Every thing in its place. Theology in a ſermon, or a catechiſm. But in this place, the flouriſh we have ſeen, might, for every purpoſe of inſtruction, have much better, it ſhould ſeem, been ſpared. What purpoſe the idea of that tremendous and incomprehenſible Being thus unne- ceſſarily introduced can anſwer, I cannot ſee, unleſs it were to bewilder and en- trance the reader; as it ſeems to have bewildered and entranced the writer.
Beginning thus, is beginning at the wrong end: it is explaining ignotum per gnotius. It Fox MS of GovRRNMENr.
It is not from the attributes of the Deity, that an idea is to be had of any qualities in men: on the contrary, it is from what we ſee of the qualities of men, that we obtain the feeble idea we can frame to ourſelves, of the attributes of the Deity. | VI.
We ſhall ſoon ſee whether it be light or darkneſs our Author has brought back from this excurſion to the clouds. The qualifications he has pitched upon for thoſe in whoſe hands Government 1s to be repoſed, we ſee are three: wiſdom, good- neſs, and power. Now of theſe three, one there is which, I doubt, will give him ſome trouble to know what to do with. I mean, that of Power: which, looking upon it as a. jewel, it ſhould ſeem, that would give a luſtre to the royal diadem, he was for importing from the celeſtial regions. In heaven, indeed, we ſhall not diſpute its being to be found; and that at all junctures alike. But the parallel, I doubt, already fails. 5 In 1 Difficulty it leads in tO.
.. SO YER, 8 = VII. Power, either natural or political.
VIII. In neicher A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
In the earthly governors in queſtion, or, to ſpeak more properly, candidates for government, by the very ſuppoſition there can not, at the juncture he ſuppoſes, be any ſuch thing. Power is that very quality which, in conſideration of theſe other qualities, which, it is ſuppoſed, are poſſeſſed by them already, my are now waiting to receive. VII.
By Power in this place, I, for my part, mean political power: the only ſort of power our Author could mean: the only ſort of power that is here in queſtion. A little farther on we ſhall find him ſpeak— ing of this endowment as being poſſeſſed, and that in the higheſt degree, by a King, a ſingle perſon. Natural power therefore, mere organical power, the faculty of giving the hardeſt blows, can never, it 1s plain, be that which he meant to num- ber among the attributes of this godlike perſonage.
VIII.
We lee then the dilemma our Author's theology Forms of GOVERNMENT.
theology has brought him into, by put- ting him upon reckoning power among the qualifications of his candidates. Pow- er is either natural or political. Political power is what they cannot have by the ſuppoſition: for that is the very thing that is to be created, and which, by the eſta- bliſhment of Government, men are going to confer on them. If any then, it muſt be natural power; the natural ſtrength that a man poſſeſſes of himſelf without the help of Government. But of this then, if this be it, there is more, if we may believe our Author, in a ſingle mem- ber of a ſociety, than in that member and all the reſt of the ſociety put together, [4] "Wt This difficulty, if poſſible, one ſhould be glad to ſee cleared up. The truth is, I take it, that in what our Author has [4] V. infra, par. 32. Monarchy, which is the go- vernment of one, is the moſt powerful form of govern- ** ment,” he ſays, of any: more ſo than Demo- cracy, which he deſcribes as being the Government of all, | 3 ſaid 69 CHaAP. II.
ſenſe can it be attributed as he attri- butes it.
— c OO, IX. What it is that may.
Aa A TT Lo E Narr — r V and for what reaſon.
4A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT. faid of power, he has been ſpeaking, as it were, by anticipation: and that what he means by it, is not any power of either kind actually poſſeſſed by any man, or body of men, at the juncture he ſuppoſes, but only a capacity, if one may call it fo, of retaining and putting into action poli- tical power, whenſoever it ſhall have been conferred. Now, of actual power, the quantity that is poſſeſſed is, in every caſe, one and the ſame: for it is neither more nor leſs than the ſupreme power. But as to the capacity above ſpoken of, there do ſeem, indeed, to be good grounds for ſuppoſing it to ſubſiſt in a higher degree in a /fingle man than in a boy.
