on the ſtrength of them to have fur- niſhed the paragraph with a title of my own framing. The danger of miſrepre- ſentation was too great; a kind of dan- ger which a man cannot but lie immi- nently expoſed to, who ventures to put a preciſe meaning upon a diſcourſe which in itſelf has none. That I may juſt 8 mention, however, in this place, the reſult of them; what he is really aiming at, I take it, is, to inculcate a perſuaſion that in every ſtate there muſt ſubſiſt, in ſome hands or other, a power that is abſolute. mention it thus prematurely, that the reader may have ſome clue to guide him in CH Ar. IV.
— II. Drift of it, as conjectured.
4 — aging r .. "RENO. © 2 ie we RR INS Is A 5 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
in his progreſs through the paragraph; which it is now time J ſhould recite, Aa £ cc «cc £6 cc cc CC cc cc cc cc ce cc C6 CC cc cc cc cc cs IIT. « Having,” ſays our Author, © thus curſorily conſidered the three uſual ſpecies of government, and our own ſingular conſtitution, ſelected and compounded from them all, I proceed to obſerve, that, as the power of making laws conſtitutes the ſupreme authority, ſo where-ever the ſupreme authority in any ſtate refides, it is the right of that authority to make laws; that is, in the words of our definition, to preſcribe the rule of civil action. And this may be diſco- vered from the very end and inſtitu- tion of civil ſtates, For a ſtate is a collective body, compoſed of a multi- tude of individuals united for their ſafety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will.
But in as much as political communi— & tles RIOHT of the SUPREME POWER to make LAWS.
« ties are made up of many natural per- « ſons, each of whom has his particular « will and inclination, theſe ſeveral wills «© cannot by any natural union be joined * together, or tempered and diſpoſed «© into a laſting harmony, ſo as to conſti- e tute and produce that one uniform « will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwiſe produced than by a % political union; by the conſent of all % perſons to ſubmit their own private ec Wills to the will of one man, or of © one, or more aſſemblies of men, to % whom the ſupreme authority is en- « truſted: and this will of that one man, or aſſemblage of men is, in dif- « ferent ſtates, according to their differ- © ent conſtitutions, underſtood to be IV. The other paſſages which ſuggeſted to me the conſtruction I have ventured to put upon this, ſhall be mentioned by and by. Firſt, let us try what is to be made 3 of it by itſelf, | V. The IV.
The ſenſe of it conſidered in itſelf.
8 e. 3. AT Ae anion ond er ni ab oe be, ee Eons.» *: + — IM Wong > | DE 5 Pt: * SY —. om a ed ed 5 rn ei: vi. no DANS "7 CR = Von wllh a ab ˙⅛ — e 7 men F — oe IL IEIW The leading argument in it nugatory.
.
The obſcurity in which the firſt ſen- tence of this paragraph is envelopped, is ſuch, that I know not how to go about bringing it to light, without borrow- ing a word or two of logicians. Lay- ing aſide the preamble, the body of it, viz. © as the power of making laws « conſtitutes the ſupreme authority, to © where-ever the ſupreme authority in “ any ſtate reſides, it is the right of that authority to make laws, may be con- ſidered as conſtituting that ſort of ſyllo- giſm which logicians call an enthymem, An enthymem conſiſts of two propo/itions; a conſequent and an antecedent, ** The * power of making laws,” ſays our Au- thor, © conſtitutes the ſupreme authority.” This is his antecedent. From hence it is he concludes, that“ where-eyer the “ ſupreme authority in any ſtate reſides, « it is the right of that authority to « make laws.” This then is his conſe- quent. | Now ſo it is, that this antecedent, and this OE AST.” „ R1GHT of the SUPREME POWER e make Laws. I29 this conſequent, for any difference at leaſt CHAP.
that I can poſſibly perceive in them, IV.
would turn out, were they but correctly 3 worded, to mean preciſely the ſame thing: for, after ſaying that the power of % making laws conſtitutes the ſupreme e authority,” to tell us that, for that reaſon, © the ſupreme authority” is (or has) the power (or the right) of making laws, is giving us, I take it, much the fame ſort of information, as it would be to us to be told that a thing is ſo, becauſe it is ſo: a fort of a truth which there ſeems to be no very great occaſion to ſend us upon * diſcovering, in the end and inſtitution of civil ſtates.” That by the“ ſo- * yereign power, he meant the power ** of making laws; this, or ſomething like it, is no more indeed than what he had told us over and over, and over again, WH vith fingular energy and anxiety, in his 46th page, in his 49th, and in, I know dot how many, pages beſides: always taking care, for precifion's ſake, to give 1 little variety to the expreſſion: the 8 Y K Words 4 "See ES pgs <I> I OI EIS ants ED * = ing. St: — tat TEC rt er a => : Fane Horn a ee tt at = p n wig CES UI 2d. rnd:.
