Thence it is that, in so far as in the instance of any class of men, the state of the law is such as to make it the interest of men belonging to that body to give rise or continuance to any system of abuse however flagrant, a prediction that may be made with full as- surance is, that the conduct of that body, that is, of its several members with few or no exceptions, will be such as to give rise or continuance to that system of abuse: and if there be any means which have been found to be, or promise to be conducive to any such end, such means will, accordingly, how inconsistent soever with probity in any shape, and in particular in the shape of sincerity, be employed.
A common bond of connection, says Cicero some- where, has place among all the virtues: To the word virtue, substitute the word abuse, meaning abuse in government, and the observation will be no less true. Among abuses in government, besides the logical commune vinculum composed of the common denomi- nation abuse, there exists a moral commune vinculum composed of the particular and sinister interest in which all men who are members of a government so circumstanced have a share.
36G CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ch. 3.
So long then as any man has any, the smallest par- ticle of this sinister interest belonging to him — so long has he an interest, and consequently a fellow-feeling with every other man who in the same situation has an interest of the like kind. Attack one of them, you attack all; and in proportion as each of them feels his share in this common concern dear to him, and finds himself in a condition to defend it, he is prepared to defend every other confederate's share with no less alacrity than if it were his ovin. But it is one of the characteristics of abuse, that it can only be defended by fallacy. It is, therefore, the interest of all the con- federates of abuse to give the most extensive currency to fallacies, not only to such as may be serviceable to each individual, but also to such as may be generally useful. ■ It is of the utmost importance to them to keep the human mind in such a state of imbecility, as shall render it incapable of distinguishing truth from error^ Abuses, that is to say institutions beneficial to the few, at the expense of the many, cannot openly, di- rectly, and in their own character, be defended. If at all, it must be in company with, and under the cover of other institutions to which this character either does not in fact appertain, or is not seen to ap- pertain.
For the few who are in possession of power, the principle the best adapted, if it were capable of being set to work, would.be that which should be applicable to the purpose of giving to the stock of abuses esta- blished at each given period, an unlimited increasCo Ch. 3] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. ^67 No longer than about a century ago a principle of this cast actually was in force, and that to an extent that threatened the whole frame of society with ruin: viz. under the name of the principle of passive obe- dience and non-resistance.
This principle was a primum mobile j by the due ap- plication of which, abuses in all shapes might be ma- nufactured for use to an amount absolutely unlimited. But this principle has now nearly, if not altogether, lost its force. The creation of abuses has, therefore, of necessity been given up; the preservation of them is all that remains feasible: it is to this work that all exertions in favour of abuse have for a considerable time past, and must henceforward be confined.
Institutions, some good, some bad — some favour- able to both the few and the many; some favourable to the few alone, and at the expense of the many — are the ingredients of which the existing system is com- posed. He who protects all together, and without discrimination, protects the bad. To this object the exertions of industry are still capable of being directed with a prospect of success: and to this ol)ject they actually do continue to be directed, and with a degree of success disgraceful to the probity of the iew by whom such breach of trust is practised, and to the intellect of the many by whom it is endured.
If the fundamental principle of all good govern- ment, viz. that which states as being on every occa- sion the proper, and the only proper end in view and object of pursuit, the greatest happiness of the greatest 368 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ch. 3, number, were on every occasion set up as the mark; on each occasion the particular question would be, by what particular means can this general object be pursued with the greatest probability of success?
But by the habit of recurring to and making appli- cation of this one principle, the eye of the inquirer, the tongue of the speaker, and the pen of the writer, would, on every part of the field of legislation, be brought to some conclusion, passing condemnation on some or other of those abuses, the continuance of which has this common interest for its support.
In a word, so long as any one of these relatively profitable abuses continues unremedied, — so long must there be one such person or more to whose in- terest the use of reason is prejudicial, and to whom hot only the particular beneficial measure from which that particular abuse would receive its correction, but every other beneficial measure, in so far as it is supported by reason, will also be prejudicial in the same way.
It is under the past and still existing state of things, — in other words, under the dominion of usage, custom, precedent, acting without any such recurrence to this only true principle, — that the abuses in ques- tion have sprung up. Custom, therefore, blind cus- tom, in contradiction and opposition to reason, is the standard which he will on every occasion endea- vour to set up as the only proper, safe, and definable standard of reference. Whatever is, is right: every thing is at it should be. These are his favourite Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 369 maxims — maxims which he will let slip no opportu- nity of inculcating to the best advantage possible.
