There being no sufficient reason for ascribing even to the worst-disposed any vvish so foolish as that of seeing the bonds of Government dissolved, nor on the part of the best-disposed any possibility of contri- buting to produce change, either in any ruling hands deemed by them unfit for their trust, or of the system deemed by them ill adapted to those which are or ought to be its ends, otherwise than by respectively bringing into general disesteem these objects of their disapprobation, — there cannot be a more unfounded imputation or viler artifice, if it be artifice, or grosser error, if it be error, than that which infers from the disposition or even the endeavour to lessen in the es- timation of the people the existing rulers, or the ex- isting system, any such vvish as that of seeing the bands of Government dissolved.
In producing a local or temporary debility in the action of the powers of the natural body, in many cases, the honest and skilful physician beholds the only means of cure: and from the act of the physi- cian who precribes an evacuant or a sedative, it would be as reasonable to infer a wish to see the patient perish, as from the act of a statesman, whose endea- vours are employed in lowering the reputation of the official hands in whom, or the system of management in which, he beholds the cause of what appears to him amiss, — to infer a wish to see the whole frame of Government either destroyed or rendered worse.
168 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 4, In so far as a man's feeling and conduct are in- fluenced and determined by what is called public opi- nion, by the force of the popular or moral sanction, and that opinion runs in conformity with the dictates of the principles of general utility, — in proportion to the value set upon reputation, and the degree of re- spect entertained for the community at large, his con- duct will be the better, the more completely the quan- tity of respect he enjoys is dependent upon the good- ness of his behaviour; it will be the worse, the more completely the quantity of respect he is sure of en- joying is independent of it.
Thus, whatsoever portion of respect the people at large are in the habit of bestowing upon the individual by whom on any given occasion the office in question is filled, this portion of respect may, so long as the habit continues, be said to be attached to the office, just as any portion of the emolument is which happens to be attached to the office.
But as it is with emolument, so is it with respect. The greater the quantity of it a man is likely to re- ceive independently of his good behaviour, the less good, in so far as depends upon the degree of influence with which the love of reputation acts upon his mind, is his behaviour likely to be.
If this be true, it is in so far the interest of the public that that portion of respect, which along with the salary is habitually attached to the office, should be as small as possible.
If, indeed, the notion which it is the object of the Sect. 2.] TALLACIES OF DANGER. \69 fallacy in question to inculcate were true, viz. that the stability of the Government or its existence at each given point of time depends upon the degree of re- spect bestowed upon the several individuals by whom at that point of time its powers are exercised, — if this were true, it would not be the interest of the public that the portion of respect habitually attached to the office, and received by the official person indepen- dently of his good behaviour in it, should be as small as possible. But in how great a degree this notion is erroneous has been shown already.
But while it is the interest of the public, that in the instance of each trustee of the public the remunera- tion received by him in the shape of respect should be as completely dependent as possible upon the goodness of his behaviour in the execution of his trust, it is the interest of the trustee himself that, as in every other shape, so in the shape of respect, what- soever portion of the good things of this world he re- ceives on whatever score, whether on the score of re- muneration, or any other, should be as great as pos- sible; since by good behaviour, neither respect nor any thing else can be always earned by him but by sacrifices in some shape or other, and in particular in the shape of ease.
Whatsoever, therefore, be the official situation which the official person in question occupies, it is his in- terest that the quantity of respect habitually attached to it be as great, and at the same time as securely at- tached to it, as possible.
170 FALLACIES or DANGER. [Ch. A.
And in the point of view from which he is by his personal and sinister interest led to consider the sub- ject, the point of perfection in this line will not be attained until the quantity of respect he receives, in consequence of the possession he has of the office, be at all times as great as the nature of the office admits; — at all times as completely independent of the good- ness of his behaviour in his office as possible; — as Sjreat, in the, event of his making the worst and least good use, as in that of his making the best and the least bad use, of the powers belonging to it.
Such being his interest, whatsoever be his official situation, if, as is the case of most if not all official situations, it be of such a nature as to have power in any shape attached to it, his endeavour and study will be so to order matters as to cause to be attached to it as above, and by all means possible, the greatest portion of respect possible.
