Then, with regard to responsibility, so happily have matters been managed by the house, — a seat there is not less clear of obligation than a seat in the opera house: in both, a man takes his seat, then only when he cannot find more amusement elsewhere; for both, the qualifications are the same, — a ticket begged or bought: in neither is a man charged with any ob- ligation, other than the negative one of not being a nuisance to the company; in both, the length as well as number of attendances depends on the amusement a man finds, except, in the case of the house, as regards the members dependent on the crown. True it is, that a self-called independent member is not necessa- rily ignorant and weak: if by accident a man pos- sessed of knowledge and intelligence is placed in the house, his seat will not deprive him of his acquire- ments: all therefore that is meant is, only, that igno- rance does not disqualify, not that knowledge does. Of the crown and its creatures it is the interest that this ignorance be as thick as possible. Why? Because the thicker the ignorance, the more completely is the furniture of men's minds made up of those interest- begotten prejudices, which render them blindly obse- quious to all those who with power in their hands stand up to take the lead.
But the emperor of Morocco is not more irrespon- sible, and therefore more likely to be ignorant and Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 55 prone to be deceived by the fallacy of authority, than a member of the British Parliament: — the emperor of Morocco's power is clear of obligation; so is the member's: — the emperor's power, it is true, is an in- teger, and the member's but a fraction of it; but no ignorance prevents a man from becoming or continu- ing emperor of Morocco, nor from becoming or con- tinuing a member: — the emperor's title is derived from birth; so is that of many a member: — to enjoy his despotism, no fraud, insincerity, hypocrisy or jar- gon is necessary to the emperor; much of all to the member: — by ascending and maintaining his throne, no principle is violated by the emperor; by the mem- ber, if a borough-holder, many are violated on his taking and retaining his seat: — by being a despot, the emperor is not an impostor; the member is: — the emperor pretends not to be a trustee, agent, deputy, delegate, representative; lying is not among the ac- companiments of his tyranny and insolence; the member does pretend all this, and (if a borough- holder) lies. — A trust-holder? yes; but a trust-breaker: — an agent? yes; but for himself: — a representative of the people? yes; but so as Mr. Kemble is of Mac- beth: — a deputy? yes; because it has not been in their power to depute, to delegate any body else: — deputy, — delegate, — neither title he assumes but for argument, and when he cannot help it; deputation being matter of fact, the word presents an act with all its circumstances, viz. fewness of the electors, their want of freedom, &c.; representation is a more con- 56 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [C/l.].
venient word, the acts, &c. are kept out of sight by it; — it is a mere fiction, the offspring of lawyer-craft, and any one person or thing may be represented by any other. By canvass witli colours, a man is represent- ed; by a king, the whole people; by an ambassador, the king, and thus the people.
Remedy against the influence of this fallacy* For banishing ignorance, for substituting to it a constantly competent measure of useful, appropriate and general instruction, the proper, the necessary, the only means lie not deep beneath the surface.
The sources of instruction being supposed at com- mand, and the quantity of natural talent given, the quantity of information obtained will in every case be as the quantity of mental labour employed in the col- lection of it — the quantity of mental labour, as the aggregate strength of the motives by which a man is excited to labour.
In the existing order of things, there is, compara- tively speaking, no instruction obtained, because no labour is bestowed, — no labour is bestowed, because none of the motives by which men are excited to la- bour are applied in this direction.
The situation being by the supposition an object of desire, if the case were such that, without labour em- ployed in obtaining instruction, there would be no chance of obtaining the situation, or but an inferior chance, while in case of labour so employed there would be a certainty or a superior chance, — here, in- Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORJTY. 57 struction would have its motives, — here, labour applied to the attainment of instruction, — here, consequently, instruction itself would have its probably efficient cause.
The quality, i.e. the relative applicability of the mass of information obtained, is an object not to be overlooked.
