The substance of this treatise, drawn up from the most unfinished of all Mr. Bent- ham^s Manuscripts, has already been pub- lished in French by M. Dumont; and con- sidering the very extensive diffusion of that tongue, the present work, but for one con- sideration, might seem almost superfluous.
The original papers contain many appli- cations of the writer's principles to British Institutions and British interests; which, with a view to continental circulation, have been judiciously omitted by M. Dumont.
To the English Reader, the matter thus omitted cannot but be highly important and a2 iv EDITOR S PREFACE.
instructive. With the view of enabling him to supply the deficiency, and to obtain sepa- rately a treatise of general importance, which in the French work has somewhat unfortu- nately been appended to one of more limited interest, — namely, that, on the mode of con- ducting business in Legislative Assemblies, — the Editor has made the present attempt.
To have done justice to the original mat- ter, the whole ought to have been re-written; this, the Editor's other pursuits did not allow him leisure to accomplish, and he has been able to do little more than arrange the papers, and strike out what was redundant.— In pre- paring the work for the press, Mr. Bentham has had no share; — for whatever therefore may be esteemed defective in the matter, or objectionable in the manner, the Editor is solely responsible. Still, he thought it better that the work should appear, even in its pre- sent shape, than not appear at all; and having devoted to it such portion of his time as could EDITORS PREFACE. V EDITORS PREFACE. V be spared from the intervals of a life of la- bour, he hopes he shall not be without ac- knowledgement, from those who are compe- tent to appreciate the value of whatsoever comes from the great founder of the science of morals and legislation.
M. Dumont's work contains an exami- nation of the declaration of the Rights of Man, as proclaimed by the French Consti- tuent Assembly. This forms no part of the present volume, to the subject of which, in- deed,— Fallacies employed in debate, — it is not strictly pertinent. But, in fact, the ori- ginal papers have been mislaid, and they seemed to lose so much of their spirit in a translation from the French, that the contents of the additional chapter would not compen- sate for the additional bulk and expense of the book.
CONTENTS, INTRODUCTION.
Page.
Sect. 1. A Fallacy, what 1 Sect. 2. Fallacies, by whom treated of heretofore ib.
Sect. 3. Relation of Fallacies to vulgar Errors 5 Sect. 4. Political Fallacies the subject of this Work 7 Sect. 5. Division or Classification of Fallacies 9 Sect. 6. Nomenclature of political Fallacies 12 Sect. 7. Contrast between the present Work and Hamilton's Parliamentary Logic 16 PART THE FIRST.
FALL.\CIKS OF AUTHORITY, The subject of which is Authority in various shapes; and the object, to repress all exercise of the reasoning Faculty^.
Chap. I. 1. Analysis of Authority 32 2. Appeal to authority in what cases fallacious.. 44 Chap. II. The Wisdom of our Ancestors, or Chinese Argu- ment,— (ad verecundiam) 69 Chap. III. 1. Fallacy of irrevocable Laws, — (ad superstitionem) 82 2. Fallacy of Vows or promissory Oaths, — (ad superstitionon) 104 Vlll CONTENTS.
Page.
Chap. V. 1. Self-assumed Authority, — (ad ignorantiam, ad verecundiam) 116 Chap. VI. Laudatory Personalities, — {ad amicitiam) 123 PART THE SECOND.
FALLACIES OF DANGER, The subject matter of which is Danger in various shapes; and the object, to repress Discussion altogether, by exciting alarm.
Chap. I. Vituperative Personalities, — {ad odium) 127 1. Imputation of bad design 131 2. Imputation of bad character 132 3. Imputation of bad motive 133 4. Imputation of inconsistency 135 5. Imputation of suspicious connections. — (^Noscitur ex sociisj 136 6. Imputation founded on identity of denomi- 7. Cause of the prevalence of the fallacies belonging to this class 140 Chap. II. 1. Hobgoblin Argument, or, " No Innovation!"
2. Apprehension of mischief from change, what foundation it has in truth 145 4. Sinister interests in vAiich this fallacy has its source 151 Chap. III. Fallacy of Distrust, or, "What's at the bottom?"
