A Fragment on Government

Attempt to reconcile theſe contra- dictions— Society diſ- tinguiſhed into natural and politi- cal.

ſite. In the one, $0cIETY, or a STATE of SOCIETY, is put ſynonymous to a STATE of - NATURE; and ſtands oppoſed to GOvERN=- MENT, or a STATE OF GOVERNMENT: in this ſenſe it may be tiled, as it com- monly is, natural SOCIETY. In the other, it is put ſynonymous to GOVERNMENT, or a STATE OF GOVERNMENT; and ſtands oppoſed to a STATE OF NATURE: in this eenſe it may be tiled, as it commonly is, Talitical so rf. Of the difference be- q tween theſe two fates, a tolerably diſ- J tint idea, I take it, may be given in a word or two.

GG: X. Ie rn.

I.

X. Idea of poli- tical ſociety.

XI.

Idea of natu- ral ſociety.

ſaid to be in a ſtate of zatural s- A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, X.

The idea of a natural ſociety is a nega- tive one. The idea of a political ſocicty is a Poſitive one. 'Tis with the latter, therefore, we ſhould begin.

When a number of perſons (whom we may ſtile ſubjects} are ſuppoſed to be in the habit of paying obedience to a perſon, or an aſſemblage of perſons, of a known and certain deſcription (whom we may call governor or governors) ſuch perſons altogether / ſubjecis and governors} are faid to be in a ſtate of political $0CIETY *, The idea of a ſtate of natural SOCIETY is, as we have ſaid, a negative one. When a number of perſons are ſuppoſed to be in the habit of conver/ing with each other, at the ſame time that they are not in any ſuch habit as mentioned above, they are CIETY.

FoRMATION F GOVERNMENT. 19 MM. Chap. If we reflect a little, we ſhall perceive, J. that, between theſe two ſtates, there is XI © 5 F, | Difficulty of not that explicit ſeparation which theſe d names, and theſe definitions, might teach — 3 one, at firſt ſight, to expect. It is with * them as with light and darkneſs: how- ever diſtinct the ideas may be, that are, at mention, ſuggeſted by thoſe names, the things themſelves have no determinate bound to ſeparate them. The circum- ſtance that has been ſpoken of as conſti- tuting the difference between theſe two ſtates, is the preſence or abſence of an Ha- lit of obedjence. This habit, accordingly, has been ſpoken of ſimply as preſent (that is as being perfectly preſent) or, in other words, we have ſpoken as if there were a 3 perfect habit of obedience, in the one caſe: it has been ſpoken of fimply as 93/ert L (that 3 is as being perfely abſent) or, in other words, we have ſpoken as if there were no habit of obedience at all, in the other. But neither of theſe manners of ſpeaking, perhaps, is ſtrictly juſt. Few, C2 in Sa To Rr LO on te Er OY Tr aL” wm 8 88 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.

HAP. in fact, if any, are the inſtances of this I. habit being perfectly ab/ent; certainly none at all, of its being perfectly preſent, Governments accordingly, in proportion as the habit of obedience is more perfect, recede from, in proportion as it is leſs perfect, approach to, a ſtate of nature: and inſtances may preſent themſelves in which it ſhall be difficult to ſay whether a habit, perfect, in the degree in which, to conſtitute a government, it 1s deemed neceſſary it ſhould be perfect, does ſubſiſ or not. [G XIII. On.

[2] 1. A habit is but an aſſemblage of ads: under E _ which name I would alſo include, for the preſent, vi luntary forbearances. | | A ee 5 78g 2. A habit of obedience then is an aſſemblage of 4d dience. chedlienct.

. An a of obedience is any act done in purſuance ef „ 3 4 | * puriuai dience, an expreſſion of will on the part of ſome ſaperior.

4. An a% of POLITICAL obedience (which is what 1 here meant) is any act done in purſuance of an exprel- ſion of will on the part of a perſon governing.

. An act of poli- tical obedience.