Having, besides his share in the sinister interest, his share in the universal and legitimate interest, there must, to a corresponding extent, be laws and institu- tions, which, although good and beneficial, are no less beneficial to and necessary to his interest, than to that of the whole community of which he makes a part. Of these, then, in so far as they are necessary to his interest, he will be as sincere and strenuous a defender, as of those by which any part of the abuses which are subservient to his sinister interest is main- tained.
It is conducive, for instance, to his interest, that the country should be effectually defended against the assault of the common enemy: that the persons and properties of the members of the community in gene- ral, his own included, should be as effectually as pos- sible protected against the assaults of internal ene- mies— of common malefactors.
But it is under the dominion of custom, blind or at best purblind custom — that such protection has been provided. Custom, therefore, being sufficient for his purpose. Reason always adverse to it, Cus- tom is the ground on which it will be his endeavour to place every institution, the good as well as the bad. Referred to general utility as their standard, shown to be conformable to it by the application of reason to the case, they would be established and supported, 'J B 370 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ch. 3.
indeed, on firmer ground tlian at present. But by placing them on tlie ground of utility, by the applica- tion of reason, he has nothing to gain, while, as hath been seen above, he has every thing to lose and fear from it.
The principle of general utility he will accord- ingly be disposed to represent in the character of " a dangerous principled for so long as blind custom continues to serve his purpose, such, with reference to him and his sinister interest, the principle of general utility really is.
Against the recognition of the principle of general utility, and the habit of employing reason as an in- strument for the application of it, the leading mem- bers of the Government, in so far as corruption has pervaded the franje of Government, and in particular the members of all ranks of the profession of the law, have the same interest as in the eyes of Protestants and other non-catholics, the Pope and his subordi- nates had at the time and on the occasion of the change known in England by the name of the Re- formation.
At the time of the Reformation, the opposition to general utility and human reason was conducted by fire and sword. At present, the war against these powers can not be completely carried on by the same engines.
Fallacies, therefore, applied principally to the pur- pose of devoting to contempt and hatred-4hose who Sect. 1.] CAUSES or utterance. 371 apply the principle of general utility on this ground, remain the only instruments in universal use and re- quest for defending the strongholds of abuse against hostile powers.
These engines we, accordingly, see applied to this purpose in prodigious variety, and with more or less artifice and reserve.
372 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ch. 4.
CHAPTER IV.
Second Cause.
Interest-begotten Prejudice.
If by interest in some shape or other, that is by a motive of one sort or other, every act of the will and thence every act of the hand is produced, so di- rectly or indirectly must every act of the intellectual faculty: though in this case the influence of the in- terest, of this or that motive, is neither so perceptible nor in itself so direct as in the other.
But how (it may be asked) is it possible that the motive a man is actuated by can be secret to himself? Nothing is more easy — nothing more frequent. In- deed the rare case is, not that of his not knowing, but that of his knowinir it.
o It is with the anatomy of the human mind, as with the anatomy and physiology of the human body: the rare case is, not, that of a man's being unconversant, but that of his being conversant with it.
The physiology of the body is not without its diffi- culties: but in comparison of those by which the knowledge of the physiology of the mind has been obstructed, the difficulties are slight indeed.
Not unfrequently, as between two persons living together in a state of intimacy, either or each may pos- sess a more correct and complete view of the motives Ch. 4.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 373 by which the mind of the other, than of those by which his own mind is governed.
Many a woman has in this way had a more cor- rect and complete acquaintance with the internal causes by which the conduct of her husband has been determined, than he has had himself.
The cause of this is easily pointed out. By interest, a man is continually prompted to make himself as correctly and completely acquainted as possible with the springs of action, by which the minds of those are determined on whom he is more or less dependent for the comfort of his life.
But by interest he is at the same time diverted from any close examination into the springs by which his own conduct is determined.
From such knowledge he has not, in any ordinary shape, any thing to gain, — he finds not in it any source of enjoyment.
In any such knowledge he would be more likely to find mortification than satisfaction. The purely social motives, the semi-social motives, and, in the case of the dissocial motives, such of them as have their source in an impulse given by the purely social or by the semi-social motives *; these are the motives, the pre- valence of which he finds mentioned as matter of praise in the instance of other men: it is by the sup- posed prevalence of these amiable motives that he finds reputation raised, and that respect and good-will * See Introduction to Moral? and Lr";islation.
S7i CAUSES or UTTERANCE. [Ch. 4 in which every man is obliged to look for so large a portion of the comfort of his life.
In these same amiable and desirable endowments he finds the minds of other men actually abounding and overflowing; abounding during their lifetime by the testimony of their friends, and after their departure by the recorded testimony enregistered in some monthly magazine, with the acclamation of their friends, and with scarce a dissenting voice from among their ene- mies.
