Mahavira probably borrowed much more from other sects than we shall ever be able to prove. It must have been easy to add new doctrines to the 6^aina creed, as it scarcely forms a system in the true sense of the word. Each sect, or fraction of a sect, which was united with the G^aina church by the successful policy of Mahavira ^ may have brought with it some of its favourite speculations, and most probably its favourite saints too, who were recog- nised as A'akravartins or Tirthakaras. This is, of course, a mere conjecture of mine; but it would account for the strange hagiology of the 6^ainas, and in the absence of any trace of direct evidence we are driven to rely upon guesses, and those deserve the preference which are the most 1 As I have said above and in note 2. p. 119, this difference has probably given rise to the division of the church into ^vetambaras and Digambaras. But these two branches have not directly grown out of the party of Parj-va and that of Mahavira; for both recognise Mahavira as a Tirthakara.
^ Mahavira must have been a great man in his way, and an eminent leader among his contemporaries; he owed the position of a Tirthakara probably not so much to the sanctity of his life, as to his success in propagating his creed.
INTRODUCTION. XXXlll plausible. For the rest, however, of the hypotheses which I have tried to establish in the preceding pages, I claim a higher degree of probability. For on the one hand I do no violence to the tradition of the 6^ainas, which in the absence of documents deserves most careful attention, and on the other, I assume but what under the given circumstances would have been most likely to happen. The cardinal feature in my construction of the early history of the Caina church consists in my turning to account the alleged existence of followers of Par.yva in the time of Mahavira, a tradition which seems to be almost unani- mously accepted by modern scholars.
If G^ainism dates from an early period, and is older than Buddha and Mahavira, we may expect to find marks of its antiquity in the character of Caina philosophy. Such a mark is the animistic belief that nearly everything is possessed of a soul; not only have plants their own souls, but particles of earth, cold water, fire, and wind also. Now ethnology teaches us that the animistic theory forms the basis of many beliefs that have been called the philosophy of savages; that it is more and more relinquished or changed into purer anthropomorphism as civilisation ad- vances. If, therefore, Gama ethics are for their greater part based on primitive animism, it must have extensively existed in large classes of Indian society when G^ainism was first originated. This must have happened at a very early time, when higher forms of religious beliefs and cults had not yet, more generally, taken hold of the Indian mind.
Another mark of antiquity Cainism has in common with the oldest Brahmanical philosophies, Vedanta and Sahkhya. For at this early epoch in the development of metaphysics, the Category of Quality is not yet clearly and distinctly conceived, but it is just evolving, as it were, out of the Category of Substance: things which we recognise as qualities are constantly mistaken for and mixed up with substances. Thus in the Vedanta the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as quali- ties of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and [45] c XXxiv GAINA SUTRAS.
joy itself. In the Saiikhya the nature of punish a or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light; and the three guwas are described as goodness, energy, and delusion, or light, colour, and darkness; yet these gu;^as are not qualities in our sense of the word, but, as Professor Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient 6^aina texts usually speak only of sub- stances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, paryayas; and when they mention gu;/as, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sutras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyaya-Vai^eshika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For at the side of paryaya, development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality,' since paryaya is the state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities^ as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text. Another instance of the G^ainas applying the category ' substance ' to things which are beyond its sphere, and come rather under that of ' quality,' is seen in their treating merit and demerit, d harm a and ad harm a, as kinds of substances with which the soul comes into contact ^; for they are regarded as co- extensive with the world, not unlike space, which even the Vai^eshikas count as a substance. If the categories of substance and quality had already been clearly distinguished from one another, and had been recognised as correlative terms, as they are in Vaij-eshika philosophy (which defines substance as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that w^hich is inherent in substance), Cainism would almost certainly not have adopted such confused ideas as those just expounded.
1 That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f.
INTRODUCTION. XXXV From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar ^, who claims a late origin for (7ainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vai^eshika. The Vaij-eshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and syste- matical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Ka;i?ada, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical dis- cussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Galnas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the G^ainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view ' which is of the nature of a compromise between the Sahkhyas and the Vedantins on the one hand and the Vaij"eshika on the other.' But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following: (i) both G^ainism and Vaij-e- shika embrace the Kriyavada, i. e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c.; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatkarya, i.e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Vedanta and Saiikhya hold that they are the same (satkarya); (3) that they distinguish qualities from their substratum (dravya). The latter item has been discussed above; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (i) and (2) are the common-sense views; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e. g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the prima facie con- XXXVl GAINA SUTRAS.
elusion of an unbiassed mind, or rather will appear as the simple statement of what common experience teaches. Such opinions cannot be regarded as characteristic marks of a certain philosophy, and their occurrence in another system need not be explained by the assumption of borrow- ing. The case would be different if a paradoxical opinion were found in two different schools; for a paradoxical opinion is most likely the product of but one school, and, when once established, it may be adopted by another. But such opinions of the Vaij-eshika, as are the result of a peculiar train of reasoning, e.g. that space (d\s) and air (akai-a) are two separate substances, do not recur in G^ainism. For in it, as well as in the older Brahmanical systems, Vedanta and Saiikhya, space and air are not yet distinguished from one another, but ^kai'a is made to serve for both.