To this purpose, amongst others, will be directed whatsoever influence his will can be made to act with on other wills, and whatsoever influence his under- standing can be made to exert over other understand- ings.
If, for example, his situation be that of a judge; by the influence of will on will, it will seldom in any considerable degree be in his power to compell men by force to bestow upon him the sentiment of respect, either by itself or in any considerable degree by means of any external mark or token of it: but he may re- strain men from saying or doing any of those things, Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 171 the effect of which would be to cause others to bestow upon him less respect than they would otherwise.
If, being a judge of the King's Bench, any man has the presumption to question his fitness for such his high situation, he may for so doing punish him by fine and imprisonment with et cceteras. If a Lord Chancellor, he may prosecute him before a judge, by whom a disposition to attach such punishments to such offences has been demonstrated by practice.
Thus much as to what can and what cannot be done towards attaching respect to office, by the influence of will on will.
What may be done by the influence of understand- ing on understanding remains to be noticed: — laying out of the question that influence which, in the official situation in question, is exercised over the understand- ings of the people at large independently of any exer- tions on the part of him by whom it is filled, — that which on his part requires exertion, and is capable of being exercised by exertion, consists in the giving ut- terance and circulation in the most impressive man- ner to the fallacy in question, together with a few such others as are more particularly connected with it.
Upon the boldness and readiness with which the hands and system are spoken ill of, depends the dif- ference between arbitrary and limited government, — between a government in which the great body of the people have, and one in which they have not, a share.
In respect of the members of the governing body, undoubtedly the state of things most to be desired, is, 172 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [67/. 4.
that the only occasion on which any endeavours should be employed to lower them in the estimation of the public should be those in which inaptitude in some shape or other, want of probity, or weakness of judg- ment, or want of appropriate talent, have justly been imputable to them: that on those occasions in which inaptitude has not in any of those shapes been justly imputable, no such endeavour should ever be em- ployed.
Unfortunately, the state of things hereby supposed is plainly (need it be said?) an impossible one. Ad- mit no accusation, you may and you will exclude all unjust ones; — admit just ones, you must admit unjust ones along with them; there is no help for it. One of two evils being necessarily to be chosen, the ques- tion is, which is the least? — to admit all such impu- tations, and thereby to admit of unjust ones, or to ex- clude all such imputations, and thereby to exclude all just ones. I answer without difficulty, — the admis- sion of unjust imputations is, beyond comparison, the least of the two evils. Exclude all unjust imputations, and with them all just ones, the only'check by which the career of deterioration can be stopped being thus removed, both hands and system will, until they arrive at the extreme of despotism and misrule, be continually growing worse and worse; — the hands themselves will grow worse and worse, having nothing to counteract the force of that separate and sinister interest to the action of which they remain constantly exposed; — and the system itself will grow worse and worse, it Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 173 being all along the interest and, by the supposition, within the power of the hands themselves to make it so.
Admit just imputations, though along with them you admit unjust ones, so slight is the evil as scarcely to bear that name. Along with unjust imputations, are not defences admitted? In respect of motives and of means, have not the defendants in this case, beyond all comparison, the advantage of the com- plainants?
As far as concerns motives, in the instance of every person included in the attack (and in an attack made upon any one member of the Government as such, who does not know how apt all are to feel themselves included?), the principle of self-preservation is stronger than the exciting cause productive of the disposition to attack can be in any instance.
As far as concerns means of defence, if the person against whom the attack is principally levelled wants time or talent to defend himself, scarce a particle of the immense mass of the matter of reward, which, in all manner of «hapes, for the purpose of carrying on the ordinary business of government, lies constantly at the disposal of the members of the Government, but is applicable, even without any separate expense, to the extraordinary purpose of engaging defending advocates.
Let it not be said, " This is a persecution to which an honourable man ought not to be exposed; — a per- secution which, though to some honourable men it 174 FALLACIES or DANGKfJ. [C/l. 4.
may be tolerable, will to others be intolerable, — in- tolerable to such a degree as to deprive the public of the benefit of their services."
