9. Of this ſtamp, by the bye, are ſome of his moſt fundamental deſinitions: of conſequence they muſt leave the reader where they found him. But of this, per— haps, more fully and methodically on ſome future occa— fion. In the mean time I have thrown out theſe looſe hints for the conſideration of the curious.
[5] 1. One may conceive three ſorts of duties; po- litical, moral, religidhs; correſpondent to the three ſorts of auction they are enforced: or the ſame point of conduct may be a man's düty on theſe three ſeveral accounts. After ſpeaking of the one of theſe to put the change upon the reader, and without warn- ing begin ſpeaking of another, or not to let it be ſeen from the firſt which of them one is ſpeaking of, cannot but be productive of confuſion.
2. Political duty is created by puniſhment; or at leaf by DvuTy of the SUPREME PowWER to make Laws.
Have theſe ſupreme governors any ſuch duty? No: for if they are at all liable to puniſhment by the will of perſons who have puniſhment in their hands; perſons ſtated and certain, — political ſuWriors.
3. Religious duty is alſo created by puniſhment: by puniſhment expected at the hands of a perſon certain,— the Supreme Being.
4. Moral duty 1s created by a kind of motive, which from the uncertainty of the perſons to apply it, and of the ſpecies and degree in which it will be applied, has hardly yet got the name of puniſhment: by. various mortifications reſulting from the ill-will of perſons àn— certain and variable, - the community in general: that is, ſuch individuals of that community as he, whoſe duty is in queſtion, ſhall happen to be connected with.
5. When in any of theſe three ſenſes a man aſſerts a point of conduct to be a duty, what he aſſerts is the exiſtence, actual or probable, of an external event: viz. of a puniſhment iſſuing from one or other of theſe ſources in conſequence of a contravention of the duty; an event extrinſic to, and diſtin from, as well the con- duct of the party ſpoken of, as the ſentiment of him who ſpeaks. If he perſiſts in aſſerting it to be a duty, but without meaning it ſhould be underſtood that it is on any one of theſe three accounts that he looks upon it as ſuch; all he then aſſerts is his own internal enti- ment: all he means then is, that he feels himſelf z/ca/ed or di/pieaſed at the thoughts of the point of conduct in queſtion, but without being able to tell 2 In this caſe he ſhould e'en ſay ſo: and not ſeek to give an un- N 4 | due CHAP. Ve The proper ſenſe of it.
3. Religious duty.
4. Maral duty.
Dien between theſe ſen- ſes and a fourth which is figura- tive and impreper.
The proper ſenſe of it.
6. Duty not appli- cable here in any Proper ſenſe, A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
puniſhment according to law, whether it be for not doing any thing, or for doing, then due influence to his own ſingle ſuffrage, by delivering it in tgrms that purport to declare the voice either of God, offof the law, or of the people.
6. Now which of all theſe ſenſes of the word our Author had in mind; in which of them all he meant to aſſert that it was the duty of ſupreme governors to make laws, I know not. Political duty is what they cannot be ſubject to“: and to ſay that à duty even of the moral or religious kind to this effect is incumbent on them, ſeems rather a precipitate aſſertion, In truth what he meant was neither more nor leſs, I ſuppoſe, than that he ſhould be glad to ſee them do what he is ſpeaking of; to wit, make laws: that is, as he explains himſelf, ſpread abroad the knowledge of them. — Would he ſo? So indeed ſhould I; and if aſked why, what anſwer our Author would give I know not; but I, for my part, have no difficulty. I anſwer,—be- cauſe I am perſuaded that it 1s for the benefit of the community that they (its governors) ſhould do ſo. This would be enough to warrant mein my own opinion for ſaying that they ought to do it. For all this, I ſhould not, at any rate, ſay that it was their duty in a political ſenſe. No more ſhould I venture to ſay it was in a moral or religious ſenſe, till I were ſatisfied whether they themſelves 7hought the meaſures uſeful and feaſible, and whether they were generally /uppo/ed to think ſo. Were I ſatsified that they r7hem/elves thought ſo, God * See the note fojlowing.
