precepts in every state; that is, not from the end which each nation makes the object of its will as the highest empirical principle of political wisdom; but they must set out from the pure concept of the duty of right, from the “_ought_” whose principle is given _a priori_ through pure reason.
This is the law, whatever the material consequences may be. The world will certainly not perish by any means, because the number of wicked people in it is becoming fewer. The morally bad has one peculiarity, inseparable from its nature;—in its purposes, especially in relation to other evil influences, it is in contradiction with itself, and counteracts its own natural effect, and thus makes room for the moral principle of good, although advance in this direction may be slow.
Hence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel between morals and politics. But subjectively, in the self-seeking tendencies of men (which we cannot actually call their morality, as we would a course of action based on maxims of reason,) this disagreement in principle exists and may always survive; for it serves as a whetstone to virtue. According to the principle, _Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito_, the true courage of virtue in the present case lies not so much in facing the evils and self-sacrifices which must be met here as in firmly confronting the evil principle in our own nature and conquering its wiles. For this is a principle far more dangerous, false, treacherous and sophistical which puts forward the weakness in human nature as a justification for every transgression.
In fact the political moralist may say that a ruler and people, or nation and nation do _one another_ no wrong, when they enter on a war with violence or cunning, although they do wrong, generally speaking, in refusing to respect the idea of right which alone could establish peace for all time. For, as both are equally wrongly disposed to one another, each transgressing the duty he owes to his neighbour, they are both quite rightly served, when they are thus destroyed in war.
This mutual destruction stops short at the point of extermination, so that there are always enough of the race left to keep this game going on through all the ages, and a far-off posterity may take warning by them. The Providence that orders the course of the world is hereby justified. For the moral principle in mankind never becomes extinguished, and human reason, fitted for the practical realisation of ideas of right according to that principle, grows continually in fitness for that purpose with the ever advancing march of culture; while at the same time, it must be said, the guilt of transgression increases as well. But it seems that, by no theodicy or vindication of the justice of God, can we justify Creation in putting such a race of corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, we assume that the human race neither will nor can ever be in a happier condition than it is now. This standpoint, however, is too high a one for us to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited concepts we have at our command, about the wisdom of that supreme Power which is unknowable by us. We are inevitably driven to such despairing conclusions as these, if we do not admit that the pure principles of right have objective reality—that is to say, are capable of being practically realised—and consequently that action must be taken on the part of the people of a state and, further, by states in relation to one another, whatever arguments empirical politics may bring forward against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot take a step forward without first paying homage to the principles of morals. And, although politics, _per se_, is a difficult art,[152] in its union with morals no art is required; for in the case of a conflict arising between the two sciences, the moralist can cut asunder the knot which politics is unable to untie. Right must be held sacred by man, however great the cost and sacrifice to the ruling power. Here is no half-and-half course. We cannot devise a happy medium between right and expediency, a right pragmatically conditioned. But all politics must bend the knee to the principle of right, and may, in that way, hope to reach, although slowly perhaps, a level whence it may shine upon men for all time.
[152] Matthew Arnold defines politics somewhere as the art of “making reason and the will of God prevail”—an art, one would say, difficult enough. [Tr.]
APPENDIX II CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT If I look at public right from the point of view of most professors of law, and abstract from its _matter_ or its empirical elements, varying according to the circumstances given in our experience of individuals in a state or of states among themselves, then there remains the _form_ of publicity. The possibility of this publicity, every legal title implies. For without it there could be no justice, which can only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, without justice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can come.
This characteristic of publicity must belong to every legal title.
Hence, as, in any particular case that occurs, there is no difficulty in deciding whether this essential attribute is present or not, (whether, that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of the agent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion which is to be found _a priori_ in the reason, so that in the particular case we can at once recognise the falsity or illegality of a proposed claim (_praetensio juris_), as it were by an experiment of pure reason.
Having thus, as it were, abstracted from all the empirical elements contained in the concept of a political and international law, such as, for instance, the evil tendency in human nature which makes compulsion necessary, we may give the following proposition as the _transcendental formula_ of public right:—“All actions relating to the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they follow are inconsistent with publicity.”