Theſe grounds it will not be expected that I ſhould diſplay at large: a flight ſketch will be ſufficient.— The efficacy of power is, in part at leaſt, in proportion to the promptitude of obedience: the promp- titude of obedience is, in part, in propor- tion to the promptitude of command:— command is an expreſſion of will: a will i Forms of GovERNMENT.
is ſooner formed by one than many. And this, or ſomething like it, I take to be the plain Engliſh of our Author's metaphor, where he tells us*, as we ſhall ſee a little farther on +, that a monarchy is the % moſt powerful” [form of government] «© of any, all the ſinews of government * being knit together, and united in the „hands of the prince.” XI. = The next paragraph, ſhort as it is, contains variety of matter. The firſt two ſentences of it are to let us know, that with regard to the manner in which each of the particular governments that we know of have been formed, he thinks proper to paſs it by. A third is to inti- mate, for the ſecond time, that all Govern- ments muſt be abſolute in ſome hands or other: In the fourth and laſt, he favours us with a very comfortable piece of intel- ligence; the truth of which, but for his averment, few of us perhaps would have FP 4 1 ſuſpected.
XI. Heteroge- neous con- tents of the next para- graph.
XII. The para- graph re- cited.
A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
ſuſpected. This is, that the qualifica- tions mentioned by the laſt paragraph as requi/ite to be poſſeſſed by all Governors of ſtates are, or at leaſt once upon a time were, actually poſſeſſed by them: (i. e.) according to the opinion of ſomebody; but of what ſomebody is not altogether clear: whether in the opinion of theſe Governors themſelves, or of the perſons governed, by them.
II.
«© How the ſeveral forms of Govern- © ment we now ſee in the world at firſt t actually began,” ſays our Author, is « matter of great uncertainty, and has « gccafioned infinite diſputes. It is not * my buſineſs or intention to enter into *« any of them. However they began, «© or by what right ſoever they ſubſiſt, * there is and muſt be in all of them a * fſupreme, irreſiſtable, abſolute, uncon- *« trolled authority, in which the urs Fe ſumm! impern, or the rights of ſove- ** reignty reſide. And this authority 1s f* placed in thoſe hands, wherein (ac- & cording Fon Ms of GoveRNMENT.
« cording to the oP1NION of the FoUN- « pers of ſuch reſpective ſtates, either « expreſsly given or collected from « their facit APPROBATION) the qua- « [ities requiſite for ſupremacy, wiſdom, « goodneſs, and power, are the moſt like- „ly to be found.“ XIII.
Who thoſe perſons are whom our Au- thor means here by the word founders 3 whether thoſe who became the Governors of the ſtates in queſtion, or thoſe who became the governed, or both together, is what I would not take upon me poli- tively to determine. For aught I know he may have meant neither the one nor the other, but ſome third perſon. And, indeed, what I am vehemently inclined to ſuſpect is, that, in our Author's large conception, the mighty and extenſive do- mains of ATHENS and SPARTA, of which we read ſo much at ſchool and at college, conſiſting each of ſeveral ſcore of miles ſquare, repreſented, at the time this paragraph was writing, the wh Ul: XIII. Paradoxical aſſertion in the latter part of it, as if all govern» ments were the reſult of a free prefer- ENCE, 8 — n P — rr ut rr - * CPR OS Bos r od 8 4+ IC ms Jy - * ye — 2 EI er eters co 1 9 > rt ane ogy ds 1 WG — BW — S — — ns ny — as rho hea OD a IS x c Z Sree ec no Is: - GREIL PER Mr 34, TORE G EIT — & 7 PFF — 6 $22. ot Seu TIL Gs ie a iden is; "IV 2 FSI m_ be ire ayer N p 1 7 4 x Þ HT MATT. ee * EO V he CCC rn — e n _— 74 cuar. II.
— XIV. Reaſons for ſuppoſing this to have been the meaning of Ic.
4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
univerſe: and the reſpective æras of So- lon and Lycurgus, the whole period of the hiſtory of thoſe ſtates. . The words“ founders, —“ opinion,” “ approbation, —in ſhort, the whole complection of the ſentence is ſuch as brings to one's view a ſyſtem of government utterly different from the generality of thoſe we have before our eyes: a ſyſ- tem in which one would think neither caprice, nor violence, nor accident, nor prejudice, nor paſſion, had any ſhare: a ſyſtem uniform, comprehenſive, and ſi- multaneous; planned with phlegmatic deliberation; eſtabliſhed by full and gene- ral aſſent: ſuch, in ſhort, as, according to common imagination, were the ſyſtems laid down by the two ſages abovemen- tioned. If this be the caſe, the object he had in mind when he ſaid Founders, might be neither Governors nor governed, but ſome neutral perſon: ſuch as thoſe ſages, choſen as they were in a manner as umpires, might be conſidered with regard .
