This, on our present standpoint, very correct result establishes a new and still more abstract M 156 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
idealism than we had before. In that former ideal ism, an itself posited activity was canceled through the nature and the essence of the Ego, canceled absolutely, without further ground; and this abso lute canceling made an object and subject, etc., possible. Representations developed themselves as such, out of the Ego in a manner utterly un known and inaccessible to us.
In the present idealism the activity has its law immediately in itself; it is a mediate activity and no other, simply because it is mediate. From this its mediateness every thing else, reality of the Non-Ego, and, in so far, negation of the Ego; and negation of the Non-Ego, and, in so far, reality of the Ego, can be completely explained Representa tions develop themselves out of the Ego according to a determined and cognizable law of its nature. It is only the ground of this law of mediation which is here inaccessible.
This idealism necessarily abolishes the former, since it explains what to the former was inexplain- able from a higher ground. The fundamental prin ciple of this latter idealism would be, the Ego is finite simfly be -cause it is finite.
Now, although such an idealism rises higher, it. does not rise high enough, does not rise to the absolutely posited and unconditioned. True, finity is to be absolutely posited; but all finite is, by its very conception, limited by its opposite, and abso lute finity is thus, an in itself contradictory concep tion.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 157 I shall call the former idealism, which cancels something posited in itself, qualitative idealism,; and the latter, which originally posits itself a limited quantity, quantitative idealism.
2d, The latter determines the former signifies: the mediateness of the positing is determined by this, that the essence of the interchanging links consists merely in their essential opposition; only through the latter fact is the mediateness possible, For if their essence were not thereby exhausted, the not-positing of the one would by no means necessitate the positing of the other in its complete essence; but if their essence consists only in this, then they can only be posited mediately.
From this view the essential opposition is the absolute fact — not the mediateness of the positing as above — and is the ground of that mediateness.
A system which takes this view, results in a quantitative realism, well to be distinguished from our previous qualitative realism. In the system of qualitative realism an independent Non-Ego, hav ing reality in itself, impresses the Ego and restricts the activity thereof. The quantitative realist re cognizes, on the contrary, that reality is posited in the Non-Ego for the Ego only by the applying of the law of the ground, though he, also, does main tain the real existence of a limitation of the Ego, •whereof t lie Ego is not the cause. The qualitative realist asserts the independent reality of & determin ing; the quantitative realist merely the independent reality of a dctennination. The latter says, there is 158 THE SCJEXCE OF JfA'Otrr f DCE.
a determination in the Ego of -which the gronnd can not be posited in the Ego. This to mrp is a fact; that is, that determination exists for "him abso- luteh' without any ground. True, the law of the ground compels him to relate it to the 3v on-Ego as the real ground of that •determination: but he also knows that that law of the ground is his own, and hence he is not deceived by it It appears at once trrat this system is the same as that of critical ideal ism; and KAJTT, indeed, has established no other -han this, as indeed, from the standpoint of reflec tion he had placed himself trpon, he neither could nor wished to -establish another one.
The above cuantitative idealism is distinguished ' ^ although both assume a finrrv of the JElgo. the former system p:>sit? that £rin- as absolutely posit ed; the latter system as accidental but alsD as unei- plainable. Quantitative realism iibolishes cuatitita- tive idealism, because:t explains without its assist ance. though mikir.- the same error, the existence of an object in consciousness. I sav. with the szme error, for it also can not explain, how 2. real deter mination may become an ideal one, how an in itself existing determination may become a determination for iJic posiiiKg £•£&- True, we have seen now how the essential oppo sition determines and grounds the mediateness of the positing; but through what is positing itself grounded t Jf a positing is to be realized, then, of THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 159 course, it can only be through mediation; but posit ing in itself is an absolute act of the absolutely undetermined and undeterminable Ego. Hence, this system can not explain the possibility of pro ceeding from the limited to the unlimited. The above quantitative idealism removes this difficulty by abolishing the unlimited altogether, but this involves it in the contradiction, that it absolutely posits a limited.
Probably by uniting both syntheses we shall obtain a critical quantitative idealism as the true result.
3d. Each is to determine the other signifies: to oppose and to be opposed, being and being posited, ideal and real relation is to be the same. This can only be when the positing and the posited of the relation is one and the same, that is, when the posited is Ego. The Ego is to be in relation to an X, which, in so far, must be a Non-Ego, by which relation the Ego is posited only through the not positing of this Non-Ego, and vice versa. The Ego, however, is in a relation only in so far as it posits itself in a relation. Hence, it is the same whether you say of the Ego it is posited in this relation, or it posits itself in this relation. Ideal and real rela tion are the same.
Let us develop more clearly the important result of this synthesis, a result, however, which is only derived from the fundamental principle of the theo retical part of our science, and has only validity so far as that principle has it The Ego can only J6O TJJE SCJEXCE OF £ posit through a non-positing, that is, can only mediately posit itself as veil as the Xon- Ego. It is always positing, but it is f>osiltd only through poshing the Non-Ego, as not posited, or through negating it. Jn other -words, the Ego is <<tf/7' the opposite of the Non-Ego, and cicr 1*73*. N o Ego, no Non-Ego; no I, BO Thon; no siib^ect, BO object. Subject is that •which is not object, and has no other predicate as vet, and -z-izf z-crsa.
This result establishes the critical cv.r.ntitatrre idealism of -which we spoke.
The difficult j Ts~as to assign a ground for the de termination of the activity of the Ego as such. Quantitative realism assigns this ground to the passivity of the Ego, caused by a real Xon-Ego. Ouantitative idealism assigns it to the positing of the Ego, Tv.?.t is, posits the Ego simply as c^sclutfjj limited through itself The present system asserts that both are •wrong, that the l2?r of —?.r ceiermina- tion is neither a merely subjective and ideal having its ground only in the Ego, nor an objective and real one, having its ground net in the Ego; but that it must be both in the object and subject. Hcr& f This question can not yet be ans-srered.
APPLICATION UXDER CATEGORY OF SUBSTAN TIALITY.
We have the same three propositions: i st The activity of the form and of the content mutuallv determine each other.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. l6l 2d. The form and content of the reciprocity mu tually determine each other.
3d. The synthetically united activity and the synthetically united reciprocity mutually determine each other.
L TJu activity of the form and of the content mu- titaUy determine each otJicr.
While the characteristic of the category of cau sality was the positing through a non-positing, the characteristic of the activity of the form under the category of substantiality is the positing of some thing as not posited through the positing of another as posited, that is, negation through affirmation. The not-posited is posited as not posited. Hence, it is not annihilated as before, but merely excluded, excluded from a certain sphere. Hence, again, it is not negated through positing generally, but through a determined positing. The not-posited has, there fore, merely a negative character; it is not this de termined sphere. Call the posited sphere A, the excluded not-posited, B. A, by itself, is posited as absolute totality; but this can not be if B is any wise posited. A is, therefore, posited both as total ity and not-totality; totality with reference to A, not-totality with reference to B. But B is merely determined negatively as not A. Hence A is posit ed as determined, and in so far total part of an un determined whole, which whole embraces both spheres, the determined and the undetermined 1 62 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, spheres. This higher sphere must be posited to make both lower ones possible, and the activity which posits it is the activity of the content we are looking for.
Example.
Let us posit iron = A as absolute totality in itself. It excludes motion = B. Now take a piece of moving iron = C. By excluding motion = B from the conception of iron = A, you do not deny the moving iron = C, but you place this C in an undetermined sphere, because you do not know under what condition the motion = C is connected with the iron. The sphere, A, is totality of the iron, and also is it not, because it excludes = C which equally belongs to iron. Hence, you posit a higher sphere, embracing both moving and not-moving iron. In so far as iron fills this higher sphere it is substance; in A it is merely a thing. Motion and not-motion are its accidences.
The activity of the form determines that of the content signifies: only by excluding from the abso lute totality can you posit a higher sphere; no ex clusion, no higher sphere; no accidence in the Ego, no Non-Ego. The absolute totality of the Ego is positing itself. If an object is posited by it, this ob jective positing is excluded from that sphere, and placed in the opposite sphere of not-positing itself. Not to posit itself and to posit an object is the same. It excludes simply because it excludes, and THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 163 did it not exclude, the higher sphere of gaifral positing would not be possible. It will be seen that the word positing itself has here a double significance, first, that of absolute totality, and se condly, that of a determined part of an undeter mined whole. Also, that substance signifies the all-embracing, not the permanent, as is generally supposed. (This results again in a system of quantitative idealism.)
The activity of the content determines that of the form signifies: the higher sphere is absolutely posited, and only through it is the exclusion (as real act of the Ego) possible. This again opens a quali tative realism, which maintains that the Ego and the Non-Ego are posited as opposites, that the Ego is generally positing; and that, if the Ego docs not posit the Non-Ego, it must certainly posit itself; but this must is accidental, and determined through the ground of the positing, which ground is not con tained in the Ego itself. According to this realism, the Ego is a representing being, which must be governed by the quality of the things.
