Referring to this hypothesis which I have called the ' short-cut ' theory, in its application to muscular move- ment, the application which has especial interest for us later on, Foster says:^ '* It is possible to maintain the thesis that man has become so developed as to his nervous system and the motor cortex, so accustomed to make use exclusively of the pyramidal system, that the will has lost the power, still possessed by the lower animals, to gain access by some path other than the pyramidal one, to the immediate nervous mechanisms of thought."
The practical result, in the case of this particular illustration, which recurs to us in a later discussion,^ may be put very briefly thus: it is possible that ajiimals may perform move7nents which seem to be voluntary, with a ner- 1 Handbook of Psychology, Vol. II., p. 46.
2 Textbook of Physiology, 5th ed., III., p. 1062.
3 Below, Chap. XIII.
Variations in Ontogeny. 23 vous apparatus wJiicJi would be inadequate to their volun- tary pe7'fornia7icc by the cJiild or the man} And this is to say that man in his individual development does not pass through the stage represented by the animal's performance of this function with this apparatus.
In the fact of Accommodation or adaptation, we find a similar influence at work to modify the strict parallel re- quired by the theory of Recapitulation. By accommoda- tion, with the new adaptations which it works, old habits are broken up, and new co-ordinations are made, which are more complex, or new organic growths secured, which sim- plify a function. These gains are again clenched by he- redity or selection and constitute further variations from phylogeny. This is particularly evident in volition. Fos- ter again notes this in the quotation which follows, citing the same structure as in the earlier quotation, the pyra- midal tracts. He does not appear to see the appHcation of the two opposite principles which I have mentioned, how- ever; for he does not make it clear that in one case, the latter, he is dealing with the question of the origin of the pyramidal tracts by new adaptations, and in the other, with the fixing by habit of these tracts for purposes of voluntary movement. He says:^ ''When we pass in review a series of brains from the lower to the higher, and see how the pyramidal system is, so to speak, grafted onto the rest of the brain, when we observe how the increas- ing differentiation of the motor cortex runs parallel to the increasing possession of skilled, educated movements, we may perhaps suppose that 'a short-cut ' from the cortex to 1 I have, in reference to this formulation, the opinion of Prof. H. F. Osborn, that ' this is probably supported by the comparative anatomy of the cortex.'
24 Infant and Race Psychology.
the origins of the several motor nerves, such as is afforded by the pyramidal fibres, from the advantages it offers to the more primitive path from segment to segment along the cerebro-spinal axis, has by natural selection been de- veloped into being in man the chief and most important instrument for carrying out voluntary movements."
This influence of Accommodation means, therefore, in this particular case, that aiiimals may have ne7'-uotis appa- ratus strikingly similar to that of man in many of its parts and still not be able to perform the functions which are performed by those parts in 7nan. And the reason of it is, again, that man has got a certain apparatus set aside for a higher function without first using it for the lower func- tion for which the animal used it. In this again, we must recognize a violation of the principle of Recapitulation.
The degree to which a simple structural device may preserve its type of action while adapting itself to new conditions, and assuming functions which, as far as their value, end, and conscious character are concerned, are new — this is simply extraordinary. And all the more so when we go to consciousness for the criterion of differ- ence in function. I shall illustrate this further in what I call the principle of 'lapsed links ' in the discussion of imitation below, and also in connection with the theory of the genesis of emotional expression. ^ The self-repeating or circular type of reaction, to which the name imitation is given in the later pages, is seen to be fundamental and to remain the same, as far as structure is concerned, for all motor activity whatever: the only difference between higher and lower function being, that in the higher, cer- tain accumulated adaptations have in time so come to 1 Chap. X., § 2 for the first reference and Chap. VIII., § 4 for the second.
I Variations in Ontogeny. 25 overlie the original reaction, that the conscious state which accompanies it seems to differ /^r jr from the crude imita- tive consciousness in which it had its beginning.