2 os 8 wa N Fox Ms of GovERNMENT.
gard to the perſons who, under the prior conſtitution, whatever it was, had ſtood reſpectively in thoſe two relations.
All this, however, is but conjecture: in the propoſition itſelf neither this, nor any other reſtriction is expreſſed. It is deliver- ed explicitly and emphatically in the cha- racer of an univerſal one. In ALL or « THEM,” he afſures us, “this authori- « ty,” (the ſupreme authority) “ plac- « ed in thoſe hands, wherein, according « to the opinion of the founders of ſuch * reſpective ſtates,” theſe. qualities of " wiſdom, goodneſs, and power, are the * moſt likely to be found.” In this character it cannot but throw a ſingular light on hiſtory. I can ſee no end, in- deed, to the diſcoveries it leads to, all of them equally new and edifying. When the Spaniards, for example, became maſ- ters of the empire of Mexico, a vulgar politician might ſuppoſe it was becauſe ſuch of the Mexicans as remained unex- terminated, could not help it. No ſuch thing— 7s CHAP.
II.
AV. The doctrine of it applied to particular inſtances.
TR; II or F 2 —. De A, AO — ny A. RA uo 76 CAP. 2 II.
applied t to particular inſtances, aromas on 7s CIA. — e Tam ene — gb * ens r EH ORR Fi —_ — — vs <p OD PP retro pgey 0" — 2 po Fi Py CI a ET. x.
* WI 8 gn I +. hee 9 R n A IVE; DE TRE 4 FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT. thing—It was becauſe either the Spa- niards were of opinion, or the Mexi. cans themſelves were of *opinion” (which of the two is not altogether clear) that, in Charles Vth, and his ſucceſſors, more - goodneſs (of which they had ſuch abundant proofs) as well as wiſdom, was likely to be found, than in all the Mexicans put tozether. The ſame perſuaſion obtained between Charlemagne and the German Saxons with reſpect to the goodneſs and wiſdom of Charlemagne:—between Wil. liam the Norman and the Engliſh Sax- ons:—between Mahomet IId and the ſubjects of John Paleologus:—between Odoacer and thoſe of Auguſtulus;—be- tween the Tartar Gingiſkan and the Chi- neſe of his time:—-between the Tartars Chang-ti and Cam-ghi, and the Chineſe of their times:—between the Protector Cromwell and the Scotch: — between William IIId and the Iriſh Papiſts: — between Cæſar and the Gauls: —in ſhort, between the Thirty Tyrants, ſo called, and the Athenians, whom our Author 6 ſeems Fox MS of GOVERNMENT.
ſeems to have had in view: to mention theſe examples only, out of as many hundred as might be required. All this, 8 we may truft our Author, he has the i grodneſs to believe: and by ſuch leſ- ſons is the penetration of ſtudents to be ſharpened for "Eg into the depths of politics.
2 XVI.
So much for the introductory para- graph. — The main part of the ſubject is treated of in ſix others: the general con- tents of which are as follows.
XVII.
In the firſt he tells us how many dif- ferent forms of government there are ac- cording to the diviſion of the antients: which diviſion he adopts. Theſe are three: Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and De- mocracy. | IX X ELLE. 1 The next is to tell us, that by the ſove- ] reign POWER he means that U making „ laws.”
XIX. In 77 CH AP. II.
XVI. General con- tents of the {ix remain; ing par: graphs relat- ing to the ſubject of this chapter 66— XVII. —of the firſt paragraph.— XVIII. Second.
.
rr nes a GRE. 2 ˙ CE FEET 8 Ser Ve A kl ORR Sy apes PI.
EROS 3 8 MES an".
PENNE Pres A I In 1 — n T. . TS Ry whe by — 78 "Wl XIX.
— Third.
XX.
— Fourth.
XXI.
XXII. — Sixth e XXIII. Definitions of the three ſorts of go- vernments 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, 24 A XIX. In a third he gives us the advantages and diſadvantages of theſe three dif.
ferent forms of government.
XX..
In a fourth he tells us that theſe are all the antients. would allow of.
XXI.
A fifth is to tell us that the Britiſh form of Government is different from each of them; being a combination of all, and poſſeſſing the advantages of all.