LL > _ 5. An expreſſion of will is either parole or tacit. 6 6. A parole expreſſion of will is that which is conveyed x apa rel. by the Aus called words. 10h OT WIII.: a 7. 7. A tacit expreſſion of will is that which is conveyed A tacit expreſ-:. . by any other /izns Wwhatſoever: among which no y FoRMATION of GOVERNMENT. XIII. | On theſe conſiderations, the ſuppoſi- tion of a perfect flate of nature, or, as it may be termed, a ſtate of ſocrety perfectly natural, may, perhaps, be juſtly pronoun- ced, what our Author for the moment ſeemed ſo efficacious as ads of puniſhment, annexed in time paſt, to the non-performance of acts of the ſame ſort with thoſe that are the objects of the will that is in queſtion. 8. A parole expreſſion of the will of a perten is a command. | | 9. When a facit expreſſion of the will of a ſuperior is ſuppoſed to have been uttered, it may be ſtiled a fetitious command. 10. Were we at liberty to coin words after the manner of the Roman lawyers, we might ſay a gua/i-com- mand, 11. The STaTUTE Law is wor of commands. The Common Law, of qgua/i-commands, = 12. An act which is the object of a command actual or ftitious; ſuch an act, conſidered before it is per- 8 Jormed, is ſtiled a duty, or a point of duty. Ss 13. Theſe definitions premiſed, we are now in a con- dition to give ſuch an idea, of what is meant by the Perfection or imperfection of a habit of obedience in a ſo- cCiety as may prove tolerably preciſe. | = 14 A period in the duration of the ſociety; the num- ber of per/ons it is compoſed of during that period; and 5 | the number of points of duty incumbent on each perſon 3 being given —the habit of obedience will be more or les perfect, in the ratio of the number of acts of obedience : to thoſe of di/obedzence, 21 CH Ap. 12 XIII. A perfect ſtate of na- ture not more chimerical than a per- fect ſtate of government.

4.

A command, 9. A fichitious com- Ma nd.

Commands guaji-com- mands.

1 Illuſtration— Statute Law, B Common Law. Duty—point of duty.

Uſe of the above chain of defini- tions.

Habit of obe- dience - meaſure of its perfection.

8 7 CCC e.. K. nt N - et Totes - > -- wo An, Ei tr ae IIluſtration.

Political union or connection.

ww: Submiſiion — ſubjection.

Submitlion ꝙ ſubjection.

of nations, from the leaſt perfect ſtates of political union be found in LoxD KATus's Hiftorical Law Tracks.

A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, ſeemed to think it, an extravagant ſuppo- ſition: but then that of a government in this ſenſe perfect; or, as it may be term- ed, a ſtate of ſociety e; political, a ſtate 15. The habit of obedience 10 this country appears to have been more perfect in the time of the Saxors than in that of the Britons: unqueſtionably it is more ſo now - than in the time of the Saxons. It is not yet ſo perſect, as well contrived and well digeſted laws in time, it is to „ may render it. But abſolutely perfect, till aſes to be man, it never can be.

A very ingenious and inſtructive view of the progreſs to that highly perfect tate of it in which we live, may 16, For the convenience and accuracy of diſcourſe it may be of uſe, in this place, to ſettle the ſignification of a few other expreſſions relative to the ſame ſubject. Per- ſons who, with reſpect to each other, are in a ſtate of political ſociety, may be ſaid alſo to be in a ſtate of politi- cal union or connection. | 17. Such of them as are /ubjefs may, accordingly, be ſaid to be in a ſtate of /ubmiſ/ion, or of ſubjection, witi reſpe& to governors ſuch as are governors in a ſtate of authority with reſpect to /ubjeds. g 18. When the ſubordination is conſidered as reſult- ing originally from the aw//, or (it may be more prope! to ſay) the pleaſure of the party governed, we rather uſe * ſubmigqtion: when from that of the party g0- verning, the word © ſubjecion. On this account it i, that the term can ſcarcely be uſed without apology, unleſs with a note of diſapprobation: eſpecially in this 7 | country, the word Wy 7 "> be.

ſtate of perfect Political union, a ſtate of perfect fubm! ion in the Subject, of perfect outborily 1 in the g9vernor, is no leſs ſo. [c] XIV. A recountry, where the habit of conſidering the con/ert of the perſons governed as being in ſome ſenſe or other in- volved in the notion of all /awful, that is, all commend- able government, has gained ſo firm a ground. It is on this account, then, that the term ** ubjection, exclud- ing as it does, or, at leaſt, not zzcluding ſuch conſent, is uſed commonly in what is called a BAD ſenſe: that is, in ſuch a ſenſe as, together with the idea of the ob- ject in queſtion, conveys the accęſſary idea of diſappro- bation. This acceſſary idea, however, annexed as it 1s to the al rad term ſubjection,“ does not extend itſelf to the concrete term - ſubjectsꝰ a kind of inconſiſtency of which there are many inſtances in language.