then, "Nat, ATE 1 Dury of the SUrREME PowER to make Laws.
then are they not, what they are ſup- poſed to be, ſupreme governors [e]: thoſe then, I might ſay, knows they do. God, we are to ſup- poſe, will puniſh them if they negle@ purſuing it. It is then their religious duty. Were I ſatisfied that the people ſuppoſed they thought ſo: the people, I might ſay, in caſe of ſuch negleQ,—the people, by various ' manifeſtations of its ill-will, will alſo puniſh them. It is then their moral duty. 8 | In any of theſe ſenſes it muſt be obſerved, there can be no more propriety in averring it to be the duty of the ſupreme power to purſue the meaſure in queſtion, than in averring it to be their duty to purſue any other ſuppoſable meaſure equally beneficial to the community. To uſher in the propoſal of a meaſure in this peremp- tory and aſſuming guiſe, may be pardonable in a looſe rhetorical harangue, but can never be juſtifiable in an ex- act didactic compoſition. Modes of private moral conduct there are indeed many, the tendency whereof is ſo well known and ſo generally acknowledged, that the obſerv- ance of them may well be ſtiled a duty. But to apply the ſame term to the particular details of g tive con- duct, eſpecially newly propoſed ones, is going, I think, too far, and tends only to confuſion.
[e]! I mean for what they do, or omit to do, when acting in a body: in that body in which, when acting, they are ſupreme. Becauſe for any thing any of them do ſeparately, or acting in bodies that are ſubordinate, they may any of them be puniſhed without any diſpa- ragement to their ſupremacy. Not only any may be, but many are: it Is what we ſee examples of every day. | are CHAP. The proper ſenſe of it.
Governors in what way ſub- ject to political duties notwith- ſtanding their being ſupreme.
py Ne L o 1386 A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
Cray. are the ſupreme governors, by whoſe apö Z V. pointment the former are liable to be puniſhed, That in The word duty, then, if applied to bea perſons ſpoken of as ſupreme governors, fgarative, is evidently applied to them in a ſenſe [ which is figurative and improper: nor ' therefore are the ſame concluſions to be drawn from any propoſitions in which , it is uſed in this ſenſe, as might be drawn i from them if it were uſed in the other ſenſe, which is its proper one, F | IX, Tze 1 This explanation, then, being pretion acceded to in this laſt ſenſe. — miſed;—underſtanding myſelf to be uſing the word duty in its improper ſenſe, the propoſition that it is the duty of the le- giſlature to ſpread abroad, as much as poſſible, the knowledge of their will among the people, is a propoſition I am diſpoſed moſt unreſervedly to accede to.
If this be our Author's meaning, I join myſelf to him heart and voice.
A i PR — ny 4 n nn 8 2 it — SD 37 2 n 1 Mb X. What 88 f N TE Fit NS ASH. ws wt EIN f e RN TEN Durv of the SUPREME PoWER to mate Laws. " What particular inſtitutions our Au- thor wiſhed to ſee eſtabliſhed in this view—what particular duties he would have found for the legiſlature under this general head of duty, is not very appa- rent: though it is what ſhould have ap- peared more preciſely than it does, ere his meaning could be apprehended to any purpoſe. What encreaſes {till the difficul- ty of apprehending it, is a practice which we have already had more than once occa- ſion to detect him in *,—a kind of verſa- tility, than which nothing can be more vexatious to rer who makes a point of entering into the ſentiments of his Au- thor. He ſets out with the word ** duty” in his mouth; and, in the character of a Cenſor, with all due gravity begins talk- ing to us of what o to be. Tis in the midſt of this lecture that our Proteus lips aſide; puts on the Eiſtorian; gives an inſen- ſible turn to the diſcourſe and, without V. ſupra, ch. II. par. 17, ch. III. par. 7. ch. IV, any X, Obſcured a- gain by the next {ſentence —the Cenſor's part con- founded with that of the Hiflorian, * rr » Hiſtorian.