Some other instances of difference in fundamental doc- trines between Vaii-eshikas and G^ainas are, that according to the former the souls are infinite and all-pervading, while to the latter they are of limited dimensions, and that the Vai^eshikas make dharma and adharma qualities of the soul, while, as has been said above, the Cainas look on them as a sort of substances. In one point, however, there is some resemblance between a paradoxical Vaij-eshika opinion and a distinct Gaina doctrine. According to the Vai.yeshika there are four kinds of bodies: bodies of earth, as those of men, animals, &c.; bodies of water in the world of Varu;/a; bodies of fire in the world of Agni; and bodies of wind in the world of Vayu. This curious opinion has its counterpart in (9ainism; for the Cainas, too, assume Earth- bodies, Water-bodies, Fire-bodies, and Wind-bodies. How- ever, these elementary bodies are the elements or the most minute particles of them, inhabited by particular souls. This hylozoistic doctrine is, as I have said above, the out- come of primitive animism, while the Vai^eshika opinion, though probably derived from the same current of thought, is an adaptation of it to popular mythology. I make no doubt that the 6^aina opinion is much more primitive and INTRODUCTION. XXXVll belongs to an older stage in the development of philo- sophical thought than the Vaij-eshika assumption of four kinds of bodies.
Though I am of opinion that between Vaij"eshika and 6^ainism no such connection existed as could be proved by borrowings of the one system from the other, still I am ready to admit that they are related to each other by a kind of affinity of ideas. For the fundamental ideas of the Ved^ntins and Sahkhyas go directly counter to those of the 6"ainas, and the latter could not adopt them without breaking with their religion. But they could go a part of their way together with the Vai^eshika, and still retain their religious persuasion. We need, therefore, not wonder that among the writers on the Nyaya-Vaii-eshika some names of Cainas occur. The 6^ainas themselves go still farther, and maintain that the Vaii-eshika philosophy was established by a schismatical teacher of theirs, AT/^aluya Rohagutta of the Kauj-ika Gotra, with whom originated the sixth schism of the G^ainas, the Traira.fika-matam, in 544 A. v.^ (18 A.D.) The details of this system given in A A the Avaj-yaka, vv. 77-83, are apparently reproduced from Ka;/ada's Vaij-eshika Darj-ana; for they consist in the enumeration of the six (not seven) categories with their subdivisions, among which that of qualities contains but seventeen items (not twenty-four), and those identical with Vaii-eshika Darj-ana I, i, 6.
I believe that in this case, as in many others, the 6'ainas claim more honour than is their due in connecting every Indian celebrity with the history of their creed. My reason for doubting the correctness of the above Gaina. legend is the following. The Vai^eshika philosophy is reckoned as one of the orthodox Brahmanical philosophies, and it has chiefly, though not exclusively, been cultivated by orthodox Hindus. We have, therefore, no reason for doubting that they have misstated the name and Gotra of the author of the Sutras, viz. Ka/^ada of the Kai'yapa Gotra. No trace ' See Indische Studien, vol. xvii, p. ii6ff.
c 3 xxxviii GAiNA sOtras.
has been found in Brahmanical literature that the name of the real author of the Vaijeshika was Rohagupta, and his Gotra the Kau^ika Gotra; nor can Rohagupta and Kawada be taken as different names of the same person, because their Gotras also differ. Ka;/ada, follower of Ka//ada, means etymologically crow-eater, owl; hence his system has been nicknamed Aulukya Dar^ana, owl-philosophy^. In Rohagupta's second name, A'/mluya, which stands for Sha^/uluka ^, allusion is made to the ' owl,' probably to the Kaw^das; but the Cainas refer uluka to the Gotra of the Rohagupta, viz. Kau^ika ^ which word also means owl. As the unanimous tradition of the Brahmans deserves the preference before that of the Cainas, we can most easily account for the latter by assuming that Rohagupta did not invent, but only adopted the Vaijeshika philosophy to support his schismatical views.
About the two works translated in this volume, the Uttaradhyayana and Sutrakrztanga, I have little to add to the remarks of Professor Weber in the Indische Studien, vol. xvi, p. 259 ff., and vol. xvii, p. 43 ff. The Sutrakrztaiiga is probably the older of the two, as it is the second Ahga, and the Ahgas obtain the foremost rank among the canonical books of the C^ainas, while the Uttaradhyayana, the first Mulasutra, belongs to the last section of the Siddhanta. According to the summary in the fourth Aiiga the object of the Sutrakrztanga is to fortify young monks against the heretical opinions of alien teachers, to confirm them in the right faith, and to lead them to the highest good. This description is correct on the whole, but not exhaustive, as will be seen by going over our table of contents. The work opens with the refutation of heretical doctrines, and the same object is again treated at greater length in the * See my edition of the Kalpa Sutra, p. 119.
" Literally Six-owl. The number six refers to the six categories of the Vai^eshika.
2 Part i, p. 290. But in the legend translated by Professor Leumann, 1. c, p. 121, his Gotra is called A'/^aulu.
INTRODUCTION. XXXIX First Lecture of the Second Book. It is followed in the First Book by Lectures on a holy life in general, on the difficulties a monk has to overcome, especially the tempta- tions thrown in his way, the punishment of the unholy, and the praise of Mahavira as the standard of righteousness. Then come some Lectures on cognate subjects. The Second Book, which is almost entirely in prose, treats of similar subjects, but without any apparent connection of its parts. It may therefore be considered as supplementary, and as a later addition to the First Book. The latter was appa- rently intended as a guide for young monks^. Its form, too, seems adapted to this purpose; for it lays some claim to poetical art in the variety of the metres employed, and in the artificial character of some verses. It may, therefore, be considered as the composition of one author, while the Second Book is a collection of tracts which treat on the subjects discussed in the first.
The Uttaradhyayana resembles the Sutrakr/tahga with regard to its object and part of the subjects treated; but it is of greater extent than the original part of the Sutra- kr/tanga, and the plan of the work is carried out with more skill. Its intention is to instruct a young monk in his principal duties, to commend an ascetic life by precepts and examples, to warn him against the dangers in his spiritual career, and to give some theoretical information. The heretical doctrines are only occasionally alluded to, not fully discussed; apparently the dangers expected from that quarter grew less in the same measure as time advanced and the institutions of the sect were more firmly established. Of more importance to a young monk seems to have been an accurate knowledge of animate and inanimate things, as a rather long treatise on this subject has been added at the end of the book.— Though there is an apparent plan in the selection and arrangement of the single Lectures, still it is open to doubt whether they were all composed by one ' According to an old tradition (see Indische Studien, vol. xvi, p. 223) the Sutrakr/tanga is studied in the fourth year after the ordination of a monk.
xl GAINA sOtRAS.
author, or only selected from the traditional literature, written or oral, which among the 6^ainas, as everywhere else, must have preceded the formation of a canon. I am inclined to adopt the latter alternative, because there is a greater variety of treatment and style in the different parts than seems compatible with the supposition of one author, and because a similar origin must be assumed for many works of the present canon.
At what time the works under discussion were composed or brought into their present shape is a problem which cannot be satisfactorily solved. As, however, the reader of the present volume will naturally expect the translator to give expression to his personal conviction on this point, I give my opinion with all reserve, viz. that most parts, tracts, or treatises of which the canonical books consist, are old; that the redaction of the Arigas took place at an early period (tradition places it under Bhadrab^hu); that the other works of the Siddhanta were collected in course of time, probably in the first centuries before our era, and that additions or alterations may have been made in the canonical works till the time of their first edition under Devardhigawin (980 A.v. = 454 A.D.)
I have based my translation of the Uttaradhyayana and Sutrakr/tanga on the text adopted by the oldest com- mentators I could consult. This text differs little from that of the MSS. and the printed editions. I had prepared a text of my own from some MSS. at my disposal, and this has served to check the printed text.
The Calcutta edition of the Uttaradhyayana (Saw^vat 1936 = 1879 A.D.) contains, besides a Guzerati gloss, the Sutra- dipika of Lakshmivallabha, pupil of Lakshmikirtiga;/in of the Kharatara Gdikkhdi. Older than this commentary is the T'ika of Devendra, which I have made my principal guide. It was composed in Sa;//vat 1179 or 11 23 A. D., and is confessedly an abstract from 5antya/?'arya's Vr/tti, which I have not used. But I have had at my disposal an illuminated old MS. of the Ava/'uri, belonging to the INTRODUCTION. xU Strassburg University Library. This work is apparently an abstract from the Vrztt'x of 6"antyaMrya, as in a great many passages it almost verbally agrees with Devendra's work.
The Bombay edition of the Sutrakrztaiiga (Sa/wvat 1936 or 1880 A. D.) contains three commentaries: (i) ^"ilanka's T\ka, in which is incorporated Bhadrabahu's Niryukti. This is the oldest commentary extant; but it was not with- out predecessors, as -Sil^fika occasionally alludes to old commentators. 5ilanka lived in the second half of the ninth century A. D., as he is said to have finished his com- mentary on the A/^araiiga Sutra in the vSaka year 798 or 876 A. D. (2) The Dipika, an abstract from the last by Harshakula, which was composed in Sawvat 1583 or 151 7 A.D. I have also used a MS. of the Dipika in my possession. (3) Pa^a/^andra's Balavabodha, a Guzerati gloss. — My prin- cipal guide was, of course, wSilaiika; when he and Harsha- kula agree, I refer to them in my notes as the ' commen- tators;' I name vSilahka when his remark in question has been omitted by Harshakula, and I quote the latter when he gives some original matter of interest. I may add that one of my MSS. is covered with marginal and interlinear glosses which have now and then given me some help in ascertaining the meaning of the text.
H. JACOBI. Bonn: November, 1894.
ADDITIONAL NOTE.
I may here add a remark on the Parable of the Three Merchants, see p. 29 f., which agrees with Matthew xxv. 14 and Luke xix. 11. It seems, however, to have had a still greater resemblance to the version of the parable in The Gospel according to the Hebrews, as will appear from the following passage from Eusebius' Theo- phania (ed. Migne's Patrologia Graeca, iv. 155), translated by Nicholson, The Gospel according to the Hebrews (London, 1879): 'The Gospel, which comes to us in Hebrew characters, has directed the threat not against the hider, but against the abandoned liver. For it has included three servants, one which devoured the substance with harlots and flute-women, one which multiplied, and one which hid the talent: one was accepted, one only blamed, and one shut up in prison.' I owe this quotation to my colleague Arnold Meyer.
Taking into consideration (i) that the G^aina version contains only the essential elements of the parable, which in the Gospels are developed into a full story; and (2) that it is expressly stated in the Uttaradhyayana VII, 15 that 'this parable is taken from common life,' I think it probable that the Parable of the Three Merchants was invented in India, and not in Palestine.
H.J.
UTTARADHYAYANA.
UTTARADHYAYANA.
FIRST LECTURE.
ON DISCIPLINE.
I shall explain in due order the discipline of a houseless monk, who has got rid of all worldly ties. Listen to me. (i) A monk who, on receiving an order ^ from his superior 2, walks up to him, watching his nods and motions, is called well-behaved. (2) But a monk who, on receiving an order from his superior, does not walk up to him, being insubor- dinate and inattentive, is called ill-behaved. (3) As a bitch with sore ears is driven away every- ^ A«a-niddesa-kare. A^«a is the order itself; nirdei'a, the assent to it.
^ The original has the plural instead of the singular. It takes great liberties in this respect, and the commentators constantly call to help a va/&anavyatyaya or lihgavyatyaya, exchange of number or gender, as the case may be. It is impossible in the translation to follow the original in this respect, and useless to note all such grammatical blunders. The conclusion we may draw from them is that in the spoken language many grammatical forms which in the literary language continued to be used, were on the point of dying out or had already actually become obsolete. I am almost sure that the vernacular of the time when the Sutras were composed began to drop the distinction between the singular and plural in the verb. It was, however, artificially revived in the literary Maha- rash/ri of later days.
where, thus a bad, insubordinate, and talkative (pupil) is turned out. (4) As a pig leaves a trough filled with grain to feed on faeces, so a brute (of a man) turns away from virtue, and takes to evil ways. (5) Hearing a man thus compared to a dog and a pig, he who desires his own welfare, should adhere to good conduct. (6) Therefore be eager for discipline, that you may acquire righteousness; a son of the wise \ who desires liberation 2, will not be turned away from anywhere. (7) One should always be meek, and not be talkative in the presence of the wise; one should acquire valuable knowledge, and avoid what is worthless. (8) When reprimanded a wise man should not be angry, but he should be of a forbearing mood; he should not associate, laugh, and play with mean men. (9) He should do nothing mean ^, nor talk much; but after having learned his lesson, he should meditate by himself (10) ^ Buddhaputta. Buddha is here and in the sequel explained by a/^arya, teacher. The word is in the crude form, not in the inflected form, as the nominative would not suit the metre. Liberties of this kind are frequently met with in our text.
^ Nioga//,^! = niyogarthin. It is always explained and usually means moksharthin. But here and in verse 20 niyoga has perhaps its common meaning: appointment, order. In that case we must translate: he who waits for an order, ^ J^a.nda.\iyz, Uterally, he should not demean himself like a A^a«(fala. The commentators, however, divide the word in k^inda, violent, hot, and alika, untrue, false. This explanation is too artificial to be accepted, though the meaning comes to the same thing.
LECTURE I.
If he by chance does anything mean, he should never deny it, but if he has done it, he should say: ' I have done it; ' if he has not done it, * I have not done it.' (i i) He should not, in every case, wait for the express command (of the teacher) like an unbroken horse for the whip (of the rider), but like a broken horse which sees the whip (of the rider) he should commit no evil act. (12) Disobedient, rough speaking, ill-behaved pupils will exasperate even a gentle teacher; but those will soon win even a hot-tempered teacher who humour him and are polite. (13) He should not speak unasked, and asked he should not tell a lie; he should not give way to his anger, and bear with indifference pleasant and un- pleasant occurrences. (14) Subdue your Self, for the Self is difficult to sub- due; if your Self is subdued, you will be happy in this world and in the next. (15) Better it is that I should subdue my Self by self- control and penance, than be subdued by others with fetters and corporal punishment. (16) He should never do anything disagreeable to the wise^ neither in words nor deeds, neither openly nor secretly. (17) He should not (sit) by the side of the teacher, nor before him, nor behind him; he should not touch (the teacher's) thigh with his own, nor answer his call from the couch. (18) A well-behaved monk should not sit on his hams -, ^ Palhatthiya = paryastika: so that his clothes cover his knees and shanks.
B 2 UTTARADHYAYANA.
nor cross his arms\ nor stretch out his legs, nor stand (too) close to his teacher. (19) If spoken to by the superior, he should never remain silent, but should consider it as a favour; asking for his command 2, he should always politely approach his teacher. (20) If the teacher speaks little or much, he should never grow impatient; but an intelligent pupil should rise from his seat and answer (the teacher's) call modestly and attentively. (2 1 ) He should never ask a question when sitting on his stool or his bed, but rising from his seat=^ and coming near, he should ask him with folded hands. (22) When a pupil who observes the above rules of conduct, questions the teacher about the sacred text, its meaning, or both, he should deliver it according to tradition. (23) A monk should avoid untruth, nor should he speak positively (about future things, his plans, &c.); he should avoid sinful speech, and always keep free from deceit. (24) He should not tell anything sinful or meaningless* ^ Pakshapiw^/a.
2 Niyaga/Mi or ni6ga///^i. The commentator explains it, as in verse 7, by ' desiring liberation.'
* Ukku</u6. The commentator explains it by muktasana^ karawata/z padapu;7/^7zanadigata/i.
* In illustration of this the commentator (Devendra) quotes the following verse: esha bandhyasuto yati khapushpakr/tajekhara>^ 1 mr/gatr/shwambhasi snata/^ jaja^rmgadhanurdhara/^ n There goes the son of a barren woman, bearing a chaplet of sky-flowers, having bathed in the water of a fata morgana, and carrying a bow made of a hare's horn.
LECTURE I.
or hurtful, neither for his own sake nor for anybody else's, nor without such a motive. (25).
In barbers' shops^ or houses, on the ground separat- ing two houses, or on the highway a single monk should not stand with a single woman, nor should he converse with her, (26) Any instruction the wise ones ^ may give me in a kind or a rough way, I shall devotedly accept, thinking that it is for my benefit. (27) (The teacher's) instruction, his manner of giving it, and his blaming evil acts are considered blissful by the intelligent, but hateful by the bad monk. (28) Wise, fearless monks consider even a rough instruction as a benefit, but the fools hate it, though it produces patience and purity of mind. (29) He should occupy a low, firm seat, which does not rock; seldom rising and never without a cause, he should sit motionless. (30) At the right time a monk should sally forth, and he should return at the right time; avoiding to do anything out of time, he should do what is appro- priate for each period of the day. (31) A monk should not approach (dining people) sitting- in a row, but should collect alms that are freely given; having begged according to the sanc- tioned rules, he should eat a moderate portion at the proper time. (32) A monk should wait (for his alms) alone, not too far from other monks, nor too near them, but so that he is not seen by another party; another monk should not pass him to get the start of him. (33)