pay him for his concession, propose to you to admit that it is not the thing for practice: — in a word, that it is good in theory, bad in practice.
That there have been plans in abundance which have been found bad in practice, and many others which would if tried have proved bad in practice, is altogether out of dispute.
That of each description there have been many which in theory have appeared, and with reference to the judgment of some of the persons by whom they have been considered, have been found plausible, is likewise out of dispute.
What is here meant to be denied, is, that a plan which is essentially incapable of proving good in practice can with propriety be said to be good in theory.
Whenever out of a number of circumstances, the concurrence of all of which is necessary to the success of a plan, any one is, in the calculation of the effects expected from it, omitted, any such plan will in pro- portion to the importance of the omitted circumstance be defective in practice; and if such be the degree of importance, had; upon the whole, a bad one; the dis- advantageous effects of the plan not finding a com- pensation in the advantageous ones.
When the plan for the illumination of the streets by gas-lights was laid before the public by the person wiio considered himself or gave himself out for the in- ventor, one of the items in the article of expense — one capital article, viz. that of the pipes, was omitte<l.
X 306 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 9- On the supposition that the pipes might all of them have been had for nothing, and lliat in the plan so ex- hibited no other such imperfections were to be found, the plan would, to the persons engaged in the under- taking, be not merely advantageous, but advantageous in the prodigious degree therein represented. If, on the contrary, the expense of this omitted article were such as to more than countervail the alleged balance on the side of profit, then would the plan, with refe- rence to the undertakers, prove disadvantageous upon the whole, and in one word a bad one.
But whatever it prove to be in practice, in theory, having so important an omission in it, it cannot but be pronounced a bad one; for every plan in which, in the account of advantages and disadvantages, of profit and losses, any item is on the side of disadvantage or loss omitted, is, in proportion to the magnitude of such loss, a bad one, how advantageous soever upon trial the result may prove upon the whole.
In the line of political economy, most plans that have been adopted and eniployed by government for enriching the community by money given to indivi- duals, have been bad in practice.
But if they have been bad in practice, it is because they have been bad in theory. In the account taken of profit and loss, some circumstance that has been necessary to render the plan in question advantageous upon the whole, has been omitted.
This circumstance has been, the advantage which, from the money employed, would have been reaped, Sect. 4.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 507 either in the way of addition to capital by other means, or in the way of comfort by expenditure.
Of the matter of wealth, portions that by these ope- rations were but transferred from hand to hand, and commonly with a loss by the way, were erroneously considered as having been created.
Sect. 4. Too good to be practicable.
There is one case in which, in a certain sense, a plan may be said to be too good to be practicable, and that case a very comprehensive one. It is where, without adequate inducement in the shape of personal interest, the plan requires for its accomplishment that some individual or class of individuals shall have made a sacrifice of his or their personal interest to the in- terest of the whole. Where it is only on the part of some one individual or very small number of indivi- duals that a sacrifice of this sort is reckoned upon, the success of the plan is not altogether without the sphere of moral possibility; because instances of a disposi- tion of this sort, though extremely rare, are not alto- gether without example: by religious hopes and fears, by philanthropy, by secret ambition, such miracles have now and then been wrought. But when it is on the part of a body of men or a multitude of individuals taken at random that any such sacrifice is reckoned upon, then it is that in speaking of the plan the term Utopian may without impropriety be applied.
In this case, if, neglecting the question of practica- 308 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [CIl. 9- bility, on the mere consideration of the nature of the results the production of which is aimed at by the plan, it can with propriety be termed a good one, the observation, too good to be practicable, cannot justly be accused of want of truth.
But it is not any such intimation that, by those in whose mouths this observation is most in use, is meant to be conveyed. The description of persons by whom chiefly, if not exclusively, it is employed, are those who, regarding a plan as being adverse to their interests, and not finding it on the ground of general utility exposed to any preponderant objection, have recourse to this objection in the character of an instrument of contempt, in the view of preventing those from looking into it who might otherwise have been disposed.
It is by the fear of seeing it practised that they are drawn to speak of it as impracticable.