The goodness of the quality will depend on the liberty enjoyed in respect of the choice. By prohi- bitions, with penalties attached to the delivery of al- leged information relative to a subject in question, or any part of it, the quality of the whole mass is im- paired, and an implied certificate is given of the truth and utility of whatsoever portion is thus endeavoured to be suppressed.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
E:vamples of descriptions of persons xvhose declared opinions upon a question of legislation are peculiarly liable to be tinged with falsity by the action of sinister interest.
1. Lawyers; oppositeness of their interest to the universal interest.
The opinions of lawyers in a question of legislation, particularly of such lawyers as are or have been prac- tising advocates, are peculiarly liable to be tinged with falsity by the operation of sinister interest. To the interest of the community at large, that of every ad- vocate is in a state of such direct and constant oppo- sition (especially in civil matters), that the above assertion requires an apology to redeem it from the 58 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [67/. 1.
appearance of trifling: the apology consists in the ex- tensively prevailing propensity to overlook and turn aside from a fact so entitled to notice. It is the people's interest that delay, vexation and expense of procedure should be as small as possible: — it is the advocate's that they should be as great as possible: viz. expense in so far as his profit is proportioned to it; factitious vexation and delay, in so far as inseparable from the profit-yielding part of the expense. As to uncertainty in the law, it is the people's interest that each man's security against wrong should be as complete as pos- sible; that all his rights should be known to him; that all acts, which in the case of his doing them will be treated as offences, may be known to him as such, to- gether with their eventual punishment, that he may avoid committing them, and that others may, in as few instances as possible, suffer either from the wrong or from the expensive and vexatious remedy. Hence it is their interest, that as to all these matters the rule of action, in so far as it applies to each man, should at all times be not only discoverable, but actually present to his mind. Such knowledge, which it is every man's interest to possess to the greatest, it is the lawyer's interest that he possess it to the narrowest extent pos- sible. It is every man's interest to keep out of law- yers' hands as much as possible; it is the lawyer's in- terest to get him in as often, and keep him in as long, as possible: thence that any written expression of the words necessary to keep non-lawyers out of his hand may as long as possible be prevented from coming into Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 5^ existence, and when in existence as long as possible kept from being present to his mind, and when pre- sented from staying there *. It is the lawyer's interest, therefore, that people should continually suffer for the non-observance of laws, which, so far from having re- ceived efficient promulgation, have never yet found any authoritative expression in words. This is the perfection of oppression: yet, propose that access to knowledge of the laws be afforded by means of a code, lawyers, one and all, will join in declaring it impos- sible. To any effect, as occasion occurs, a judge will forge a rule of law: to that same effect, in any deter- minate form of words, propose to make a law, that same judge will declare it impossible. It is the judge's interest that on every occasion his declared opinion be taken for the standard of right and wrong; that whatever he declares right or wrong be universally re- ceived as such, how contrary soever such declaration be to truth and utility, or to his own declaration at other times: — hence, that within the whole field of law, men's opinions of right and wrong should be as contradictory, unsettled, and thence as obsequious to him as possible: in particular, that the same conduct * A considerable proportion of what is termed the Common law of F.ngland is in this oral and unwritten state. The cases in which it has been clothed with words, that is, in which it has been framed and pronounced, are to be found in the various collections of reported de- cisions. These decisions, not having the sanction of a law passed by the legislature, are confirmed or overruled at pleasure by the existing judges; so that, except in matters of the most common and daily oc- currence, they afford no rule of action at all.
60 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [C/l. 1.
which to others would occasion shame and punish- ment, should to him and his occasion honour and re- ward: that on condition of telling a lie, it should be in his power to do what he pleases, the injustice and falsehood being regarded with complacency and re- verence; that as often as by falsehood, money or ad- vantage in any other shape can be produced to him, it should be regarded as proper for him to employ re- ward or punishment, or both, for the procurement of such falsehood. Consistently with men's abstaining from violences, by which the person and property of him and his would be alarmingly endangered, it is his interest that intellectual as well as moral depravation should be as intense and extensive as possible; That transgressions cognizable by him should be as nume- rous as possible; That injuries and other trans- gressions committed by him should be reverenced as acts of virtue; That the suffering produced by such injuries should be placed, not to his account, but to the immutable nature of things, or to the wrong- doer, who, but for encouragement from him, would not have become such. His professional and personal in- terest being thus adverse to that of the public, from a lawyer's declaration that the tendency of a proposed law relative to procedure, &c. is pernicious, the con- trary inference may not unreasonably be drawn. From those habits of misrepresenting their own opinion (i. e. of insincerity), which are almost peculiar to this in comparison with other classes, one presumption is, that he docs not entertain the opinion thus declared; Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITV. 51 — another, that if he does, he has been deceived into it by sinister interest and the authority of co-pro- fessional men, in like manner deceivers or deceived: in other words, it is the result of interest-begotten pre- judice. In the case of every other body of men, it is generally expected that their conduct and language will be for the most part directed by their own interest, that is, by their own view of it. In the case of the lawyer, the ground of this persuasion, so far from being weaker, is stronger than in any other case. His evidence being thus interested evidence, according to his own rules his declaration of opinion on the subject here pointed out would not be so much as bearable. It is true, were those rules consistently observed, judicature would be useless, and society dissolved: accordingly they are not so observed, but observed or broken pretty much at pleasure; but they are not the less among the num- ber of those rules, the excellence and inviolability of which the lawyer is never tired of trumpeting. But on any point, such as those in question, nothing could be more unreasonable, nothing more inconsistent with what has been said above, than to refuse him a hear- ing. On every such point, his habits and experience afford him facilities not possessed by any one else for finding relevant and specific arguments, when the na- ture of the case affords any; but the surer he is of being able to find such arguments, if any such are to be found, the stronger the reason for treating his naked declaration of opinion as unworthy of all regard: ac- companied by specific arguments, it is useless; desti- 6'2 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [Ch. 1.
tute of them, it amounts to a virtual confession of their non-existence.
So matters stand on thequestion whdLtought to be law.
On the question what the law is, so long as the rule of action is kept in tlie state of common, alias unwritten, alias imaginary law, authority, though next to nothing, is every thing. The question is, what on a given oc- casion A. (the judge) is likely to think: wait till your fortune has been spent in the inquiry, and you will know; but, forasmuch as it is naturally a man's wish to be able to give a guess what the result will even- tually be, before he has spent his fortune, in the view if possible to avoid spending his fortune and get- ting nothing in return for it_, he applies through the medium of B. (an attorney) for an opinion to C. (a counsel), who, considering what D. (a former judge) has, on a subject supposed to be more or less analo- gous to the one in question, said or been supposed to say, deduces therefore his guess as to what, when the time comes. Judge A., he thinks, will say, and gives it you. A shorter way would be to put the question at once to A.; but, for obvious reasons, this is not per- mitted.
On many cases, again, as well-grounded a guess might be had of an astrologer for five shillings, as of a counsel for twice or thrice as many guineas, but that the lawyer considers the astrologer as a smuggler, and puts him down.
But Packwood's opinion on the goodness of his own razors would be a safer guide forjudging of their good- Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY, 6S ness, than a judge's opinion on the goodness of a pro- posed law: it is Packwood's interest that his razors be as good as possible; — the judge's, that the law be as bad, yet thought to be as good, as possible. It would not be the judge's interest that his commodity should be thus bad, if, as in the case of Packwood, the customer had other shops to go to; but in this case, even when there are two shops to go to, the shops being in confederacy, the commodity is equally bad in both; and the worse the commodity, the better it is said to be. In the case of the judge's commodity, no experience suffices to undeceive men; the bad quality of it is referred to any cause but the true one.
Examples. Churchmen; oppositeness of their interest to the universal interest.
