Ego as totality of reality, but because this, its posit ing, is directed upon objects, (a world,) it never com pletes the positing. The moral world (the only real world) is always complete, and is always real ized in every act; but is, at the same time, never realized in the actual objective world, for the very reason that, being objective, it extends into the in finite.
Were the Ego more than a tendency, that is, if it had infinite causality, it would not be an Ego, would not posit itself, and hence be nothing. If, again, it had not this infinite tendency, it could also not posit itself, for it could not posit its opposite; hence, it would again be no Ego, be nothing.
OTHER STATEMENT OF THE SAME RESULT.
Our RESULT was, that the pure, self-returning activity, in its relation to a possible object, is an infinite tendeiuy. A tendency, that is, an activity which meets resistance, has, therefore, no causality as such, and is in so far partly conditioned by a Non-Ego, which has as such no causality. Such a causality is, therefore, required. TJiat the require ment of such an absolute causality must be origi nally contained in the Ego, we have proven by showing that the contradiction between the Ego as intelligence and as absolute Ego could not be other wise solved; and hence our proof was only apogo- gical; but Jwju this requirement originated in the Ego we have not yet shown. This direct and gene- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
tic proof or deduction must, however, be possible. It must be possible to show up in the Ego not only a tendency to have a determined causality, (deter mined through a Non-Ego,) but a tendency to have causality in general — the latter to be the ground of the former.
An activity which goes beyond the object be comes a tendency only because it goes beyond the object, and hence only on condition of an object But we must now show up a ground in the Ego for its going out of itself at all, and show how this go ing beyond itself of the Ego is solely grounded in the Ego itself, and how it precedes all resisted ac tivity, and first makes it at all possible.
In other words, we must show up in the absolute Ego the ground of the possibility of the influence of an Other (of a foreign Non-Ego) upon itself. We must show how, although it only posits itself, it re mains susceptible to the positing of another.
The Ego is, therefore, to find originally in itself an heterogeneous, foreign, distinguishable Other.
//; itself, not outside of itself. If the latter were true, the Other would not \)tfor the Ego. Hence, in some respect, the Other must be equal, relatable, to the Ego, must belong to it The Ego is = absolute activity, (self-positing;) if the heterogeneous Other is, therefore, any ways to be ascribed to the Ego, it must be an activity of the Ego, which as such can not be foreign, but the direction of which may perhaps be foreign, that is, may not be grounded in the Ego. If the activity 2/S THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
of the Ego extends into the infinite and is thrown back into itself, the activity, as such, always re mains activity of the Ego; only its direction, its return, is foreign to the Ego. Now, here arise these important questions: How does the Ego get to distinguish between the direction of its activity out-ward into the infi nite, and inward back into itself, and why does it ascribe the latter to a foreign Other?
The absolute essence of the Ego is self-positing, as we know. As such it has, doubtless, a self-re turning direction, (if we can speak of directions as yet, though we touch here upon the source of all directions, centripetal and centrifugal,) that is to say, a centripetal direction. But since all determi nation involves negation, or the positing of another, centripetal direction involves the silent presupposi tion of the centrifugal. Rightly taken, the true scheme of the above absolute Ego would be the mathematical point, which is content and form to gether, that is, which is all that it is, "ivlicre it is. But the absolute Ego is not simply a self-positing, (which would make it an objective thing,) but it is a positing of itself for itself. Through this far the above centripetal direction at once receives its complement in the centrifugal. The direction of the activity of the Ego is centripetal in so far as it is reflecting, and centrifugal in so far as it is that which is reflected upon, and this centrifugality is infinite. Both the centripetal and the centrifugal directions are equally grounded in the Ego, are THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
both one and the same, and are only different when reflected upon as different.
REMARK.
All centripetal power in the world of nature is purely product of the power of imagination of the Ego, in virtue of a law of reason to gather the manifold into unity.
But both directions can not be distinguished, unless a third link is found whereby they can be related to each other. As yet this third link has not been found; both directions are as yet undis- tinguishable, and consciousness, therefore, impos sible.
SECOND REMARK.
God's self-consciousness could only be explained by the presupposition that God thinks his own being. But since in God the reflected would be all in one and one in all, and the reflecting would be also one in all and all in one, God could not distin guish between reflecting and reflected, between consciousness and the object thereof; and hence his self-consciousness could not be explained. In deed, the self-consciousness of God can be explained or comprehended by no thinking which is subject to the law, that all determination is a negation.