CHAP. = W. The ante- cedent ſtated anew, phr ale, ſuppoſed to be better underitood, A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, words ** power and “ authority,” ſome- times, ſeemingly put for the ſame idea; ſometimes ſeemingly oppoſed to each other: both of them ſometimes denoting the fitious being, the abſtraf quality; ſometimes the real being or beings, the perſon or perſons ſuppoſed to poſſeſs that guality.—Let us diſentangle the ſenſe from theſe ambiguities; let us learn to ſpeak diſtinctly of the perſons, and of the quality we attribute to them; and then let us make another effort to find a meaning for this perplexing paſſage.
By the © ſupreme authority then, (we may ſuppoſe our Author to ſay) © I mean e the ſame thing as when I ſay the power of making laws.” This is the propoſition we took notice of above, under the name of the antecedent. This ante- cedent then, we may obſerve, is a defini- tion: a definition, to wit, of the phraſc « ſupreme authority.” Now to define a phraſe is, to tranſlate it into another and RiGHT of the SUPREME Pow ER fo mate Laws, and expreſſive of the ſame ideas. The ſuppoſition here then 1s, that the reader was already, of himſelf, tolerably well acquainted with the import of the phraſe te power of making laws:” that he was not at all, or was however leſs acquainted with the import of the phraſe © ſupreme autho- ©« rity.” Upon this ſuppoſition then, it is, that in order to his being made clearly to underſtand the latter, he is informed of its being ſynonymous to the former.
Let us now introduce the mention of the perſon: let us add the word “ perſon” to the definition; it will be the ſame defini- tion ſtill in ſubſtance, only a little more fully and preciſely worded. For à perſon 40 poſſeſs the ſupreme authority, is for à perſon to poſſeſs the power of making laws. This then is what in ſubſtance has been already laid down in the antecedent.
VII. Now let us conſider the conſequent; which, when detached from the context, may be ſpoken of as making a ſentence of itſelft. Wherever,” ſays he, * the ſu- K 2 | «« preme VIL The conſe» quent new ſtated.
732 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
CHAP. © preme authority in any ſtate reſides, it IV. ais the rigbt of that authority to make « Laws” — By © wherever” I take it ö for granted, he means, whatever per- "| * ſons: by © authority,” in the former Uh part of the ſentence, —power; by the ö ſame word, authority, in the latter part of the ſentence, - perſons. Corrected therefore, the ſentence will ſtand thus: In whatever perſons in any ſtate the ſupreme power reſides, it is the right of ava ber- 1 ons t6 make Laws.
VIII. VIII. 1 The only word now remaining undiſ- the antece- poſed of, is the word right. And what dent to think of this, indeed I know not: whether our Author had a meaning in it, or whether he had none. It is inſerted, we may obſerve, in the latter part only of the ſentence: it appears not in the former. Concerning this omiſſion, two conjectures here preſent themſelves: it may have happened by accident; or it may have been made by deſign. It by accident, then the caſe is, that the 1dea annexed RIGHT of the SUPREME PowER to mate Laws.
annexed to the word right is no other than what was meant to be included in the former part of the ſentence, in which it is at expreſſed, as well as in the latter, in which it 7s. In this caſe it may, with- out any change in the ſignification, be ex- preſſed in both. Let it then be expreſſed, and the ſentence, take it all together, will ſtand thus: In whatever perſons the right of exerciſing ſupreme power in any late reſides, it is the right of thoſe perſons to make Laws, If this conjecture be the true one, and I am apt to think it is, we ſee once more, and, I truſt, beyond all doubt, that the conſequent in this enthymem is but a repetition of the antecedent. We may judge then, whether it is from any ſuch confideration as that of ©** the end * and inſtitution of civil ſtates,” or any other conſideration that we are likely to gain any further conviction of the truth of this concluſion, than it preſents us of it- ſelf, We may alſo form ſome judgment before-hand, what uſe or meaning there P CRE) — 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
Cnae. is likely to be in the aſſemblage of words IV. that is to follow.
Wa IX. —orelſe no- What is poflible, notwithſtanding, ny ies however improbable, is, that the omiſſion we have been ſpeaking of was de/igned. In this caſe, what we are to underitand is, that the word © right was meant to introduce a new idea to this latter part of the ſentence, over and above any that was meant to be ſuggeſted by the former. Right then, according to this conſtruction, in the one place, is to be confidered as put in contradiſtinction to act in the other. The ſenſe is then, that whatever perſons do actually exerciſe fu- preme power, (or what, according to the antecedent of the enthymem, is the ſame thing, the power of making laws) thoſe per- ſons have the right to exerciſe it. But, in this caſe, neither does what is given as a conſequence in any reſpect follow from the antecedent, nor can any thing be made of it, but what 1s altogether foreign to the reſt of the diſcourſe. So much 1n- deed, = RICH of the SUPREME PowWER te mate Laws.
deed, that it ſeems more conſonant to probability, as well as more favourable to our Author, to conclude that he had no meaning at all, than that he had this. X.
Let us now try what we can make of the remainder of the paragraph. Being uſher d in by the word ** for,” it ſeems to lay claim to the appellation of an argu- ment. This argument, ſetting out, as we have ſeen, without an object, ſeems how- ever to have found ſomething like one at laſt, as if it had picked it up by the way. This object, if I miſtake it not, is to per- ſuade men, that the ſupreme power, (that is the perſon or perſons in ule to exerciſe the ſupreme power in a ſtate) ought, in all points without exception, to be obeyed. What men intend, he ſays, to do when they are in a ſtate, is to act, as if they were but one man.” But one man has but one will belonging to him. What they intend therefore, or what they ought to intend, (a flight difference which our Author ſeems not to be well aware Xo The reſt of the para- graph new ſtated — ſup- poſed drift of it.
CHAP. IV.
The reſt of the para- graph new ſtated.
- 2 Eh EE rd oe oe: her a ED pon.
of) is, to act as if they had but one will. To act as if they had but one will, the way 1s, for them to join” all their wills e together.” To do this, the moſt obvious way would be to join them“ naturally: but, as ws will not ſplice and dovetail like deal boards, the only feaſible way is Now the only way for men to join their wills together politically, is for them all to conſent to ſubmit their wills to the will of one. This one will, to which all others are to be ſubmitted, is the will of thoſe perſons who are in uſe to exerciſe the ſupreme power; whoſe wills again, when there happens to be many of them, have, by a proceſs of which our Author has ſaid nothing, been reduced (as we muſt ſuppoſe) into one already. So far our Author's ar- The above is the ſubſtance of gumen K.
it fairly given; not altogether with ſo much ornament, indeed, as he has given it, but, I truſt, with ſomewhat more precifion, The whole concludes, we may obſerve, with our Author's favourite iden- 6 tical eee n R1GHT of the SUPREME PowER to nate Laws. = *tical propoſition, or ſomething like it, CRHAP. now for the twentieth time repeated. IV. ZE: = Taking it altogether, it is, without weakneſs of...it as a perſua- queſtion, a very ingenious argument: nor N can any thing in the world anſwer the ence. purpoſe better, except juſt in the caſe where it happens to be wanted. Not but that a veteran antagoniſt, trained up in the regular and accuſtomed diſcipline of legal fencing, ſuch an one, indeed, ui contrive perhaps, with due management, to give our Author the honour of the field. But ſhould ſome undiſciplined blun- derer, like the Commiſſary's landlady, thruſt in guart, when he ſhould have thruſt in Fierce, I doubt much whether he might not get within our Author's guard. _ —] intend?'—T conſent?“ I ** ſub- © mit” myſelf?—* Who are you, I won- * der, that ſhould know what I do better than I do myſelf? As to © ſubmttimg * my will to the wills of the people * who made this law you are ſpeakiny * of, what I know is, that I never in- «© tended — NE ER +4 1 CHAP. IV.
AT IR "If r, 4 A FRAGMENT ox GOVERNMENT, * tended” any ſuch thing: I abominate * them, I tell you, and all they ever did, Weakneſs of and have always ſaid ſo: and as to my it as a perſua- five to obedi- ENCE, * conſent,” ſo far have I been from giving it to their law, that, from the « firſt to the laſt, I have proteſted againſt it with all my might.“ So much for our refractory diſputant.— What I ſhould ſay to him I know: but what our Author could find to fay in anſwer to him, is more than I can imagine [5].
[4] One thing in the paragraph we are conſidering is obſervable; it is the concluding ſentence, in which he brings together the ideas of lago and will, Here then, in the tail of a digreſſion, he comes nearer in fact, though without being aware of it, to the giving a jull and preciſe idea of a law, than in any part of the de- finition itſelf from whence he is digreſſing. If, inſtead of ſaying that a law is a vill, he had called it the ex- preſſion of a will, and that fort of expreſſion of a will which goes by the name of a command, his definition would, ſo far as this goes, have been clear as well as right. As it is, it is neither the one nor the other. But of this more, if at all, in another place. T he de- finition of law is a matter of too much nicety and im- portance to be diſpatched in a note.
II. Let II. Let 1 RiohT of the SUPREME POWER fo mate Laws.
.
Let us now return and pick up thoſe other paſſages which we ſuppoſed to have a reſpect to the ſame deſign that ſeems to be in view in this. Firſt comes the ſhort introductory paragraph that uſhers in the whole digreſſion: a paragraph which, however ſhort, and however imperfect with reſpect to the purpoſe of giving a general view of the contents of thoſe which follow it, was, in deſpite of me- thod, to expatiate upon this ſubject. Upon this ſubject, indeed, he does ex- patiate with a force of argument and energy of expreſſion which nothing can withſtand. *© This,” it begins, will ** neceſſarily lead us into a ſhort enquiry concerning the nature of ſociety and „civil government *.”---This is all the intimation it gives of the contents of thoſe paragraphs we have examindd. Upon his before us it touches in ener- getic terms; but more energetic than preciſe.--=** And the natural (it conti- nues) © and zzberent right that belongs to the CAP. IV.
II. A prior para- graph ſup- poſed to be relative to the object of this.
= — 140 A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, CHAP. the ſovereignty of a ſtate,” / natural IV. right, obſerve, that belongs to the ſove- reignty of a political ſociety) © wherever « that ſovereignty be lodged, of making Another. This is not all. The moſt emphatical paſſage is yet behind. It is a paſſage in that ſhort paragraph * which we found to contain ſuch a variety of matter. He is there ſpeaking of the ſeveral forms of government now in being. However they began,” ſays he, or by what right * ſoever they ſubſiſt, there c and muſt be « in all of them a ſupreme, irrehſtable, ce abſolute, uncontrouled authority, in c which the ura ſumm: imperii, or the ce rights of ſovereignty, reſide,” XY. = Agitation he The vehemence, the Szvoryc, of this r paſſage is remarkable. He ranſacks the language: he piles up, one upon another, four of the moſt tremendous epithets he * 1 Comm. p. 48, ſupra ch. II. par. 11.
can find; he heaps Offa upon Pelion: and, as if the Engliſh tongue did not furniſh expreſſions ſtrong or impoſing enough, he tops the whole with a piece of formidable Latinity. From all this agitation, it is plain, I think, there is a ſomething which he has very much at heart; which he wiſh= es, but fears, perhaps, to bring out undiſ- guiſed; which in ſeveral places, notwith- ſtanding, burſts out involuntarily, as it were, before he is well ready for it; and which, a certain diſcretion, getting at laſt the upper hand of propenſity, forces, as we have ſeen, to dribble away in a ſtring of obſcure ſophiſms. Thus oddly enough it happens, that that paſſage of them all, which, if I miſtake not, is the only one that was meant to be dedicated expreſly to the ſubject, is the leaſt explicit on it [e].
[c] Another paſſage or two there is which might ſeem to glance the ſame way: but theſe I paſs over as leſs material, after thoſe which we have ſeen, XV. A cous CHAP. IV.
Agitation he betrays.
CHAP. IV.
2 EV; Cauſe of it.
XVI. Reſource he finds in ob- ſcurity.
4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, 1 OWL nh A courage much ſtauncher than our Author's might- have wavered here. A faſk of no leſs intricacy was here to be travelled through, than that of adjuſting the claims of thoſe two jealous antago- niſts, Liberty and Govetnment. A more invidious ground is ſcarcely to be found any where within the field of politics, Enemies encompaſs the traveller on every fide. He can ſcarce ſtir but he muſt ex- pect to be aſſaulted with the war-hoop of political hereſy from one quarter or ano- ther. Difficult enough is the\ſfituation of him, who, in theſe defiles, feels himſelf impelled one way by fear, and another by affection.
XVI.
To return to the paragraph which it was the more immediate bufineſs of this chapter to examine: Were the path of obſcurity leſs familiar to our Author, one ſhould be tempted to imagine he had ſtruck into it on the particular occaſion before us, in the view of extricating him- RicHT of the SurRtme Pow ER to mate Laws.
ſelf from this dilemma. A diſcourſe thus prudently indeterminate might ex- preſs enough to keep fair with the rulers of the earth, without ſetting itſelf in di- rect array againſt the prejudices of the people. Viewed by difterent perſons, it might preſent different aſpects: to men in power it might recommend itſelf, and that from the firſt, under the character of a practical leſſon of obedience for the uſe of the people; while among the people themſelves it might paſs muſter, for a time at leaſt, in quality of a ſtring of abſtract ſcientific propoſitions of juriſprudence. It is not till ſome occaſion for making application of it ſhould. occur, that its true uſe and efficacy would be brought to light. The people, no matter on what occaſion, begin to murmur, and concert meaſures of reſiſtance. Now then is the time for the latent virtues of this paſſage to be called forth. The book is to be opened to them, and in this paſſage they are to be ſhewn, what of themſelves, per- haps, they would never have obſerved, a ſet CH AP. IV.
Reſource he finds in ob- ſcurity.
\ 1 AI FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
Cuar. ſet of arguments curiouſly ſtrung together 3 IV. and wrapped up, in proof of the univer- Rcpure he ſal expedience, or rather neceſſity, of ſub- 1 RT” miſſion: a neceſſity which is to ariſe, I not out of the reflection that the probat!: = miſchiefs of reſiſtance are greater than the probable miſchiefs of obedience; not out of ll - any ſuch debateable conſideration; but out of a ſomething that is to be much more cogent and effectual: to wit, a cer- tain metaphy/ico-legal impotence, which is to beget in them the ſentiment, and an- {wer all the purpoſes of a natural one. 1 Armed, and full of indignation, our male- contents are making their way to the royal palace. In vain, A certain gfoppe/ being made to bolt out upon them, in the manner we have ſeen, by the force of our Author's legal engineering, their arms are to fall, as it were by enchantment, from their hands. To diſagree, to cla- 'o mour, to oppoſe, to take back, in ſhort, „ their wills again, is now, they are told, 9 too late: it is what cannot be done: their wills have been put in hotchpot along with Ridhr of the SUPREME POWER o make Laws.
with the reſt: they have © united,” — they have *© conſented,” —they have ſub- „ mitted.” Our Author having thus put his hook into their noſe, they are to go back as they came, and all is peace. An ingenious contrivance this enough: but popular paſſion is not to be fooled, I doubt, ſo eaſily. Now and then, it is true, one error may be driven out, for a time, by an oppoſite error: one piece of nonſenſe by another piece of nonſenſe: but for barring the door effectually and for ever againſt all error and all nonſenſe, there is nothing like the ſimple truth. N After all theſe pains taken to inculcate unreſerved ſubmiſſion, would any one have expected to ſee our Author himſelf among the moſt eager to excite men to diſobedience? and that, perhaps, upon the moſt frivolous pretences? in ſhort, upon any pretence whatſoever? Such, however, upon looking back a little, we ſhall find him. I ſay, among the moſt 1 eager; CHAP, IV.
XVII. Inconſiſtency of the preſent paſſage with a tormer.
XVIII. The former paſſage re- cited.
for their own ſakes, on the footing of D Ne e A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
eager; for other men, at leaſt the moſt enlightened advocates for liberty, are con- tent with leaving it to ſubjects to reſiſt, permiſſion: this will not content our Au- thor, but he muſt be forcing it upon them as a point of duty.
XVIII.
Tis in a paſſage antecedent to the di- greſſion we are examining, but in the ſame ſection, that, ſpeaking of the pre- tended law of Nature, and of the law of Revelation, no human laws,” he ſays, * ſhould be /fered to contradict theſe*.“ The expreſſion is remarkable. It is not that no human laws ſhould contradict them: but that no human laws ſhould be SUFFERED to contradict them. He then proceeds to give us an example. This example, one might think, would be ſuch as ſhould have the effect of ſoftening the dangerous tendency of- the rule:—on the contrary, it is ſuch as cannot but enhance RIcHT of the SUPREME PoweR to mate LA ws.
it la; and, in the application of it to the rule, the ſubſtance of*the latter is again repeated in ſtill more explicit and ener- getic terms. Nay,” ſays he, ſpeaking of the act he inſtances, ** if any human % law ſhould allow or enjoin us to com- « mit it, we are BOUND TO TRAN $- © GRESS that human law, or elſe we ** muſt offend both the natural and the divine.“ XIX.
The propriety of this dangerous maxim, ſo far as the Divine Law is concerned, [d] It is that of murder. In the word here choſen there larks a fallacy which makes the propoſition the more dangerous as it is the more plauſible. It is too important to be altogether paſt over: at the ſame time that a light hint of it, in this place, 1s all that can be be given. Murder is 4://ing under certain circum/tances, Is the human law then to be allowed to define, in der- ner reſort, what ſhall be thoſe circumſtances, or is it not? If yes, the caſe of a © human law allowing or enjoin- ing us to commit it,“ is a caſe that is not ſo much as ſuppoſable: if 20, adieu to all human laws: to the fire with our Statutes at large, our Reports, our Infitutes, and all that we have hitherto been uſed to call dur law books; our law books, the only law books we an be ſafe in truſting to, are Puffendorf and the Bible.
CHAP. IV.
1 XIX. Dangerous tendency of It.
Cuary, is what I muſt refer to a future occaſion IV. for more particular conſideration [e]. As een to the Law of Nature, if (as I truſt * of it will appear) it be nothing but a phraſe [/]; if there be no other medium for proving any act to be an offence againſt it, than the miſchievous tendency of ſuch act; if there be no other medium for proving a law of the fate to be contrary to it, than the expediency of ſuch law, unleſs the bare unfounded di ſapprobation of any one who thinks of it be called a proof; if a teſt for diſtinguiſhing ſuch laws as would be contrary to the Law ff Nature from ſuch as, without being con- trary to it, are ſimply inexpedient, be that +.
* [z] According to our Author, indeed, it ſhould be to no purpoſe to make any ſeparate mention of the two laws; ſince the Divine Law, he tells us, is but“ a part of“ that of Nature. Of- conſequence, with reſped to that part, at leaſt, which is common to both, to be contrary to the one, is, of courſe, to be contrary to the other. | [/] This is what there would he occaſion to ſhev more at large in examining ſome former parts of this ſection.
which Richr of the SUPREME PowER to make Laws.
which neither our Author, nor any man elſe, ſo much as pretended ever to give; if, in a word, there be ſcarce any law whatever but what thoſe who have not liked it have found, on ſome account or another, to be repugnant to ſome text of ſcripture; I ſee no remedy but that the natural tendency of ſuch doctrine is to impel a man, by the force of conſcience, to riſe up in arms againſt any law what- ever that he happens not to like. What ſort of government it is that can conſiſt with ſuch a diſpoſition, I muſt leave to our Author to inform us, XX. It is the principle of utility, accurately CHAP. Iv: XX, The princiapprehended and ſteadily applied, that af- ple of urifords the only clew to guide a man through theſe ſtreights. It is for that, if any, and for that alone to furniſh a deci- hon which neither party ſhall dare in theory to diſavow. It is ſomething to re- concile men even in theory. They are, at leaſt, ſomething nearer to an effectual L 3 union, LIT y the on- ly guide un- der theſe dit- ficulties.
be.
CHAP, IV.
— 4 XXI. Juncture for reſiſtance.
. ECT Re.