[e] It is true that every perſon muſt, for ſome time, at leaſt, after his birth, neceſſarily be in a ſtate of ſub- jection with reſpect to his parents, or thoſe who ſtand in the place of parents to him; and that a perfect one, or at leaſt as near to being a perfect one, as any that we ſee. But for all this, the ſort of ſociety that is con- ſtituted by a ſtate of ſubjection thus circumſtanced, does not come up to the idea that, I believe, is generally entertained by thoſe who ſpeak of a political ſociety, To conſtitute what is meant in general by that phraſe, a greater number of members is required, or, at leaſt, a duration Capable of a longer continuance, Indeed, for this purpoſe nothing leſs, I take it, than an indefinite duration is required. A ſociety, to come within the no- tion of what is ordinarily meant by a political one, muſt * It is not a fa- mily union, however perfect, that can conſtitute a politica ſociety —Why.

Ul - P NC TT dat 8. oy * LY << 8 Mr + WP 39 A By SR WITT, Ro 1 _— A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, Cuar. Z | i I. A remark there is, which, for the more ho ths. Gen XIV. thoroughly clearing up of our notions on 6 State of hi ſh.. | « nature” a this ſubject, it may be proper here to relative ex- make. To ſome ears, the phraſes, “ ſtate preſſion, 1 0 1 * of nature, * ſtate of political ſociety,” be ſuch as, in 1ts nature, 15 not incapable of continuing for ever in virtue of the principles which gave it birth, This, it is plain, is not the caſe with ſuch a family ſo— ciety, of which a parent, or a pair of parents are at the head. In ſuch a ſcciety, the only principle of union which is certain and uniform in its operation, is the na- tural weakneſs of thoſe of its members that are in 2 ſtate of ſubjection; that is, the children: a principle which has but a ſhort and limited continuance. I quel- tion whether it be the caſe even with a family ſociety, ſubſiſting in virtue of collateral conſanguinity; and that for the like reaſon. Not but that even in this caſe a habit of obedience, as perfe& as any we ſee examples of, may ſubſiſt for a time; to wit, in virtue of the ſame moral prineiples which may protract a habit of filial obedience beyond the continuance of l ones which gave birth to it: I mean affection, gratitude, awe, the force of habit, and the like. But it is not long, even in this caſe, before the bond of connection muſt either become imperceptible, or loſe its influence by being too extended.

Theſe conſiderations, therefore, it will be proper to bear in mind in applying the definition of political ſo- ciety above given [in par. 10.] and in order to reconcile it with what is ſaid further on [in par. 17. ] may Fox MAT ION of GOVERNMENT.

may carry the appearance of being abſo- Jute in their ſignification: as if the con- dition of a man, or a company of men, in one of theſe ſtates, or in the other, were a matter that depended altogether upon themſelves. But this is not the caſe. To the expreſſion “ ſtate of na- 4 ture,” no more than to the expreſſion « ſtate of political ſociety,” can any pre- ciſe meaning be annexed, without refer- ence to a party different from that one who is ſpoken of as being in the ſtate in queſtion. This will readily be perceived, The difference between the two ſtates lies, as we have obſerved, in the habit of obedience. With reſpect then to a habit of obedience, it can neither be underſtood as ſubſiſting in any perſon, nor as not ſubſiſting, but with reference to ſome other perſon. For one party to obey, there muſt be another party that is obeyed. But this party who is obeyed, may at dif- ferent times be different. Hence may one and the ſame party be conceived to obey and ot to obey at the ſame time, * 40 3 Dy r * VS r Lo Wis * 1 8 ed i. i Ld _ VVV n ö 8 Ye EC FE. a 1 ES SW. WF A CY end ISL ES — hi Weg 8 LAY 1 2 _— LIKED 1 F Woe n c So rs ES L Dr — ,.

— 85 e. Sets ASD 26 CHAP. Li V. Different de- grees of ſuh · jection a- mong gover- nors.