This principle must be regarded not merely as ethical, as belonging to the doctrine of virtue, but also as juridical, referring to the rights of men. For there is something wrong in a maxim of conduct which I cannot divulge without at once defeating my purpose, a maxim which must therefore be kept secret, if it is to succeed, and which I could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up the opposition of everyone. This necessary and universal resistance with which everyone meets me, a resistance therefore evident _a priori_, can be due to no other cause than the injustice with which such a maxim threatens everyone. Further, this testing principle is merely negative; that is, it serves only as a means by which we may know when an action is unjust to others. Like axioms, it has a certainty incapable of demonstration; it is besides easy of application as appears from the following examples of public right.
1.—=Constitutional Law.= Let us take in the first place the public law of the state (_jus civitatis_), particularly in its application to matters within the state. Here a question arises which many think difficult to answer, but which the transcendental principle of publicity solves quite readily:—“Is revolution a legitimate means for a people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing off the oppressive yoke of a so-called tyrant (_non titulo, sed exercitio talis_)?”
The rights of a nation are violated in a government of this kind, and no wrong is done to the tyrant in dethroning him. Of this there is no doubt. None the less, it is in the highest degree wrong of the subjects to prosecute their rights in this way; and they would be just as little justified in complaining, if they happened to be defeated in their attempt and had to endure the severest punishment in consequence.
A great many reasons for and against both sides of this question may be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic deduction of the principles of right. But the transcendental principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this diffuse argumentation. For, according to that principle, the people would ask themselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they could venture to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a favourable opportunity should present itself. It is quite clear that if, when a constitution is established, it were made a condition that force may be exercised against the sovereign under certain circumstances, the people would be obliged to claim a lawful authority higher than his. But in that case, the so-called sovereign would be no longer sovereign: or, if both powers, that of the sovereign and that of the people, were made a condition of the constitution of the state, then its establishment (which was the aim of the people) would be impossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is quite obvious from the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which justify this step would make attainment of the end at which they aim impossible. We are obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy would not be necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may say quite plainly that the ringleaders of every rebellion will be punished by death, even although they may hold that it was he who first transgressed the fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious of possessing irresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed in every civil constitution, because a sovereign who has not power to protect any individual member of the nation against his neighbour has also not the right to exercise authority over him), then he need have no fear that making known the maxims which guide him will cause the defeat of his plans. And it is quite consistent with this view to hold that, if the people are successful in their insurrection, the sovereign must return to the rank of a subject, and refrain from inciting rebellion with a view to regaining his lost sovereignty. At the same time he need have no fear of being called to account for his former administration.[153] [153] “When a king has dethroned himself,” says Locke, (_On Civil Government_, Ch. XIX. § 239) “and put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with them?”...“The legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still _in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative_.”
134.) we find the words, “...over whom [_i.e._ society] no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them.” Cf. also Ch. XIX. § 228 _seq._ Hobbes represents the opposite point of view. “How many kings,” he wrote, (Preface to the _Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society_) “and those good men too, hath this one error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, been the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position cut, that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for the multitude!” This “erroneous doctrine” Kant received from Locke through Rousseau. He advocated, or at least practised as a citizen, a doctrine of passive obedience to the state. A free press, he held, offered the only lawful outlet for protest against tyranny. But, in theory, he was an enemy to absolute monarchy. [Tr.]
2.—=International Law.= There can be no question of an international law, except on the assumption of some kind of a law-governed state of things, the external condition under which any right can belong to man. For the very idea of international law, as public right, implies the publication of a universal will determining the rights and property of each individual nation; and this _status juridicus_ must spring out of a contract of some sort which may not, like the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded upon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a permanent free association such as the federation of the different states, to which we have alluded above. For, without the control of law to some extent, to serve as an active bond of union among different merely natural or moral individuals,—that is to say, in a state of nature,—there can only be private law. And here we find a disagreement between morals, regarded as the science of right, and politics. The criterion, obtained by observing the effect of publicity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but only when we understand that this agreement binds the contracting states solely with the object that peace may be preserved among them, and between them and other states; in no sense with a view to the acquisition of new territory or power. The following instances of antinomy occur between politics and morals, which are given here with the solution in each case.
