A, that is, the effect which was said to have been produced in the Ego by the thing, is posited with respect to the Ego as accidental. Hence, there is necessarily opposed to this effect and to the Ego, in so far as it is determined thereby, an indepen dent in itself and through itself existing Ego. Just as we opposed to the accidental in the Non-Ego causality, but for all a priori laws, but shows by a closer determina tion of the object that our knowledge has objective validity for that very reason, and can only have it on that condition.
254 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, the necessary thing, so we now oppose to the acci dental in the Ego the necessary or the E.go fer se; and this latter, like the necessary Non-Ego, is pro duct of the Ego itsel£ The necessary is substance; the accidental an accidence of it. Both must be synthetically united as one and the same Ego. But since they are absolute opposites, they can only be united by absolute activity of the Ego, whereof the Ego never becomes immediately con scious, but rather applies it to the objects of the reflection, thus positing the relation of causality between the two. In the reflecti:.:h-r accidental becomes effect of the activity of;,>/j?l solute Ego and hence something real for the Ego, its utter ance. That it is effect of the Non-Ego is altogether lost sight of in this reflection, since it can not be posited at the same time as effect of the Ego and of the Non-Ego. Thus, the thing and its utter ance are completely excluded from the Ego and opposed to it Both the Ego and the Non-Ego exist in themo o selves necessary, and both completely independent of each other; 'both utter themselves in this inde pendence, each by its own activity and power, which power, however, is as yet perfectly free.
We have now shown how we came to oppose an acting Ego and an acting Non-Ego, and to consider both as completely independent of each other. In our present view the Non-Ego exists because it exists, and is altogether determined through itself; but that it is imaged, represented by the Ego, is acci- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 235 dental for the Non-Ego. Again, the Ego acts ab solutely through itself; but that it images the Non- Ego is accidental for it The utterance of the thing in its appearance is product of the thing; but the appearance, in so far as it exists for the Ego, is again product of the Ego.
The Ego can not act without having an object; hence, the acting of the Ego posits that of the Non- Ego. Again, the Non-Ego can not act, that is, for tJu Ego, unless the acting of the Ego is preposited. The utterance of both powers is, therefore, neces sarily synthetically united, and we must now show the ground of their union, their harmony.
This union occurs through absolute spontaneity. But what is posited through freedom has the cha racter of the accidental; hence, the present syn thetical union must have this character. It is, therefore, the accidental unity of the acting we have to examine, or the r.ccidental junction of the acting of the Ego, and of the acting of the Non- Ego in a third, which is and can be nothing but their junction, and which we shall call for the present a foint.
TIME AND SPACE, Contemplation is determined in time, and the con templated in space.
We have determined contemplation, in our last paragraph, as the synthetical union of the acting of the Ego and of the acting of the Non-Ego through 236 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
their accidental junction in a point This contem plation occurs in the Ego means, it is posited as acci dental. The contemplation X is posited as contem plation accidental means, another contemplation — not another object, determination, or any such thing, but — another contemflatwn, which we shall call Y, is opposed to it Y is necessary when opposed to X, and X is accidental in opposition to Y. Y is, therefore, completely excluded from the Ego, which rests in the contemplation of X.
X, as contemplation, necessarily rests in a point. So does Y, but in an opposite, distinct point One point is not the other.
The question is now, What necessity is it which Y has in relation to X, and what accidentalness which X has in relation to Y? Clearly, the con templation Y and its point are necessarily syntheti cally united if X is to be united with its point, or the union of X and its point presupposes that of Y and its point, but not vice versa. In that point wherein X is posited another contemplation viight be posited; at least, so the Ego judges; but in the point of Y none but Y can be posited, if X is to be posited as contemplation of the Ego. Only in so far as the accidentalness of this synthesis is posited, is X to be posited as contemplation of the Ego; and only in so far as to this accidentalness is op posed the necessity of the same synthesis is the accidentalness itself to be posited.
The much more difficult question remains, how the points X and Y are to be otherwise determined THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
than through the respective contemplations X and Y. As yet they are only points wherein a causal ity of the Ego and the Non-Ego meet It is, how ever, dear that, if X is to be posited as the point wherein another contemplation may be posited, and Y as its opposite in which no other can be posited, both points dirempt from their contemplations, and must be distinguishable from each other. We can not yet see Jww this is possible, but we can see t/utt it must be possible if ever a contemplation is to be ascribed to the Ego.