A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, ſo as it be with reſpect. to different perons, or, as we may ſay, to different objefs of obedience. Hence it is, then, that one and the ſame party may be ſaid to be in a ſtate of nature and not to be in a ſtate of nature, and that at one and the ſame time, according as it is this or hat party that 1s taken for the other obje& of com-- pariſon. The caſe is, that in common ſpeech, when no particular object of com- pariſon is ſpecified, all perſons in general are intended: ſo that when a number of perſons are ſaid fimply to be in a ſtate of nature, what is underſtood is, that they are ſo as well with reference to one ano— ther, as to all the world. XV.

In the ſame manner we may under- ſtand, how the ſame man, who is gover- nor with reſpe& to one man or ſet of men, may be ſabject with reſpect to ano- ther: how among covernors ſome may be in a perfect ſtate of nature with reſpect to each other: as the KINGS of FRANCE. and SPAIN: others, again, in a ſtate of per fect 8 FoR MATION of GoVERNMENT.

perfect ſubjeftion, as the Hospopars of WALACHIA and MoLDAvIaA with re- ſpect to the GRAND S16N10R: others, again, in a ſtate of manifeſt but inperfeci ſubjeFion, as the GERMAN States with re- ſpect to the EMPEROR: others, again, in ſuch a ſtate in which it may be difficult to determine whether they are in a ſtate of imperfect ſubection or in a perfect ſtate of nature: as the KING of NAPLES with reſpect to the Pore. [di XVI.

In the ſame manner, alſo, it may be \ conceived, without entering into details, how any fingle perſon, born, as all per- ſons are, into a ſtate of perfect ſubjection to his parents *, that is into a ſtate of perfect political ſociety with reſpect to his parents, may from thence paſs into a perfect ſtate of nature; and from thence 4] The Kingdom of Naples is feudatory to the Papal See: and in token of fealty, the King, at his acceſſion, preſents the Holy Father with a white horſe. The Royal vaſſal ſometimes treats his Lord but cavalierly: but always ſends him his white horſe, * V. ſupra, par. 13. note [c].

ſucceſſively 27 CHAP. E — Dong XVI. The ſame perſon alter. nately in a ſtate of po- litical and natural ſo- ciety with reſpect to different ſo- cieties.

/ 28 CuAr. L.

— XVII.

In the ſame political ſo- ciety the ſame perſons alternately, governors and ſubjects, with reſpect to the ſame perſons.

XVIII. Hints of ſe- R * FT ko the Ae Hee ee 8 nun” 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.

ſucceſſively into any number of different ſtates of political ſociety more or leſs per- fe, by paſſing into different ſocieties, XVII.

In the ſame manner alſo it may be conceived how, in any political ſociety, the ſame man may, with reſpect to the ſame individuals, be, at different periods, and on different occaſions, alternately, in the ſtate of governor and ſubject: today concurring, perhaps active, in the bu- ſineſs of iſſuing a general command for the obſervance of the whole ſociety, a- mongſt the reſt of another man in quality of Judge to-morrow, puniſhed, per- haps, by a particular command of that ſame Judge for not obeying the genera command which he himſelf (1 mean the perſon acting in character of governor) had iflued. I need ſcarce remind the eader how happily this alternate ſtate of authority and fubmiſjion is exemplified a- mong ourſelves. XVIII.

Here might be a place to ſtate the different FoRMATION of GOVERNMENT. different ſhares which different perſons may have in the iſſuing of the ſame com- mand: to explain the nature of corporate a#ion: to enumerate and diſtinguiſh half 1 dozen or more different modes in which ſubordination between the ſame parties may ſubſiſt: to diſtinguiſh and explain the different ſenſes of the words, ** con- « ſent,” © repreſentation,” and others of connected import: conſent, and repre- ſentation, thoſe intereſting but perplexing words, ſources of ſo much debate: and ſources or pretexts of ſo much animoſity. But the limits of the preſent deſign will by no means admit of ſuch protracted and intricate diſcuſſions. | XIX.

In the ſame manner, alſo, it may be conceived, how the ſame ſet of men con- ſidered among themſelves, may at one time be in a ſtate of nature, at another time in a ſtate of government. For the habit of obedience, in whatever degree of per- fection it be neceſſary it ſhould ſubfiſt in order to conſtitute a government, may be h conceived, 29 CHAP.

1 veral topics that muſt be paſſed by.

XIX.

The {ame ſo- ciety, alter- nately, in a tate of na- ture and a ſtate of go- vernment.

Cnar. I.

XX. In ſtance the Abori- gines of America.

XXI.

Characteriſ- iſtic of poli- tical union.

4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, conceived, it is plain, to ſuffer interrup- tions. At different junctures it may take * and ceaſe.

Inſtances of this ſtate of things appear not to be unfrequent. The ſort of ſo- ciety that has been obſerved to ſubſiſt among the AMERICAN INDIANS may afford us one. According to the accounts we have of thoſe people, in molt of their tribes, if not in all, the habit we are ſpeaking of appears to be taken up only in time of war. It ceaſes again in time of peace. The neceſſity of acting in concert againſt a common enemy, ſubjects a whole tribe to the orders of a common Chicf. On the return of peace each war- rior reſumes his priſtine independence.

XXI.; One difficulty there is that ſtill ſticks by us. It has been ſtarted indeed, but not ſolved. —This is to find a note of diſtinction, —a characteriſtic mark, whereby to diſtinguiſh a ſociety in which there 7s a habit oFobedience, and that at the degree OY Fox MAT ION of GOVERNMENT.

31 degree of perfection which is neceſſary C HA.

to conſtitute a ſtate of government, from a ſociety in which there is zof a mark, I mean, which ſhall have a viſible deter- minate commencement; inſomuch that the inſtant of its firſt appearance ſhall be diſtinguiſhable from the laſt at which it had not as yet appeared. Tis only by the help of ſuch a mark that we can be in a condition to determine, at any given time, whether any given ſociety is in a ſtate of government, or in a ſtate of na- ture. I can find no ſuch mark, I muſt confeſs, any where, unleſs it be this; the eſtabliſhment of names of office: The appearance of a certain man, or ſet of men, with a certain name, ſerving to mark them out as objects of obedience: ſuch as King, Sachem, Cacique, Senator, Burgo-maſter, and the like. This, I think, may ſerve tolerably well to diſtin- guiſh a ſet of men in a ſtate of political union among hemſelves from the ſame ſet of men not yet in ſuch a ſtate.

XXII.

B . n K 32 4 FRAGMENT ox GOVERNMENT, CHnaP. XXII. bl J. But ſuppoſe an inconteſtible political XXII. ſociety, and that a large one, formed; > 2 and from that a ſmaller body to break in a ſtate of Off by this breach the ſmaller body political union, at ceaſes to be in a ſtate of political union what inſtant a new ſociety With reſpect to the larger: and has there- ny pe lard by placed itſelf, with reſpect to that larger | ii to be formed, by defection body, in a ſtate of nature—What means from a for- 2; mer. ſhall we find of aſcertaining the preciſe juncture at which this change took place? What ſhall be taken for the characteristic mark in this caſe? The appointment, it may be ſaid, of new governors with new names. But no ſuch appointment, ſup- poſe, takes place. The ſubordinate go- vernors, from whom alone the people at largewere in uſe to receive their commands under the old government, are the ſame from whom they receive them under the new one. The habit of obedience which theſe ſubordinate governors were in with reſpect to that ſingle perſon, we will ſay, who was the ſupreme governor of the whole, is broken off inſenſibly and by degrees, Fox MATION F GovERNMENT.

grees. The old names by which cheſe ſubordinate governors were characterized, while they were ſubordinate, are continued now they are ſupreme. In this caſe it ſeems rather difficult to anſwer. XXIII.

If an example be required, we may take that of the DuTcu provinces with reſpect to SPAIN. Theſe provinces were b once branches of the Spaniſh monarchy. hey have now, for a long time, been W univerſally ſpoken of as independent ſtates: independent as well of that of W Spain as of every other. They are now in a ſtate of nature with reſpe& to Spain. They were once in a ſtate of political union with reſpect to Spain: namely, in 1 a ſtate of ſubjection to a fingle governor, 4 a King, who was King of Spain. At 1 what preciſe juncture did the diſſolution 3 of this political union take place? At what preciſe time did theſe provinces ceaſe 4 [to be ſubject to the King of Spain? This, C D I doubt, XXIII.

1ſt, in caſe of defection by whole bo- dies —in- ſtance the Dutch pro- vinces.

. PPP P 22 N SY — CHAP. 1 XXIV. 2dly, in caſe of defection by indivi- duals—in- ſtances, Rome Venice.

. A rewvo!t, at what junc- ture 1t can be ſaid to have taken place.

4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, I doubt, will be rather — to agree upon ſel.

XXIV.