Neither this result nor the previous one is to be valid; both must, therefore, be mutually modified. Because the Ego is to exclude something from it self, a higher sphere must be, and be posited; and vice versa. Or, there is a Non-Ego because the Ego posits something as its opposite, and it posits some thing as its opposite because a Non-Ego is, and is posited. This will again establish the above criti cal idealism.
IL Tiff (fin end tJu c&nicnl cf the rcdf-r-x^ fy cslcratixjc each clkfr.
Tbt fvmj cnc-i-lns r: t!->* err'-pf^g ctf tbs tccalrrr, B is txil^dec 5"^=i rts i osrt "on ss 15-o^.tcc. in rest, m cti'?n to iron. Your former ccnofrtzr-n cf iron is, tbenefore, no longer surnclen^ an£ yc -~ cc»~p!ete it b}- adding the characteristic cf srtractability bv the nragnet. Xow. from the one view, rzxr is essen tial to iron, and ir^ticr. accidental; from the other, bfih are accidental because both are detertnin-ed by tbe absence or presence of the ma~net. Hence. voa are in a cuandarv; unless A~OU can assiirn a THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 165 ground why you take the first or second view, that is, unless you can determine from what totality you must proceed, whether from the determined totality which has been absolutely posited, or from the deter- minable totality which has arisen from it and from the excluded sphere.
The form of the reciprocity determines its con tent signifies-: the mutual exclusion determines which of both totalities is absolute. That which excludes another from the totality is, in so far as it excludes, the totality, and vice versa. If the abso lutely posited A excludes B, then, in so far, A is totality; and if B is reflected upon, and hence A not regarded as totality, in so far A + the unde termined B is the determinable totality. Result: There is no other ground of the totality than a rela tive one. You may optionally take either view. Take the absolutely posited conception of iron, and rest is essential; take its merely determinable con ception, and rest is accidental. Both conceptions are right, and you may take whichever you choose. The distinction is purely relative.
The content of the reciprocity determines its form signifies: the determinability of the totality, as explained by us, and vjliich is therefore posited, determines the mutual exclusion; that is, one of the totalities is the absolute one, either the de termined (B) or the merely determinable, (A + B.) If B is the absolute totality, then that which it excludes is also absolutely excluded. Result- There is an absolute ground of the totality, and it 1 66 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
is not merely relative. It is not the same whether you take the determined or the determinable con ception of iron, and whether you posit rest as essential or accidental to it. If from some un known ground the determined conception of iron must be the first conception, only motion and not rest is its absolute accidence.
The form and the content mutually determine each other signifies: absolute and relative ground of the determination of the totality are the same; the relation is absolute, and the absolute nothing but a relation.
Both the results heretofore attained were wrong. There is an absolute law, our synthesis now says, for the determination of the totality, but this law is not contained in either of the above modes of de termination, but in positing both as imitually deter mining each other. Neither of the two totalities is the desired totality; both together, determining each other, give the true totality. Not A is abolute total ity, nor A + B, but A determined by A + B. The determinable is determined by the determined, and vice versa, and the thus resulting unity is the true totality.
What does this mean: the determined and the determinable must mutually determine each other? Evidently this: the determination of that which is to be determined is determinability. It is a deter minable, and nothing else; therein its whole essence is expressed. This determinability is the looked-for totality; that is, determinability is a fixed quantum, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. l6/ has its limits, beyond which no further determina tion occurs, and all possible determinability lies within these limits.
The Ego posits itself; this is the absolute total ity of the reality of the Ego. The Ego posits an object. This objective positing must be excluded from the sphere of the self-positing of the Ego; and yet must also be ascribed to the Ego. Thus we obtain the sphere A + B as (unlimited as yet) totality of all the acts of the Ego. Now, both these spheres, the A and the A B, are mutually to determine each other. A gives what it has, abso lute limit; A -I- B gives what it has, content Thus the Ego is now positing an object, and then it is not the subject; or the subject, and then it is not an object; in so far as it posits itself, as posit ing under this rule. In this manner both spheres are united, and unitedly first form a single limited sphere; and in so far the determination of the Ego consists in its determinability through subject and object.
Determined determinability is the totality we sought, and such a totality is called Substance. No substance, unless you first proceed from the ab solutely posited, (the Ego, here,) which posits only itself; or, unless something is first excluded from it, (the Non-Ego, here.) But the substance which as such is nothing but determinability, and yet is to be fixed determinability, is no substance, (not ^//-embracing,) unless again determined by the absolutely posited, (here, by the itself-positing.)