{ad metum) 154 Chap. IV. Official Malefactor's Screen, — {ad metum) — "Attack us, you attack Government.".. 158 CONTENTS. IX Page. Chap. V, Accusation-scarer's Device, — (ad metum) — "In- famy must attach somewhere." 184 PART THE THIRD.
FALLACIES OF DELAY, The subject matter of which is Delay in various shapes; and the object, to postpone Discussion, with a view of eluding it.
Chap. I. The Quietist, or, " No Complaint," — {ad quietem) 1 90 Chap, II. Fallacy of False-consolation, — (ad quietem)...194 Chap. III. Procrastinator's Argument, — {ad socordiam) " Wait a little, this is not the time." 1 98 Chap. IV. Snail's-pace Argument, — {ad socordiam) " One thing at a time 1 Not too fast! Slow and sure!" 201 Chap. V. Fallacy of artful Diversion, — {ad verecundiam).. 209 PART THE FOURTH.
FALLACIES OF CONFUSION, The object of which is, to perplex, when Discussion can no longer be avoided.
Chap. I. Question-begging Appellatives, — {ad judicium).. 213 Chap. II. Impostor Terms, — {ad judicium) 221 Chap. 111. Vague Generalities, — {ad judicium) 230 3. Matchless Constitution 236 4. Balance of Power 248 5. Glorious Revolution 256 Chap. IV..Allegorical Idols, — {ad imaginationem) 258 X CONTENTS.
Page.
1. Government; for members of the governing 2. The Law; for law^yers Jbid.
3. The Churchy for churchmen 260 Chap. V. Sweeping Classifications, — (ad judicium) 2G5 1. Kings; — Crimes of Kings Ibid.
2. Catholics; — Cruelties of Catholics 266 Chap. VI. Sham Distinctions, — (ad judicium) 271 1. Liberty and Licentiousness of the Press Ibid.
2. Reform j — temperate and intemperate.. 2/6 Chap. Vn. Popular Corruption, — (ad superbiam) 279 Chap. VIII. Observations on the seven preceding Fallacies 287 Chap. IX. Anti-rational Fallacies, — (ad verecundiam)...295 1. Abuse of the words Speculative, Theoretical, 8fc 298 2. Utopian 301 3. Good in theory, bad in practice 303 4. Too good to be practicable 307 Chap. X. Paradoxical Assertion, — (ad judicium) 314 1. Dangerousness of the Principle of Utility 315 2. Uselessness of Classification 316 3. Mischievousness of Simplification 319 4. Disinterestedness a mark of Profligacy.. 320 5. How to turn this Fallacy to account...322 Chap. XI, Non-causa pro causd: or. Cause and Obstacle confounded, — (ad judicium) 328 presented as a cause, — the influence of the Crown 330 presented as a cause, — station of the Bishops in the House of Lords 332 stacle stated as a cause, — system of edu- CONTENTS. XI Page.
cation pursued in Church-of-England Universities 334 4. Effect, National virtue; — Obstacle repre- sented as a cause, — Opulence of the Clergy 336 Chap, XII. Partiality-preacher's Argument, — (ad judicium) " From the abuse, argue not against the Chap. XIII. The End justifies the Means, — {ad judicium).. 341 Chap. XIV. Opposer-general's justification, — (ad invidiam) " Not measures, but men," or " Not men, but measures." 344 Chap. XV. Rejection instead of Amendment, — (ad judicium) 349 PART THE FIFTH.
Chap, I. Characters common to all these Fallacies 359 Chap. II. Of the mischief producible by Fallacies 361 Chap. III. Causes of the utterance of these Fallacies...362 First Cause: — Sinister interest, of the operation of which the party affected by it is conscious.. Ibid. Chap. IV. Second Cause: — Interest-begotten Prejudice.. 372 Chap. V. Third Cause: — Authority-begotten Prejudice 376 Chap. VI. Fourth Cause: — Self-defence against counter Fal- lacies 379 Chap. Vll. Use of these Fallacies to the utterers and ac- ceptors of them 382 Chap, VIII. Particular demand for Fallacies under the En- glish Constitution 389 Chap. IX. The demand for political Fallacies: — how created by the state of interests 392 Chap. X. Different parts which may be borne in relation to Fallacies 400 Chap. XI. Uses of the preceding Exposure 406 INTRODUCTION, Section I.
A FALLACY, WHAT.