A notion to any such effect will scarcely be advanced with a grave face. — That censure is the tax imposed by nature upon eminence, is the A B C of common place. Who is there to whom it can be a doubt that exposure to such imputations is among the inevitable appendages of office? If it were an office which in no shape whatever had any adequate allowance of the matter of reward annexed to it, — if it were a situation into which men were pressed, — the observation would have some better ground; but in the class of office here in question, exists there any such?
A self-contradiction is involved in the observation itself. The subject, of which sensibility thus morbid is predicated, is an honourable man: but to an honour- able man, to any man to whom the attribute honour- able can with truth and justice be applied, such sen- sibility cannot be attributed. The man who will not accept an office but upon condition that his conduct in it shall remain exempt from all imputation, intends not that his conduct shall be what it ought to be. The man to whom the idea of being subject to those imputations to which he sees the best are exposed, is intolerable, — is in his heart a tyrant, — and, to become so in practice, wants nothing but to be seated on one of those thrones, or on one of those benches, in which, by the appearance of chains made for show and not for use, a man is enabled, with the greater dignity as Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGFJJ. 175 well as safety, to act the part of the tyrant, and glut himself with vengeance.
To a man who, in the civil line of office, accepts a commission, it is not less evident that by so doing he exposes himself to imputations, some of which may happen to be unjust, than to a man in the military line it is evident that by acceptance of a commission in that line he exposes himself to be shot at: and of a military office, with about equal truth, might it be said, that an honourable man will not accept it on such condition, as of a civil office that an honourable man will not accept it, if his conduct is to stand ex- posed to such imputations.
In such circumstances, it is not easy to see how it should happen to a public man to labour at the long- run under an imputation that is not just. In so far as any such incident does take place, evil does in truth lake place: but even in this case, the evil will not be unaccompanied with concomitant good, operating in compensation for it. On the part of men in office, it contributes to keep up the habit of considering their conduct as exposed to scrutiny, — to keep up in their minds that sense of responsibility On which goodness of conduct depends, in which good behaviour finds its chief security.
On the part of the people at large, it serves to keep alive the expectation of witnessing such attacks; the habit of looking out for them; and, when any such attack does come, it prevents the idea of hardship which is apt to attach upon any infliction, how neces- 176 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 4.
sary soever, of which it can be said that it is unprece- dented or even rare; and hinders the public mind from being set against the attack, and him who finds exertion and courage enough to make it.
When, in support of such imputations, false facts are alleged, the act of him by whom such false alle- gations are made, not only ought to be regarded as pernicious, but ought to be, and is, consistently with justice and utility, punishable; — punishable even when advanced through temerity without consciousness of the falsity, and more so when accompanied with such dishonest consciousness.
But by a sort of law, of which the protection of high-seated official delinquency is at least the effisct, not to say the object, a distinction thus obvious as well as important has been carefully overlooked: and whenever to the prejudice of the reputation of a man, especially if he be a man in office, a fact which has with more or less confidence been asserted or insi- nuated turns out to be false, the existence of dishonest consciousness, whether really existing or not, is as- sumed.
In so far as public men, trustees and agents for the people in possession or expectancy are the objects, a general propensity to scrutinize into their conduct, and thereby to cast imputations on it at the hazard of their being more or less unmerited, is a useful propensity. It is conducive to good behaviour on their part, and for the opposite and corresponding reason, the habit of general laudation, laudation without specific grounds, Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 177 is a mischievous propensity, being conducive to ill behaviour on their part.
Render all such endeavours hopeless, you take from a bad state of things all chance of being; better: — al- low to all such endeavours the freest range, you do no injury to the best state of things imaginable.
Whatsoever facilities the adversaries of the existing state of things have for lowering it in the estimation of the people, equal facilities at least, if not greater, have its friends and supporters for keeping and raising it up.
Under the English constitution, at any rate, the most strenuous defenders of the existing set of mana- ging hands, as well as of the existing system of ma- nagement, are not backward in representing an oppo- sition as being no less necessary a power among the springs of Government than the regulator in a watch*. But in what way is it that opposition, be it what it may, ever acts or ever can act but by endeavouring to lower either the managing hands, or, in this or that part of it, the system of management, in the estimation of the people? and from a watchmaker's putting a regulating spring into the watch he is making, it would be just as reasonable and fair to infer that his meaning is to destroy the watch, as from the circumstance of a man's seeking, in this or that instance, to lower in the estimation of the people the managing hands, or this or that part of the system of management, to infer a desire on his part to destroy the Government.
N 178 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 4.
Under the English constitution at least, not only in point of fact is the disposition to pay that obedience by which the power of Government is constituted, and on which the existence of it depends, independent of all esteem for the hands by which this power is exercised, unaffected by any disesteem for this or that part of the system of management according to which it is executed, — but under such a constitution at least, the more complete this independence, the better for the stability and prosperity of the state. Being as it is, it suffices for carrying on at all times the business of Government, — viz. upon that footing in point of skill and prosperity which is consistent with the apti- tude, probity and intelligence of the managing hands, and the goodness of the system of management under which they act: but if on each occasion it depended on the degree of estimation in which the conduct and character of the managing hands and the structure of the system of management under which they act hap- pened at that time to be held by the majority of the people, this power would be seen strong, and per- haps too strong, at one time, — weak to any degree of weakness, — insufficient to any degree of insufficiency, — at another.
Among the peculiar excellencies of the English con- stitution, one is, that the existence of the Government, and even the good conduct of it, depends in a less de- gree than under any other monarchy upon the per- sonal qualifications of the chief ruler, and upon the place he occupies in the estimation of the people. Conceive the character of the chief ruler perfect to a Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 179 certain degree of perfection, all checks upon his power would be a nuisance. On the other hand, under a constitution of government into which checks upon that power are admitted, the stronger and more efficient those checks, the worse the personal character of the chief ruler may be, and the business of government still go on without any fatal dis- turbance.
On recent occasions, as if the endeavour had been new and altogether anomalous to the constitution, great were the outcries against the audacity of those parliamentary electors and other members of the com- munity who, in the character of petitioners, were using their endeavours to lower the House of Commons in the estimation of the people, or, in stronger terms, to bring it and its authority into contempt. That by the individuals in question an endeavour of this nature should be regarded as a cause of personal inconve- nience, and as such be resisted, is natural enough; but as to its being, on the part of the authors of those exertions, blameable, — or, on the part of the consti- tution, dangerous, — surely no further observation need here be added.
But what was complained of as an abuse, was the existence of that state of things, of that system of ma- nagement, under which, in a number sufficient on or- dinary occasions to constitute or secure a majority, the members of that governing body have a sinister interest separate from and opposite to that of the people for whom they profess to serve: that being in- 180 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 4.
dependent as towards those to whom they ought to be dependent, — as to those whom it is their duty to control, and towards whom they ought to be inde- pendent,— they are dependent; and that, by means, by which, though altogether out of the reach of punish- ment, the dependence is rendered beyond comparison more constant and effectual than it would be by acts of punishable bribery.
In this state of things, if any alteration in it be de- sirable, it is impossible that such alteration should be brought about by other means than lowering in the estimation of the people not only the system itself, but all those who act willingly under it, and use their endeavours to uphold it.
Without this means, and by any other means, how is it that by possibility any such change should be produced? Supposing them assured of possessing, in the event of a refusal of all such change, as high a place in the estimation of the people as they hold at present, any thing done by them in furtherance of such a change would be an effect without a cause. In their personal capacities, they have all, or most of them, little to gain, while they have much to lose, by any proposed change.
True, it may be said, to be remedied, an imperfec- tion, be it what it may, must be pointed out. But what we complain of as dangerous to Government, is, not the indication of such imperfections with their sup- posed remedies, but the mode in which they are apt to be pointed out; — the heat, the violence, with w hicli Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 181 uch indication is accompanied. This we object to, n ot merely as dishonesty but as unwise, — as tending to irritate the very persons at whose hands the remedy thus pleaded for is sought.
To this, the answer is as follows: — 1. Whatsoever may be the terms most decorous, and, upon the supposition, the best adapted to the obtaining of the relief desired, it is not possible to comprise them in any such scheme of description as will enable a man to satisfy himself before-hand what terms will be considered exposed to, what exempt from, censure.