In the lawyer's case it has been shown that on the question, what on such or such a point ought to be law, to refer to a lawyer's opinion given without or against specific reasons, is a fallacy; its tendency, in proportion to the regard paid to it, deceptions; — the cause of this deceptions tendency, sinister interest, to the action of which all advocates and (being made from advocates) all judges stand exposed. To the churchman's case the same reasoning applies: as, in the lawyer's case the objection does not arise on the question, what law is, but what ought to be law, — so in the churchman's case it does not arise as to what in matters of religion is law, but as to what in those matters ought to be law. On a question not connected 64 TALLACIKS OF AUTHORITY. [Ch. 1.
with religion, reference to a churchman's opinion as suchy as authority, can scarcely be considered as a fallacy, such opinion not being likely to be considered as constitutive of authority. To understand how great would be the probability of deception, if on the ques- tion, what in matters of religion ought to be law, the unsupported opinion of a churchman were to be re- garded as authority, we must develop the nature and form of the sinister interest, by which any declaration of opinion from such a quarter is divested of all title to regard. The sources of a churchman's sinister in- terest are as follows: — 1. On entering into the profession, as condition precedent to advantage from it in the shape of sub- sistence and all other shapes, he makes of necessity a solemn and recorded declaration of his belief in the truth of 39 articles, framed 262 years ago, the date of which, the ignorance and violence of the time con- sidered, should suffice to satisfy a reflecting mind of the impossibility of their being all of them really be- lieved by any person at present: 2. In this declaration is generally understood to be included an engagement or undertaking, in case of ori- ginal belief and subsequent change, never to declare, but, if questioned, to deny such change: 3. In the institution thus established, he beholds shame and punishment attached to sincerity, rewards in the largest quantity to absurdity and insincerity. Now the presumptions resulting from such an application of reward and punishment to engage men to declare as- Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 65 sent to given propositions are, 1st, That the proposi- tion is not beheved by the proposer; 2nd, Thence, that it is not true; 3rd, Thence, that it is not believed by the acceptor. It is impossible by reward or punish- ment to produce real and immediate belief: but the following effects may certainly be produced: 1st, The abstaining from any declaration of disbelief; 'ind, De- claration of belief; 3rd, The turning aside from all considerations tending to produce disbelief; 4th, The looking out for, and fastening exclusive attention to, all considerations tending to produce belief, authority especially, by which a sort of vague and indistmct belief of the most absurd propositions has every where been produced.
On no other part of the field of knowledge are re- ward or punishment now-a-days considered as fit in- struments for the production of assent or dissent. A schoolmaster would not be looked upon as sane, who, instead of putting Euclid's Demonstrations into the hands of his scholar, should, without the Demonstra- tions, put the Propositions into his hand, and give him a guinea for signing a paper declarative of his belief in them, or lock him up for a couple of days without food on his refusal to sign it. And so in chemistry, mechanics, husbandry, astronomy, or any other branch of knowledge. It is true, that in those parts of know- ledge in which assent and dissent are left free, the im- portance of truth may be esteemed not so great as here, where it is thus influenced; but the more im- portant the truth, the more flagrant the absurdity and F 66 FALLACIES OF AUTIIOIIITY. [67/. 1.
tyranny of employing, for the propagation of it, in- struments, the employment of which has a stronger tendency to propagate error than truth.
4. For teaching such religious truths as men are allowed to teach, together with such religious error as they are thus forced to teach, the churchman sees re- wards allotted in larger quantities than are allotted to the most useful services. Of much of the matter of reward thus hestowed, the disposal is in the king's hands, with the power of applying it, and motives for applying it, to the purpose of parliamentary service, paying for habitual breach of trust, and keeping in corrupt and secret dependence on his agents, those agents of the people whose duty it is to sit as judges over the agents of the king. In Ireland, of nine-tenths of those on pretence of instructing whom this vast mass of reward is extorted, it is known, that, being by con- science precluded from hearing, it is impossible that they should derive any benefit from such instruction.
In Scotland, where Government reward is not em- ployed in giving support to it, Church-of-Englandism is reduced to next to nothing.
The opinions which, in this state of things, interest engages a churchman to support, are — 1st, That re- ward to the highest extent has no tendency to pro- mote insincerity, even where practicable, to an un- limited extent, and without chance of detection; 2nd, Or that money given in case of compliance, refused in case of non-compliance, is not reward for com- pliance; 3rd, Or that punishment, applied in case of Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OP AUTHORITY. 67 non-compliance, withheld in case of compliance, is not punishment; 4th, Or that insincerity is not vice but virtue, and as such ought to be promoted; 5th, That it is not merely consistent with, but requisite to, good government to extort money from poor and rich to be applied as reward for doing nothing, or for doing but a small part of that which is done by others for a small proportion of the same reward, and this on pre- tence of rendering service, which nine-tenths of the people refuse to receive.