1st We have shown before that, if A is posited as totality, B is excluded. If A signifies the image to be determined spontaneous!}', B signifies the inde pendent and necessary quality of the image. ' We now apply this here. — From the contemplation X, as such, the determined object X is excluded; and the same in the contemplation Y. Both objects, as such, are determined; that is, the Ego in contem plation must posit them exactly as it posits them. This, their determinateness, is to remain, of course.
But the same relation which exists between the contemplations must exist between the objects. Hence, the object X is accidental 'in reference to Y, but Y necessary in reference to X. The deter mination of X necessarily presupposes that of the Y, but not vice versa.
But since both objects, as objects of contemplation* are perfectly determined, their postulated relation can have no reference to this determinateness, but must refer to another as yet unknown determinate- 238 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
ness, one through which something does not be come an object generally, but an object of a con templation distinguishable from another contempla tion. The required determination does not belong to the inner determinations of the object, (in so far as it is A = A,) but is an external one. Unless we have the required distinction, a contemplation can not be posited in the Ego. The distinction, however, is not possible without this external de- terminateness of the object, and the object can not be an object of contemplation without this determi- nateness. It is, therefore, the exclusive condition of all contemplation. We call this unknown some what through which the object is to be determined O; the way in which Y is determined through it, we call Z; and the way in which X is determined through it, V.
The mutual relation is, therefore, as follows: X must be posited as to be or not to be synthetically united with V, and hence V also as to be united thus with X or with any other object; but Y must be posited as necessarily in synthetical union with Z, if X is to be united with V.
If V is posited as to be united with X, or as not to be united with X, Y is posited necessarily as united with Z. From this it results that every pos sible object may be united with V except Y, for Y is already inseparably united. Thus, also, may X be united with every possible O, except with Z, for this is inseparably united with Y.
X and Y are both completely excluded from the THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2J9 Ego; the Ego loses and forgets itself completely in their contemplation. The relation we have here .shown up is, therefore, to be ascribed to the things themselves; the relation appears to the Ego as not •dependent upon its freedom, but aS determined- through the things.
The relation was: because Z is united with Y, X is excluded from it It must, therefore, applied to the things, be expressed thus: Y excludes X from Z; Y determines X negatively. If Y extends to the point d, X goes to this point; if it only extends to c, X goes to c. But since the only ground why X can not be united to Z is this, that Y excludes it, X certainly begins where Y ceases to exclude it; hence, continuity belongs to both.
This exclusion, this continuity is not possible unless X and Y are both in a common sphere, (which •we do not know as yet,) and meet in one point in this sphere. The positing of this sphere constitutes the synthetic union of both as required. Hence, such a common sphere is produced by the absolute -spontaneity of the power of imagination.
2d We have shown before that, if the excluded B is reflected upon, A is thereby excluded from the to tality, from the Ego. But since B has been posited in the Ego by reflection, and is, therefore, itself posited in union with A as totality, (as accidental,) it follows that another B, in reference to which it is accidental, must be excluded or posited as a neces sary opposite. We now apply this here.
Y is now, with reference to its synthetical union 240 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
with an unknown O, determined; and X in respect to, and by means of, Y, is also at least negavtiely determined But if they are to be united with A, or to be po sited in the Ego, they must be posited as accidental also in this respect, that is, a necessary X and Y must be opposed to them, in regard to which they are accidental: substances whereof they are acci- dences.
This necessary X and Y, whereof the accidental X and Y in the Ego are the utterances, are their presupposed powers, free powers. The same rela tion which exists between X and Y as utterances exists, therefore, between these powers. The ut terance of power Y is utterly independent of that of power X; but the latter in its utterance is de pendent upon and conditioned by Y. Conditioned, that is, the utterance of Y does not determine the utterance X positively, but negatively; not the qua- litativeness of X, but in this that X can not utter itself in a certain manner.
But it has been expressly stated that X as well as Y are to utter themselves through free, unlimited causality. How, then, can X be conditioned by Y? Evidently X has causality as well as Y, and the causality of the latter is not the condition of that of the former; Y does not compel or urge X to utter itsel£ Nor does it determine the character of this, the utterance or causality of X. But how, then, does it condition it?
X and Y are to be in a synthetical relation to an THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 24!
unknown O. For in and only through their rela tion to O are they mutually related. Each must, therefore, have- an independent relation to O.