_a._ “When either of these states has promised something to another, (as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of certain territory, or subsidies and such like), the question may arise whether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound depends on its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so by maintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:—firstly, as sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that sovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest official in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to the state for every action. And the result of this is that the state is acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has committed itself in the first.” But, if a nation or its sovereign proclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every other would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such pretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning, defeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action public, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have quoted must be wrong.
_b._ “If a state which has increased its power to a formidable extent (_potentia tremenda_) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it right to assume that, since it has the means, it will also have the will to oppress others; and does that give less powerful states a right to unite and attack the greater nation without any definite cause of offence?” A state which would here answer openly in the affirmative would only bring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the greater power would forestall those smaller nations, and their union would be but a weak reed of defence against a state which knew how to apply the maxim, _divide et impera_. This maxim of political expediency then, when openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the end at which it aims, and is therefore wrong.
_c._ “If a smaller state by its geographical position breaks up the territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary to the preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in subjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory in question with its own?” We can easily see that the greater state dare not publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller states would without loss of time unite against it, or other powers would contend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a maxim becomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a sign that it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although the victim of an act of injustice may be of small account, that does not prevent the injustice done from being very great.
3.—=Cosmopolitan Law.= We may pass over this department of right in silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, its maxims are easily specified and estimated.
* * * * * In this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of international law with their publicity, we have a good indication of the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a science of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these maxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that the converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has no need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a law of nations being possible at all is that, in the first place, there should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, there can be no public right, and all right which we can think of outside the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of nature,—is mere private right. Now we have seen above that something of the nature of a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing away with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable with their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and morals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is necessarily given _a priori_, according to the principles of right.
And the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment of this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end, all political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham politics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit school. It has its mental reservation (_reservatio mentalis_): as in the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we will, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example, the distinction between the _status quo_ in fact (_de fait_) and in right (_de droit_). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it pretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the probability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason for bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. Finally, it has its philosophical sin (_peccatum philosophicum_, _peccatillum_, _baggatelle_) which is that of holding it a trifle easily pardoned that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this be to the gain of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase in power is supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.[154] [154] We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr Hofrichter Garve’s essay, _On the Connection of Morals with Politics_, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this question. But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with the admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour of those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it might perhaps be wise to admit.
Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or the other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our fellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the former is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an unconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would give himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be first perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands.
Politics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense of the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors their rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect, as the science of right before which politics must bow the knee, the politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts and rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate the artifices of a politics like this, which shuns the light of criticism, by publishing its maxims, if only statesmen would have the courage to grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions.
With this end in view, I propose another principle of public right, which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula would be as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order that they may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right and politics.”
For, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim by being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end of mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to make the people contented with their lot) is the real business of politics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or in other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of politics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for a union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this right.
I must postpone the further development and discussion of this principle till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental formula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical conditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the _matter_ of law, are absent, and that it has regard only to the _form_ of universal conformity to law.
* * * * * If it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the same time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be realised, although only by an approximation advancing _ad infinitum_, then perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually works out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given advance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal.
INDEX A Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 44; of Schopenhauer, 43; according to Kant, 43, 44, 125-128; to Locke, 44.
Alexander I. of Russia; 80.
Alexander the Great; 31, 103.
Ambrose, Saint; 15.
Amphictyonic League; 16, 22.
Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, 18; on war, 18, 19.
Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87; difficulties settled by, 80; where it is useless, 82, 83, 86.
Aristotle; on war, 7, 8; and rights of an enemy, _ib._; 31; on the relation between politics and ethics, 162.
Assyrians; war among the, 9.
Augustine, Saint; 16.
B Balance of power; 26, 95.
Calvin, John; 19.
Carnegie, Andrew; 100.
Cicero; on the conduct of war, 22, 41.
Clement of Alexandria; 15.
Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15; Wycliffe, 18; Erasmus, _ib._; Aquinas, _ib._ Cobden, Richard; 64.
Corvinus, Matthias; 109.
Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103.
D Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46; on universal monarchy, 68, 69.
Disarmament; 88-93; Czar’s proposal of, 90; practicability of, 90-93.
Dubois, Cardinal; 36.
E Empire; of Rome, 9, 20, 68; of Alexander the Great, 31, 68; Frankish, 69; Holy Roman 69; of Napoleon I., 69.
Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, 17; on war, 18, 19; on fighting clergy, 18, 32.
Finland; 92, 95.
Fischer, Kuno; 62, 67.
Fleury, Cardinal; 55.
Frederick the Great; 66, 126.
Golden Age; 3, 41.
Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5; according to Hume, 5, 52; to Cowper, 5, 6; to Kant, 51-54, 152-154; to Rousseau, 52; to Locke, 53; Greeks; their attitude to other nations, 7; to an enemy, _ib._; their Sacred Wars, 16; the Amphictyonic League, 16.
Grotius, Hugo; his _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 24-27; and the Law of Nature, 25; H on war, 71, 72, 75.
Henry IV. of France; 30, 32, 33, 36.
Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of his influence on Kant, 40, 46; his views on revolution, 41, 188; of the relations between states, 43-46, 128, 131; on the conduct of war, 45, 89, 120, 124, 159.
Holls, Fred. W.; 86.
Hooker, Richard; 52; on the depravity of man, 173.
Hume, David; on the origin of government, 5, 52; on the state of nature, 40, 41; on the original contract, 52, 108, 109, 162.
I International Law; the development of, 20-24; its connection with the Reformation, 21, 24; in Greece and Rome, 22, 23.
J Jews; war among the, 9-11; their dream of peace, 32.
Justin; 15.
K Kant, Immanuel; 26, 37; his indebtedness to earlier political writers, 40, 46; his theory of human development, 47-49; and how this is possible, 49-51, 54; on the foundation of the state, 51-54, 152-154; the relations between states and individuals, 54, 55, 117-120, 128, 173, 174; the necessity for reform within the state, 55, 56, 168; the political and social conditions of his time, 57-59; on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157; and ideal of perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196; the conditions of its realization, 62-69; on representative and other constitutions, 65-68, 120-128, 152, 153, 167; his opinion of the English constitution, 66; 89, 100, 105; on the right of way, 137-142; on nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143-157; on the relation between politics and morals, 161-196; L Laveleye, Émile de; 81.
Leibniz, Gottfried W.; 36; his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38, 58, 106.
Locke, John; and the golden age, 3, 4; on the original contract, 53; Lorimer, James; 34, 80.
Louis Philippe; 76.
Luther, Martin; on war, 19.
M Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162.
Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25.
Maistre, Joseph de; 71.
Martineau, James; 102.
Mennonites; and war, 14.
Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19; compulsory, 89; voluntary, 111.
Mill, John Stuart; 80.
Moltke, Graf von; 71, 73-75.
Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69; and Fichte, 69.
Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83; on armed peace, 88, 159.
More, Thomas; 32.
Morley, John; 3.
N Napoleon, Louis; 80.
O Origen; on military service, 14, 15.
Original Contract; 40; as understood by Rousseau, 52; by Hobbes, 52, 53; by Hooker, 52; by Hume, _ib._; by Kant, _ib._; by Locke, 53.
Peace, perpetual; the dream of, 29-33; projects of, by Penn, 30; by Henry IV., 30, 33, 34; by St. Pierre, 30, 32, 34-37; for Kant an ideal, 61, 129; the articles of, 62-69, 107-142, 158-160; the guarantee of, 143-157.
Penn, William; 30.
Plato; on the origin of the state, 5; on war, 8, 41; on the relation between ethics and politics, 162.
Poland; 92, 93, 95.
Politics; and morals, according to Kant, 161-196; to Plato, 162; to Aristotle, _ib._; to Hume, _ib._; sophistical maxims of, 170-172.
Pope, Alexander; 4, 127.
Puffendorf, Samuel; 27; on intervention, 64, 131.
Q Quakers; and war, 14.
R Reformation; and military service, 18; and international law, 21, 24.
Religion; Roman, and war, 9; Jewish, 9-11; Mohammedan, 10; Buddhist, and conversion, 12; Christian, and war, 12-20.
Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, 41, 53; and Spinoza, 41; according to Locke, 53; to Rousseau, _ib._; to Kant, 167, 186-188.
Right of way; Vattel on, 65, 138; Kant on, 65, 137-142.
Ritchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, 3; on Locke and the golden age, _ib._, 52, 85, 98.
and international law, 22, 23.
his criticism of St. Pierre, 38-40; his views on militarism, 39;