Both the activity of the object of sensation and of the sensating are to be posited in the Ego. Hence, there must be a ground of relation, of equal ity, of these two opposites. This ground of rela tion must be both, real activity and suppressed ac tivity. As real activity, it must be a positing of the Ego; the Ego must be its real ground. As sup pressed activity, it must be a determined, limited positing; but the Ego can not limit itself. The ground of limitation must, therefore, be in the Non- Ego. The Non-Ego is its ideal ground, is the ground that it has quantity at all. It is to be both together, to be regarded in both ways. Its limitation is also to have its ground in the Ego; and its being its ground also in the Non-Ego. Ideal and real ground are to be both one and the same. The act is to be regarded absolutely as both; as the abso lute act of the Ego in regard to both its being and deterrninateness; and as the absolute act of the THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 199 Non-Ego in regard to both its being and determi- nateness.
Such an act is called contemplation.
The Ego contemplates a Non-Ego. In the con templation the Ego posits itself as absolutely inde pendent of the Non-Ego; contemplates it because it does so, without outward force. It posits by its own activity, and with the consciousness of its activity, each of the characteristics (qualities) of the Non- Ego. But, at the same time, it posits them as merely reproductions of the characteristics of an external something. This external something is to have the same characteristics originally and inde pendent of the Ego, and is to have them according to its own laws, not by virtue of the laws of the con sciousness of the Ego. As the Non-Ego is not the cause that the Ego contemplates it, so the Ego is not the cause of the determinateness of the Non- Ego; both are to be utterly independent, and yet in complete harmony. The truth is, if it were pos sible to regard the Non-Ego as in itself, and not as in the contemplation, and the contemplating Ego as in itself, and not as in relation to the contem plated Non-Ego, they would both be found deter mined in the same manner, and hence their har mony.
We have now deduced the ground of all cogni tion as such; we have shown why the Ego is and must be intelligence, namely, because the Ego must originally (that is, without consciousness and for the very sake of making consciousness possible) 200 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
unite a contradiction existing within itself, between its activity and its passivity. It is clear that we could not have made this deduction had we not gone beyond all consciousness.
We add the following for the purpose of throwing a clearer light on the foregoing, and of promoting an insight into our method. In our deductions we always regard only the product of an act of the hu man mind, not the act itself. But in every subse quent deduction the act which gave rise to the first product becomes itself product by a new act which gives rise to it Thus, whatever is established in every preceding deduction without any further de termination simply as an act of the mind, is posited and thus further determined in ever)' subsequent deduction. So, also, in the present case. If we look close, we shall find that the contemplation, just now synthetically deduced, is to be found already in the previous deduction as an act That act con sisted in this: The Ego, we found, must posit its conflicting activity, as pure or as not pure under condition, in the Ego. Such an act of positing is evident!)' the contemplation now deduced. In it self, as act, it is solely grounded in the Ego, in the postulate that the Ego must posit in itself whatso ever is to occur in the Ego. But it also posits something in the Ego which is absolutely not to have its ground in the Ego, but in the Non-Ego, namely, the impression of the act As act this con templation is completely independent of the impres sion and the impression of it; both proceed in pa rallel.
THE SCIENCE Of KNOWLEDGE. 2OI UX10N OF SENSATION AND CONTEMPLATION.
How can the Ego posit itself as the sensating? or, popularly expressed, how does the Ego manage in order to have sensation? This was the question we had to solve. The deduced contemplation would seem to preclude the possibility of such a positing. For contemplation, though as act having its ground in the Ego, posits something in the Ego which has its absolute ground in the Non-Ego.
The Ego is to posit something foreign to it in itself; this foreign something is not-activity, or passivity, and the Ego is to posit this passivity in itself through activity; the Ego is, therefore, to be active and passive together, and only on the suppo sition of such a union of activity and passivity is sensation possible. We must, therefore, show up a third link, wherein activity and passivity are so thoroughly united that this determined activity is not possible without this determined passivity, and vice versa; that one can only be explained through the other, and that each considered in itself is in complete.
No activity in the Ego can be so related to pas sivity as to produce it; for, in that case, the Ego would both posit and annihilate something in itself at the same time, which is a contradiction. But the activity maybe so related to the passivity as to determine it, to draw its limit And this is indeed an activity which is not possible without a passi vity. For the Ego can not cancel itself a part of 2O2 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
its activity; the canceling must occur through something outside of the Ego. The Ego can, there fore, draw no limit, unless a something to be limited has been given it externally. Determining is, there fore, an activity which necessarily relates itself to a passivity. Likewise passivity is necessarily related to an activity when it is considered as simply a limitation of- activity. Our third link is, therefore, limitation.
Sensation is only possible, therefore, in so far as the Ego and the Non-Ego mutually limit each other, and extends no further than this common limit. Beyond the limit the Ego is no longer sen- sating, but intelligence.
By means of limitation, therefore, can the Ego be posited as the sensating. If it were not limited by an opposite, the Ego could not be posited as the sensating.
But the Ego is to be limited for itself, is to posit itself as the limited, the sensating. In so far as the Ego is limited, it only extends to the limit; but, in so far as it posits itself as limited, it necessarily goes beyond the limit. The Ego is posited as limit ed means, therefore: in so far as it extends merely to the limit, the Ego is opposed to an unlimited Ego which goes beyond the limit Such an un limited Ego must, therefore, be posited for the pur pose of relating the limited Ego to it; and this Ego is unlimited and unlimitable in so far as its activity is altogether grounded in itself; or in so far as it is ideal activity, while as limited Ego it is real activity.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2O3 The real activity of the Ego only goes to the limit; its ideal activity extends beyond that limit Neither activity is without the other. Ideality and reality are synthetically united in the Ego.
The real activity can be related to the Ego, be cause it is also ideal; and by reason of this, its very ideality, (freedom, spontaneity,) it is ascribed to the Ego as real and limited activity, or as sensa tion.
Now, it will be observed that the ideal activity has no relation at all to a Non-Ego, is purely ideal The Non-Ego being thus invisible to that ideal activity, so the Ego also is invisible to it We, looking down upon the Ego, see the Ego act, it is true, but the Ego itself does not posit itself on this stand-point as acting. It forgets, if we may say so, itself in the object of its activity; and thus we have an activity which has all the appearance of a passi vity. The act is an unconscious contemplation. The Ego is the contemplated, in so far as it has sensa tion; but it is also the contemplating, only not con scious thereof, not positing itself as contemplating.
Here we first meet with a substrate for the Ego, namely, the pure activity of the Ego which is po sited as being, although there be no foreign in fluence upon it. The being of this activity is inde pendent of all foreign influence upon the Ego; but, since it can be posited only through its opposite, the positedncss of this activity is dependent upon a foreign influence.
Sensation is to be posited. This is our task p 204 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
But sensation is only possible in so far as the sen- sating is directed upon an object of sensation, and posits the same in the Ego. Hence, the object of sensation must also be related to the Ego by the mediating conception of limitation.
True, it has already been thus related in our first deduction of sensation. "But at present sensation itself is to be posited. We have just thus posited it by means of a contemplation; but this contem plation excluded the object of sensation. Therein it was insufficient, for the object of sensation must also be posited as included in and appropriated by the contemplation.
This appropriation is to be achieved by means of the conception of limitation, and is only possible if the limitation is posited. The solution, therefore, required is, how is the object of sensation limited?
Evidently, the very fact of its being excluded in sensation, and posited as limiting this sensation, proves that it is posited as limited by the Ego, or as a Non-Ego. But again, because it is thus limited by, excluded from, the Ego, it is also posit ed, in a higher sense, in tJic Ego. The Ego limits it; hence, it must be in the Ego.
And now we see clearly how the object of sensa tion is placed in relation to the Ego by the concep tion of limitation. The limitation is the act of the Ego, whereby the object of sensation is necessarily placed within its sphere of action, and appropriated by the Ego as its own.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 20$ EXPLANATORY.
In our deduction of sensation we already touched this point. There the object of sensation was re lated to the Ego, by the positing of an activity op posed to the Ego as the condition of such relation; that is, as an activity which might or might not be posited. The Ego was, therefore, endowed with the faculty of positing or not-positing something. Mark well: not the faculty to posit, nor the faculty not to posit, but the faculty to posit or not to posit; that is, the power to posit a something, and not posit this same something in one and the same synthetically united act Namely: Sensation, we had shown, is only possi ble if the Non-Ego is posited as accidental condi tion of the object of sensation; Iww this positing was done we did not stop to inquire. But this positing can only be achieved if the Ego posits and not-posits at the same time; hence, such an act of positing and not-positing must necessarily occur in sensation as a connecting link. Now let us see how such an act is accomplished.
The activity in this positing and not-positing is evidently ideal activity. It goes beyond the point of limitation. It has, moreover, its ground only in the Ego, since we deduced it solely from the re quirement that the Ego must posit in itself what ever is to be in the Ego. But, if the activity is thus solely grounded in the Ego, it is a mere not-posit- 206 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
ing, and no. positing whatever; it is simply pure activity.
But this activity is also to be a positing; and it is a positing, because it does not cancel or diminish the activity of the Non-Ego, but only places it beyond its own sphere; and since a Non-Ego is never beyond the sphere of the Ego, but only op posed to it, the Ego by this its activity posits the Non-Ego— only it posits it throughout an arbitrary infinity.
The Ego is, therefore, limited, because a Non- Ego is posited through it; and is, at the same time, unlimited, because it posits the Non-Ego by its ideal activity throughout an infinity.
The activity of the Ego, therefore, in this posit ing and not-positing is a limiting through ideal (that is, free and unlimited) activity.
Now let us determine this activity of positing and not-positing by its opposite; that is, by a posit ed and not-posited.
The activity of the Non-Ego is such a posited and not-posited. That activity is posited arid not-posit ed at the same time It is posited, for, if it were not posited by the Ego, there would be no limit; and it is at the same time not-posited, because the Ego constantly extends the limit, and thus cancels it The limit is always posited bv the Ego and the Non-Ego together, only by each in a different man ner; and therein they are opposites. In so far as the limit is posited by the Ego i: is idfjl; and in so far as it is posited by the Non-Ego it is real; THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2Q?
but is both in a synthetical unity. It is real only in so far as it is ideal; or in so far as it is posited by the Ego; it is ideal (that is, it can be extended by the Ego) only in so far as it is real; or in so far as it is posited by the Non-Ego.
Thus the activity of the Ego, which penetrates beyond the limit, becomes both real and ideal It is real because it tends upon something posited by the real; it is ideal, because it tends upon it by its own election.
Thus the perceived becomes relatable to the Ego. The activity of the Non-Ego remains ex cluded, for it is pushed together with the limit into the infinite; but the product of this activity, the limitation in the Ego, as the condition of its ideal activity, becomes relatable to the Ego.
But since that, to which the product of the Non- Ego becomes related, is the ideal adi-sity of the Ego-— the same activity which is to posit the relation —there is no distinction between the relating and that to which something is to be related. Hence, there is no relation at all with the Ego; and the whole deduced occurrence is a contemplation, in which the Ego loses itself in the object of its ac tivity. The contemplated is an idealistically viewed product of the Non-Ego, which contemplation ex tends into the infinite. And thus we obtain a sub strate for the Non-Ego, as we before obtained one for the Ego. The contemplating is, of course, the Ego, which, however, does not reflect upon itself.
Sensation was to be posited. We have seen both 208 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
how the sensating and the object of sensation are posited through contemplation; but, in order to have sensation posited, the sensating and the ob ject of sensation must not be posited separately, but in synthetic unity. This is now our concluding task In order to posit the Ego as limited, as sensating, we required an ideal activity, opposed to the limited activity. Again, in order to posit the object of sensation, which was beyond the limit, nevertheless within the sphere of the Ego, we required an acti vity of the Ego, always removing the limit into an infinity. The synthetical union of both would sig nify: The Ego, in order to be able to limit itself must remove (extend) the limit; and in order to remove the limit it must limit itself. Thus sen sation and contemplation would be synthetically united; and in sensation, inner contemplation (the contemplation of the sensation} and outer con templation (that of the object of sensation) would also be synthetically united; and our task would be accomplished.
isL The limited activity of the Ego is to be de termined by its opposite, the ideal activity of the Ego. In so far, therefore, the ideal activity is the presupposition, the condition of a relation between the two activities — by no means the sequence of such a relation. If both are to be related, then the ideal activity is presupposed.
The limited activity is limited, let us say, in C. Its opposite, therefore, the ideal activity, is charac- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 209 terized by this, that it is not limited in C, (whether it be limited in another point is left, and must be left, undetermined.) Hence, the determined point C is in this relation related to the ideal activity; and, since the latter is its presupposition, must be con tained in it The ideal activity is not originally directed upon C, but touches it in the relation by chance, as it were. As soon as the relation occurs, however, the point C is posited wherever it occurs; and there is no freedom in positing its place of oc currence. This place is determined; and only the express positing of the point as point is activity of the relation. Moreover, in the relation, this ideal activity is posited as going beyond this point C. This, again, is not possible, unless the point is po sited in the ideal activity as a point, beyond which it goes. Hence, throughout all the extension of the activity, this point is carried over in it, as an ideal istic point of limitation, wherewith to measure the 'distance, as it were, from the first fixed and im movable point Bat since the activity is to go be yond, and never to be limited, this second ideal point is also not fixed, but always a moving one, and in such a manner that throughout the whole extension no point can (idealistically) be posited, which this point has not touched. As certain, therefore, as that ideal activity goes beyond the point of limitation, that point is carried out into the infinite, (until, perhaps, we shall touch a new limit) Now, what activity carries the point thus beyond the ideal activity, or that of the relation? Evi- Z1O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
dently, since for the ideal activity no such point ex ists previous to the relation; and since, on the other hand, the relation itself presupposes that carrying beyond, it must be thus: that in the very relation and through it the point of limitation as well as its carrying beyond are posited synthetically in it; and since all relation is grounded in the Ego, this must also be done through ideal activity, but through another ideal activity than that which we know. We have thus the following three acts of the Ego: one, which has the ideal activity as its object; another, which has the real and limited activity as its object; and these two must be one and the same, though as yet we do not see how this can be; and thirdly, an activity which carries the limit from the real into the ideal activity. By means of this latter, the ideal activity itself is dis tinguished: firstly, as going merely to C, and thus far remaining altogether pure; and, secondly, as going beyond C, and carrying forward the limit 2d. But this solving the difficulty of positing the Ego as limited and unlimited together, by calling its limited activity real and the other ideal, will not suffice. For if you ask, again, what is its real ac tivity, all you can say is, its limited activity, etc, and the explanation is a circle. \Ve must have a different ground of distinction than that of limita tion, or we have no explanation at all Before finding this ground, let us premise what we shall discover as the final result; that is, the Ego cannot posit itself for itself at all, unless it THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 211 limits itself, and hence unless it goes beyond it* self Originally the Ego is posited through itself; or, it is what it is, for any outside intelligence; it is its own ground; that is, thus it must be thought, if the Ego is thought Moreover, it has a tendency (see the " Practical Part") iojill vp and eticirck the infinity; or, to reflect upon itself as an infinite. But this mere tendency produces no act of the Ego.
Now, posit it thus, tending toward C, and at that point checked — of course, for any possible outside intelligence, which observes the Ego, and which has posited that tendency in its own consciousness. What will thereby arise in the Ego? Evidently a tendency to reflect upon itself, which it could not do before, since all reflected must be limited, and the Ego before was not limited.
In C Ethe go is limited; hence, in C there arises in the Ego, together with the limitation, the reflec tion upon itself; it returns into itself, finds itself feels itself, but clearly nothing outside of itself This reflection of the Ego upon itself is, as we clearly see from our stand-point of an outside intel ligence, an act of the Ego, grounded in the neces sary tendency and the added condition. But what is this reflection for the Ego itself? Clearly: In this reflection it first finds itself; arises first for tt- sclf. It can not accept itself as the ground of something before it ever was! Hence, that self- feeling, self-finding is for the Ego a mere passivity; 212 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
it reflects not for itself, but is reflected by an outside something. We, the outside intelligence, saw it act, it is true; but the Ego itself does not see itself act; is purely passive.