O must be a something which leaves to both per fect freedom of causality, for in this, their free cau sality, are they to be united with O. And since the resistance of every power to a causality limits that causality, O can have no power, no activity, no intension. It can, therefore, have no reality at all, and is nothing.
We have seen how Y and Z being synthetically united, X is excluded from Z. We have also seen, now, that this synthetical union of Y and Z is ef fected through the own free causality of the inner power Y. Not that Z is product of the power Y, but, being necessarily united with Y, it must also have a distinctive feature. Now, this union of Y and Z excludes the causality of X and its product from Z; hence, Z is the sphere of causality of Y, and is nothing but this sphere; it is nothing in it self, has no reality, and can have no predicate but the one just shown up.
Again, Z is sphere of causality only of Y; for, by being posited as such a sphere of Y, X and all other possible object is excluded from it. The " sphere of the causality of Y " means the same as " Z;" both are in all respects the same. The causality of Y fills vp Z, that is, excludes all other but the causality of Y.
If Z goes to c, d, or e, the causality of X is thus far excluded. But, since the latter is only excluded 242 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
because Y excludes it, there is necessarily conti nuity between the spheres of causality of both, and both meet or join in a point The power of imagi nation unites both and posits Z and — Z, or, as we determined it above, V = O.
But the causality of X is to remain free altlwugk excluded from Z. This exclusion would not leave X free, if the causality of Y in Z negated or can celed something in X, or made any in itself possible utterance of X impossible. Hence, it must be that no possible utterance cf X does ever come in conflict with the causality of Y and Z; there must not be any such tendency of filling up Z in X. There must be in X itself a ground by virtue of which Z is not its sphere of causality; there must not be in X any ground of a possibility that Y could be its sphere of causality.
Y and X, therefore, unite accidentally in a point, in the absolute synthetical union of absolute oppo- sites, without any mutual influence or action upon each other.
3d. We have shown before that A + B must be determined through B. Hitherto only B has been thus determined; but mediately A also is determined through it This formula we interpreted: that which is in the Ego— that is, contemplation — is determined through the Non-Ego, and is mediately a product thereof We now apply this here.
X is product of the Non-Ego, and is, in regard to its sphere of action, determined in the Ego; Y is the same, both through themselves in their abso- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 243 lute freedom. Both through their accidental junc tion determine also the point of this junction; and the Ego is only passive in regard to it But this can not be. The Ego, as sure as it is an Ego, must produce this determination with free dom.
We have solved this same problem before in this way: The whole reflection of substantiality is de pendent upon the absolute freedom of the Ego. We now solve the problem in the same way. The Ego is absolutely free to reflect or not reflect upon Y and X as an abiding, as a simple. If it does so reflect, it must, by the law of that reflection, un doubtedly place Y in the sphere of action Z, and posit C as a limit between the spheres of action of Y and X; but it also may not so reflect, and may posit, instead of X and Y, ever}' possible object as substance through its absolute freedom.
Suppose the spheres Z and V as connecting in the point C. In the sphere Z, the Ego can posit an a or a b instead of Y; it can make Z the sphere of action of both, and their limit, the dividing line, G. Let us now call the sphere of action of a, H. Then the Ego can now again proceed to take this H, and, instead of positing a in it as indivisible sub stance, it can posit E and D in it, and so on ad in- fnitum. But, if an a and a b have once been posit ed, the Ego must assign to them a sphere of action connecting in one point This accidentalness of Y and its sphere of action for the Ego the Ego must now posit as real through 244 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, its power of imagination. O is thus posited as an extended, continuous, infinitely indivisible, and is SPACE.
REMARKS.
ist The power of imagination, by positing the possibility of other substances with other spheres of action in the space Z, first diranpts space from the thing which actually fills it, and sketches an empty space; of course, only as an attempt, and transitively in order to fill it immediately again with any desired substances and their spheres of action. Hence, there is no empty space but in this transi tion from the filling up of space by A to its being filled up by B, C, D, etc.
2d The infinitely smallest part of space is always a space, a continuity, but not a mere point, or the limit between placc-s in space. It is thus a continuity, because in it can be posited, ari is po sited in so far as itself is posited, a. power which necessarily utters itself, and which can not be posit ed except as uttering itself. But it can not utter itself unless it has a sphere of its utterance, which is nothing but such a sphere.
