Spirit. It is this separation, then, that thou neces sarily recognisest in becoming conscious of thyself? In this thy very original being consists?
7. So it is.
Spirit. And on what then is it founded?
7. I am intelligence, and have consciousness in my self. This separation is the condition and result of consciousness. It has its foundation, therefore, in my self, like consciousness.
BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 441 Spirit. Thou art intelligence, thou sayest, at least this is all that is now in question, and as such thou becomest an object to thyself. Thy knowledge, there fore, in its objective capacity, presents itself before thy self, i.e. before thy knowledge in its subjective capacity; and floats before it, although thou canst indeed never become conscious of such a presentation?
/. So it is.
Spirit. Canst thou not then adduce some more exact characteristics of the subjective and objective elements as they appear in consciousness?
7. The subjective appears to contain within itself the foundation of consciousness as regards its form, but by no means as regards its substance. That there is a consciousness, an inward perception and concep tion, — of this the foundation lies in itself; but that precisely this or that is conceived, — in this it is de pendent on the objective, with which it is conjoined, and by which it is borne along. The objective, on the contrary, contains the foundation of its being within itself; it is in and for itself, — it is, as it is, because it is. The subjective appears as the still and passive mirror of the objective; the latter floats before it. That the former should reflect images generally, lies in itself. That precisely this image and none other should be reflected, depends on the latter.
Spirit. The subjective, then, according to its es sential nature, is precisely so constituted as thou hast previously described thy consciousness of an existence out of thyself to be?
I. It is true, and this agreement is remarkable. I begin to believe it half credible, that out of the internal laws of my own consciousness may proceed even the Q q * 442 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
presentation of an existence out of myself, and inde pendent of me; and that this presentation may at bot tom be nothing more than the presentation of these laws themselves.
Spirit. And why only half credible?
/. Because I do not yet see why precisely such a pre sentation — a presentation of a mass extended through space — should arise.
Spirit. Thou hast already seen that it is only thine own sensation which thou extendest through space; and thou hast had some forebodings that it is by this extension in space alone that thy sensation becomes transformed for thee into something sensible. We have therefore only to do at present with space itself; and to explain its origin in consciousness.
/. So it is.
/. So it is.
Spirit. Let us then make the attempt. I know that thou canst not become conscious of thy intelligent ac tivity as such, in so far as it remains attached originally and unchangeably to unity; — L e. in the condition which begins with thy very being, and can never be destroyed without at the same time destroying that being. But thou canst become conscious of it in so far as it passes from one state of transition to another within the limits of this unchangeable unity. When thou dost represent it to thyself in the performance of this function, how does it appear to thee — this internal spiritual activity?
/. My spiritual faculty appears as if in a state of internal motion, swiftly passing from one point to an other; — in short, as an extended line. A definite thought makes a point in this line.
Spirit. And why as an extended line?
/. Can I give a reason for that, beyond the circle of BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 443 which I cannot go without at the same time over stepping the limits of my own existence? It is so, absolutely.
Spirit. Thus, then, does a particular act of thy con sciousness appear to thee. But what shape then is assumed, not by thy produced, but by thy inherited, knowledge, of which all specific thought is but the revival and farther definition? — how does this present itself to thee? Under what image does it appear?
/. Evidently as something in which one may draw lines and make points in all directions, namely, as space.
Spirit. Now then, it will be entirely clear to thee, how that, which really proceeds from thyself, may nevertheless appear to thee as an existence external to thyself, — nay, must necessarily appear so.
Thou hast penetrated to the true source of the pre sentation of things out of thyself. This presentation is not perception, for thou perceivest only thyself; — as little is it thought, for things do not appear to thee as mere results of thought. It is an actual, and indeed absolute and immediate consciousness of an existence out of thyself, just as perception is an immediate con sciousness of thine own condition. Do not permit thy self to be perplexed by sophists and half-philosophers; things do not appear to thee through any representa tion; — of the thing that exists, and that can exist, thou art immediately conscious; — and there is no other thing than that of which thou art conscious. Thou thyself art the thing; thou thyself, by virtue of thy finitude — the innermost law of thy being — art thus presented before thyself, and projected out of thyself; and all that thou perceivest out of thyself is still — thyself only.
444 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
This consciousness has been well named INTUITION. In all consciousness I contemplate myself, for I am my self: — to the subjective, conscious being, consciousness is self-contemplation. And the objective, that which is contemplated and of which I am conscious, is also myself, — the same self which contemplates, but now floating as an objective presentation before the sub jective. In this respect, consciousness is an active re trospect of my own intuitions; an observation of myself from my own position; a projection of myself out of myself by means of the only mode of action which is properly mine, — perception. I am a living faculty of vision. I see (consciousness) my own vision (the thing of which I am conscious.} Hence this object is also thoroughly transparent to thy mind's eye, because it is thy mind itself. Thou dividest, limitest, determinest, the possible forms of things, and the relations of these forms, previous to all perception. No wonder, — for in so doing thou dividest, limitest, and determinest thine own knowledge, which undoubtedly is sufficiently known to thee. Thus does a knowledge of things become possible. It is not in the things, and cannot proceed out of them. It pro ceeds from thee, and is indeed thine own nature.
There is no outward sense, for there is no outward perception. There is, however, an outward intuition; — not of things, but this outward intuition — this know ledge apparently external to the subjective being, and hovering before it, — is itself the thing, and there is no other. By means of this outward intuition are per ception and sense regarded as external. It remains eternally true, for it is proved, — that I see or feel a surface, — but my sight or feeling is intuitive, and BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 445 takes the shape of the sight or feeling of a surface. Space, — illuminated, transparent, palpable, penetrable space, — the purest image of my knowledge, is not seen, but is an intuitive possession of my own mind; in it even my faculty of vision itself is contained. The light is not out of, but in me, and I myself am the light. Thou hast already answered my question, " How dost thou know of thy sensations, of thy seeing, feeling, &c.?" by saying that thou hast an immediate know ledge or consciousness of them. Now, perhaps, thou wilt be able to define more exactly this immediate con sciousness of sensation.
/. It must be a two-fold consciousness. Sensation is itself an immediate consciousness; for I am sensible ^of my own sensation. But from this there arises no knowledge of outward existence, but only the feeling of my own state. I am however, originally, not merely a sensitive, but also an intuitive being; not merely a practical being, but also an intelligence. I intuitively contemplate my sensation itself, and thus there arises from myself and my own nature, the cognition of an existence. Sensation becomes transformed into its own object; my affections, as red, smooth, and the like, into a something red, smooth, &c. out of myself; and this something, and my relative sensation, I intuitively contemplate in space, because the intuition itself is space. Thus does it become clear why I believe that I see or feel surfaces, which, in fact, I neither see nor feel. I intuitively regard my own sensation of sight or touch, as the sight or touch of a surface.
Spirit. Thou hast well understood me, or rather thyself.
446 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
/. But now it is not at all by means of an inference, either recognised or unrecognised, from the principle of causality, that the thing is originated for me; it floats immediately before me, and is presented to my consciousness without any process of reasoning. I cannot say as I have formerly done, that perception becomes transformed into a something perceivable, for the perceivable, as such, has precedence in conscious ness. It is not with an affection of myself, as red, smooth, or the like, that consciousness begins, but with a red, smooth object out of myself.
Spirit. If, however, thou wert obliged to explain what is red, smooth, and the like, couldst thou possibly make any other reply than that it was that by which thou wert affected in a certain manner, that thou namest red, smooth, &c.?
/. Certainly not, — if you were to ask me, and I were to enter upon the question and attempt an explanation. But originally no one asks me the question, nor do I ask it of myself. I forget myself entirely, and lose myself in my intuition of the object; become conscious, not of my own state, but only of an existence out of myself. Red, green, and the like, are properties of the thing; it is red or green, and this is all. There can be no farther explanation, any more than there can be a farther explanation of these affections in me, on which we have already agreed. This is most obvious in the sensation of sight. Colour appears as something out of myself, and the common understanding of man, if left to itself, and without farther reflection, would scarcely be persuaded to describe red, green, &c. as that which excited within him a specific affection.
Spirit. But, doubtless, it would if asked regarding BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 447 sweet or sour. It is not our business at present to inquire whether the impression made by means of sight be a pure sensation, or whether it may not rather be a middle term between sensation and intuition, and the bond by which they are united in our minds. But I admit thy assertion, and it is extremely welcome to me. Thou canst, indeed, lose thyself in the intuition; and unless thou directest particular attention to thy self, or takest an interest in some external action, thou dost so, naturally and necessarily. This is the remark to which the defenders of a groundless consciousness of external things appeal, when it is shown that the principle of causality, by which the existence of such things might be inferred, exists only in ourselves; they deny that any such inference is made, and, in so far as they refer to actual consciousness in particular cases, this cannot be disputed. These same defenders, when the nature of intuition is explained to them from the laws of intelligence itself, themselves draw this infer ence anew, and never weary of repeating that there must be something external to us which compels us to this belief.
/. Do not trouble thyself about them at present, but instruct me. I have no preconceived opinion, and seek for truth only.
Spirit. Nevertheless, intuition necessarily proceeds from the perception of thine own state, although thou art not always clearly conscious of this perception, as thou hast already seen. Even in that consciousness in which thou losest thyself in the object, there is al ways something which is only possible by means of an unrecognised reference to thyself, and close observation of thine own state.
448 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
/. Consequently, at all times and places the con sciousness of existence out of myself must be accom panied by an unobserved consciousness of myself?
Spirit. Just so.
/. The former being determined through the latter, — as it actually is?
Spirit. This is my meaning.
I. Prove this to me, and I shall be satisfied.
Spirit. Dost thou imagine only things in general as placed in space, or each of them individually as occu pying a certain portion of space?
I. The latter, — each thing has its determinate size.
Spirit. And do different things occupy the same part of space?
I. By no means; they exclude each other. They are beside, over or under, behind or before, each other; — nearer to me, or further from me.
Spirit. And how dost thou come to this measure ment and arrangement of them in space? Is it by sensation?
/. How could that be, since space itself is no sen sation?
Spirit. Or intuition?
/. This cannot be. Intuition is immediate and in fallible. What is contained in it does not appear as produced, and cannot deceive. But I concern myself to estimate, measure and deliberate upon the size of an object, its distance, its position with respect to other objects; and it is a truth known to every be ginner, that we originally see all objects in the same line; that we learn to estimate their greater or lesser distances; that the child attempts to grasp distant ob jects as if they lay immediately before his eyes; and BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 449 that one born blind who should suddenly receive sight would do the same. This conception of distances is therefore a judgment; — no intuition, but an ar rangement of my different intuitions by means of the understanding. I may err in my estimate of the size, distance, &c. of an object; and the so-called optical deceptions are not deceptions of sight, but erroneous judgments formed concerning the size of the object, concerning the size of its different parts in relation to each other, and consequently concerning its true figure and its distance from rne and from other objects. But it does really exist in space, as I contemplate it, and the colours which I see in it are likewise really seen by me; — and here there is no deception.
Spirit. And what then is the principle of this judg ment, — to take the most distinct and easy case, — thy judgment of the proximity or distance of objects, — how dost thou estimate this distance?
/. Doubtless by the greater strength or feebleness of impressions otherwise equal. I see before me two objects of the same red colour. The one whose colour I see more vividly, I regard as the nearer; that whose colour seems to me fainter, as the more distant, and as so much the more distant as the colour seems fainter.
Spirit. Thus thou dost estimate the distance ac cording to the degree of strength or weakness in the sensation; and this strength or weakness itself, — dost thou also estimate it?
/. Obviously only in so far as I take note of my own affections, and even of very slight differences in these. — Thou hast conquered! All consciousness of objects out of myself is determined by the clearness and exactitude R r -150 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
of my consciousness of my own states, and in this con sciousness there is always a conclusion drawn from the effect in myself to a cause out of myself.
Spirit. Thou art quickly vanquished; and I must now myself carry forward, in thy place, the controversy against myself. My argument can only apply to those cases in which an actual and deliberate estimate of the size, distance, and position of objects takes place, and in which thou art conscious of making such an estimate. Thou wilt however admit that this is by no means the common case, and that for the most part thou rather becomest conscious of the size, distance, &c. of an ob ject at the very same undivided moment in which thou becomest conscious of the object itself.
7. When once we learn to estimate the distances of objects by the strength of the impression, the rapidity of this judgment is merely the consequence of its fre quent exercise. I have learnt, by a lifelong experience, rapidly to observe the strength of the impression and thereby to estimate the distance. My present concep tion is founded upon a combination, formerly made, of sensation, intuition, and previous judgments; al though at the moment I am conscious only of the present conception. I no longer apprehend generally red, green, or the like, out of myself, but a red or a green at this, that, or the other distance; but this last addition is merely a renewal of a judgment formerly arrived at by deliberate reflection.
Spirit. Has it not then, at length, become clear to thee whether thou discoverest the existence of things out of thyself by intuition, or by reasoning, or both, — and in how far by each of these?
/. Perfectly; and I believe that I have now attained BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 451 the fullest insight into the origin of my conceptions of objects out of myself.
1. I am absolutely, because I am conscious of this /, — myself; and that partly as a practical being, partly as an intelligence. The first consciousness is Sensation, the second Intui tion — unlimited space.
2. I cannot comprehend the unlimited, for I am finite. I therefore set apart, in thought, a certain portion of universal space, and place the former in a certain relation to the latter.
3. The measure of this limited portion of space is the extent of my own sensibility, according to a principle which may be thus expressed: — Whatever affects me in such or such a manner is to be placed, in space, in such or such rela tions to the other things which affect me. The properties or attributes of the object proceed from the perception of my own internal state; the space which it fills, from intuitive contemplation. By a process of thought, both are conjoined; the former being added to the latter. It is, assuredly, as we have stated above; — that which is merely a state or affection of myself, by being transferred or projected into space becomes an attribute of the object; but it is so projected into space, not by intuition, but by thought, by measuring, regulating thought. Not that this act is to be regarded as an intellectual discovery or creation; but only as a more exact definition, by means of thought, of something which is already given in sensation and intuition, independent of all thought. Spirit. Whatever affects me in such or such a man ner is to be placed in such or such relations: — thus 452 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
dost thou reason in defining and arranging objects in space. But does not the declaration that a thing affects thee in a certain manner, include the assumption that it affects thee generally?
/. Undoubtedly.
Spirit. And is any presentation of an external object possible, which is not in this manner limited and de fined in space?
/. No; for no object exists in space generally, but each one in a determinate portion of space.
Spirit. So that in fact, whether thou art conscious of it or not, every external object is assumed by thee as affecting thyself, as certainly as it is assumed as filling a determinate portion of space?
/. That follows, certainly.
Spirit. And what kind of presentation is that of an object affecting thyself?
/. Evidently a thought; and indeed a thought found ed on the principle of causality already mentioned. I see now, still more clearly, that the consciousness of the object is engrafted on my self-consciousness in two ways, — partly by intuition, and partly by thought founded on the principle of causality. The object, however strange it may seem, is at once the immediate object of my consciousness, and the result of delibe rate thought.
Spirit. In different respects, however. Thou must be capable of being conscious of this thought of the object?
/. Doubtless; although usually I am not so.
Spirit. Therefore to thy passive state, thy affection, thou dost assume in thought an activity out of thy self, such as thou hast above described in the case of thy thought according to the principle of causality?
BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 453 /. Yes.
Spirit. And with the same meaning and the same validity as thou didst describe it above. Thou thinkest so once for all, and must think so; thou canst not alter it, and canst know nothing more than that thou dost think so?
/. Nothing more. We have already investigated all this thoroughly.
Spirit. I said, thou dost assume an object: — in so far as it is so assumed, it is a product of thy own thought only?
/. Certainly, for this follows from the former.
Spirit. And what now is this object which is thus assumed according to the principle of causality?
/. A power out of myself.
Spirit. Which is neither revealed to thee by sen sation nor by intuition?
/. No; I always remain perfectly conscious that I do not perceive it immediately, but only by means of its manifestations; although I ascribe to it an exist ence independent of myself. I am affected, there must therefore be something that affects me, — such is my thought.
Spirit. The object which is revealed to thee in in tuition, and that which thou assuinest by reasoning, are thus very different things. That which is actually and immediately present before thee, spread out in space, is the object of intuition; the internal force within it, which is not present before thee, but whose existence thou art only led to assert by a process of reasoning, is the object of the understanding.
/. The internal force within it, saidst thou; — and now I bethink me, thou art right. I place this force u r 2 454 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
also in space, and superadd it to the mass by which I regard space as filled.
Spirit. And what then, according to thy view, is the nature of the relation subsisting between this force and the mass?
/. The mass, with its properties, is itself the result and manifestation of the inward force. This force has two modes of operation: — one whereby it maintains itself, and assumes this particular form in which it appears; another upon me, by which it affects me in a particular manner.
Spirit. Thou hast formerly sought for another sub stratum for sensible attributes or qualities than the space which contains them; something permanent amid the vicissitudes of perpetual change besides this space.
/. Yes, and this permanent substratum is found. It is force itself. This remains for ever the same amid all change, and it is this which assumes and supports all sensible attributes or qualities.
Spirit. Let us cast a glance back on all that we have now established. Thou feelest thyself in a certain state, affected in a certain manner, which thou callest red, smooth, sweet, and so on. Of this thou know- est nothing, but simply that thou feelest, and feelest in this particular manner. Or dost thou know more than this? Is there in mere sensation anything more than mere sensation?
I. No.
Spirit. Further, it is by thine own nature as an intelligence, that there is a space spread out before thee; — or dost thou know anything more than this concerning space?
BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
/. By no means.
Spirit. Between that state of simple sensation, and this space which is spread out before thee, there is not the smallest connexion except that they are both present in thy consciousness. Or dost thou perceive any other connexion between them?
/. I see none.
/. I see none.
Spirit. But thou art a thinking, as well as a sensi tive and intuitive, being; and yet neither dost thou know anything more of this matter, than that so thou art. Thou dost not merely feel thy sensible state, — thou canst also conceive of it in thought; but it affords thee no complete thought; thou art compelled to add something to it, an external foundation, a foreign power. Or dost thou know more of it than that thou dost so think, and that thou art compelled so to think?
/. I can know nothing more respecting it. I cannot proceed beyond my thought; for simply because I think it, does it become my thought, and fall under the inevitable laws of my being.
Spirit. Through this thought of thine, there first arises a connexion between thy own state which thou feclest, and the space which thou dost intuitively con template; thou supposest that the latter contains the foundation of the former. Is it not so?
/. It is so. Thou hast clearly proved that I pro duce this connexion in my consciousness by my own thought only, and that such a connexion is neither directly felt, nor intuitively perceived. But of any connexion beyond the limits of my consciousness I cannot speak; I cannot even describe such a connexion in any manner of way; for even in speaking of it I must be conscious of it; and, since this consciousness 456 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
can only be a thought, the connexion itself could be nothing more than a thought; and this is precisely the same connexion which occurs in my ordinary natural consciousness, and no other. I cannot proceed a hair's- breadth beyond this consciousness, any more than I can spring out of myself. All attempts to conceive of an absolute connexion between things in themselves, and the / in itself, are but attempts to ignore our own thought, — a strange forgetfulness of the undeniable fact that we can have no thought without having — thought it. A thing in itself is a thought; — this, namely, that there is a great thought, which yet no man has ever comprehended.
Spirit. From thee then I need fear no objection to the principle now established: — that our consciousness of things out of ourselves is absolutely nothing more than the product of our own presentative faculty, and that, with regard to external things, we can produce in this way nothing more than simply what we know, i. e. what is established, by means of our consciousness itself, as the result of our being possessed of conscious ness generally, and of this particular determinate con sciousness subject to such and such laws.
7. I cannot refute this. It is so.
Spirit. Thou canst not then object to the bolder statement of the same proposition; that in that which we call knowledge and observation of outward things, we at all times recognise and observe ourselves only; and that in all our consciousness we know of nothing whatever but of ourselves, and of our own determi nate states.
I say, thou wilt not be able to advance aught against this proposition; for if the external world generally BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 457 arises for us only through our own consciousness, what is particular and multiform in this external world can arise in no other way; and if the connexion between what is external to us and ourselves is merely a con nexion in our own thought, then is the connexion of the multifarious objects of the external world among themselves undoubtedly this and no other. As clearly as I have now pointed out to thee the origin of this system of objects beyond thyself and their relation to thce, could I also show thee the law according to which there arises an infinite multiplicity of such ob jects, mutually connected, reciprocally determining each other with rigid necessity, and thus forming a com plete world-system, as thou thyself hast well described it; and I only spare myself this task because I find that thou hast already admitted the conclusions for the sake of which alone I should have undertaken it.
/. I see it all, and must assent to it.