XXII.
In the fixth, and laſt, he ſhews us that it could not poſſeſs theſe advantages, if, inſtead of being what it is, it were either of thoſe others: and tells us what it 1: that may deſtroy it. Theſe two laſt it will be ſufficient here to mention: to ex- amine them will be the taſk of our next chapter.
. Monarchy is that form of Govern- ment in which the power of making Laws is lodged in the hands of a ng!
member Forms of GoveERnMENT.
member of the ſtate in queſtion. Ariſto- cracy is that form of Government in which the power of making laws is lodg- ed in the hands of ſeveral members. De- mocracy is that form of government in which the power of making laws is lodg- ed in the hands of a//” of them put to- gether. Theſe, according to our Au- thor, are the definitions of the Antients; and theſe, therefore, without difficulty, are the definitions of our Author.
XXIV.
« The political writers of antiquity,” ſays he, © will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the firſt, * when the ſovereign power is lodged « in an aggregate aſſembly, conſiſting of * all the members of a community, * which is called a Democracy; the ſe- * cond, when it is lodged in a council * compoſed of ſelect members, and then it is ſtyled an Ariſtocracy; the laſt, © when it is entruſted in the hands of a © ſingle perſon, and then it takes the = © name of a Monarchy. All other ſpe- 79 CHAP. II.
according to our Author.
XXIV. The para- graph re- cited —— Ax EP IE ALICE RG —— 8 os.
1 CHAP.
How he aſ- figns them d elſe the conſtitution is at an end.“ 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
* cies of government they ſay are either * corruptions of, or reducible to theſe © three.” * XXV.
* By the ſovereign power, as was be- e fore obſerved, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power re- , fides, all others muſt conform to, and ff be directed by it, whatever appearance F the outward form and adminiſtration * of the government may put on. For « it is at any time in the option of the i legiſlature to alter that form and ad- % miniſtration by a new edict or rule, * and to put the execution of the laws “ into whatever hands it pleaſes: and all * the other powers of the ſtate muſt * obey the legiſlative power in the exe- % cution of their ſeveral functions, or * XXVI. Having thus got three regular ſimple forms of Government (this anomalous complex one of our own out of the queſtion) and juſt as many qualifications to divide . „ Forms of GOVERNMENT.
divide among them; of each of which, by what he told us a while ago, each form of Government muſt have ſome ſhare, it is eaſy to ſee how their allot- ments will be made out. Each form of Government will poſſeſs one of theſe qualities in perfection, taking its chance, if one may ſay ſo, for its ſhare in the two others. XXVII..
Among theſe three different forms of Government then, it ſhould ſeem, accord- ing to our Author's account of them, there is not much to chooſe. Each of them has a qualification, an endowment, to it- ſelf, Each of them is completely cha- racterized by this qualification. No in- timation is given of any pre-eminence among theſe qualifications, one above another. Should there be any diſpute concerning the preference to be given to any of theſe forms of Government, as proper a method as any of ſettling it, to judge from this view of them, is that of croſs and pile. Hence we may infer, chat all the Governments that ever were, (; or XXVII. All appear- ing equally eligible in his view of them.
92 CAP.
XXVII.
wo How to the Britiſh Conſtitution, K. Contradicö tion he falls A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
or will be, (except a very particular one that we ſhall come to preſently, that is to ſay, our own) are upon a par: that of ATHENS with that of PRRSIA; that of Gr- NEVA with that of Morocco: fince they are all of them, he tells us, ©* corruptions 6 of, or reducible to,” one of theſe. This is happy. A legiflator cannot do amils. He may ſave himſelf the expence of thinking. The choice of a King was once determined, we are told, by the neighing of a horſe. The choice of a form of Government might be determined ſo as well.. XXVIII.
As to our own form of Government, however, this, it is plain, being that which it ſeemed good to take for the theme of his panegyric, and being made out of the other three, will poſſeſs the advantages of all of them put together; and that without any of the diſadvantages; the diſadvantages vaniſhing at the word of command, or even without it, as not being ſuitable to the purpoſe.
At the end of the paragraph which gives FoRMs of GovERNMENT.
gives us the above definitions, one obſer- vation there is that is a little puzzling. « Other ſpecies of government, we are given to underſtand, there are beſides theſe; but then thoſe others, if not re- 83 Crap. IT.
into, in ſup- poſing other ſorts of Go- vernment than theſe « qucible to,” are but“ corruptions of three, deſeri.