1 68 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
The Ego posits itself as self-positing by excluding the Non-Ego, or it posits the Non-Ego as positing by excluding itself. Remark the two characters of the self-positing in this sentence; the first an un conditional, the second a conditional positing, de- terminable by excluding the Non-Ego.
Example.
Example.
If the determination of iron in itself be rest, then a change of place is excluded from it, and, in so far, iron is not substance, for it is not dctmninable. Still, the change of place is to be ascribed to the iron. This you can not do so as utterly to cancel its rest; for if you do, you cancel the iron itself as posited by you. Hence, you only cancel that rest in part, and the change of place is thus determined and limited by the rest of the iron; that is, the change of place occurs only within the sphere of a certain condition, (for instance, within the attraction of a magnet.) Beyond this sphere the iron is again in rest Who does not notice here the double sig nificance of the word rest? In the first instance, it is unconditioned; in the second, conditioned, namely, by the absence of a magnet Again, as A + B is determined by A, so B is determined, for it now belongs to the sphere of the determined determinable; and A itself is now a de- terminable. Hence, in so far as B itself is now de termined, it also can determine A and B, and must determine it in order to form an absolute relation. Hence, if A and B is posited, and A is in so far THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 169 placed within the sphere of the determinable: A and B is again determined by B.
Let us explain this: The Ego is to exclude some thing from itself. This something must be in the Ego previous to the exclusion, that is, independent of the excluding. It must be absolutely posited hi the Ego. Hence, for this something it is aczidct*- tal that the Ego should exclude it, (shouVl make a representation of it, as we shall see hereafter.) Even without this excluding it would exist, (not without the Ego, but in the Ego, of course.) The object (A + B) is the determined; its being ex cluded, the determinable. It may be excluded or not, and still remains object The object is, there fore, posited here in two different ways: first, it is posited unconditionally and absolute; next, tin der condition of a being excluded through the Ego.
From the iron posited as in rest, motion is to be excluded. By the conception of iron, iron was not to involve motion; but now motion is to be exclud ed from the iron. Hence, motion must be posited independently of this excluding, and must be posit ed — with reference to its not being posited in iron — absolutely. In other words, if you wish to op pose motion to iron, you must first know motion; but the knowledge of motion is not given you through iron. Hence, you know it from some other source; and since here we have only iron and mo tion to look to, you know it absolutely.
THE SCIENCE OF A'XOU'LEDGE.
Now, if we start from this conception of motion, then it is accidental to this conception that it is applied to iron among other things. It is the es sential, and iron is for it the accidental Motion is posited absolutely. Iron is excluded from its sphere, because it is in rest Now, you cancel rest in iron and ascribe motion to it And, whereas, at first the conception of motion was abso lute and unconditioned, it is now conditioned by the canceling of rest in iron.
The result of our synthesis was this: The totality consists simply in the complete rela tion, and there is nothing in itself determined Avhereby it is determined. The totality consists in the completeness of a relation, not of a reality.
The links of a relation, singly considered, are accidences; their totality, substance. Substance is nothing fixed, but a mere change. If a substance is to be determined, or, in other words, if something determined is to be thought as substance, the change, it is true, must proceed from one of the links, which is in so far fixed as the change is to be determined. But it is not absolutely fixed, for I might as well proceed from its opposite link, and then the former link would be accidental, etc. In short, the accidences, synthetically united, give the substance; and the substance is nothing but the totality of accidences. A permanent substrate must not be entertained. Ever}' accidence is its own substrate, and the substrate of its opposite acci dences. The positing Ego, by the most marvelous THE SCIENCE OF KNOW-LEDGE. 1 71 of its powers, (productive imagination,) holds the vanishing accidence firmly, until it has compared it with the accidence whereby it is pushed aside. This power is it which, from perennial opposites, forms a unity which enters between moments (con tradictions) that would mutually cancel each other, and thus maintains both; this power is it which alone makes life and consciousness (and particularly consciousness as a continuing series of time-mo ments) possible; and all this it achieves simply by this, that it diverts and guides along itself and in itself accidences which have no common bearer, and can have none, because they would mutually destroy each other.
1 1 1. — The activity as synthetical unity, and the re ciprocity as synthetical unity, mutually determine each other.
The activity as synthetical unity can be best characterized as an absolute gathering- together and holding firmly of oppcsitcs (subjective and objective) in the category of dctenninability, wherein they are also opposed to each other.