Suppoſe the defection to have begun, not by entire provinces, as in the inſtance juſt mentioned, but by a handful of fugi- tives, this augmented by the acceſſion of other fugitives, and ſo, by degrees, to 1 body of men too ſtrong to be reduced, the difficulty will be encreaſed {till far- ther. At what preciſe juncture was it that ancient RoME, or that modern Vꝑ- NICE, became an independent ſtate > XXV.

XXV.

In general then, At what preciſe juncture is it, that perſons ſubject to a government, become, by diſobedience, with reſpect to that government, in a ſtate of nature? When is it, in ſhort, that a revs! ſhall be deemed to have taken place; and [e]! Upon recolle&ion, I have ſome doubt whether this example would be found hiſtorically exact. If not, that of the defection of the Nabobs of Indoſtan may a. ſwer the purpoſe. My firſt choice fell upon the nn ſuppoſing it to be rather better known.

10 Wien, * Vell to the law as to the fact [/]. Diſobedience that is unconſcious with reſpect 4 " 8 * keen Wo She IP LY ne EAT OY ONT LITRE It TT Oe dats, 4 * * * g 9 9 Re * 4% * Jn Axa 0 8 mais 8 R. Rn, OTE bo * N rr iM 9 Sr wy 5 RA 0 28 R CR ate heels oi AA W 1; 2 3 W with reſpe? to the fads, when the party is ignorant either unconſcious I of his having done the act itſelf, which is forbidden by with, NE . the law, or elſe of his having done it in thoſe circum- F Sauces, in which alone it is forbidden.

FoRMATION of Government. 25 when, again, 1s it, that that revolt ſhall Cur, be deemed to ſuch a degree ſucceſsful, as I.

— to have ſettled into independence? 5. XXVI. As it is the obedience of individuals Di/ebed*erces that conſtitutes a ſtate of ſubmiſſion, ſo 1 — \ is it their diſobedience that muſt conſti- revolt. tute a ſtate of revolt. Is it then every act of diſobedience that will do as much? The aftirmative, certainly, is what can never be maintained: for then would there be no ſuch thing as government to be found any where. Here then a diſtinction or two obviouſly preſents itſelf. Difobedi- ence may be diſtinguiſhed into confcrous, or unconſcious; and that, with reſpect a8 to either, will readily, I ſuppoſe, be ac- knowledged not to be a revolt. Diſobe- 3 „ dience [f] 1. Dif obedience. may be faid to be noni 1. Diſobedience the fact.

2. Diſohedience 36 CHnaP.

.

XXVII. Diſobediences do amount to what a revolt.

2. Diſobedience unconſcious with reſpect to the Law.

Illuſtra tion.

Diſobediences fraudulent and forcible — the difference, illuſ- trated, 4 FRAGMENT ox GOVERNMENT.

dience again that is conſcious with reſpect to both, may be diſtinguiſhed into fecret and open; or, in other words, into fraudulent and forcible, [g] Diſobedience that is only fraudulent, will likewiſe, I ſuppoſe, be readily Oo. not to amount to a revolt. XXVII. The difficulty that will remain will concern ſuch diſobedience only as is both conſcious, (and that as well with reſpect 2. Diſobedience may be ſaid to be avconſeious, with reſpect to the /aw; when although he may know of his having done the ad that is in reality forbidden, and. that, under the circumſtances in which it is forbidden, he knows not of its being forbidden, or at leaſt of its being forbidden in theſe circumances.

3. So long as the buſineſs of ſpreading abroad the knowledge of the law continues to lie in the neglect in which i: has lain hitherto, inftances of diſobedience unconſcious with reſpect to the laav, can never be other- wiſe than abundant, ſe] If examples be thought neceſſary, Theft may ſerve for an example of fraudulent diſobedience; Rob- bery of forcible. In Theft, the perſon of the diſobedient party, and the ack of diſobedience, are both endeavoured | to be kept ſecret, In Robbery, the 44 of diſobedience, at leaſt, if not the per/or of him who diſobeys, is mani- feſt and avowed, to FoRMATION of GOVERNMENT.