In the character of opposers of a plan, of the good- ness of which (that is, of its conduciveness to the welfare of the whole community taken together) they are themselves persuaded, it cannot be their intention or wish to exhibit themselves: it is not, therefore, in any such property of the plan that it can be their aim to engage those on whom it depends, to look for the cause of the impracticability which they impute to it. Under favour of such observation as may have been made of the instances in which plans, — the goodness of which, supposing them carried into effect, has been beyond dispute, — have failed of success, what they aim Sect, 4.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 309 at is the producing, in superficial minds, the idea of a universal and natural connexion between extraordinary and extensive goodness and impracticability: that so often as upon the face of any plan the marks of ex- traordinary and extensive utility are discernible, these marks may, as it were by a signal, have the effect of inducing a man to turn aside from the plan, and, whether in the way of neglect and non-support, or in the way of active opposition, to bestow on it the same treatment that he would be justified in bestowing upon a bad one.
*• Upon the face of it, it carries that air of plausi- bility that, if you were not upon your guard, might engage you to bestow more or less of your attention upon it. But were you to take the trouble, you would find that, as it is with all these plans ihat promise so much, practicability would at last be wanting to it. To save yourself from this trouble, the wisest course you can take, is, therefore, to put the plan aside, and think no more about the matter."
There is a particular sort of grin — a grin of mali- cious triumph — a grin made up of malicious triumph with a dash of concealed foreboding and trepidation at the bottom of it — that forms a natural accompaniment of this fallacy, when vented by any of the sworn defend- ers of abuse: and Milton, instead of crammin<: all his angels of the African complexion into the divinity school disputing about predestination, should have employed part of them at least in practising this grin, with the corresponding fallacy, before a looking-glass.
310 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 9- Proportioned to the difficulty of persuading men to regard a plan as otherwise than beneficial, supposing it carried into effect, is the need of all such arguments or phrases as present a chance of persuading them to regard it as impracticable: and according to the sort of man you have to deal with, you accompany it with the grin of triumph, or with the grimace of regret and lamentation.
There is a class of predictions, the tendency and object of which is to contribute to their own accom- plishment; and in the number of them is the predic- tion involved in this fallacy. When objections on the ground of utility are hopeless or have been made the most of, objections on the ground of practicability still present an additional resource: by these, men who, being convinced of the utility of the plan, are in ever so great a degree well-wishers to it may be turned aside from it: and the best garb to assume for the purpose of the attempt, is that of one who is a well- wisher likewise.
Till the examples are before his eyes, it will not be easy for a man who has not himself made the ob- servation to conceive to what a pitch of audacity po- litical improbity is capable of soaring: how completely, when an opportunity that seems favourable presents itself, the mask will sometimes be taken off: — what thorough confidence there is in the complicity, or in the imbecility of hearers or readers.
If to say a good thing is a good thing is nugatory, and as such, foolish language, what shall we say of Sect. 4:.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 311 him who stands up boldly and says, to aim at doing good is a bad thing?
In so many words, it may be questioned whether any such thing has yet been said: but what is abso- lutely next to it, scarce distinguishable from it, and in substance the same thing, has actually been said over and over. To aim at perfection has been pronounced to be utter folly or wickedness; and both or either at the extreme. To say that man (the species called 7?iau) has so much as a tendency to better himself, and that the range of such tendency has no certain limits, — this has been — speculation: propositions or observations to that effect have also been set down as a mark of wickedness. " By Priestley an observation to this effect has somewhere or other been made. By Godwin an observation to this effect has somewhere or other been made. By Condorcet, or some other Frenchman or Frenchmen of the class of those who, for the purpose of holding them up to execration, are called philosophers, an observation to this effect has some where or other been made.
" By this mark, with or without the aid of any other, these men, together with other men of the same leaven, have proved themselves the enemies of mankind: and you too, whosoever you are, if you dare to maintain the same heresy, you also are an enemy to mankind."
In vain would you reply to him, if he be an official man, Sir, Mr. Chalmers who, like yourself, was an offi- cial man, has maintained this tendency, and written a 312 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 9- book which, from beginning to end, is a demonstration of it as clear and undeniable as Euclid's: and Mr. Chal- piers is neither a madman nor an enemy to mankind.
In vain would you reply to him, if he call himself ix Christian, Sir, Jesus said to his disciples, and to you if you would be one of them, " Be ye perfect, even as our Father in heaven is perfect;" and in so doing has not only assumed the tendency, but commanded it to be encouraged and carried to its utmost possible length.