The Ego is now for itself, because, and in so far as it is limited, and being an Ego, it must posit itself as limited; that is, must oppose to itself a limiting something. This is done by an activity, which goes beyond the limit C, and views the limit as an oppo site to the Ego. This activity is altogether ground ed in the Ego. The Ego posits a limiting something, because it is limited, and because it must posit what ever it is. It posits it as a limiting something, and hence as an opposite and Non-Ego, because it is to explain its own limitation. Let no one, therefore, believe that we open here a way to penetrate into the thing fcrsc; that is, the thing without refe rence to an Ego. Our presupposition was: the Ego is limited. You ask: Has this limitation in itself, that is, without reference to a possible intel ligence, a ground, and how is this ground consti tuted? But how can you ask so? And how can I answer you rationally when you require me to abstract from all reason? For the Ego, (for rea son,) tliat limitation Jias a ground, since all limi tation presupposes a limiting; and for the Ego this ground is also not in the Ego, for then the Ego would be contradictory, but in an opposite; and such an opposite is, therefore, posited as such by the Ego, according to those laws of reason, and is its product THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Let us repeat this: We say the Ego must be limited if it is to be an Ego; and must, by the laws of its being, posit this limitation and Its ground in a limiting something; the latter is, therefore, its product Now, if any body should be so thoroughly pene trated with transcendent dogmatism that he can not yet tear himself from it, he might probably argue thus against us: "I admit all this; but this merely explains the representation of the thing in the Ego, which certainly is its product, but not the thing itself which I want to know about. You say the Ego is limited. Very well But this limita tion, considered in itself, and abstracting altogether from its reflection through the Ego, must have a ground, and this ground is the thing in itself." To this argument we reply: You explain just like the Ego which we are considering; and you are that Ego just as surely as you follow the laws of reason in your argument. If you will but reflect maturely upon this fact, you will see that you with your ar gument remain, though unconsciously, in the same circle which we have just pointed out You will never escape that circle, unless you can get beyond those laws of thinking. But when you do get be yond them, you will cease to urge such objections.
The Ego is, therefore, in this whole act utterly •passive and unconscious of its activity; wherefore, the product thereof, if it should appear to the Ego, will necessarily appear to it as existing indepen dently of it 214 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
3d. The Ego has gone, for an outside observer, beyond C with the tendency to reflect upon itself! But as it can not reflect without being limited, it is clear that it must be again limited beyond C, say in the point D. The Ego also produced, for an out side observer, a Non-Ego, but unconscious of its activity. Now, it reflects upon its product, and posits it as a Non-Ego, of course without further determination and without consciousness, contra dictory as it may sound, since the Ego has not yet been reflected upon.
This second product, a posited Non-Ego, must again be reflected upon. The Ego in sensating is posited as passive; the opposite Non-Ego must be posited as active.
This Non-Ego, posited as active, must again be reflected upon; and now we enter the field of our investigation.
Through the Ego and in the Ego, though with out consciousness, as we have repeatedly said, an active Non-Ego is posited. This is reflected upon, or a new activity of the Ego is directed upon it. Reflection only tends upon a limited; hence, the activity of the Non-Ego is necessarily limited, limit ed as activity, not in its extent, as might be sup posed, for as yet we have no space. The Non-Ego, therefore, is checked in its activity, becomes pas sive; the manifestation of its power is checked, and only a substrate of the power remains. In so far as the Ego reflects, it does not reflect upon this reflec tion itself; hence, it does not become conscious of THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, its activity therein, and we thus again obtain the above external (though not yet posited as external) first original contemplation, which has neither con sciousness, self-consciousness, nor even conscious ness of the object We are now at the same point from which we started in our second part of the theoretical part of the science of knowledge, that is, at the con tradictory opposite activities of the Ego and the Non-Ego. We have seen that no activity of the Ego can be annihilated by the Non-Ego, unless the Ego proceeds from what we may describe as its original sphere, that is, the sphere between A and C, into the sphere of the Non-Ego, which extends from C into infinity. We have also seen that no activity of the Non-Ego is possible unless the Ego first posits the Non-Ego and its activity; both are products of the Ego. But we have only seen this from the stand-point of an outside observer; it re mains that the Ego should see this for itself. How?