4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
union, than when at variance as well in reſpect of theory as of practice. NL In ſpeaking of the ſuppoſed contract between King and people®, I have al- ready had occaſion to give the deſcrip- tion, and, as it appears to me, the only general deſcription that can be given, of that juncture at which, and not before, reſiſtance to government becomes com- mendable; or, in other words, reconcile- able to juſt notions, whether of /zgal or not, at leaſt of moral, and, if there be any difference, religious duty T. What was there ſaid was ſpoken, at the time, with reference to that particular branch of go- vernment which was then in queſtion; the branch that in this country is admi- niſtered by the King. But if it was juſt, as applied to hat branch of government, and in His country, it could only be for the ſame reaſon that it is ſo when applied to the whole of government, and that in any country whatſoever, It is hen, we * Ch. I. + See Ch. V. par. 7, note [5]. may THY me ie Boys. © 4 Moe erte 8 5 i; FS by * RicHT of the SUPREME PowER to make Laws, may ſay, and not till then, allowable to, if not incumbent on, every man, as well on the ſcore of duty as of intereſt, to en- ter into meaſures of reſiſtance; when, according to the beſt calculation he is able to make, the probable miſchiefs of re- fiance (ſpeaking with reſpect to the com- munity in general) appear leſs to him than the probable miſchiefs of ſubmiſſion. This then is to him, that is to each man in particular, the juncture for refitance.
XXII, A natural queſtion here is—by what 4 gn ſhall this juncture be known? By what common ſignal alike conſpicuous and ſign.
perceptible to all? A queſtion which is readily enough ſtarted, but to which, I hope, it will be almoſt as readily per- ceived that it is impoſſible to find an an- ſwer. Common ſign for ſuch a purpoſe, I, for my part, know of none: he muſt be more than a prophet, I think, that can ſhew us one. For that which ſhall ſerve as a particular ſign to each particu- lar perſon, I have already given one—his L242 - own XXII. Not charac- terizable by any common Sata i IE bn, es ws . N _ ud. Louth n "Pf BY a Cray,. own internal perſuaſion of a ballance of IV. utility on the ſide of reſiſtance.
Rl + XX: — XXIII.
Freedom in a Unleſs ſuch a ſign then, which I think Overnment. |. 4. not impoſſible, can be ſhewn, the feld, if one oat | * may ſay ſo, of the ſupreme governor's au- the Supreme thority, though not infinite, muſt una- 140; yoidably, I think, unleſs where limited by expreſs convention [g], be allowed to be indginite. Nor can I ſee any narrower, or other - bounds to it, under this conſti- tution, or under any other yet freer con- ſtitution, if there be one, than under the molt defpotic. Before the juncture I have been deicribing were arrived, reſiſtance, even in a country like this, would come too ſoon: were the juncture arrived a/- ready, the time for reſiſtance would be come already, under ſuch a government even as any one ſhould call deſporrc.
g This reſpects the caſe where one ſtate has, upon terms, ſubmitted itſelf to the government of another: or where the governing bodies of a number of Rates agree to take directions in certain ſpecified caſes, ſrom ſome body or other that is diſtin from all of them: conſiſting of members, for inſtance, appointed out of each.
XXIV. In XXIV. In RIGHT of the SUPREME Pow ER to mate LAWS.
XXIV.
In regard to a government that is Avec, and one that is de/þoric, wherein is it then that the difference conſiſts? Is it that thoſe perſons in whoſe hands that power is lodged which 1s acknowledged to be ſupreme, have leſs power in the one than in the other, when it is from cuſtom that they derive it? By no means. It is not that the power of one any more than of the other has any certain bounds to it. The diſtinction turns upon circumſtances of a very different complexion:—on the man- ner in which that whole maſs of power, * CnaPr. IV, XXIV, Principal cir- cumſtances on which it does depend, which, taken together, is ſupreme, is, in a free ſtate, diſtributed among the ſeveral ranks of perſons that are ſharers in it:— —on the ſource from whence their titles to it are ſucceſſively derived:—on the frequent and eaſy changes of condition between governors and governed; where- by the intereſts of the one claſs are more or leſs indiſtinguiſhably blended with thoſe of the other:—on the reſponſibility of the gavernors; or the right which a ſubject CCCP 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
ſubje& has of having the reaſons pub. licly aſſigned and canvaſſed of every act of power that is exerted over him: on the liberty of the preſs; or the ſecurity with which every man, be he of the one claſs