By observations such as these, may the sort of man in question be perhaps for a moment silenced; but neither by this, nor any thing, nor any body, though one rose from the dead, would he be converted.
To various descriptions of persons over and above those who are in the secret, a fallacy of this class is in a singular degree acceptable and conciliating.
1. To all idle men; all haters of business; a con- siderable class, where a share in the sovereignty of an empire such as ours is parcelled out into portions which are private property; — where electors' votes are free in appearance only, and scarcely in appear- ance, and where the votes that are sold for money are in fact among the freest that are to be found.
2. All ignorant men: all who for want of due and appropriate instruction^ feeling themselves incapable of judging on any question on its own merits, look out ivith eagerness for such commodious and reputation- saving grounds.
3. All dull and stupid men: in whose instance, in- Sect. 4.] I'ALLACirs or confusion. 313 formation — reading — such as has fallen to their lot, has not yet been sufficient to enable them to deter- mine a question on its own merits.
When a train of argument — when but a single ar- gument is presented that requires thought, — an opera- tion so troublesome and laborious as that which goes by the name of thought, — an expression of scorn level- led at the author, or supposed author, of this trouble, as far as it goes, a just, howsoever scanty and inade- quate, punishment for the disturbance attempted to be given to honourable repose.
Under the name of theory, &c.: what is it that to men of this description is so odious? what but refe- rence to the end — to that which on that part of the field of thought and action which is in question, is, or at any rate ought to be, the end pursued — and thence, in every case, the end in view? (how often must it, and ever in vain be repeated?) the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But were refe- rence made to this end — to this inflexible standard -—every thing almost they do — every thing almost they support — would stand condemned. What then shall be the standard r Custom-^Custom: Custom being their own practice, blindly imitating the prac- tice of men in the same situations, put in motion and governed by the same sinister interests.
314 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ck, 10.
CHAPTER X.
Paradoxical Assertion.
Ad judicium.
I. Dangerousness of the Principle of Utility. — 2. Use- lessness of Classification. — 3. Mischievousness of Simplification. — 4. Disinterestedness, a mark of profligacy.
Exposition.
When of any measure, practice or principle, the utility is too far above dispute to be capable of being impeached by reasoning, a rhetorician to whose inter- ests or views it has appeared adverse, has in some instances in a sort of fit of desperation made this at- tack upon it; taking up the word or set of words commonly employed for the designation of it, with- out any such attempt as that of opposing it by any specific objection, he has assailed it with some vehe- ment note of reprobation or strain of invective^ in which the mischievousness or folly of it has been taken for granted as if it were undeniable.
Exposure is a sort of process of which the device in question is scarce susceptible: but for the purpose of exposition an example or two may have its use.
Utility, method, simplification, reason, sincerity. By a person unexperienced in the arts of political and verbal warfare, it would not readily be imagined, that Sect. 1.] FALLACIES OF COXFUSION. 315 entities like these should, by any man laying claim to the distinguishing attribute of man^ be pointed out as fit objects of hatred and contempt: yet so it is.
1. As to utility. Already has been named "a great character in a high situation" by whom the principle of utility was pronounced a dangerous one*. A book * Lord Loughborough, when Attorney-General*. The observation made by him in the year 1789, was reported to me presently after it was made. Not till many years after — some time, as I perceive, after what is in the text was written, was the true import perceived by me. The charac- ter in which at the time it presented itself to my view, was that of a gross absurdity: its true character was that of deep sagacity. By the prin- ciple of utility, what I understood, was — that principle which states as the only justifiable end of Government, the greatest ha])piness of the greatest number of the members of tlie community. At that time I still continued to take for granted (such was my simplicity) that this was the end generally aimed at, though often so widely missed By those, whose desire it was that on each occasion that end should be attained, it could not without self-contradiction be supposed that the endeavour to attain it could seem dangerous. But Loughborough was too well acquainted with the state of Government in this country (not to speak of other countries) not to know that it is the greatest happi- ness of the ruling few, and not that of the greatest number, that is the end pursued on each occasion by the ruling few. What then was the interest which, on that occasion, as on all occasions, that member of the ruling few, had at heart, and thence preferably if not exclusive- ly, in mind? It was, of course, the interest of the ruling few. But the interest of the ruling few is, on the greatest part of the field of Go- vernment, in a state of continued opposition to that of the greatest number: accordingly a principle, which, in case of competition, and to the extent of the competition, called for sacrifices to be made of the interests of the class to which he belonged, and which alone was the object of his solicitude, could not but, in his eyes, be a dangerous one.