« theſe.” Now, what there is in any of theſe to be corrupted, is not ſo eaſy to underſtand. The eſſence of theſe ſeveral forms of government, we muſt always remember, is placed by him, ſolely and entirely, in the article of number in the ratio of the number of the Governors, (for ſo for ſhortneſs we will ſtyle thoſe in whoſe hands is lodged this “ power of * making laws”) to that of the governed. If the number of the former be, to that of the latter, as one to all, then is the form of Government a Monarchy: if as all to all, then is it a Democracy: if as ſome number between one and all, to all, then is it an Ariſtocracy. Now then, if we can conceive a fourth number, which not being more than all, is neither one nor all, nor any thing between one and all, we can conceive a form of Govern- G 2 ment, bed as they are by him.
XXX.
Govern- ments the ſame as theſe under other names.
9 CE . n nn A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, ment, which, upon due proof, may appear to be a corruption of ſome one or other of theſe three []. If not, we muſt look for the corruption ſamewhere elſe: Sup- poſe it were in our Author's reaſon [e]. A Not but that we may meet, indeed, with ſeveral other hard-worded names for forms of Government: but theſe names were only ſo many names for one [4] By the laws of Germany, ſuch and ſuch ſtates are to furniſh ſo many men to the general army of the Empire: ſome of them ſo many men and one half; others, ſo many and one third: others again, if I miſ- take not, ſo many and one fourth. One of theſe half-, third-part, or quarter-men, ſuppoſe, poſſeſſes him- ſelf of the Government: here then we have a kind of corruption of a Monarchy. Is this what our Author had in view? | [c] A more ſuitable place to look for corruption in, if we may take his own word for it, there cannot be. Every man's reaſon,” he aſſures us“, © 15 *© corrupt;”” and not only that, but his underſtand- « ing full of ignorance and error. With regard to others, it were as well not to be too poſitive: but with regard to a man's ſelf, what he tells us from experience, it would be ill manners to diſpute with him.
Or Forms of GovERNMENT.
or other of thoſe three. We hear often of a Tyranny but this is neither more nor leſs than the name a man gives to our Author's Monarchy, when out of humour with it, It is ſtill the Government of number one. We hear now and then too, of a ſort of Government called an Olgarchy: but this is neither more nor leſs than the name a man gives to our Author's Ariſtocracy, in the ſame caſe. It is ſtill the Government of ſome num- ber or other, between one and all. In fine, we hear now and then of a ſort of Go- vernment fit to break one's teeth, called an Ochlocracy: but this is neither more nor leſs than the name a man gives to a Democracy in the ſame caſe. It is ſtill that ſort of Government, which, accord- ing to our Author, is the Government of all. | XXXI.
Let us now ſee how he has diſpoſed of his three qualifications among his three ſorts or forms of Government. Upon Mo- narchy, we ſhall find, he has beſtowed the G3: perfection — EI 'XX Xl.
Qualifica- tions of the three forms, how allotted —the ſubject reſumed.
Dk n OT IIS. 8 ＋: s . * OY: Shes LARS ys hh FATE TTC by a LT I 8 2 c eG NG n 8 r r I WO ASE D LEI, 07 of To AA Rpt c ĩ re Neg en F TI EP Io ECO A k: DET" 2 p % % FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
Cray, perfection of power; on Ariſtocracy, of II. wiſdom; on Democracy, of goodneſs: each OE — FEI of theſe forms having juſt enough, we may ſuppoſe, of the two remaining qualifica- tions beſides its own peculiar one, to make up the neceſſary complement of qualities — EIS rr oor. tm He neg tr I Is > — .
5 requiſite for ſupremacy.” Kings are, (nay were before they were Kings, ſince it was this qualification determined their j ſubjects to make them Kings *) as ſtrong as ſo many Hercules's; but then, as to . their wiſdom, or their goodneſs, there is not much to ſay. The members of an Ariſtocracy are ſo many Solomons: but then they are not ſuch ſturdy folks as your Kings; nor, if the truth is to be ſpoken, have they much more honeſty than their neighbours. As to the members of a Democracy, they are the beſt ſort of people in the world; but then they are but a puny ſort of gentry, as to ſtrength, put them all together; and apt to be 2 little defective in point of underſtanding.