a ne — Cray. : "jp Obſcured a- gain by the next ſentence the Cenſor's part con- founded with that of the 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
any warning of the change, finiſhes with telling us what. Between theſe two points, indeed, the 7s, and the ought to be, ſo oppoſite as they frequently are in the eyes of other men, that ſpirit of obſequious quietiſm that ſeems conſtitutional in our Author, will ſcarce ever let him recognize a difference. Tis in the ſecond ſentence of the paragraph that he ob- ſerves that © it is expedient that they” (the people) © receive directions from the « ſtate” (meaning the governing body) ce declaratory of that it's will.” Tis in the very next ſentence that we learn from him, that what it is thus “ expedient” that the ſtate /hould do, it does do. But * {ince it is impoſſible in ſo great a mul- * titude, to give particular injunctions to e every particular man relative to each « particular action, therefore,” ſays he, ce the ſtate eſtabliſhes” (does actually eſta- bliſh) “general rules (he ſtate gene- rally, any ſtate, that is to ſay, that one can mention, all ſtates, in ſhort, whatever do eſtabliſh) <* "um rules for the per- 6 « petual e Den 8 1 3 anna Durv of the SUPREME POWER 70 make LA ws.
« petual information and direction of a// «« perſons in a// points, whether of poſi- « tive or of negative duty.” Thus far our Author; fo that, for ought appears, whatever he could w/h to ſee done in this view is done. Neither this ſtate of our own, nor any other, does he wiſh to ſee do any thing more in the matter than he ſees done already; nay, nor than what is ſure to be done at all events: fo that hap- pily the duty he is here ſo forward to lay on his ſuperiors will not fit on them very heavy. Thus far is he from having any determinate inſtructive meaning in that part of the paragraph in which, to ap- pearance, and by accident, he comes near- eſt to it. XI.
Not that the paſſage however is abſo- lutely ſo remote from meaning, but that the inventive complaiſance of a commen- tator of the admiring breed might find it pregnant with a good deal of uſeful matter.
The deſign of diſſeminating the know- ledge N | Fs PSY 9 „ „ A XE Fixed and particular- 1zed —Prog- mulgation re- commended, » Dr _ 2 PEA DET SO arr Pan pms — 2. ot EEG S CHAP. V.
— Fixed and particular- A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
ledge of the laws is glanced at by it at leaſt, with a ſhew of approbation. Were our Author's writings then as ſacred as they are myſterious; and were they in the number of thoſe which ſtamp the ſeal of authority on whatever doctrines can be faſtened on them; what we have read might ſerve as a text, from which the obligation of adopting as many meaſures as a man ſhould deem ſubſervient to that deſign, might, without any unexampled violence, be deduced. In this oracular paſſage I might find inculcated, if not totidem ſyllabis, at leaſt totudem literis, as many points of legiſlative duty as ſhould ſeem ſubſervient to the purpoſes of dige tion and hromulgation. Thus fortified, I might preſs upon the legiſlature, and that on the ſcore of ** duty,” to carry into execution, and that without delay, many a buly project as yet either unthought of or unheeded, I might call them with a tone of authority to their work: I bid them go make proviſion forthwith for DuTy of the SurREME PowER to mate Laws.
the bringing to light ſuch ſcattered materials as can be found of the judi- cial deciſions of time paſt, —fole and neglected materials of common law;— for the regiſtering and publiſhing of all future ones as they ariſe;—for transform- ing, by a digeſt, the body of the com- mon law thus compleated, into ſtatute- law;—for breaking down the whole to- gether into codes or parcels, as many as there are claſſes of perſons diſtinguiſh- ably concerned in it;—for introducing to the notice and poſſeſſion of every perſon his reſpective code: — works which public neceſſity cries aloud for, at which profeſſional intereſt ſhudders, and at which legiſlative indolence ſtands aghaſt.
XII.
All theſe leading points, J ſay, of le- giſtative economy, with as many points of detail ſubſervient to each as a medi- tation not unaſſiduous has ſuggeſted, I might enforce, were it neeeſſary, by our Author's X. The recom- mendation enforced by our Author's concluding ſentence.