It is the interest of the persons thus engaged in a course of insincerity, that by the same means perse- verance in the same course should be universal and perpetual; for suppose, in case of the reward being withheld, the number annually making the same de- claration should be reduced to half: this would be presumptive evidence of insincerity on the part of half of those who made it before.
The more flagrant the absurdity, the stronger is each man's interest in engaging as many as possible in joining with him in the profession of assent to it; for the greater the number of such co-declarants, the greater the number of those of whose professions the elements of authority are composed; and of those who stand precluded from casting on the rest the im- putation of insincerity.
The following, then, are the abuses in the defence of which all churchmen are enlisted: 1st. Perpetua- tion of immorality in the shape of insincerity; 2. Of absurdity in subjects of the highest importance; 68 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [Cfl. 1.
3. Extortion inflicted on the many for the benefit of the few; 4. Reward bestowed on idleness and inca- pacity to the exclusion of labour and ability; 5. The matter of corruption applied to the purposes of cor- ruption in a constant stream; 6. In one of these king- doms a vast majority of the people kept in degrada- tion avowedly for no other than the above purposes. But whoever is engaged by interest in the support of any one Government abuse, is engaged in the support of all, each giving to the others his support in exchange.
It being the characteristic of abuse to need and re- ceive support from fallacy, it is the interest of every man who derives profit from abuse in any shape to give the utmost currency to fallacy in every shape, viz. as well those which render more particular ser- vice to others' abuses as those which render such ser- vice to his own. It being the interest of each person so situated to give the utmost support to abuse, and the utmost currency to fallacy in every shape, it is also his interest to give the utmost efficiency to the system of education by which men are most effectually divested both of the power and will to detect and ex- pose fallacies, and thence to suppress every system of education in proportion as it has a contrary tendency: lastly, the stronger the interest by which a man is urged to give currency to fallacy, and thus to propa- gate deception, the more likely is it that such will be his endeavour: the l^s fit, therefore, will his opinion be to serve in the character of authority, as a standard and model for the opinions of others.
Ch. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 69 CHAPTER II.
The wisdom of our ancestors; or Chinese argument.
Ad verecundiam.
This argument consists in stating a supposed re- pugnancy between the proposed measure and the opi- nions of men by whom the country of those who are discussing the measure was inhabited in former times; these opinions being collected either from the express words of some writer living at the period of time in question, or from laws or institutions that were then in existence.
Our wise ancestors — the wisdom bjour ancestoj^s — the wisdom of ages — venerable antiquity — wisdom of old times — Such are the leading terms and phrases of propo- sitions the object of which is to cause the alleged repugnance to be regarded as a sufficient reason for the rejection of the proposed measure.
Sect. 2. E.vposure.
This fallacy affords one of the most striking of the numerous instances in which, under the conciliatory influence of custom, that is of prejudice, opinions the most repugnant to one another are capable of maintaining their ground in the same intellect.
70 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [Ch. 2.
This fallacy, prevalent as it is in matters of law, is directly repugnant to a principle or maxim universally admitted in almost every other department of human intelligence, and which is the foundation of all useful knowledge and of all rational conduct.
" Experience is the mother of wisdom," is among the maxims handed down to the present and all future ages, by the wisdom, such as it has been, of past ages.
No! says this fallacy, the true mother of wisdom is, not e.vperience, but ine.vperience.
An absurdity so glaring carries in itself its own re- futation; and all that we can do is, to trace the causes which have contributed to give to this fallacy such an ascendancy in matters of legislation.
Among the several branches of the fallacies of au- thority, the cause of delusion is more impressive in this than in any other.
1st, From inaccuracy of conception arises incor- rectness of expression; from which expression, con- ception, being produced again, error, from having been a momentary cause, comes to be a permanent effect.