* Note written August 21, 1819: — " Great characters in high situa- tions," a phrase employed about December 1809 by minister Percival, then Attorney-General, in calling down the vengeance of the law on I forget what alleged libeller, for using the appellation of " the Doctor" might be mentioned, and one of no small celebrity *, in which the same principle — the principle of utility — has been pronounced useless: — the principle itself, and consequently every investigation in which to the purposes of legislation or common life, application is endeavoured to be made of it.
What must be acknowledged is, that to make a right and effectual use of it, requires the concurrence of those requisites which are not always found in com- pany: invention, discernment, patience^, sincerity; each in no inconsiderable degree; while, for the pronouncing of decisions without consulting it, decisions in the ipse dlvit style, nothing is required but boldness.
Not that, on any occasion on which it promises to suit his purpose, and he feels in himself a capacity to apply it to that purpose, the most decided scorner of it, ever fails to make use of it. It is only when, if consulted, its decisions would be against him, or he feels himself awkward at consulting it, that he ever takes upon him to do without it: and to prove any thing to be right or wrong, thinks it sufficient for him- self to say so.
2. — Clamfication a had thing. — Good Method a bad thing.
On the same occasion in which a convenience was found in pronouncing the principle of utility useless, in speaking of Lord Sidmouth. By the picture it seemed to give of the character of the prosecution and of the persons who bore a part in it, it made a lasting impression oJi my mind. * The Edinburgh Review.
Sect. 2.] F.\LLACIES OF CONFUSION. 317 the like convenience was found in professing th6lik6 contempt for that quality in discourse which goes by the name of good method, or, simply, method, and that sort of operation called good classification, or, simply, classification.
When the subject a man undertakes to write upon, is to a certain degree extensive, as, for example, the science of morals, or that of legislation, whether what a man says be clear or not, of falsehood, will depend upon the goodness of the method in which the parts of it have been cast. 1. If for example, snow and charcoal were both classed under the same name and neither of them had any other, if the question were asked, whether the thing known by that name were white or black, no inconsiderable difficulty would be found in answering it either by a yes or no. 2. And if under favour of the identity of denomination, sugar of lead were to be used in a pudding instead of any of the sort of sugar usually applied to that purpose, practical inconveniences analogous to those which were experienced by Thornbury from eating pancake*, might probably be found to result from the mistake thus exemplified in the tactical branch of the art or science of life, call it v/hich you please.
In the course of an attempt made'* to cast the ' In the pancake in question, which, at a table at the Cape of Good Hope, was served up to a company of which Thornbury, better known by his travels in Japan, was one, white lead was employed instead of flour: — some recovered, and some died.
'' In a book written Anno 1781, published Anno 1789, under the title of Introduction to Morals and Legislation, SI8 FALLACIES OP CONFUSION. [Ch. 10.
whole multitude of pernicious actions into apt classes, — as a fruit, and proof, and test of the supposed apti- tude, about a dozen propositions were mentioned as being capable of being without any deviation from the truth of thingSj ascribed to the pernicious acts, respec- tively, collected together under one denomination by the names respectively assigned to the four classes to which they were referred.
On the same occasion intimation was likewise given, that in the system of law and law terms in use, for the designation of offences, among English lawyers, no such fair general denomination could be found, to the contents of which an equal number, and it might perhaps have been added, any number at all of com- mon propositions could, without error and falsehood, be ascribed. A system of classification and nomen- clature which can never be employed without con- founding at every turn, objects which, to prevent prac- tical and painful accidents, require to be distinguished, must by every man, who has not a decided interest in maintaining the contrary, be acknowledged to be very ill adapted to those which are, or at least which ought to be, its purposes.
Here then was an intimation given, that the whole system of English penal law is in an extreme degree ill adapted to what ought to be the purposes of every system of law: and an implied invitation to those, if any such there were, who being conversant in the sub- ject of law, had any desire to see it well adapted to its professed purposes, to show that the system was not in respect of the points indicated, a bad one, the Sect. 3.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 319 radically bad one it was there represented to be, or else to take measures for making it better. But it be- ing the interest of every one who is most conversant with this subject, that the whole system, instead of be- ing as good as it can be made, should be as bad as those who live under it will endure to see it, the invi- tation could not in either branch be accepted.