The recom- mendation enforced by our Author's concluding ſentence.
4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, Author's oracular authority. For nothing leſs than what has been mentioned, I truſt, is neceſſary, in order that every man may be made to know, in the degree in which he night and ought to be made to know, what (in our Author's words) te to look upon as his own, what as % ahother's; what abſolute and what re- « lative duties are required at his hands; « what is to be eſteemed honeſt, diſe honeſt, or indifferent; what degree * every man retains of his natural liber- e ty; what he has given up as the price * of the benefits of ſociety; and after * what manner each perſon is to mode- rate the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe rights « which the ſtate aſſigns him, in order e to promote and ſecure the public tran- « quility.” In taking my leave of our Author, I finiſh gladly with this pleaſing peroration: a ſcrutinizing judgment, per- haps, would not be altogether ſatisfied with it; but the ear is ſoothed by it, and the heart is warmed.
XIII. I now DuTy of the SurREME Pow RR to mate LAWS. 192 1 1 En I now put an end to the tedious and XIII.
intricate war of words that has ſubſiſted, Nec and in a more particular manner during the uſe of theſe | verbal criti- 1 courſe of theſe two laſt chapters: a logo- ciſms. 1 machy, weariſome enough, perhaps, and ww infipid to the reader, but beyond deſcrip- tion laborious and irkſome to the writer, What remedy? Had there been ſenſe, I ſhould have attached myſelf to the ſenſe: finding nothing but words; to the words | J was to attach myſelf, or to nothing. Had the doctrine been but /a/ſe, the taſk "=; of expoling it would have been compa-. ratively an eaſy one: but it was what is | worſe, unmeaning; and thence it came to require all theſe pains which I have been here beſtowing on it: to what pro- fit let the reader judge.
IF" Crna ˙ WeocgnaCmlliin. = .
„ Well then,” —(cries an objector) * the taſk you have ſet yourſelf is at an % end; and the ſubject of it after all, according to your own repreſentation, * teaches nothing;—according to your O 66 own — CD — ig 8 Dre 2 —— CT > rw i — CHAP. V.
Neceſſity and uſe of theſe verbal criticiſms.
— riod ac A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
% own ſhewing it is not worth attend- “ ing to.— Why then beſtow on it fo « much attention?“ In this view—To do ſomething to in- ſtruct, but more to undeceive, the timid and admiring ſtudent:—to excite him to place more confidence in his own ſtrength, and leſs in the infallibility of great names:—to help him to emanci- pate his judgment from the ſhackles of authority:—to let him ſee that the not underſtanding a diſcourſe may as well be the writer's fault as the reader's:— to teach him to diſtinguiſh between ſhewy language and ſound ſenſe:—to warn him not to pay himſelf with words: —to ſhew him that what may tickle the ear, or dazzle the imagination, will not always inform the judgment:—to ſhew him what it is our Author can do, and has done; and what it is he has not done, and cannot do:—to diſpoſe him rather to faſt on ignorance than feed himſelf with error;—to let him fee that with 6 | regard nn 36 D&S ETD Dury of the SUPREME POWER to mate LAws.
regard to an expoſitor of the law, our Author is not he that ſhould come, but that we may be ſtill /ooking for another. “ Who then,” ſays my objector, e ſhall be that other? Yourſelf?” No verily.e——My miſſion is at an end, when I have prepared the way before him.
CONTENTS, Ao - 4d ha ba en error rr — Ret oy EET rene, bs. oy * „ r CONTENTS.
PREFACE.
OTIVEs of the preſent undertaking page iz Hiſtory of it — — 1 The buſineſs of the Cenſor diſtinguiſhed from that of the Expoſitor — — ix The latter alone our Author's * Laws ought to be ſcrutinized with freedom — xi Our Author why attacked in the character of an Expoſitor _ — xxii Reprehenſible paſſages from the work at large xxv Its merits — — — Xl Idea of a natural arrangement xlv Merits of the work reſumed _ — Ii Manner in which the preſent Eſſay has been conducted — — L liv INTRODUCTION.