2. The cause of irritation is not so properly in the terms of the application, as in the substance and nature of the application itself: so that the greatest irritation would be produced by that mode of application, which- ever it were, that appeared most likely to produce the effect in question; — ^the effect, the production of which is on the one part an object of desire, on the other of aversion: the least irritation by that which, in what- ever terms couched, afforded the fairest pretence for non-compliance.
3. The imperfection in question being, by the sup- position, one of a public nature, the advantages of which are enjoyed by a few, while the interest which the many, each taken individually, have in the remo- val of the imperfection is commonly comparatively small and remote, no little difficulty is commonly ex- perienced by any one whose endeavour it should be to persuade the many to collect amongst them a de- 182 FALLACIKS OF DANGER. [67/. 4.
gree of impressive force sufficient to operate upon the ruling powers with effect. On the part of the many, the natural interest being in each case commonly but weak, it requires to bring it into effective action what- soever aids can be afforded it. Strong arguments, how strong soever, will of themselves be scarcely suf- ficient; for at the utmost they can amount to no more than the indication of that interest which, in the case of the greater part of the many whose force it is ne- cessary to bring to bear upon the point in question, is by the supposition but weak. In aid of the utmost strength of which the argument is susceptible, strength of expression will therefore be necessary, or at least naturally and generally regarded as necessary, and as such employed. But in proportion as this strength of expression is employed, the mode of application stands exposed to the imputation of that heat, and violence, and acrimony, the use of which it is the object of the alleged fallacy to prevent.
4. It is only on the supposition of its being in effect, and being felt to be, conducive, or at least not repug- nant, to the interest of the ruling powers addressed, that the simple statement of the considerations which, in the character of reasons, prove the existence of the supposed imperfection, and, if a remedy be proposed, the aptitude of the proposed remedy, can with reason be expected to operate on them with effect. But the fact is, that on the part of those ruling powers, this sort of repugnance, in a degree more or less consider- able, is no other than what on every such occasion Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 183 ought in reason to be expected. If the imperfection in question be of the nature of those to which the term abuse is wont to be applied, these ruling powers have some or all of them, by the supposition, a special profit arising out of that abuse, a special interest con- sequently in the preservation and defence of it. Even if there be no such special interest, there exists in that quarter at all times, and in more shapes than one, a general and constant interest by which they are ren- dered mutually averse to applications of that nature. In the first place, in addition to their ordinary labours, they find themselves called upon to undertake a course of extraordinary labour, which it was not their design to undertake, and for which it may happen to some or all of them to feel themselves but indifferently pre- pared and qualified; and thus the application itself finds itself opposed by the interest of their ease. In the next place, to the extent of the task thus imposed upon them, they find the business of Government taken out of their hands. To that same extent their conduct is determined by a will, which originated not among themselves; and if, the measure being carried into effect, the promoters of it would obtain reputation, respect and affection, of those rewards a share more or less considerable falls into other hands: and thus the application in question finds an opponent in the interest of their pride.
184 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 5.
CHAPTER V.
Accusation-scarers Device.
Ad metiiin. " Infamy must attach somewhere."
Ed'posieioji.
This fallacy consists in representing the imputa- tion of purposed calumny as necessarily and justly at- taching upon him vvho, having made a charge of mis- conduct against any person or persons possessed of political power or influence, fails of producing evidence sufficient for conviction.
Its manifest object, accordingly, is, as far as possi- ble, to secure impunity to crimes and transgressions in every shape, on the part of persons so situated: — namely, by throwing impediments in the way of accu- sation, and in particular, by holding out to the eyes of those persons who have in view the undertaking the functions of accusers, in case of failure, in addi- tion to disappointment, the prospect of disgrace.
E.rposure.
*' Infamy must attach somewherer To this eflect was a dictum ascribed in the debates to the Right Honourable George Canning, on the occasion of the inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York in his office of Commander in Chief.
Ch. 5.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 185 In principle, insinuation to this effect has an un- limited application, — it applies, not only to all charges against persons possessed of political power, but, with more or less force, to all criminal charges in form of law against any persons whatsoever: and not only to all charges in a prosecution of the criminal cast, but to the litigants on both sides of the cause, in a case of a purely non-penal, or, as it is called, a civil nature.