IjY the name oi fallaaj it is common to designate any argument employed, or topic suggested, for the purpose, or with a probability, of producing the effect of deception, — of causing some erroneous opinion to be entertained by any person to whose mind such argument may have been presented.
Section II.
Section II.
FALLACIES, BV WHOM TREATED OF HEUETOFORE.
The earliest author extant in whose works any men- tion is made on the subject oi fallacies is Aristotle; by whom, in the course or rather on the occasion of his treatise on Logic, not only is this subject started, but a list of the species of arguments to which this denomination is applicable is undertaken to be given. Upon the principle of the exhaustive method at so early a period employed by that astonishing genius, and in comparison of what it might and ought to have been, so little turned to account since, two is the B number of parts into which tlie whole mass is distri- buted— fallacies in the diction, fallacies not in tlie diction: and thirteen (whereof in the diction six, not in the diction seven) is the number of the articles distributed between those two parts *.
As from Aristotle down to Locke, on the subject of the origination of our ideas, (deceptious and unde- ceptious included,) — so from Aristotle down to this present day, on the subject of the forms, of which such ideas or combination of ideas as are employable in the character of instruments of deception, are suscep- tible,— all is a blank.
To do something in the way of filling up this blank is the object of the present work.
In speaking of Aristotle's collection of fallacies, as a stock to which from his time to the present no addition has been made, all that is meant, is, that whatsoever arguments may have had deception for their object, none besides those brought to view by Aristotle, have been brought to view in that character and under that name; for between the time of Aristotle and the present, treatises of the art of oratory, or po- pular argumentation, have not been wanting in various " 2,0(p<ff']U.a, from whence our English word sophism, is the word employed by Aristotle. The choice of the appellation is singular enough; <ro(pof is the wc d that was already in use for designating a wise man. It was the same appellation that was commonly employed for the designation of the seven Sages. ^0(pifJ]s, from whence our sophist, being au impretative of 'S,o(f>os, was the word applied as it were in irony to designate the tribe of wranglers, whose pretension to the praise of wisdom had no better ground than an abuse of words.
languages and in considerable number: nor can any of these be found in which, by him who njay wish to put a deceit upon those to whom he has to address himself, instruction in no small quantity may not be obtained.
What in these books of instruction is professed to be taught comes under this general description; viz. how, by means of words aptly employed, to gain your point; to produce upon those with whom you have to deal, those to whom you have to address yourself, the impression, and, by means of the impression, tlie disposition most favourable to your purpose, whatso- ever that purpose may be.
As to the impression and disposition the produc- tion of which might happen to be desired, whether the impression were correct or deceptions, whether the disposition were with a view to the individual or community in question, salutary, indifferent, or per- nicious, was a question that seemed not in any of these instances to have come across the author's mind. In the view taken by them of the subject, had any such question presented itself, it would have been put aside as foreign to the subject; exactly as, in a treatise on the art of war, a question concerning the justice of the war.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cicero, and Quintilian, Isaac Voss, and, though last and in bulk least, yet not the least interesting, our own Gerard Hamilton (of whom more will be said), are af this stamp.
Between those earliest and these latest of the writera 4 who have written on this subject and with this view, others in abundance might be inserted; but these are quite enough.
After so many ages past in teaching with equal complacency and indifference the art of true instruc- tion and the art of deception — the art of producing good effects, and the art of producing bad effects — the art of the honest man and the art of the knave — of promoting; the purposes of the benefactor and the purposes of the enemy of the human race; — after so many ages during which, with a view to persuasion, disposition, action, no instructions have been endea- voured to be given but in the same strain of imper- turbable impartiality, it seemed not too early in the nineteenth century to take up the subject on the ground of morality, and to invite common honesty for the first time to mount the bench and take her seat as judge.
As to Aristotle's fallacies, unless h\s petitio principii and h\s Jallacia, non causapro causa be considered as exceptions, upon examination so little danger would be found in them, that, had the philosopher left them unexposed to do their worst, the omission need not have hung very heavy upon his conscience; scarce in any instance will be discovered any the least dan- ger of final deception: the utmost inconvenience they seem capable of producing seems confined to a slight sensation of embarrassment. And as to the embar- rassment, the difficulty will be, not in pronouncing that the proposition in question is incapable of form- ing a just ground for the conclusion built upon it, but in finding words for the descri[)tion of tlie weakness which is the cause of this incapacity: not in discover- ing the pr^oposition to be absurd, but in giving an exact description of the form in which the absurdity presents itself.
Section III.
RELATION OF PALLACIES TO VULGAR ERKORS.
Error, vulgar error % is an appellation given to an opinion which, being considered as false, is considered in itself only, and not with a view to any consequences of any kind, of winch it may be productive.
It is termed vulgar with reference to the persons by whom it is supposed to be entertained: and this either in respect of their multitude, simply, or in re- spect of the lowness of the station occupied by them or the greater part of them in the scale of respectabi- lity, in the scale of intelligence.
Fallacy is an appellation applied not exclusively to an opinion or to propositions enunciative of supposed opinions, but to discourse in any shape considered as. having a tendency, with or without design, to cause any erroneous opinion to be embraced, or even, through * Vulgar errors is a denomination which, from the work written on this subject by a physician of name in the seventeenth century, has. obtained a certain degree of celebrity.
Not the moral (of which the political is a department), but the phy- sical, was the field of the errors which it was the object of Sir Thomas Brown to hunt out and bring to view: but of this restriction no inti- mation is given by the words of which the title of his work is composed, 6 6 the medium of erroneous opinion already entertained, to cause any pernicious course of action to be engaged or persevered in.
Thus, to believe that they who lived in early or old times were, because they lived in those times, wiser or better than those who live in later or modern times, is vulgar error: the employing that vulgar error in the endeavour to cause pernicious practices and insti- tutions to be retained, is fallacy.
By those by whom the term fallacy has been em- ployed, at any rate by those by whom it was originally employed, deception has been considered not merely as a consequence more or less probable, but as a con- sequence the production of which was aimed at on the part at least of some of the utterers.
YXiyxpi Go(pi?ojv, arguments employed by the sophists, is the denomination by which Aristotle has designated his devices, thirteen in number, to which his commen- tators, such of them as write in Latin, give the name oifallacicE, (ivom Jallere to deceive,) from which our English word fallacies.
That in the use of these instruments, such a thing as deception was the object of the set of men men- tioned by Aristotle under the name of sophists, is al- together out of doubt. On every occasion on which they are mentioned by him, this intention of deceiving is either directly asserted or assumed.
Section IV.
POLITICAL TALLACIES THE SUBJECT Ol- THIS WORK.
The present work confines itself to the examination and exposure of only one class of fallacies, which class is determined by the nature of the occasion in which they are employed.
The occasion here in question is that of the forma- tion of a decision procuring the adoption or rejection of some measure oi government: including under the notion of a measure of government, a measure of le- gislation as well as of administration; two operations so intimately connected, that the drawing of a boun- dary line between them will in some instances be mat- ter of no small difficulty, but for the distinguishing of which on the present occasion, and for the purpose of the present work, there will not be any need.
Under the name of a Treatise on Political Fallacies^ this work will possess the character, and, in so far as the character answers the design of it, have the effect of a treatise on the art of government: having for its pmctical object and tendency, in the first place, the facilitating the introduction of such features of good government as remain to be introduced; in the next place giving them perpetuation — perpetuation, not by means of legislative clauses aiming directly at that ob- ject (an aim of which the inutility and mischievousness will come to be fully laid open to view in the course of this work), but by means of that instrument, viz.
reason f by which alone the endeavour can be produc- tive of any useful effect.
Employed in this endeavour, there are two ways in which this instrument may be applied: one, the more direct, by showing, on the occasion of each proposed measure, in what way, by what probable conse- quences it tends to promote the accomplishment of the end or object which it professes to have particu- larly in view: the other, the less direct, by point- ing out the irrelevancy, and thus anticipating and de- stroying the persuasive force, of such deceptious ar- guments as have been in use, or appear likely to be employed in the endeavour to oppose it, and to dis- suade men from concurring in the establishment of it. Of these two different but harmonizing modes of applying this same instrument to its several purposes, the more direct is that of which a sample has, ever since tbe year 1802, been before the public, in that collection of unfinished papers on legislation, pub- lished at Paris in the French language, and which had the advantage of passing through the hands of Mr. Dumont, but for whose labours it would scarcely, in the author's life-time at least, have seen the light. To exhibit the less direct, but in its application the more extensive mode, is the business of the present work.
To give existence to good arguments was the object in that instance: to provide for the exposure of bad ones is the object in the present instance — to provide ' for the exposure of their real nature, and thence for the destruction of their pernicious force.
Sophistry is a hydra of which, if all the necks could be exposedj the force would be destroyed. In this work they have been diligently looked out for, and in the course of it the principal and most active of them have been brought to view.
Section V.
DIVISION OR CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES.
So numerous are the instruments of persuasion which in the character of fallacies the present work will bring to view, that, for enabling the mind to obtain any tole- rably satisfactory command over it, a set of divisions deduced from some source or other appeared to be altogether indispensable.
To frame these divisions with perfect logical accu- racy will be an undertaking of no small difficulty; an undertaking requiring more time than either the author or editor has been able to bestow upon it.
An imperfect classification, however, being prefer- able to no classification at all, the author had adopted one principle of division from the situation of the ut- terers of fallacies, especially from the utterers in the British Houses of Parliament: — fallacies of the ins, — fallacies of the outs, — either-side fallacies.
A principle of subdivision he found in the quarter to which the fallacy in question applied itself, in the persons on whom it was designed to operate; the qf- Jections, the judgement, and the imagination.
To the several clusters of fallacies marked out by this subdivision, a Latin affix, expretisive of the faculty 10 or affection aiiDcii at, was given; not surely for osten- tation, for of the very humblest sort would such osten- tation be, but fov p7wm?ierice, for impressiveness, and thence for clearness: arguments 1. ad verecu?idiam: 2. ad superstitiojiem: 3. ad amicitiam: 4. admetum: 6. ad odium: 6. ad invidentiam: 1. ad quiet em: 8. ad socordiam: 9- ad super biam: 10. ad judicium: W. ad imaginatio7iem.
In the same manner, Locke has employed Latin de- nominations to distinguish four kinds of argument: ad •verecundiam, ad ignorantiam, ad liominem, ad judicium.
Mr. Dumont, who some few years since published in French a translation, or rather a redaction, of a con- siderable portion of the present work, divided the fal- lacies into three classes, according to the particular or special object to which the fallacies of each class appeared more immediately applicable. Some he supposed destined to repress discussion altogether; others to postpone it; others to perplex, when discus- sion could no longer be avoided. The first class he called fallacies of authority, the second fallacies of delay, and the third fallacies of confusion: he has also added to the name of each fallacy the Latin affix which points out the faculty or affection to which it is chiefly addressed.
The present editor has preferred this arrangement to that pursued by the author, and with some little variation he has adopted it in this volume.
In addition to the sui)posed immediate object of a given class of fallacies, he has considered the subject mattei^ of each individual fallacy, with a view to the comprehending in one class all such fallacies as more nearly resemble each other in the nature of their sub- ject matter: and the classes he has arranged in the order in which the enemies of improvement may be supposed to resort to them according to the emergency of the moment.
First, fallacies of author'iti) (including laudatory personalities); the subject matter of which is authority in various shapes, and the immediate object, to repress, on the ground of the weight of such authority, all ex- ercise of the reasoning faculty.
Secondly, fallacies oi danger (including vituperative j)ersonalities); the subject matter of which is the sug- gestion of danger in various shapes, and the object, to repress altogether, on the ground of such danger, the discussion proposed to be entered on.
Thirdly, fallacies of delay; the subject matter of which is an assigning of reasons for delay in various shapes, and the object, to postpone such discussion, with a view of eluding it altogether.
Fourthly, fallacies oi confusion; the subject matter of which consists chiefly of vague and indefinite gene- ralities, while the object is to produce, when discussion can no longer be avoided, such confusion in the minds of the hearers as to incapacitate them for forming a correct judgement on the question proposed for deli- beration.
In the arrangement thus made, itnperfections will be found, tlic removal of which, should the removal of them be practicable and at the same time worth the trouble, must be left to some experter hand. The classes themselves are not in every instance sufficiently distinct from each other; the articles ranged under them respectively not appertaining with a degree of propriety sufficiently exclusive to the heads under which they are placed. Still, imperfect as it is, the arrangement will, it is hoped, be found by the reflect- ing reader not altogether without its use.
Section VI.
NOMENCLATURE OF POLITICAL FALLACIES.
Between the business of classification and that of nomenclature, the connexion is most intimate. To the work of classification no expression can be given but by means of nomenclature: no name other than what in the language of grammarians is called a. proper name, no name more extensive in its application than is the name of an individual, can be applied, but a class is marked out, and, as far as the work of the mind is creation, created.
Still, however, the two operations remain not the less distinguishable: for of the class marked out, a description may be given of any length and degree of complication; the description given may be such as to occupy entire sentences in any number. But a name properly so called consists either of no more than one word, and that one a noun substantive, or at most of no more than a substantive with its adjunct: 13 or, if of words more than one, they must be in siu li sort linked together as to form in conjunction no more than a sort of compound word, occupying the place of a noun substantive in the composition of a sentence.
Without prodigious circumlocution and inconve- nience, a class of objects, however well marked out by description, cannot be designated, unless we substitute for the words constituting the description, a word, or very small cluster of words, so connected as to constitute a name. In this case nomenclature is to description what, in algebraical operation, the sub- stitution of a single letter of the alphabet for a line of any length composed of numerical figures or letters of the alphabet, or both together, is to the continu- ing and repeating at each step the complicated niat- ter of that same line.
The class being marked out whether by description or denomination, an operation that will remain to be performed is, if no name be as yet given to it, the find- ing for it and giving to it a name: if a name has been given to it, the sitting in judgement on such name, for the purpose of determining whether it presents as ade- quate a conception of the object as can be wished, or whether some other may not be devised by which that conception may be presented in a manner more ade- quate.
Blessed be he for evermore, in whatsoever robe ar- rayed, to whose creative genius we are indebted for the first conception of those too short-lived vehicles, by which, as in a nutshell, intimation is conveyed to 14 us of the essential character of those awful volumes which at the touch of the sceptre become the rules of our conduct, and the arbiters of our destiny: — " The Alien Act," "The Turnpike Act," "The Middlesex Waterworks Bill," &c. &c.!
How advantageous a substitute in some cases, how useful an additament in all cases, would they not make to those authoritative masses of words called titles, by which so large a proportion of sound and so small a proportion of instruction are at so large an ex- pense of attention granted to us; " An Act to explain and amend an Act entitled An Act to explain and In two, three, four, or at the outside half a dozen words, information without pretension is given, which frequently when pretended is not given, but confusion and darkness given instead of it, in twice, thrice, four times, or half a dozen times as many lines.
Rouleaus of commodious and significative appella- tives, are thus issued day by day throughout the session from an invisible though not an unlicensed mint; but no sooner has the last newspaper that appeared the last day of the session made its way to the most distant of its stages, than all this learning, all this circulating medium, is as completely lost to the world and buried in obli- vion as a French assignat.
So many yearly strings of words, not one of which is to be found in the works of Dryden, with whom the art of coining words fit to be used became num- bered among the lost arts, and the art of giving birth 15 to new ideas among the prohibited ones! So many words, not one of which would have found toleration from the orthodoxy of Charles Fox!
Let the workshop of invention be shut up for ever, rather than that the tympanum of taste should be grated by a new sound! Rigorous decree! more rigorous if obedience or execution kept pace with design, than even the continent-blockading and commerce-crushing de- crees proclaimed by Buonaparte.
So necessary is it that, when a thing is talked of, there should be a name to call it by; so conducive, not to say necessary, to the prevalence of reason, of common sense, and moral honesty, that instruments of deception should be talked of, and well talked of, and talked out of fashion, — in a word talked down, — that, without any other license than the old one granted by Horace, and which, notwithstanding the acknowledged goodness of the authority, men are so strangely backward to make use of, — the author had, under the spur of necessity, struck out for each of these instruments of deception a separate barbarism, such as the tools which he had at command would enable him to produce: the objections, however, of a class of readers, who, under the denomination of men of taste, attach much more importance to the manner than to the matter of a composition, have in- duced the editor to suppress for the present some of these characteristic appellations, and to substitute for them a less expressive periphrasis.
16 Section VII.
contrast between the present work and Hamilton's " parliamentary logic."