I. Diviſion of our Author's Introduction page 1 II. What part of it is here to be examined — 2 III. His definition of Law Municipal — 5. IV. A digreſſion in the middle of it. It's gene- ral contents — — 3 V. This digreſſion the ſabje& of the preſent examination — — 4 O 3 VI. Our — PE A eu a a ee Gi os Sos K *. i — n * yo WP ene — 6 EF GS "Om n K AC ONT DE: CONT EN TS. VI. Our Author's ſketch of the contents page VII. Inadequate — — VIII. Diviſion of the preſent Eflay — — CHAS + I. Subject of the paſſage to be examined in the preſent chapter — — II. The paſſage recited— — — III. Confuſion among the leading terms of it — IV. “ Society“ put ſynonymous to a ſtate of na- ture. —oppoſed to Government.“ - and ſpoken of as having exiſted EK V. Society! —put ſynony mous to © poverncc ment“ 1 VI. A flate of nature ſpoken of, as never having exiſted — — VII. Original contract, its reality denied VIII. —aſſerted — — IX. Attempt to reconcile theſe contradictions — Society diſtinguiſhed into natural and polit.cal — X. Idea of political ſociety — — XI. Idea of zatural ſociety — ow XII. Difficulty of drawing the line between the two ſtates — — 1. A habit — — 3. An ad of obedience — — 4. An att of political obedience — 5. An expreſſion of will — — 6. 4 parole expreſſion of will — 7. A tacit expreſſion of will == — 8. A command — © mn ib.
21 9. A fiftitious N 9. 4 fictitious command page 10. Commands ꝙ quaſi- command. — 11. Iluſtration — Statute Law, ꝙ Common Law — — 12. Duty point of duty — — 13. L/ of the above chain of definitions 14. Habit of obedience—meaſure of its per- XIII.
XIV. XV XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX. XXI.
A perfect ſtate of nature not more chime- rical than a perfect ſtate of govern- ment It is not a family union, however per- fect, that can conſtitute à political ſociety—why «© State of nature” a relative expreſſion Different degrees of ſubjection among go- vernors — — The ſame perſon alternately in a ſtate of political and natural ſociety with reſpect to different ſocieties — In the ſame political ſociety the ſame per- ſons alternately, governors and ſub- jets, with reſpect to the ſame perſoyg Hints of ſeveral topics that muſt be paſled by The ſame ſociety, alternately, in a ſtate of nature and a ſtate of government — Inſtance—the Aborigines of America — Characteriſtic of political union — => 21 ib, ib. ib. ib, 22 ib. ib.
ZI 23 24 26 27 28 ib, 29 30 XXII. Amon —. ung ho FT XXII. Among perſons already in a ſtate of political union, at what inſtant a new ſociety can be ſaid to be formed, by deſection from a former page XXIII. 1ſt, in caſe of defection by whole bo- dies—irfſtance the Dutch provinces XXIV. zdly, in caſe of defection by individu- als—inſtances, Rome Venice _ XXV. A revolt, at what juncture it can be ſaid to have taken place XXVI. Di/ſobediences what do act amount to a revolt: Mis 1. Diſobedience unconſcious with reſpec to the fact Difebedience unconſcious with reſpect to the Law 3» Ilaſtration —.