But the more closely he looks into the mechanism of his own mind, the less of the mass of effects pro- duced he finds referable to any of those amiable and delightful causes; he finds nothing, therefore, to attract him towards this study, he finds much to repel him from it.
Praise and self-satisfaction, on the score of moral worth, being accordingly hopeless, it is in intellectual that he vvill seek for it. " All men who are actuated by regard for any thing but self, are fools; those only, whose regard is confined to self, are wise. I am of the number of the wise."
Perhaps he is a man with whom a large proportion of the self-regarding motives may be mixed up with a slight tincture of the social motives operating upon the private scale. What in this case will he do? In investigating the source of a given action, he vvill in the first instance set it down, the whole of it, to the account of the amiable and conciliatory, in a word, the social motives. This, in the study of his own Ch. 4.] CAUSES or utterance. '375 mental physiology, will always be his first step, and this will commonly be his last. Why should he look further? Why take in hand the probe? Wliy unde- ceive himself, and substitute a whole truth, that would mortify him, for a half truth that flatters him?
The greater the share which the motives of the so- cial class have in the production of the general tenour of a man's conduct, the less irksome it seems evident this sort of psychological self-anatomy vvill be. The first view is pleasing; and the more virtuous the man, the more pleasing is that study, which to every man has been pronounced the proper one.
But the less irksome any pursuit is, the greater, if the state of faculties, intellectual and active permit, will be a man's progress in it.
376 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ch. 5.
CHAPTER V.
Third Cause.
Aut hority-begotten Prejudice.
Prejudice is the name given to an opinion of any sort, on any subject, nhen considered as having been embraced without sufficient examination: it is a judg- ment, which being pronounced before evidence, is, therefore, pronounced without evidence.
Now, at the hazard of being deceived, and by de- ception led into a line of conduct prejudicial cither to himself or to some one to whom it would rather be his wish to do service, what is it that could lead a man to embrace an opinion without sufficient exami- nation?
One cause is the uneasiness attendant on the labour of examination: he takes the opinion up as true, to save the labour that might be necessary to enable him to discern the falsity of it.
Of the propensity to take not only facts but opinions upon trust, the universality is matter of universal ob- servation. Pernicious as it is in some of its applica- tions, it has its root in necessity, in the weakness of the human mind. In the instance of each indivi- dual, the quantity of opinion which it is possible for him to give acceptance or rejection to, on the ground of examination performed by himself, bears but a Ch. 5.] CAUSES OF UTTEKANCE. 377 small proportion to that in which such judgment, as be passes upon it, cannot have any firmer or other ground than that which is composed of the like judg- ment pronounced by some other individual or aggre- gate of individuals: the cases, in which it is possible for his opinion to be home-made, bear but a small pro- portion to the cases in w hich, if any opinion at all be entertained by him, that opinion must necessarily have been imported.
But in the case of the public man, this necessity forms no justification either for the utterance or for the acceptance of such arguments of base alloy, as those which arc represented under the name of fal- lacies.
These fallacies are not less the offspring of sinister interest because the force of authority is more or less concerned. Where authority has a share in the pro- duction of them, there are two distinguishable ways in which sinister interest may also have its share.
A fallacy which, in the mouth of A., had its root immediately in interest, — in self-conscious sinister in- terest,— receiving utterance from his pen or his lips, obtains, upon the credit of his authority, credence among acceptors in any multitude. Having thus rooted itself in the minds of men, it becomes consti- tutive of a mass of authority, under favour of which, such fallacies as appear conducive to the planting or rooting in the minds of men in general the erroneous notion in question, obtain, at the hands of other men, utterance and acceptance.
378 CAUSES or utterance. [C/i. 5, 2. Having received the prejudice at the hands of authority, viz. of the opinion of those whose adherence to it was produced immediately or mediately by the operation of sinister interest, — sinister interest ope- rating on the mind of the utterer or acceptor of the fal- lacy in question, prom})ts him to bestow on it, in the character of a rational argument, a degree of attention exceeding that which could otherwise have been be- stowed on it; he fixes, accordingly, his attention on all considerations, the tendency of which is to procure for it utterance or acceptance, and keeps at a distance all considerations by which the contrary tendency is threatened.
Ch. 6.] CAUSES OF UTTEllANCE. 379 CHAPTER VI.
Fourth Cause. Self-defence against counter Fallacies.
The opposcrs of a pernicious measure may be sometimes driven to employ fallacies, from their sup- posed utility as an answer to counter fallacies.