The infinitely extending activity of the Ego is to be somewhere checked and repelled; and the Ego is not to fill up infinity. That this is so can not be 280 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
shown, but can only be known as fact; but it can be shown that this must be so if consciousness is to be realized. But still the requirement that the Ego should fill up the infinity remains, and when taken up in reflection it is found that the require ment has not been satisfied, that the activity has been checked, repelled; and only through this third link of the requirement is a distinction possible and a centripetal direction established, which is as such distinguishable from the first centrifugal direction of the Ego whereby it sought to fill up infinity. The centrifugal direction is the original direction of the absolute Ego, the centripetal direction the reflected direction of the checked Ego.
RESULTS.
1st Because the Ego is a for-itscJf positing, a reflecting, of itself, docs it go beyond itself; and be cause in thus positing itself it must posit itself as the totality of all reality has it a tendency to causa lity.
2d. In so far as the Ego simply posits itself it is complete in itself, and posits no other. But since it must posit itself as self-posited, (that is, far it self,) it thus, by this second (as it were) positing, posits the possibility that something could be in it self not posited through itself, and thus externalizes itself.
The first positing gives the activity of the Ego which is to be checked; the second positing makes THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 28 1 it possible that the first activity can be checked for the Ego, or that the Ego can posit itself as deter mined. And thus we have discovered an original self-relation of the Ego, through which alone an external influence upon the Ego is made possible.
3d. The absolute Ego posits itself as the totality of all reality. In applying this positing to the infi nite objective world, the Ego becomes a practical or moral Ego. In this, its morality, it is not abso lute, since it goes beyond itself by the tendency of its reflection; nor is it theoretical, since its reflec tion tends upon the absolute Ego alone, and does not take the check into account at all It is simply moral — and gives the moral, the ideal world, the •world to be posited.
But if the reflection takes the check into account and thus considers its externalization limited, we obtain the real world determined by the Non-Ego. In doing this the Ego is theoretical, or intelligence.
Without the practical, moral faculty of the Ego the intelligence is not possible; for, unless the Ego goes beyond the check, there is no check, no Non- Ego for and in the Ego. Again, unless the Ego is intelligence, it can not be practical or self-con scious, since only the foreign check makes possible a distinction of the directions of the Ego's activity.
ADDENDA.
We have thus obtained as the last ground of all reality for the Ego an original reciprocal causality 282 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
between the Ego and an external Other, of which only this can be predicted, that it must be the op posite of the Ego. By this reciprocity nothing new or foreign is posited rn the Ego; it is only the ground of all motion and activity of the Ego; and, since the Ego is nothing but activity, the ground of the existence of the Ego. The Ego is, there fore, dependent, so far as its existence is concerned. But in regard to the determinations of this exist ence, it is utterly independent. In other words: That the Ego must be determined, in order to be, is an absolute first fact; but that its determina tions are all its own has been clearly developed. Or: The point wherein we first attain conscious ness does not depend upon us; but all the infinite determinations of our course from this point de pend wholly upon us. Our theory is, therefore, realistic, in so far as it absolutely posits an Other, a foreign check or power; but all possible determi nations of this Other it undertakes to deduce from the determining faculty of the Ego.
Our science is also idealistic. For by explaining consciousness, from an independent Other, it re members that this very explanation necessarily takes already the stand-point of consciousness, and follows its laws; whereas, the moment you seize the Other in thought, it ceases to be an independent Other, and becomes the production of thinking. But the pos sibility of this thinking again presupposes real con sciousness, and hence that independent Other which makes consciousness only possible.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 283 * In short: Every thing in its ideality -is dependent upon the Ego; but in its reality even the Ego is dependent. But in the Ego ideal and real ground are one and the same, and hence the reciprocity between the Ego and the Non-Ego is at the same time a reciprocity of the Ego with itself, a self- relation. The Ego can posit itself as limited by the Non-Ego, if it does not reflect that itself posits this Non-Ego; it can posit itself as limiting the Non-Ego by so reflecting. ' This, that the finite spirit must posit for itself an absolute somewhat outside of itself, (the. thing per se,) and at the same time knows that it exists only for it, (is a necessary uoumcn,) is the circle, which we may infinitely extend, but can never break through. A system which does not take account of this circle is a dogmatic idealism; a system which believes to have gone beyond it is a tran scendent realistic dogmatism.
We have said the consciousness of finite beings can only be explained by presupposing an indepen dent power. Can only be explained for whom? Who are they that want explanation? The finite beings themselves. As soon as we speak of " ex plaining," we are already in the field of finiteness; for all explanation, that is, not a gathering of all determinations at once, but a gradual rise from one determination to another, is finite; and this very determining or limiting is the bridge which carries the explanation, and which the Ego has in itself. The opposite power is independent of the Ego in .284 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
regard to its being and determination, which seeks .to modify the practical activity of the Ego, or the tendency of the Ego, to posit itself as the totality -of all reality; but it is dependent upon the ideal .activity, the theoretical power of the Ego. It is for the Ego only, in so far as it is posited through •the Ego, and otherwise it is not for the Ego. In dependent reality the other has only in so far as it is related to the practical (moral) activity of the Ego; in so far as it is related to the theoretical activity of the Ego, (the intelligence,) it is utterly .dependent, and subject to its laws. But, again, how can it be in relation to the theoretical except through the practical Ego, and vice versa f Here we have, again, no ideality, no reality, and vice •versa. Hence, we can also say: The final ground •of all consciousness is a reciprocal causality, self- relation, in the Ego, by means of a Non-Ego, an Other, which may be viewed in various ways.
All seeming objections to the science of know ledge can be traced to an inability to hold this final result. This may be mar/fe^ced in T.O ways. You jnay either reflect that, since this result is an idea, it must also be in the Ego, and then you become a dogmatic idealist, and must deny dogmatically all -external reality; or you cling to the sayings of your feeling, and of your common sense, (with which our science, rightly understood, perfectly •agrees,) and then you deny what is clearly put be fore you, or accuse our science of dogmatic ideal- THE SCIENCE CF KNOWLEDGE. 2%$ ism, because you do not gather its meaning. Nei ther should be done; but you should float between the two opposite determinations of this idea. This is the business of creative power of imagination, with which surely all human beings are gifted, but which not all have under their complete control.
V.
SECOND PART OF THE PRACTICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND PART or THI PR ACTI C AL PART, or THX SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
INTRODUCTORY.
THE result we have attained now as our final one is this: In positing the tendency of the Ego, a counter tendency of the Non-Ego is posited at the same time which holds it in balance.
With this result we shall have to do as we did with the result of the theoretical part of our science, that is to say, the Ego must posit it now in itseiC. It must become for the Ego; the Ego must realize it. The realization of the theoretical result has snown itself up as the quantitative side of the con struction of the universe, contemplation, sensation, time, and space, etc.; the realization for the Ego of the practical result will, therefore, undoubtedly give its qualitative side, impulse, feeling, qualities of things, etc.
29° THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
I. To clear the way, let us first state more pre cisely the contents of our result: The conception of a tendency is the conception of a cause which is not cause. But every cause presupposes activity. Eveiy tendency has power; if it had no power, it could not be cause.
2. The tendency, as such, has necessarily its de termined quantity as activity. It wants to be cause. But it does not become cause, does not attain its end, and hence is checked. If it were not checked, it would be cause, and not tendency.
3. The tendency is not checked, limited by itself for the conception of tendency involves that it should seek to be causality. If it limited itself, it would not be tendency. Hence, every tendency must be limited by another power opposed to it 4. This opposing power must also be a tendency* that is, strive to be causality; for, if it did not so strive, it would have no relation to the first tendency. Moreover, it must not have any causality; for, if it Lad causality, it would annihilate the tendency of its opposite by annihilating its power.
5. Neither of the two opposite tendencies can have causality. If one of them had it, the power of the opposite would thereby be annihilated, and they would cease to be opposite tendencies. Hence, they must hold each other in balance, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2<)l THE TENDENCY OF THE EGO IS POSITED AS IMPULSE, THE COUNTER TENDENCY OF THE NON-EGO AS . CHECK, AND THE BALANCE OF BOTH AS FEELING.
The tendency of the Ego, the opposing tendency of the Non-Ego, and their mutual balance is now to be posited, that is, to become for the Ego.
A. The tendency of the Ego is posited as such.
1. It is posited generally as something after the general law of reflection; hence, not as activity, as something in motion, but as a fixed, permanent something.
2. It is posited as a tendency. Tendency is a desire to have causality; it must, therefore, in this, its character, be posited as causality. Now, this causality can not be posited as directed upon the Xon-Ego, for then it would be posited as real effec tive causality, and not as tendency. Hence, it can only return into itself, only produce itself. But an itself-producing tendency, which is also something fixed, permanent, decided, is called an impulse.
(The conception of an impulse involves, ist. That it should be grounded in the inner essence of that ^hereunto it is ascribed, hence, that it should be produced by the causality of that essence upon it self by its self-positing; 2d. That it should be for that very reason something fixed and enduring; 3d. That it should seek to have causality outside of it self, but should have none in so far as it is merely impulse. Hence, the impulse is purely in the sub- 292 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGEject, and never goes beyond the sphere of the sub ject) B. The tendency of the Ego can not be posited without the positing of a counter tendency of the Non-Ego; for the tendency of the former desires to have causality and has none; and that it has not causality can not be grounded in itself, for the very conception of a tendency is the desire to have cau sality. Hence, the ground of its not having causa lity must be posited outside of the Ego, and again only as a tendency, otherwise the tendency of the Ego, or the impulse, as we now call it, would be suppressed.
C. The balance between both must be posited. The question here is not that this balance must be posited, for this has been shown before, but * Wliat is posited in and through the Ego by posit ing this balance? The Ego tends to fill up the in finite; it also tends to reflect upon itself, which it can not do without being limited; and in regard to the impulse, without being limited through a rela tion to the impulse.
Let us suppose the impulse to be limited in the point C; then in C the tendency to reflection is satis fied, but the ivtfulse to Jiavc real causality is limited. The Ego, then, limits itself in C, and is placed in self-relation; the impulse urges it further on, the reflection holds it still, and through the reflection it holds itself still Both united is the expression of a compulsion? of an / can not. An / can not involves, first, a fur^ THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 293 ther onward tendency, for else that which I can not would not be for me; second, limitation of real activity; and, thirdly, that the limiting should not be in me, but outside of me, or else there would be no tendency, and instead of an / can not we should have an I will not.
This utterance or expression of the / can not in the Ego is called feeling. In feeling is intimately united, first, activity — / feel, I am the feeling, (and this activity is that of the reflection;) and, secondly, limitation — I feel, am passive, not active, there is a compulsion. This limitation necessarily presup poses a tendency to go beyond. For else it would not be limited, for itself, of course. Feeling is altogether subjective. To explain it we require, it is true, an objective, a limiting, which is the busi ness of the theoretical part of the science of know ledge, but not to deduce it as occurring in the Ego, as being posited in the Ego.
EXPLANATORY REMARK.
Here we see sun clear what so many philoso phers, who can not get rid of transcendent dogma tism, can not comprehend, that is, tJiat and liow the Ego develops out of itself whatsoever occurs in it, without ever going beyond itself or breaking through its own circles. And how else could an Ego indeed be an Ego? There is a feeling in the Ego; this is a limitation of the impulse; and if it is a determined feeling, (distinguished from other 294 HIE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
feelings,) I he possibility whereof is as yet not visi ble, then it is the limitation of a determined im pulse, distinguished from other impulses. The Ego must posit a ground of this limitation, and must posit it outside of itself. It can posit the impulse as limited only by an opposite, and hence the impulse evidently determines what is to be posited as object If the impulse is posited as Y, the object must, therefore, necessarily be not-Y. But as all this occurs in consciousness necessarily, a consciousness of this act never occurs, and each one assumes that he has received externally what nevertheless he has only produced by his own power in accordance with his own laws. Still, such a pro ceeding has also objective validity, for it is the uni versal procedure of all finite reason, and there is and can be no other objective validity than the one shown up.
It is true, we in our investigation appear to have broken through this circle, for we have assumed as explanation of a tendency in the Ego an indepen dent and opposite Non-Ego. But the ground of the possibility and correctness of such a proceed ing on our part is this: Every one who enters into this investigation with us is himself an Ego — an Ego, however, which long ago has passed through all the acts we have here deduced, that is, which long ago has posited a Non-Ego; and our present investigation intends merely to show to him that this Non-Ego is his own product. He has long since necessarily completed the whole business of THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 295 Reason; and now merely determines himself to take a second look at this transaction, to go over the whole account anew, as it were; and hence ne posits arbitrarily with us an Ego, which he places on the stand-point from which he originally started, and makes his experiment upon this Ego. When ever this Ego, now investigated, shall arrive at the same point which the investigator now occupies, both Egos will be united, and the circle will be closed.
FEELING ITSELF IS POSITED AND DETER MINED.
PRELIMINARY.
The Ego is originally a tendency to fill up the infinite. This tendency is opposed to all object The Ego also has a law in itself to reflect upon it self, as thus filling up the infinite. But it can not thus reflect, unless it is limited. Hence, the satis faction of this tendency to reflect itself is conditioned by an object. The reflection-tendency may also be described as a tendency toward the object.