To make this synthesis clearer, let us compare it with the former synthesis (§ 3) of the Ego and the Non-Ego through quantity. Just as the Ego was there in its quality, absolutely posited as absolute reality, so here we absolutely posit something, that is, a quantitatively determined, in the Ego, or, in other words, so here we absolutely posit the Ego as determined quantity; a something subiective is po- 172 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
sited as an absolutely subjective; and this proceed ing here is a thesis, and a quantitative thesis in dis tinction from the above qualitative thesis. From a thesis, however, all the modes of acting of the Ego must proceed.
(At least it is a thesis in our theoretical part, because we can not in it break through the limit of its fundamental principle; when we do so in the practical part, we shall see that it is also a synthesis, a synthesis which results from the highest thesis.)
Again, as in § 3, a Non-Ego was opposed to the Ego as opposite quality, so here to the subjective is opposed an objective, by the mere exclusion thereof from the sphere of the subjective; hence, merely through and by means of quantity, (of limi tation, determination,) and this proceeding is a quantitative antithesis, as that in § 3 was a qualita tive antithesis. But now the subjective is not to be canceled by the objective, and vice "i-crsa, precise ly as the Ego was not to be canceled by the Non- Ego, and -dee rcrsa; both are to coexist They must, therefore, be united, which is done through that wherein they are equal, determinability. Both, — that is, not the subject and object in themselves, but the subjective and objective posited through the thesis — are mutually determinable through each other, and only in so far as they are so determinable can they be taken up and held together by the ac tive power of this synthesis, (productive imagina tion.)
Again, as above, this antithesis is not possible THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. IJl \vithout thesis, because only to the posited can be opposited; and here also the required thesis is, in its content, not possible -without the content of the antithesis; for, until something is absolutely deter mined, that is, until the conception of quantity can be applied to it, it must exist in its quality.
But in form, again, the antithesis is not possible without synthesis, for otherwise the antithesis would cancel the posited of the thesis, and would thus be no antithesis, but would be itself a thesis. All the three acts arc only one and the same act, and are dis tinguished only in reflection as moments of one act.
The reciprocity as synthetic unity is sufficiently characterized as mere relation, as mere mutual ex cluding, or as determinability. This, of course, must be abstractly conceived — indeed, in our whole theo retical part, we must always abstract from some thing — must be conceived as mere relation without any thing related. A and B, for instance, are op- posites; if one is posited, the other is not; never theless they are both to be posited, and not merely in part, (quantitatively limited,) but wholly. But they can not be thought together, except in so far as they mutually cancel each other. You can not think A, nor can you think B. But you can think their union.
Example.
Posit in the physical time-moment light = A, •and in the immediately succeeding moment darkness = B. Then they are divided. But the moments join •each other. Hence, they are not divided For, let 1/4 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, the dividing line be D, then D is not light, which is in A; nor darkness, which is in B. Hence it is nei ther. But you can also say it is both, for there is no such line. Of course, the line D is extended by ima gination to a moment in the latter view, and so it is. But so are also A and B, and intagituztion is their origin. Hence, I can and I must, moreover, extend D, if I want to think the immediate junction of A and B. Productive power of imagination is indeed our most marvelous function, and upon it the whole mechanism of human spirit may be grounded.
i. The activity as synthesis determines the reci procity as synthesis means, the joining of the in terchanging links as such is conditioned by an ab solute activity of the Ego, by means whereof this Ego opposes an objective to a subjective, and unites botk Only in the Ego, and by virtue of this act of the Ego, are they reciprocal interchanging links, and do they join together.
It is clear that this result is idealistic. If the activity established in it is taken as exhausting the essence of the Ego, representation consists in Jus, that the Ego posits a subjective and posits an objective in opposition to it, etc. We discovered above a law of the mediateness of positing, accord ing to which no objective could be posited without canceling a subjective, and vice versa. To this law is here added the determination that both are syn thetically united, and must be posited through one and the same act of the Ego; and by this addi- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 1/5 P tion the unity of that wherein the reciprocity occurs, while the reciprocal links remain opposites, is ex plained, which the law of mere mediation could not •explain.
This result, therefore, establishes an intelligence as existing with all its possible determinations through its mere spontaneity. The Ego is consti tuted as it posits itself, and because it posits itself as thus constituted. Still there is here also a de fect left yet. For, go back in the series as far as you will, you must always arrive finally at something already existing in the Ego, wherein a subjective and objective are already posited as opposites. The existence of the subjective may thus be ex plained, for it follows from the self-positing of the absolute Ego, but not that of the objective.
2. The reciprocity determines the activity signi fies, not through the real existence of opposites, but through their mere joining or touching each other in consciousness is oppositing and the gathering together of the opposites through the activity of the Ego made possible; that joining is the condi tion of this activity.