" Such is the nature of men (they may say), that these arguments, weak and inconclusive as they arc, aie those which on the bulk of the people (upon whom ultimately every thing depends) make the strongest and most effectual impression: the measure is a most mischievous one: it were a crime on our parts to leave unemployed any means not criminal that promise to be contributory to its defeat. It is the weakness of the public mind, not the weakness of our cause, that compels us to employ such engines in the defence of it/' This defence might, indeed, be satisfactory where the fallacies in question are em[>loyed, — not as sub- stitutes but only as supplements ro relevant and direct ones.
But if employed as supplements, to prove their be- ing employed in that character and in that character only, and that the use thus made of them i& not in- consistent with sincerity, two conditions seem requisite. 1. That arguments of the direct and relevant kind 380 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ol. 6.
be placed in the front of the battle, declared to be the main arguments, the arguments and considerations by which the opposition or support to the proposed mea- sure was produced; 2. That on the occasion of employing the fallacies in question, an acknowledgement should be made of their true character, of their intrinsic weakness, and of the considerations which, as above, seemed to im- pose on the individual in question the obligation of employing them, and of the regret with which the consciousness of such an obligation was accompanied.
If, even when employed in opposition to a measure really pernicious, these warnings are omitted to be annexed to them, the omission affords but too strong a presumption of general insincerity. On the occasion in question, a man would have nothing to fear from any avowal made of their true character. Yet he omits to make this avowal. Why? — Because he fore- sees that, on some other occasion or occasions, argu- ments of this class will constitute his sole reliance.
The more closely the above considerations are ad- verted to, the stronger is the proof which the use of such arguments, without such warnings, will be seen to afford of improbity or imbecility, or a mixture of the two, on the part of him by whom they are em- ployed: of imbecility of mind, if the weakness of such arguments has really failed of becoming visible to him: of improbity, if, conscious of their weakness, and of their tendency to debilitate and pervert the faculties, intellectual and moral, of such persons as are swayed Ch. 6.1 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 381 by them,— he gives currency to them unaccompanied by such warning.
Is it of the one or of the other species of imperfec- tion, or of a mixture of both, that such deccptious argumentation is evidentiary? On this occasion, as on others, the answer is not easy, nor fortunately is it material, to estimate the connexion between these two divisions of the mental frame; so constantly and so materially does each of them exert an influence on the other, that it is difficult for either to suffer but the other must suffer more or less along w ith it. On many a well-meaning man this base and spurious metal has no doubt passed for sterling; but if you see it bur- nished, and held up in triumph by the hands of a man of strong as well as brilliant talents — by a very master of the mint — set him down, without fear of injuring liim, upon the list of those who deceive without having any such excuse to plead as that of having been de- ceived.
382 USE OF FALLACIES. [C/l. 7.
CHAPTER VII.
U^e of these Fallacies to the utterers and acceptors of them.
Being all of ihem to such a degree replete with absurdity — many of thtMn upon the face of them com- posed of nothing else — a question that naturally ])re- sents itself is, how it has happened that they have ac- quired so extensive a currency? — how it is tliat so much use has been made, and continues to be made, of them.
Is it credible (it may be asked) that, to those by whom they are employed, the inanity and absurdity of them should not be fully manifest? — Is it credible, that on such grounds political measures should pro- ceed?
No, it is not credible: to the very person by whom the fallacy is presented in the character of a reason — of a reason on the consideration of which his opinion has been formed, and on the strength of which his conduct is grounded, — it has presented itself in its genuine colours.
But in all assemblies in which shares in power are exercised by votes, there are two descriptions of per- sons whose convenience requires to be consulted, — that of the speakers and that of the hearers.
To the convenience of persons in both these situa- tions, the class of arguments here in question are in Ch. 7.] USE OF FALLACIES. 383 an eminent degree favourable: 1. As to the situation of the sjDcaker: — the more numerous and efficient the titles to respect which his argument enables him to produce, the more convenient and agreeable is that situation made to him. Probity in the shape of inde- pendence— superiority in the article of wisdom — su- periority in the scale of rank — of all these qualities, the reputation is matter of convenience to a man; and of all these qualities, the reputation is by these argu- ments promised to be made secure.
1. As to independence: — when a man stands up to speak for the purpose of reconciling men to the vote he purposes to give, or for the purpose of giving, to the side which he espouses whatsoever weight is re- garded by him as attached to his authority; the nature of the purpose imposes on him a sort of necessity of linding something in the shape of a reason to accom- pany and recommend it.
Though in fact directed and governed by some other will behind the curtain, and by the interest by which that other will is governed, decency is under- stood to require, that it is from his own understanding, not from the will of any other person, that his own Avill should be understood to have received its direc- tion.