This limitation occurs through feeling, and by it the tendency is satisfied, so far as its form is con cerned — the Ego docs now reflect with absolute spontaneity; not satisfied, so far as its content is concerned; for the Ego is posited as limited, whereas it should be posited as unlimited. But this dissatisfaction is again not for the Ego, unless the Ego goes beyond the limit posited by itself.
20X> THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, How can this be? How can this dissatisfaction or feeling be posited for the Ego?
As sure as the Ego reflects upon itself, it is lim ited Limited, that is, for a possible outside ob server, not yet for itself. Let us at present be these outside observers, or, which is the same, let us posit in place of the Ego something which is only observed, a lifeless body, to which, however, we shall ascribe what we have presupposed as per taining to the Ego. Let us, therefore, suppose an elastic ball, = A, and assume that it is pressed in by another body. In this case: A. You posit in A a power, which, as soon as the opposite power gives way, will manifest itself without any further external influence, which, therefore, has in itself the ground of its causality. The power is in A, and tends in and upon itself to find expression; it is a power which is directed in and upon itself, hence an internal power. It is an immediate tendency to have causality upon itself, but which has no causality by reason of the ex ternal resistance. It is a balance of the immediate tendency, and of the mediated counter-impression in the body itself; hence, what above we called impulse. In the elastic body A an impulse is therefore posited.
B. In the other body, which presses A in, and which we shall call B, the same internal power which resists the reaction and the resistance of A, and which, therefore, is also itself restricted by A, but which has its ground solely in itself, is also THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 2$?
posited; that is, power and impulse is posited in B precisely as in A.
C. If one of both powers is increased, then the opposite is weakened, and vice versa; and, if the stronger power manifested itself fully, then the weaker one would be driven completely out from its sphere of action. As it is, both completely balance each other, and the point of their junction is the point of this balance. If that point is moved in the least, the whole relation is destroyed.
This is the case with an object having a ten dency, but not reflection; (we call such an object clastic.} Let us now see how this will apply to our object of investigation, which is an Ego, and which therefore has reflection and tendency.
The impulse is an inner power, determining it self to manifest causality. But the lifeless body has no causality at all, except outside of itself; and hence, since the inner power is held back by the external other body, its self-determination, its desire to manifest causality, results in nothing.
This is the case precisely with the Ego, in so far as it desires to have external causality; and, if it only had a desire for external causality, the case of the elastic body would be altogether applicable, But the Ego, precisely because it is an Ego, has also a causality upon itself, that is, a causality to posit itself, or to reflect upon itself. Now, the im pulse is to determine the power of tliat which lias the tendency, and hence, in so far as this power is to manifest itself in that which Jias tJu tendency, as is 298 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
the case with reflection, it follows that from the de termining of the impulse a manifestation of such a determining must necessarily result Or, in other words, the impulse necessarily results in tlit self- reflection of the Ego. (An important point) Hence, all reflection is grounded upon the ten dency; and, again, there is no tendency, that is, for the Ego, and hence no tendency of the Ego, and indeed no Ego at all unless there is reflection. Both tendency and reflection are synthetically united. Hence, also, the limitation of the Ego, For no limitation no tendency, no tendency no re flection, etc.
Hence, also, the distinction and union of ideal and real activity. The original tendency of the Ego as such is both ideal and real, both external and internal, because neither is distinguishable. By the limitation the external direction of the ten dency is cut off, but not the internal, the self-re turning, which is therefore the ideal. This ideal activity will soon appear to be the activity of re presentation, and hence the relation of the impulse to it maybe called the impulse of representation; which is, therefore, the first and highest manifesta tion of the impulse, whereby the Ego first becomes intelligence.
Hence, finally, the subordination of the theoreti cal to the practical part; and why all theoretical laws are grounded upon practical laws, or rather upon one practical law. From this result, more over, the absolute freedom of reflection and abstrac- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 299 tion, and the possibility to direct your attention upon a subject and to avert it from another subject for moral reasons, without which indeed no morality were possible. Fatalism is rooted out thoroughly, and its doctrine that an acting and willing is de pendent upon the system of our representations is destroyed by the proof that this system is again dependent upon our impulse and our -will.
Now, in this self-reflection, the Ego as such, which is never immediately conscious of its acting, can not be self-conscious. And yet it is now an Ego, a for — of course, for an outside observer; and here is the limit, where the Ego as a living essence is distinguished from a lifeless body, in which there also may be an impulse, as we have shown, but no reflection. The Ego is posited now as something for which something might be, though it is not yet for itself. But it is posited as something, for which there is an inner impelling power, which, however, is only-felt, since there is as yet no consciousness of it