to /aw as fact,) and forcible, This diſ- obedience, it ſhould ſeem, is to be de- termined neither by umbers altogether (that is of the perſons ſuppoſed to be diſobedient) nor by acts, nor by mrentions all three may be fit to be taken into conſideration. But having brought the difficulty to this point, at this point I muſt be content to leave it. To pro- ceed any farther in the endeavour to ſolve it, would be to enter into a diſcuſſion of particular local juriſprudence. It would be entering upon the definition of Treaſon, as diſtinguiſhed from Murder, Robbery, Riot, and other ſuch crimes, as, in compariſon with Treaſon, are ſpoken of as being of a more private nature. Sup- poſe the definition of Treaſon ſettled, and the commiſſion of an act of Treaſon is, as far as regards the perſon committing it, the characteriſtic mark we are in ſearch of, | XXVIII. Theſe remarks it were eaſy to extend to a much greater length. Indeed, it is hat would be neceſſary, in order to give "JE 2 h them XXVII.. Unfniſhed ſtate of the above hints, 4 i!

2; 8 l A SL 2 .

1 XXIX.

Our Author's propoſition, That go << vernment * reſults of % courſe,” not true.

A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.

them a proper fullneſs, and method, and preciſion. But that could not be done without exceeding the limits of the pre- ſent deſign. As they are, they may ſerve as hints to ſuch as ſhall be diſpoſed to give the ſubject a more exact and regular examination.

From what has been ſaid, however, we may judge what truth there is in our Author's obſervation, that“ when ſo— « ciety” (underſtand natural ſocicty) * is * once formed, government” (that is po- litical ſociety) (whatever quantity or de- gree of Obedience is neceſſary to conſti- tute political ſociety) « reſults of courſe; * as neceſſary to preſerve and to keep that ſociety in order.” By the words, e of courſe,” is meant, I ſuppoſe, con- ftantly and immediately: at leaſt conſtantly. According to this, political ſociety, in any ſenſe of it, ought long ago to hays been eſtabliſhed all the world over. Whether this be the caſe, let any one judge from the inſtances of the Hottentots, of the Patagonians, and of ſo many other STI FoRMATION of GovERNMENT: 29 other barbarous tribes, of which we hear Cyap, from travellers and navigators. | 1.

XXX. XXX. It may be, after all, we have miſunder- Ambiguity ſtood his meaning. We have been ſup- e, 8885 poſing him to have been meaning to aſ- ſert a matter of fact, and to have written, or at leaſt begun, this ſentence in the character of an Hiſtorical obſerver: where- as, all he meant by it, perhaps, was to ſpeak in the character of a Cenſor, and, on a caſe ſuppoſed, to expreſs a ſentiment of opprobation. In ſhort, what he meant, perhaps, to perſuade us of, was not that government“ does actually reſult * from natural ſociety;” but that it were better that it /hould; to wit, as being neceſſary to preſerve and keep” men © in that ſtate of order,” in which it is of advantage to them that they ſhould be. Which of the abovementiqned characters he meant to ſpeak in, is a problem I mult leave to be determined. The diſ- tinction, perhaps, is what never ſo much as occured to him; and indeed the ſhift- Ds -- ing — I ee I dere wer * ORs _— — 1 —— OY ASC API SIN Win gas WP es, — Es — l ” ws TA - ng — . XY 2 et, K CR Roo 2: As r ͤ— I eo Er =, awed — oF 2 CO en — Cry — * Ls — = * et MF eb: he OS I 40 CHAP. 15 XXXI.

Darkneſs of the whole pa- ragraph fur- ther ſnewn.

reſolve. The preſervation of manwhat it is he would eſtabliſh, are queſ- 4 FRAGMENT o GOVERNMENT. ing inſenſibly, and without warning, from one of thoſe characters to the other, is a failing that ſeems inveterate in our Author; and of which we ſhall probably have more inſtances than one to notice, XXXI. To conſider the whole paragraph (with its appendage) together, ſomething, it may be ſeen, our Author ſtruggles to overthrow, and ſomething to eſtabliſh, But how it is he would overthrow, or tions I muſt confeſs myſelf unable to * kind,” he obſerves, © was effected by *« fingle families.” This is what, upon the authority of the Holy Scriptures, he aſſumes: and from this it is that he would have us conclude the notion of an original contract (the ſame notion which he afterwards adopts) to be ridiculous. The force of this concluſion, I muſt own, I do not ſee. Mankind was preſerved. by ſingle, families—Be it ſo, What is there in this to hinder © individuals“ of thoſe families, or of families deſcended. from Fox MAT TOY of GovERNMENT.