In 65 In 65 £6 "Be ce cc ic ce cc 10 3 cc cc cc 6c cc ce ce cc cc cc 46 cc Fonus of GovERNMENT.
XXXII.
« In a democracy,” ſays he, where πππτν 87 CHAP, II.
the right of making laws reſides in The parathe people at large, public virtue or goodneſs of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualities of government. Popular aſſemblies are frequently fooliſh in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and juſt, and have always a degree of patriotiſm or public ſpirit. In ariſtocracies there is more wiſdom to be found than in the other frames of Government; being compoſed, or intended to be com- poſed, of the moſt experienced citizens; but there is leſs honeſty than in a republic, and leſs ſtrength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the moſt powerful of any, all the finews of government being knit together and united in the hand of the prince; but then there is imminent danger of Ss > ma graph cited.
re- — CHAp.
.
XXXIII.
—and the .
cc cc cc ec cc cc cc Cc cc cc ce cc ce c cc A 0 cc cc 66 Fc * A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, his employing that ſtrength to improvident or oppreſſive purpoſes.”
XXXIII. * Thus theſe three ſpecies of govern- ment have all of them their ſeveral perfections and imperfections. De- mocracies are uſually the beſt calcu- lated to direct the end of a law; ariſ- tocracies to invent the means by which that end ſhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thoſe means into exe- cution. And the antients, as was obſerved, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but theſe three; for though Cicero de- clares himſelf of opinion, efſe optime conſtitutam rempublicam, que ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari * ft modice confuſa; yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a viſionary whim; and one, that if effected, could never be laſting or ſecure.”
In ForMs of GovERNMENT.
XXXIV.
In the midſt of this fine- ſpun ratiocina- tion, an accident has happened, of which our Author ſeems not to be aware. One of his accidents, as a logician would ſay, has loſt its ſubject. one of the qualification he has been telling us of, is, ſomehow or other, become vacant: the form of Government he deſigned it for, having unluckily ſlipped through his fingers in the handling. I mean Democracy; which he, and, according to him, the Antients, make out to be the Government of all. Now © all” is a great many; ſo many that, I much doubt, it will be rather a difficult matter to find theſe high and mighty perſonages power enough, ſo much as to make a decent figure with. The members of this redoubtable Common- wealth will be ſtill worſe off, I doubt, in point of ſubje&s, than Trimculo in the play, or than the potentates, whom ſome late navigators found lording it, with might and main, **4parepyQ: Biy:,” over a Spaniſh ſettlement: there were three members of 6 3 the "mn XXXIV.
Democracy, as deſcribed by him, no Government at all, — nog EEE 2 n. EL no 7 — ͤ— es ms ä Ws n 5 ae 6 pd as + FR OI.) e 90 CHAP. II.
Democracy, as deſcribed by him, no dat at all.
A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, the Government; and they had one ſubject among them all*. ſe] Let him examine it a little, and it will turn out, I take it, to be preciſely that ſort of Go- vernment, and no other, which one can conceive to obtain, where there is no Government at all. Our Author, we may remember, had ſhrewd doubts about the exiſtence of a fate of nature. grant him his Democracy, and it exiſts in his Democracy. [/] XXXV. The * See HawksSWORTH's Feyages.
[ſe] The condition of theſe imaginary ſovereigns puts one in mind of the ſtory of, I forget what King's Fool. The Fool had ſtuck himſelf up one day, with great gravity, in the King's throne; with a ftick, by way of a ſceptre, in one hand, and a ball in the other: being aſked what he was doing? he anſwered, © reigning.” Much the ſame ſort of reign, I take it, would be that of the members of our Author's Democracy.
+ V. ſupra, ch. I. par. VI.
L/] What is curious is, that the ſame perſons who tell you (having read as much) that Democracy is a form of Government under which the ſupreme power is veſted in all the members of a fate, will alſo tell you (having alſo read as much) that the Athenian Commor.- wealth was a Democracy. Now the truth is, that in the Athenian Common-wealth, upon the moſt moderate computation, Forms of GovERNMENT.
XXXV. The qualification of goodneſs, I think it was, that belonged to the Government of all, while there was ſuch a Govern- ment. This having taken its flight, as we have ſeen, to the region of non-enti- ties, the qualification that was deſigned CHAP. .