In any other branch of science that can be named, Medicine, Chemistry, Natural History in all its branches, the progress made in every other respect is acknowledged to be commensurate to, and at once ef- fect and cause in relation to the progress made in the art of classification: — nor in any one of those branches of science, would it, perhaps, be easy to find a single in- dividual by whom the operation of classification would be spoken of as any thing below the highest rank in the order of importance. Why this difference? Be- cause in any one of these branches of science there is scarce an individual to whose interest the advance- ment of the science is opposed: whereas among the professors of the l^w there exists not an individual to whose interest the advancement of the art of legisla- tion is not opposed; — is not, either immediately de- trimental or ultimately dangerous.
3. Simplification.
By the opposite vice, complication, every evil op- posite to the ends of justice, viz., uncertainty of the law itself, unnecessary delay, expense and vexation in respect of the execution, is either produced or aggra- 320 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 10.
vated*. Consequently, to every one by whom any wish is entertained of seeing the mass of these evils reduced, a fervent desire is entertained of seeing the virtue of simplification infused into the system of law and judicial procedure. On an occasion that took place not long ago, if the account of the debates can be trusted, a gentleman was found resolute and frank enough to stand up and rank this virtue, if after that, such it may be called, among the worst of vices: the use of it was evidence of Jacobinism: evidence of the circumstantial kind indeed, but sufficiently conclu- sive.
If on a declaration to that effect any sentiment of disapprobation were visible in the language or de- portment of that honourable house, none such are, at least, recorded: and if none such really were percep- tible, this circumstance alone might afford no incon- siderable ground for the desire expressed by some, of seeing the character of that honourable house under- go a thorough change, 4. Disinterestedness a mark of profligacy.
In his pamphlet on his Official Economy Bill, to give up official emolument, is by Edmund Burke pro- nounced, in so many words, to be " a mark of the basest profligacy: " On somewhat more defensible grounds might this position itself be pronounced as strong a mark as ever * See Scotch Reform Table.
Sect. 4.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 321 was exhibited, or ever could be exhibited, of the most shameless profligacy.
An assumption contained in it, besides others too numerous to admit of their being detailed here, is — that in the eyes of man there is nothing that has any value — nothing that is capable of actuating and giving direction to his conduct, but the matter of wealth: that the love of reputation and the love of power are themselves, both of them, without efficient power over the human heart.
So opposite is this position of his to the truth, that the less the quantity of money which, in return for his engagement to render official service, a man, not pal- pably unfit for the business of it, is content to accept, the stronger is the proof, the presumptive evidence thereby affi)rded, of his aptitude in all points, with re- lation to the business of that office: since it is a proof of his relish for the business — of the pleasure he anti- cipates from the performance of it*^.
Blinded by his rage, in this his frantic exclamation, wrung from him by the unquenched thirst for lucre, this madman, than whom none perhaps was ever more mis- chievous,— this incendiary, who contributed so much more than any other to light up the flames of that war, under the miseries occasioned by which the nation is still groaning, poured forth the reproach of " the basest profligacy" on the heads of thousands, before whom, • See Bentham par Dumont. Traite de^ Peines et des Recompenses: and Defences of economy against Edmund Burke and George Rose, Y 322 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 10.
had he known who they were, he would have been ready to bow the knee. Not to mention the whole magistracy of the empire, whose office is that of jus- tice of the peace, — among other persons before whom he was in the habit of prostrating himself, of the ver- bal filth he thus casts around him, one large mass falls upon the head of the Marquess Camden, and from his, rebounds upon those other official heads, from which the surrender made of the vast mass of official emolument, drew forth the stream of eulogium which the documents of the day present us with..
5. How to turn this fallacy to account.
To let off a paradox of this sort with any chance of success, you must not be any thing less than the leader of a party. For if you are, instead of gaping and staring at you, men will but laugh at you, or think of something else without so much as laughing at you, because there is no laughing at any thing without thinking of it.
Moreover a thing of this sort succeeds much better in a speech, than in a book or pamphlet; and that, for several reasons.