3d, Hence, intensity and extensity are necessarily synthetically united, and one can not be deduced without the other. Every power fills up (not through itself, /<?r the power is not in space, and is, in fact, nothing at all without utterance, but through its necessary product, which is this same synthetical ground of union of intensity and extensity) a place THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 245 in space; and space is nothing but this sphere, filled or to be filled by these products.
4th. Apart from the inner determinations of the things, (their qualitativeness,) which only refer to feeling, (more or less pleasure or disgust,) and which are not at all accessible to the theoretical faculty of the Ego, as, for instance, that the things are red or smooth, bitter or sweet, heavy or light, etc., these things are only distinguishable from each other by the space they occupy. Hence, that which pertains to these things in such a manner that it is only as cribed to them and not to the Ego, though it does not belong to their inner essence, is the space which they occupy.
5th. But all space is equal, and through it, there fore, no distinction and determination is possible, except in so far as one thing = Y has been posited in a certain space, and thus determined and charac terized space. In that case 3'ou can say of X, it is in another space than Y. All determination of space presupposes a space filled up, and determined by that filling up. Posit A in the infinite empty space, it remains as undetermined as it was before, and you can not answer my question, Where is it? for you have no fixed point from which you can measure it. The place which it occupies is only determined through A, and A is only determined through that place. Hence, there is in reality no determination except in so far as you posit one; it is a synthesis through absolute spontaneity. To express this sensuously, A might move continuously THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, from one point to another in space, and you would not observe the movement, because for you there •would be no points, but only the limitless, endless spaces. For you it would always remain where it is, because it would always remain in space. But if you put B aside of it, then B is determined; and if I ask you where it is, you reply, By the side of A. This satisfies me, unless I ask again, But where is A? If you posit C, D, E, etc,, aside of B, then you have for all of them relative determina tions of place; but you may fill up space as far as you like, and you will always have in the filled up space only a finite space which can have no relation to the infinite space. This finite space is only de termined in so far as you have determined it by virtue of an absolute synthesis. An evident truth, it seems to me, which ought long since to have proven the ideality of space.
6th. The object of the present contemplation is characterized as such by this, that we posit it through the power of imagination in a space as empty space. But this, as we have shown, is not possible, unless a filled up space is presupposed. A dependent succession of the filling up of space, but in which, from reasons we shall show up hereafter, one can always go further back infinitely.
To restore the freedom of the Ego, and to posit the Non-Ego as accidental, we posited the Ego as free to connect Z with Y, or a, b, c, etc.; and through positing this freedom we first discovered O as space. This sort of accidentalness remains; THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 247 but the question is, whether it has solved the prob lem.
True, the Ego is generally free to posit in space Y, X, or a, b, c, etc.; but, if it is to reflect upon X as substance, from which presupposition we started, it must necessarily, as we have shown, posit Y as determined substance, and as determined by the space Z; hence, in that condition it is not free. Nor is it then free in determining the place of X is space, for it must place X aside of Y. Hence, the Ego, under this condition, remains always deter mined by another. But it sJiall be free; and the contradiction must be solved. This is done as fol lows: Y and X must both be determined and opposed to each other in another manner than through their determinedness and determinabflity in space; for both have been posited above independent of their space, and as distinct from each other. They must have other characteristics, in virtue of which the sentence A = A is applied to them; for instance, that X is red, Y yellow, etc. Their place in space has no reference to these determinations, does not make Y, as yellow, the determined in space, or X as red, the determinable in space. It only posits one of both as determined, and the oth er as determinable, without any reference to any inherent characteristics they may possess. Thus freedom attains its sphere again. Freedom must oppose a determined and a determinable; but it can make either opposite the determined or the de- T48 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
terminable. Whether X be determined through Y, or vice versa, depends only upon the spontaneity of the Ego. In other words, it is the same what series you describe in space, whether from A to B, or vice -versa; whether you place B on the side of A, or A on the side of B, for the things mutually exclude each other in space.
This, its freedom of making either determined or determinable, the Ego posits through the power of imagination. It floats between determinedness and determin ability, ascribes to both both, or, which is the same, to neither neither. But if a contempla tion and object of a contemplation is to be, then the Ego must make one of the in themselves determined two a dctcrmijiable in space.
Why it posits X or Y, or a, b, c, d, etc., as de terminable admits of no ground, and can not admit of a ground, for it is an act of absolute spontaneity. This shows itself as accidentalness. But it must be well observed wherein this accidentalness con sists, namely, in the being posited, or in the existence of the determinable. The positing of this determi nable becomes an accidence of the Ego, to which the Ego itself, as shown before, must be opposited as its substance.
Ego and Non-Ego are now again complete oppo sites, and independent of each other. Inner powers of the Non-Ego work with absolute freedom, fill up their spheres of action, accidentally meet in a point, and thus mutually exclude each other, without limit ing their respective freedom, from their spheres of THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 249 •action, or from their places in space. The Ego, again, posits as substance whatsoever it chooses, divides space, as it were, amongst substances, spon taneously decides which shall be the determined and which the determinable in space, or in what direction it will course through space.
Thus, all connection between the Ego and the Non-Ego is broken off; both are only connected by empty space, which, being empty, and only the sphere wherein the Non-Ego, rcaliter with freedom, posits its products, and the Ego, idealitcr, posits also with freedom its products, as imaginary pro ducts of a Non-Ego, does limit neither nor connect one with the other. The opposition of both and the independent existence of the Ego and the Non- Ego is explained; but not the required harmony between both. Space is justly called the form, that is, the subjective condition of the possibility of the external contemplation. Unless there is another form of contemplation, the required harmony be tween representation of a thing and a thing itself and their mutual relation; hence, also, their oppo sition through the Ego, is impossible. Let us find this form.
TIME.
TIME.
I. Y and X, in all their possible and mutual relations, are products of the free causality of the independent Non-Ego. But this they are not for t/if Ego, nor are they indeed at all/or the Ego with out a free causality of the Ego itsel£ 25° THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 2. This causality of Ego and Non-Ego, there fore, must be reciprocal causality, that is, the utter ances of both must meet in a point, in the absolute synthesis of both through imagination. This point of union the Ego posits by its absolute power, and it posits this point as accidental, that is, tJie connect ing of the causality of both opposite is accidental.
3. If Y or X is to be posited, such a point of union must be posited; or, in other words, the positing of an object involves such a union with the causality of the Ego.
4. The Ego is perfectly free in regard to the determinateness or undeterminateness of the X or Y means, therefore, the Ego is perfectly free to connect Y or X with the point (and tfats with the Ego) or not 5. This thus determined freedom of the Ego must be posited through the power of imagination, that is, the mere possibility of a synthesis of the point with a causality of the Non-Ego must be posited. This is only possible if the feint can be posited apart from the causality of tlie Xcm-Ego.
6. But such a point is nothing but a synthesis of the causality of the Ego and of the Non-Ego. Hence, by altogether removing it from the causality of the Non-Ego, you destroy the point. Hence, we only remove the determined X from the point, and unite the point instead with an undetermined pro duct (a, b, c, or d, etc., a Non-Ego) so as to have it retain its determined character as synthetical point 7. The Ego is really synthetically to unite the point with X. This is our whole presupposition,, for we require a contemplation of X, which, even as contemplation, is not possible -without such a synthesis. This synthesis, as we have also shown, occurs through absolute spontaneity. But, by unit- ing X with the point, all other possible powers are excluded from the point 8. This synthetical connection of X with the point is to be a real connecting, and to be posited as such, that is, it is to bear the characteristic of absolute spontaneity, namely, accidentalmss, and this not merely in the respect heretofore mentioned,, but in its very characteristic as a connecting of a synthesis. But such accidentalness of its character as syntlicsis is only possible through opposition with another necessary synthesis of a determined Y with a point; of course, not with the point of X, for from that point all other is excluded, but with another opposite point. Let us call this point c, and the point with which X is connected d.
9. This point c, like d, is synthetical point of union of the causality of the Ego and of the Non-Ego But it is opposed to d in this, that with d the syn thetical union is considered as dependent upon freedom, as that which might be otherwise, while with c the union is considered as necessary.
10. This accidentalness of the synthetical union with d must be posited; hence, also, must the ne cessity of the union with c be posited. Both must, therefore, be posited in this respect as necessary ••and accidental in regard to each other. If the syn- • thetical union with d is to be posited, that with c »must have been posited before, but not vice versa.
11. Now, this synthesis with d is really to be 'posited; hence, it is posited as dependent, as condi tioned by the synthesis with c. But c is not, vice • versa, conditioned by d.
12. Again, the synthesis with c is to be exactly . as the synthesis with d, that is, an arbitrary, acci- • dental synthesis. If it is posited as such, another : synthesis with b must again be opposed to it as ne- • cessary, as the synthesis of which it is dependent • and by which it is conditioned. The synthesis with