Diobediences fraudulent and forcible —the difference, illuſtrated — XXVII. Diſobediences what do amount to a revolt XXVIII. Unfiniſhed ſtate of the above hints — XXIX. Our Author's propoſition, “ That go- „ vernment reſults of courſe,“ not true — XXX. Ambiguity of the ſentence XXXI. Darkneſs of the whole paragraph fur- ther ſhewn — — XXVXII. Farther proofs of the darkneſs of the whole paragraph — XXXIII. A general idea of its character — XXXIV. Difficulty attending this examination XXXV. Uſe that that may be made of it — XXXVI. Orginal Contract, a fiction | — 32 33 45 I. Notion — © T N r 1. Notion of the Original Contra over- thrown by Mr. Hume page 2. Hiftory of a mind perplexed by Fiction XXXVII. Fictions in genera! miſchievous in the preſent ſtate of things —— XXXVIII. This had a momentary ufe — A compact, or contract — XXXIX. Terms of the ſuppoſed contract ſtated : XL. Stated thus generally, it could not diſ- . penſe men from entering into the : queſtion of z:/ity, as was intended XLI. Nor, if ſtated more particularly, could it anſwer what was deſigned by it XLII. Nor is it an original independent prin- ciple — XLIII. Nor can it ſerve to prove any thing but what may be better proved without it | XLIV. The Coronation-Oath does not come up to the notion of it | Sk XLV. The obligation of a promiſe will not h ſtand againſt that of utility: while that of utility will againſt that of a promiſe — — VXLVI. A fallacy obviated — — XLVII. The obligation of a promiſe, were it even independent, would not be extenfive enough for the purpoſe — XLVIII. But the principle of vrilirr is allſufficient — — 62 _ CHAP, NT NN TFS.
= CHA F. 1L I. Subje& of the preſent chapter page II. Theological flouriſh of our Author — III. Governors—celeſtial endowments found for them — — IV. The paſſage recited — — V. Theology on ſuch an occaſion as this impertinent — VI. Difficulty it leads him into — VII. Power, either natural or political — VIII. In neither ſenſe can it be attributed as he attributes it — — IX. What it is that may — — X. —and for what reaſon —— XI. Heterogeneous contents of the next para- graph — XII. The paragraph recited — XIII. Paradoxical aſſertion in the latter part of it, as if all governments were the re- ſult of a free preference XIV. Reaſons for ſuppoſing this to have been the meaning of it | XV. The doctrine of it applied to particular inſtances | | XVI. General contents of the ſix remaining pa- ragraphs relating to the ſubject of this chapter — —— XVII. —of the firſt paragraph — XVIII. — Second — XIX. — Third — — XX. — Fourth —— — ib.
XXII. XXIII.
XXIV. XXV. XXVI.
XXVII. XXVIII. XXIX. XXX. XXXI. XXXII. XXXIII.
XXXIV.
XXXV.
CONTENTS.
— Sixth | page 78 Definitions of the three ſorts of govern- ments according to our Author — 33. The paragraph recited — 79 and the next How he aſſigns them their reſpective qualifications— is.
All appearing equally eligible in his view of them 81 — How to the Britiſh Conſtitution — 82 Contradiction he falls into, in ſuppoſing other ſorts of Government than theſe three, deſcribed as they are by him 26, Governments the ſame as theſe under other names Qualifications of the three forms how allotted—the ſubje@ reſumed — 85 The paragraph recited — 87 —and the next — — 33 Democracy, as deſcribed by him, no Government at all 89 The qualification deſigned for it be- come vacant —— — 91 H . Our Author's panegyric on the Britiſh Conſtitution — 92 The paragraph recited — 6, And that which follows it — 94 Executive power the mention of it— incongruouſly introduced 96 Difficulty of determining what it is as contra- diſtinct to legiſlative 97 VI. Independence CONTENT S8.
VI. Independence inaccurately attributed to the three branches of the Govern- ment - page VII. A happy diſcovery—merit inſeparable from high ſtation — VIII. Suppoſed qualities of the three pretended forms of Government not applicable to our on IX. Wiſdom, why likely to be wanting in the members of a Democracy— X. —and pre/ent in thoſe of an Ariſtocracy XI. Why, according to our Author — XII. Superiority of ** experience” how far a proof of ſuperiority of wiſdom — XIII. —how far attributable to ariſtocrac ies in general — XIV. —how far to our Houfe of Lords in particular — — XV. What is to be underſtood by the word © experience” XVI. Opportunity of experience not the fole cauſe of wiſdom — — XVII. Mediatory caution not the peculiar ow vince of the Lords | XVIII. The Democratical branch of our Legiſ- lature upon our Author's principles, not diſtinguiſhable from the Ariftocratical — XIX. All. perfection of the Britiſh Conſtitution mathematically demonſtrated — XX. The demonſtration drawn up in form XXI. Concluſion of the Chapter — IOF ib, * XII.