These positions, it is clear, suggest modifications of that doctrine of ontogenesis which holds that it closely epito- mizes phylogenesis. It is evident that while the organism develops serially in regular stages, yet often the stages in the individual's growth represent directly later stages in the series of animal structures, without having passed through all the earlier stages. To use the same example, which is apropos to our later topics, we could not hold that the infant first gets voluntary movement by using the intra-segmental pathways, and then later, by developing the pyramidal tracts and their connections, transfers its voluntary function to these. Yet this latter has been, prob- ably, the course of phylogenesis. On the contrary, we find that the infant does not act voluntarily at all until he acts via the pyramidal tracts and their central connections. The stage of intra-segmental voluntary action which, if it exists, represents phylogenetically a necessary stage of de- velopment, is lacking altogether in the ontogenetic series.^ Similarly, we find a remarkable illustration on the side of Accommodation. On the strict interpretation of the doctrine of Recapitulation we should find the child first passing through a stage of very varied and admirable in- stinctive adjustments, — corresponding to the instinctive equipment of the brutes, — and then later losing these instincts when it learns to act voluntarily. But the child shows nothing of the kind. We find instead that he passes directly from the suggestive, sensori-motor, stage, which is 1 Cf. Edinger's account of the foetal and early development of the pyramidal tracts in his Structure of the Central Nervous System.
26 Infant a7id Race Psychology.
much lower and earlier in the phylogenetic series than the extreme instinctive stage, directly to the volitional stage. He accomplishes this by direct inheritance of the highly differentiated organism which has arisen through the exer- cise of conscious mental selection with heredity or through natural selection, and so omits, in his individual develop- ment, a great mass of phylogenetic details.
The probability of such a modification of the doctrine of ontogenesis occurs to us also in a later connection as a corollary from the psychological theory of Habit. ^ The question is raised whether the effects of habit, itself a phenomenon of development, would not be inherited, or selected, thus abbreviating the ontogenetic process. A child, for example, by inheriting a direct tendency to re- spond to a visual stimulus with movements of the tongue and larynx, would be saved the long course of development which has been necessary phylogenetically for the estab- lishing of the direct connection, now very generally held to exist, between the visual and motor-speech centres, with a corresponding saving on the mental side. A striking illustration is seen, also, in the infant's behaviour in regard to space. A strict reproduction of the phylogenetic order would require that the child should first see the spacial dimensions with all the exactitude of the young of the lower mammals, and then afterwards develop the appara- tus for learning space properties by a very gradual expe- rience, at the same time losing the former apparatus and with it his instinctive knowledge of space.^ 2 It will have been noticed that in using the phrase * heredity, or natural selection,' I offer either of the current biological views of heredity. I do not think the current controversy over * acquired characters ' is pertinent to this topic: for Wcismann's supplementary hypotheses in support of neo- Variations in Ontogeny. 27 These considerations also seem, from the psychological side, to support the general theory of 'race experience' as held by the evolutionists of both schools. The whole tendency of current psychology is toward a functional view of experience, i.e., toward the view that memory is a form of mental reinstatement or habit, that character is disposition for action, that the brain develops by enlarge- ment of function on the basis of earlier function, and that the mind proceeds upon its past, even when it does not know its indebtedness. The value of ancestral experience is seen in what it makes me to be for opinion and action now — by whatever process it may have come down from my father to myself.
Now this is what evolution claims for race-experience. It says what is present in the mind now, in the way of function, is due somehow to the past. Nervous inherit- ance provides for the apparatus, and mental inheritance sums up the experience. Hence if individual mental de- velopment does not epitomize race development and yet it be true that man has developed, then the ' race experi- ence hypothesis ' becomes absolutely essential to genetic psychology, just as animal physiology would be the main resource of human morphology, if the animal embryos did not show Recapitulation.^ Darwinism are so evidently framed to reinstate all the explanations of the doctrine of use with heredity, that it makes little difference which side is right. If the effects of experience are preserved sufficiently to secure development, as we find it, it becomes an extremely interesting biological problem to be sure, but not a matter of much philosophical importance, which does it, the * Sar- colemma ' or the ' Germ-plasm '; nor whether the method is used with heredity or variation with selection. See further discussion of the bearing of the two views upon the theory of organic development below, Chap. VII., § 3.
1 An interesting line of inquiry has recently been opened up into what is known as « Neuroses of Development ' (cf. Clouston's book with that title), i.e., 28 Infant and Race Psychology.
The probabilities point, therefore, from the side of the phylogenesis of mind to the very marked modifications of the race record in the growth of the individual. They may finally have to be stated even more strongly than the purely nervous ones are stated, e.g., by Balfour, who says: ''The time and sequence of the development of parts is often modified, and finally secondary structural features make their appearance to fit the embryo or larva for spe- cial conditions of existence...Like the scholar with his manuscript, the embryologist has by a process of care- ful and critical examination to determine where the gaps are present, to detect the later insertions, and to place in order what has been misplaced";^ and by Marshall: "It is indeed a history, but a history of which entire chapters are lost, while in those that remain many pages are mis- placed and others are so blurred as to be illegible...and worse still, alterations or spurious additions have been freely introduced by later hands, and at times so cunningly as to defy detection."
II. The second great consideration pertains to the period of infancy, using the term ' infancy ' to cover the entire period of an organism's life from germination to independent existence with power to support life alone.
The bearing of the length of the extra-uterine period of infancy — the usual meaning of the term — upon the development of the creature has been shown by Fiske and others to be highly important. Children are, during their long infancy, given parental care and artificial protecthe nervous conditions which arise from the fact of development itself. These states arise at the crises, bridges, * short-cuts,' in the individual's development; such as the preliminaries of puberty, which probably represent a great series of phylogenetic changes.
Variations in Ontogeny. 29 tion, and so enabled to develop slowly to maturity, with all the practice in the acquisition of movements and in general adaptation to artificial conditions of living, etc., which the human intellectual and social environment of the adult demands. A long infancy period is accordingly necessary to his being a man; the child must have time, nourishment and protection during the time, and finally instruction.
Biologists are now recognizing a corresponding group of modifying circumstances brought to bear also during the prenatal period, which is simply an earlier stage of infancy. The course of development of the embryo is dependent upon the presence and amount of food, called 'food-yolk,' which the ^gg supplies. A principle has been formulated which connects the ontogenetic stages of growth directly with the food-yolk supply, i.e., a plentiful supply of food- yolk tends to a direct development toward maturity, to the abbreviation, consequently, of the recapitulation proc- ess, and to the birth of the creature ready formed for separate and independent existence. ^ In this matter of the interpretation of the whole infancy period, including both prenatal and postnatal infancy, how- ever, there seem to be two influences at work which tend to opposite results. We have seen that abundant food supply in the conditions of embryonic or prenatal life tends to sw^ift development and developmental abbrevi- ation. The new-born animal is soon fitted, under these conditions, for independent life on a comparatively high level of competition. This shortness of the embryonic period seems to be in direct relation to the shortness or entire absence of a postnatal infancy period. ]^eing thus 1 See Marshall's discussion of the influence of the food-yolk supply, Bio- logical Lectures, XIII.
30 Infant a7id Race Psychology.
fitted to take care of himself by advanced uterine develop- ment, he does not need after birth the artificial care, pro- tection, etc., of all infants.
On the other hand, where we find a long postnatal in- fancy period, as in the case of the child, we find also a long antecedent embryo period, in spite of the abundant food-supply afforded by the placental method of uterine nourishment.
The difference in the two cases seems to find some explanation when we look at the nature of the mental endowment secured in each case respectively. In the former case — that of swift intra-uterine preparation for immediate, independent life — the goal is refined and varied instinct, a matter of organic habit secured by ear- lier phylogenetic development: so the pathway of progress is already well trodden and the young organism has a straight road to grow along, marked out by its hereditary impulse. So the stretch to maturity is made rapidly.
In the case, however, of long infancy, both before and after birth, the mental gifts to be secured are of a kind not already crystallized in instinct. The hereditary impulses require a long ontogenetic evolution in each individual. So in spite of all the favourable conditions of abundant food, freedom from disturbing influences, etc., the creature must have both one and the other period at its longest.
The psychological considerations — which I am careful to keep to, not making any claim to biological expertness — would seem to favour some such formulation as the following, i.e.^ extra-uterine infancy period is to the intra- uterine embryonic period, the conditions being equally favourable, directly as the amount of ontogenetic develop- ment is to the amount of phylogenetic development in the Variatio7is in Ontogeny, 31 entire development of the creature's hereditary impulse. For although with creatures of instinct, which represent much phylogeny, the sum of the two periods is short, still the prenatal infancy period is relatively long, while with creatures of intelligence, which represent much ontogeny, although their whole period is long, yet the prenatal infancy period is relatively short.
Furthermore, a great class of mechanical influences, such as external strain and stress, accidents, sudden changes in environment, cause modifications of the physi- ological conditions, and so also modifications of the stages of growth during the whole infancy period. Biologists recognize the need of restricting their expectations of recapitulation to circumstances in which the physiologi- cal conditions have been normal.
The great cause, however, of departures from the series demanded by the theory of recapitulation in a given case is that which is known in general biology technically as 'fortuitous' or 'spontaneous variation.' The law upon the basis of which natural selection gets application in the preservation of adult organisms — the law of supply, by which a great variety of forms is secured to select from — this law applies none the less to immature organisms. Not only do the fittest adults survive, but also the fittest embryos develop. And it is only a further application of the same truth — an application recently put in evidence by Weismann {Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 1894), under the term * Intra-Selection' — that single organs of one and the same creature are subject to such selection.^ It is 1 I aim to show in my theory of motor adaptation developed below (Chap. VII.), that the same principle of variation with natural selection appHes also to the single acts by which new functions are started and new adapta- tions secured, — what I call 'Organic Selection.'
32 Infant and Race Psychology.
easy then to see that the actual course of development of an organism along the line of stages marked out by the earlier race development might be disturbed at any point by the operation of natural selection. For under new conditions an embryo which departs in some way from the series demanded by recapitulation may by that very fact be fitted to survive, and so be seized upon by natural selection. 1 Sedgwick maintains also that variations found in adult forms are also reflected in the embryo. He says in the paper referred to in the last note (p. 41): "Varia- tions do not merely affect the non-early period of life where they are of immediate functional importance to the animal, but, on the contrary, they are inherent in the germ and affect more or less profoundly the whole of development." Coming back to mental development, we should expect to find a similar state of things: the recapitulation of mental stages in the history of the child should show similar breaks. Abundant 'food supply' in the shape of lessons, rich suggestions in its social and educational life, urging forward in tasks of mind, etc., should give preco- cious mental development in the sense of early maturity of mind. The stages normally prescribed for natural growth may thus be abbreviated. The same effect is produced 1 This influence of 'variation' does not seem to have had sufficient empha- sis by embryologists; but see the illustrations of it given by Marshall, who, nevertheless, rather leaves it to be assumed than definitely states it. The re- cent paper by Sedgwick, Quarterly yournal of Microscopic Science (April, 1894), endeavours, however, to reconstruct the theory of recapitulation in view of the facts of variation. He finds that only those stages of an- cestral form are preserved in embryos which represent conditions of larval existence in the ancestral line, the point being that the independent life of larvae have required the full development of organs for actual functions and so secured their preservation in the latter series of embryonic changes, the change from larval to embryonic development being due to variation.
Variations in Ontogeny. 33 also by accidents of environment. Newsboys and street gamins become sharp and mentally agile to a phenome- nal degree from their method of life, while boys reared in the artificial seclusion and solitude of the single son, edu- cated by a tutor in his father's house, show the contrary character.
The fact of variation, however, should here, as on the biological side, have supreme emphasis. No two children are alike. This is a commonplace; but its true meaning is not a commonplace. Its meaning is not limited to the fact that the child, A, has a different temperament, differ- ent tastes, different memory type, etc., from the child, B. It means further that this difference is the only means to human progress, — the only supply of material for the selection of the fittest under the action of a progressive social environment.
I do not care to enlarge here upon the extraordinary pedagogical aspects of this theme: they await attention later on.^ I note it here as a fact important in the theory of mental development. If it be a fact, then all infant observations must be read in the light of it. No child's deeds should be given universal value without a critical examination, before which even the most competent psy- chologist might well quail. For how do we know that this child has not had artificial rearing so far in its life, how know that he has not experienced accidents of environ- ment which produce those 'developmental conveniences ' of mental behaviour which psychologists may recognize as artificial short-cuts from one stage of growth to another; how know that he does but show anachronisms of develop- ment forced upon him by malformation of brain, body, or ^ In my proposed volume. D 34 Infant and Race Psychology, limb? Or is he not himself in some important respect — as to filial instinct, premature sexuality, unusually strong or early thrill of nervous emotion, etc. — a variation, for life or for speedy death? We do not know.
If the morphologist, whose specimens are laid out on glass and bottled in jars, is confused by the perpetual anomalies of recapitulation, which make it necessary for him to arm himself with all the cautions formulated by Balfour, Marshall, Adam Sedgwick,^ and others; then where is the morphologist of mind, whose specimens are hidden behind all the screens of social convention, mater- nal pride and tenderness, and all the hideous realities of ignorant nursery customs.-^ All he can get is an occa- sional snap-shot at a baby. And, alas, this is more than most psychologists seem to want!
I am obliged, therefore, to modify even further the principle which seemed safe in our earlier paragraph, i.e., that the order of an infant's stages of development might be considered constant. It is only true if we know that the 'stage' is really an universal and regular stage. To be such it must lie between two other 'stages' just as universal and regular. With this caution we may use the rule with two very different degrees of value, according as we are dealing with the ontogeny of man or with his phylogeny, — with what a human mind goes through from cradle to grave on one hand, and with what, on the other hand, we may take from this development, as representing the race history of man, either the history of the species or the wider reach of animal race history.
For it is clear that the stages of human ontogeny may be built up from a wide series of observations of different ^ In Quarterly yournal of Microscopic Science, April, 1 894.
Variations in Ontogeny. 35 children under varied conditions. So the embryologists estabHsh the ontogeny of a species with great exactness and nicety of observation. In this way the widest reports of single observers of children get their value — a value for science, and especially for education.
But such a science as comparative mental morphology — and even worse, that of mental embryology — is at present a chimera. How can we say anything about recapitulation when we know so little about mental ontogeny and less, perhaps, about comparative mental physiology } In popular phrase, that is: how can we compare the development of the infant with that of the animal series, when we know neither how the child de- velops nor what is actually taking place in his conscious- ness, in any great detail, at any stage to which he may have developed?
CHAPTER II.
A New Method of Child Study. § I. Critical.
The current discussions of the more elementary mental processes show that we lack clearness in our conceptions of the earlier stages of mental life. This is evident enough to call out frequent appeals for 'scientific' child study. The word ' scientific ' is all right, as far as it goes; but as soon as we come to ask what constitutes scientific child study, and why it is that we have so little of it, we find no clear answer; and we go on as before, accepting the same anecdotes of fond mothers and repeat- ing the observations of Egger and Max Muller.
Now there are only two ways of studying a child, as of studying any other object — observation and experiment. But who can observe, and who can experiment.'' Who can look through a telescope and ' observe ' a new satellite } Only a skilful astronomer. Who can hear a patient's hesitating speech and 'observe' aphasia.? Only a neurologist. Observation means the acutest exercise of the discriminating faculty of the scientific specialist. And yet many of the observations which we have in this field were made by the average mother, who knows less about the human body than she does about the moon or a wild flower, or by the average father, who sees his child 36 Critical. 37 for an hour a clay, when the boy is dressed up, and who has never slept in the same room with him in his life; by people who have never heard the distinction between reflex and voluntary action, or that between nervous adap- tation and conscious selection. Only the psychologist can ' observe ' the child, and he must be so saturated with his information and his theories that the conduct of the child becomes instinct with meaning for his theories of mind and body.
It is evident, however, that all faithful recording is of importance, and that this may be done by all those who can be thoroughly objective and unprejudiced in the pres- ence of children. I believe that many parents can do this with very great accuracy; but there remains still the uncertainty, when such records are taken up for interpre- tation, as to whether the parent or nurse, in a particular case, Jias been free from the influences of affection, pride, jealousy, etc. On the whole, judging from the records in this branch of psychology, the science would better wait till its competent workers realize their opportunities and seriously study the children for themselves.
And as for 'experiment,' greater still is the need. Many a thing a child is said to do, a little judicious experimenting — a little arrangement of the essential requirements of the act in question — shows it is alto- gether incapable of doing. But to do this we must have our theories, and have our critical moulds arranged be- forehand. That most vicious and Philistine attempt in some quarters to put science in the straight-jacket of barren observation, to draw the life-blood of all science — speculative advance into the secrets of things — this ultra- positivistic cry has come here as everywhere else, and put 38 A New Method of Child Study.
a ban upon theory. On the contrary, give us theories, theories, always theories! Let every man who has a theory pronounce his theory! This is just the difference between the average mother and the good psychologist — she has no theories, he has; he has no interests, she has. She may bring up a family of a dozen and not be able to make a single trustworthy observation; he may be able, from one sound of one yearling, to confirm theories of the neurologist and educator, which are mo- mentous for the future training and welfare of the child.
In the matter of experimenting with children, therefore, our theories must guide our work — guide it into channels which are safe for the growth of the child, stimulating to his powers, definite and enlightening in the outcome. All this has been largely lacking, I think, so far, both in scientific psychology and in applied pedagogy. The implications of physiological and mental is so close in infancy, the mere animal can do so much to ape reason, and the rational is so helpless under the leading of in- stinct, impulse, and external necessity, that the task is excessively difficult — to say nothing of the extreme deli- cacy and tenderness of the budding tendrils of the mind. Experiment.'' Every time we send a child out of the home to the school, we subject him to experiment of the most serious and alarming kind. He goes into the hands of a teacher who is not only not wise unto the child's salvation, but who is on the contrary a machine for administering a single experiment, to an infinite variety of children. It is perfectly certain that two in every three children are irretrievably damaged or hindered in their mental and moral development in the school; but I am not at all sure that they would fare any better if Critical. 39 Critical. 39 they stayed at home! The children are experimented with so much and so unwisely, in any case, that it is possible that a little intentional experiment, guided by real insight and psychological information, would do them good.