But it is not by the matter of punishment or the matter of reward — it is not by Jea?'s or hopes — it is not by threats ox promises — it is by something of the nature, or in the shape at least of a reason, that un- derstandino- is iioverned and detei"mined. To show, 384 USE OF FALLACIES. [Ch. 7.
then, that it is by the determination of his own judg- ment that his conduct is determined, it is deemed ad- visable to produce some observation or other in the character of the determinate reason, from which on the occasion in question, his judgment, and thence his will and active faculty, have received their direction.
The argument is accordingly produced, and by this exhibit, the independent character of his mind is esta- blished by irrefragable evidence.
To this purpose every article in the preceding cata- logue may with more or less effect be made to serve, according to the nature of the case.
2. Next, as to superiority in the scale of wisdom: — on running over the list, different articles will be seen to present in this respect different degrees of con- venience.
Some of them will be seen scarcely putting in any special title to this praise.
In others, while the reputation of prudence is se- cured, yet it is that sort of prudence which, by the timidity attached to it, is rendered somewhat the less acceptable to an erect and commanding mind.
To this class may be referred the arguments ad metum and ad verecimdiamy — the hydrophobia of inno- vation, the argument of the ghost-seer, whose nervous system is kept in a state of constant agitation by the phantom of Jacobinism dancing before his eyes, — the idolator, who, beholding in ancestry, in authority, in allegorical personages of various sorts and sizes, in precedents of all sorts, in great characters dead and Ch. 7.] use OF FALLACIES. 385 living, placed in high situations, so many tyrants to whose will, real or supposed, blind obsequiousness at the hands of the vulgar of all classes, may by apt ce- remonies and gesticulation be secured, makes himself the first prostration, in the hope and confidence of finding it followed by much and still more devout prostration, on the part of the crew of inferior idola- tors, in whose breasts the required obsequiousness has been implanted by long practice.
Other arguments again there are, in and for the delivery of which the wisdom of the orator places itself upon higher ground. His acuteness has pene- trated to the very bottom of the subject — his compre- hension has embraced the whole mass of it — his adroit- ness has stripped the obnoxious proposal of the delu- sive colouring by which it had recommended itself to the eye of ignorance: he pronounces it speculative, theoretical, romantic, visionary: it may be good in theory, but it would be bad in practice: it is too good to be practicable, the goodness which glitters on the outside is sufficient proof, is evidence, and tliat con- clusive, of the worthlessness that is within: its appa- rent facility suffices to prove it to be impracticable. The confidence of the tone in which tiie decision is conveyed, is at once the fruit and the sufficient evi- dence of the complete command which the glance of the moment sufficed to give him of the subject in all its bearings and dependences. By the experience which his situation has led him to acquire, and the use which his judgment has enabled him to make of 386 USE OF FALLACIES. [Ch. 7.
that experience, he catches up at a single glance those features which suffice to indicate the class to which the obnoxious proposal belongs.
By the same decision delivered in the same tone, superiority of rank is not less strikingly displayed than superiority of talent. It is no new observation how much the persuasion, or at least the expression given to it, is strengthened by the altitude of the rank as con- stituted or accompanied by the fullness of the purse.
The labour of the brain, no less than that of the hand, is a species of drudgery which the man of ele- vated station sees the propriety and facility of turning over to the base-born crowd below — to the set of plodders whom he condescends upon occasion to honour with his conversation and his countenance. By his rank and opulence he is enabled in this, as in other vvays, to pick and choose what is most congenial to his taste. By the royal hand of Frederic, philoso- phers and oranges were subjected to the same treat- ment and put to the same use. The sweets, the ela- boration of which had been the work of years, were elicited in a few moments by the pressure of an expert hand.
The praise of the receiver of wisdom is always in- ferior to that of the utterer; but neither is the receiver, so he but make due profit of what he receives, without his praise.
The advantage he acquires from these arguments, is, that of being enabled to give the reason of the faith that is, or is supposed to be, in him.
In some circumstances in uhlcli silence will not serve a man, it will, and to a certainty, be construed into a confession of self-convicting consciousness; — consciousness that what he does is wrong and inde- fensible: — that what he ijives men to understand to be his opinion, is not really his opinion; — that of the sup- posed facts, which he has been asserting to form an apparent foundation for his supposed opinion, the ex- istence is not true.
By a persuasion to any such effect, on the part of those with whoui he has to do, his credit, his reputa- tion, would be effectually destroyed.
Something, therefore, must be said, of which it may be supposed that, how little soever may be the weight properly belonging to it, it may have operated on his mind in the character of a reason. By this means his reputation for wisdom is all that is exposed to suffer; — his reputation for probity is saved.