XIII. XIV.
XV. XVI. XVII.
XVIII.
The paragraph recited CONTEN T8.
CHAP. IV. Subject of the paragraph in queſtion as ſtated by our Author page Drift of it as conjectured — The ſenſe of it confidered in itfelf —— The leading argument in it nugatory The antecedent ſtated anew — The conſequent new ſtated That it is identical with the antecedent: —or elſe nothing to the purpoſe The reſt of the paragraph new ſtated ſuppoſed drift of it Weakneſs of it as a perſuaſive to obe- dience — A prior paragraph ſuppoſed to be relative to the object of this — Another 2 — Agitation he betrays pai Cauſe of it —— — Reſource he finds in obſcurity Inconſiſtency of the preſent paſſage with a former The former paſſage recited Dangerous tendency of it The principle of uT1LITY the only guide under theſe difficulties Juncture for reſiſtance Not characterizable by any common ſign — Freedom in a government depends not upon any limitation to the Supreme Power — ib.
XXIV. Principal XXIV. Principal circumſtances on which it N does depend — page 15 3 þ XXV. Freedom in a government how far fa- vourable to reſiſtance — 154 0 - XXVI. The ſupreme power not limited in it- XXVII. Arguments that ſuppoſe it to be ſo, unſatis factory — 3.
XXVIII. —and inapplicable to particulars — 156 XXIX. What they lead to is either an appeal [- to the body of the people — 7 5 | XXX. —or to the judicial power — 158 j XXXI. Which tends to give it a controul over the legiſlative | XXXII. —A remedy worſe than the diſeaſe 160 XXXIII. But not ſo bad as ſome might repre- | ſent it — | 1 fin. XXXIV. The ſupreme power limitable by con- 8 vention — — 162 XXXV. So as the terms of it be explicit — 164 XXXVI. Which furniſhes what may be taken 4 for a common ſignal of reſiſtance 165 —_. XXXVII. A /alvo for reformation 106 = XXXVIII. Notion of a natural limit to the ſu- . preme power difficult to eradicate 168 8 XXXIX. This not a mere affair of words —— 170 XL.” The above notion perpetuates wrang- | XLI. The principle of uTiLIiTY puts an end to it 17 E d TK 207 CHAP Fs I. Subject of the paragraph examined in the preſent chapter page 175 II. The paragraph recited zb. III. The firſt ſentence examined. The moſt obvious ſenſe of it nugatory 176 TV. The next moſt obvious extravagant — 177 V. A third ſenſe propoſed 178 VI. Objection to the uſe of the word Jury” on this occaſion — m — 179 1. Duty (political) — — z. 2. Right (political) — — 180 3. Puniſhment a fundamental idea — ib. 4. To define or expound 15. 5. Words not to be expounded but by pa- raphraſis — 125. 6. Paraphraſis at — 2. 7. Definition per genus & differentiam, not uni verſally applicable — 181 8. Further examples; — diſpoſition, — eltate,—interelt, - power — 7. 9. An imperfection frequent in our Au- thor*s method —. VII. The proper ſenſe of it — — 180 I. Duties, three ſorts — 152 2. Political duty — — 25. 3. Religious duty — — 183 4. Moral duty — — 25. 5. Difference between theſe ſenſes and a fourth awhich is figurative and 1mproper — 6. Duty * COU T 6. Duty not applicable here 12 any proper fuss, — page Governors in aubat way ſubſect to po- litical duties notwith/tanding their being 1 upreme VIII. That in which it is here uſed gurati ve IX. The propoſition acceded to in this laſt ſenſe.— — X. Obſcured again by the next ſentence the Cenſor's part confounded with that of the Hi/orian RE ů — OE XI, —Fixed and particularized—Promulgation recommended XII. The recommendation enforced by our Author's concluding ſentence III. Neceſſity and uſe of theſe verbal criticiſms — Vn MVSEVM BRITANNICVM "ID — ͥ́ͤ WED AE ol bes 5 Ke n