XXXV._ The qualifi- cation de- ſigned for it become va- Cant.
for it remains upon his hands: he is at liberty, therefore, to make a compliment of it to Ariſtocracy or to Monarchy, which beſt ſuits him. Perhaps it were as well to give it to Monarchy; the title of that form of Government to its own peculiar qualification, power, being, as we have ſeen, rather an equivocal one: or elſe, which, perhaps, is as good a way of ſettling matters as any, he may ſet them to caſt lots.
computation, it is not one tenth part of the inhabitants of the Athenian ſtate that ever at a time partook of the ſupreme power: women, children, and ſlaves, being taken into the account“. Civil Lawyers, indeed, will tell you, with a grave face, that a ſlave is zobedy; as Common Lawyers will, that a baſtard is the /oz of no- body. But, to an unprejudiced eye, the condition of a ſlate is the condition of all the individuals, without dif. tinction, that compole it.
See, among Mr. Humz's Eſſays, that en the Pepulouſneſs of ancient nations. OE” 9 | CHAP, * 0 OY nee.
CHAP. III.
I. Our Author's panegyric on the Britiſh Conſtitution.
II. The para- graph re- cited mm R 4A FRAGMENT o GOVERNMENT.
CHAP. III.
BRITISH CoNsTITUTION.
I.
ITH a ſet of data, ſuch as we have ſeen in the laſt chapter, we may judge whether our Author can meet with any difficulty in proving the Britiſh Conſtitution to be the beſt of all poſſible governments, or indeed any thing elſe that he has a mind. In his paragraph on this ſubje& there are ſeveral things that lay claim to our attention. But it is neceſſary we ſhould have it under our eye.
* But happily for us in this iſland e the Britiſh Conſtitution has long re- « mained, and I truſt will long continue, * a ſtanding exception to the truth of e this obſervation. For, as with us the | e executive power of the laws is lodged * in a ſingle perſon, they have all the ad- , vantages co BRITISH ConSTITUTION.
are to be found in the moſt abſolute monarchy; and, as the legiſlature of the kingdom is entruſted to three diſtinct powers entirely independent of each other; firſt, the King; ſecondly, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, which is an ariſtocratical aſſembly of perſons ſelected for their piety, their birth, their wiſdom, their valour, or their property; and thirdly, the Houſe of Commons, freely choſen by the people from among themſelves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this ag- gregate body, actuated by different ſprings, and attentive to different intereſts, compoſes the Britiſh Parliament, and has the ſupreme diſpoſal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three bran- ches, but will be withſtood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power ſufficient to repel any innovation which it ſhall think inexpedient or dangerous.; III. Here 93 vantages of ſtrength and diſpatch that CRHAP.
III.
94 Cu Ar.
III. —- And that which fol- lows its A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
&« Here then is lodged the ſovereignty of the Britiſh Conſtitution; and lodged as beneficially as is poſſible for ſociety. For in no other ſhape could we be fo certain of finding the three great qua- lities of Government ſo well and ſo happily united. If the ſupreme pow- er were lodged in any one of the three branches ſeparately, we muſt be expoſ- ed to the inconveniencies of either ab- ſolute monarchy, ariſtocracy, or democracy; and ſo want two of the principal ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wiſdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for in- ſtance, in the King and Houſe of Lords, our laws might be providently made and well executed, but they might not always have the good of the people in view: if lodged in the King and Com- mons, we ſhould want that circum- ſpection and mediatory caution, which the wiſdom of the Peers is to afford: if the ſupreme rights of legiſlature were « lodged I. a one Att, CCC 3 * Re Ce Lo EI ERIE AY ond 2 REES, 9 ic 40 cc (6 cc cc 60 cc 66 6c 40 cc (c cc «c « 44 40 If e BRITISH ConsSTITUTION.
lodged in the two Houſes only, and the King had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to aboliſh the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally de- ſtroy) the ſtrength of the executive e power. But the conſtitutional government of this iſland is ſo admirably tempered and compounded, that no- thing can endanger or hurt it, but de- ſtroying the equilibrium of power be- tween one branch of the legiſlature and the reſt. For if ever it ſhould happen that the independence of any one of the three ſhould be loſt, or that it ſhould become ſubſervient to the views of either of the other two, there would ſoon be an end of our conſtitution. The legiſlature would be changed from that which was originally ſet up by the general conſent and fundamental act of the ſociety; and ſuch a change, however effected, is, according to Mr. Locke (who perhaps carries his theory CHAP. III.
IV.
Executive power the mention of it — incon- gruouſly in- troduced.
A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT,