Hence, the ideal Ego floats with absolute free dom over and within the limit; its limit is altoge ther undetermined. But since it is to reflect upon itself in this contemplation, it must posit itself as dftcnniticd in it; for all reflection presupposes de termination. Now, the law of determination is, that something is determined only in so far as it is determined through itself. Hence, the Ego in the contemplation of that X must posit the limit of its contemplation for itself; or, in other words, the Ego must determine itself to posit the very point C as its point of limitation; and then X would be determined through the absolute spontaneity of the Ego.
But X is also an X, which, in accordance with the general law of determination, determines itself, and is only as such object of reflection. Now, X as X, that is, as both determined and determining, extends to C. Hence, the Ego must limit X in C, if it is to limit it correctly; and thus X is iwt de- SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 321- termined through the absolute spontaneity of the- Ego.
The limitation of X in C is only felt, not contem plated. The spontaneously posited, limitation of X in C, through the Ego, is to be merely contemplated,, not felt. But both feeling and contemplation have no connection. Contemplation sees, but it is empty,- feeling relates to reality, but it is blind. A synthe tical union of feeling and contemplation is, there fore, necessary to limit X in C as demanded. The contemplation is to limit X through absolute spon taneity, and yet so as to make X appear altogether self-limited. This is done if the ideal activity by its absolute power of production proceeds beyond X and posits a Y, (in the point B, C, D, etc., for the ideal activity can neither posit itself the fixed point of limitation, nor receive it as immediately given.) This Y, opposed to a determined some what, must, firstly, be also somewhat, that is, self- determined; secondly, opposed to X, or limiting X,. that is, neither determining X, as far as X is deter mined, nor being determined by X as far as X determines, and vice versa; or it must be impossible to reflect upon X and Y as one. (Each is a some what; but each is another somewhat Without opposition the whole Non-Ego is a somewhat, but not a determined, particular somewhat.) The law is, therefore, that Y and Y shall mutually exclude each other. And it is to posit this opposition that the impulse determines the ideal activity. The im- $22 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
pulse in. this tendency may be called an impulse of reciprocal determination* The limitation-point C is altogether posited through feeling; hence the Y beyond C, in so far as it is to begin in C, can only be given through a relation to feeling. Feeling alone unites both in the limit The impulse of reciprocal determination, therefore, also relates to a feeling; and in this im pulse, indeed, ideal activity and feeling are inti mately united; in it the whole Ego is one. It is this impulse which manifests itself through yearn ing, a yearning for another, opposed to the previous.
REMARK.
REMARK.
In yearning ideality and impulse to produce reality are closely united. Yearning longs for an- ctlier; this is only possible under presupposition of a previous determination through ideal activity. Again: yearning is not thought or represented, but felt, as the limited impulse to produce reality. And thus it appears bow in feeling an impulse to go outward, hence the presentiment of an external world, may manifest itself; for feeling is modified by ideal activity, which is free from all limitation. Here it also appears how a theoretical function of the Ego can relate back to its practical power, which had to be shown as possible if a rational being was ever to become a complete whole.
The feeling does not depend upon us, because it depends upon a limitation, and the Ego can not THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, $2$ limit itself. Now, an opposite feeling is to arise. The question is: will the external condition, under ivhich alone such a feeling is possible, arise also? It must arise; for, if it does not, the Ego has no determined feeling, hence feels nothing at all, and hence, does not live, and is no Ego.
The feeling of an opposite is the condition of a satisfaction of the impulse, hence yearning is the impulse for a cJiange of feelings. The yearned for object is now determined, but merely as this, that it is to be another feeling.
Now, the Ego can not feel two feelings together, can not be limited in C and not limited in C at the same time. The other condition can, therefore, not be felt as another. It can, therefore, only be con templated as another feeling, an opposite to the previous one. Hence, in the Ego contemplation and feeling are always together, and both are syn thetically united in one and the same point Again: the ideal activity can not replace or cre ate a feeling; it can, therefore, determine its object only by this, that it is not the felt object, that all determinations except those of feeling may be pre- • dicated of it. Thus the thing always remains only negatively determined for the ideal activity, and the felt also undetermined. It is an infinitely con tinued negative determining.
ILLUSTRATION.
What is sweet f You determine it, it is some thing not related to seeing, hearing, etc., but to 324 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, taste. But what is taste? That you can only know by experience, and can recall it by imagination only negatively, that is, in a synthesis of all tliat is not taste. Again, sweet is not sour, not bitter; and thus you can go on and count up all the known determina tions of taste. But, however many you may count, s.n infinite variety of possible new determinations which are not sweet remain.
The only remaining question is, How does the ideal activity ascertain that the feeling has changed for another? Evidently, through the satisfaction of yearning, through a feeling of satisfaction. But let us examine this closer.
THE FEELINGS THEMSELVES MUST BE POSITED AS OPPOSITES.
Through ideal activity the Ego is to oppose an object Y to the object X; it is to posit itself as changed. But it posits Y only by virtue of a feel ing, and of another feeling than that which posit ed X.
The ideal activity is altogether self-dependent, not dependent upon feeling. But if only the feel ing, X, is in the Ego, then the ideal activity can not limit the object, X, can not say ivJiat it is, can not characterize. Hence, another feeling, =Yf must arise in the Ego, whereby the ideal activity can now characterize X, that is, oppose X to a de termined Y. The change of feeling must, there fore, have an influence upon the ideal activity. How can this be?
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, The feelings themselves are different feelings for an outside observer, but they are to be different for the Ego itself; that is, they are to be posited as different Positing is done by ideal activity. Both feelings must, therefore, be posited to make the positing of each possible; they must be syntheti cally united, but also opposed.
How, then, is a feeling posited? How are feel ings synthetically united through positing? How are they posited as opposites?
A feeling is posited through ideal activity. The Ego, without self-consciousness, reflects upon a limitation of its impulse. From this arises a self- feeling. It again reflects upon this reflection, or posits itself in it as the determining and determined together. Thus, feeling itself becomes an ideal act, since ideal activity is transferred into feeling. The Ego feels, or, more correctly, has a sensation of something, that is, of matter. Through this reflec tion upon feeling, feeling changes into sensation.
Feelings are synthetically united through ideal positing. And their synthetical ground of union is this, that, without reflecting upon both, ncitJier can be reflected upon as a feeling. When two feel ings are related so as to limit and determine each other mutually, you can not reflect upon one with out reflecting upon the other.
But if they are to be thus related, there must be, in each feeling, something suggestive of the other. And such a relation we have already indeed dis covered, namely, a feeling connected with a yearn- 326 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
ing, that is, with a desire for a cJuingc. If this yearning is to be fully determined, the other, the yearned for feeling, must be shown up. Such an other feeling we have also already postulated. The same may determine in itself the Ego in whatever manner; but, in so far as it is the yearned for feel ing, it must be related to the former feeling, to the yearning, and must, in so far, be accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction. The feeling of yearning can not be posited without a satisfaction for which it yearns; and the satisfaction can not be posited without presupposing a yearning which is being satisfied. The limit is where yearning ceases and satisfaction commences.
How does this satisfaction manifest itself in feel ing? Yearning arose from an impossibility of de termining, because the limitation was lacking. Hence, in yearning, ideal activity and impulse to produce reality were synthetically united. Now, as soon as another feeling arises: 1st The required determining becomes possible, and hence, occurs really; and, 2d. From its actual occurrence follows another feeling. (In feeling itself, as limitation, there is and can be no distinction. But from the fact that something becomes possible, which was not possible without a change of feeling, it follows that the con dition of the feeling has undergone a changed 3d, By its actual occurrence impulse and act are one and the same; the determination which the impulse requires is now possible, and really occurs.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, The Ego reflects upon this feeling, and upon itself in this feeling, as the determining and determined together, as completely united with itself and such a determination of feeling may be called approval. The feeling is accompanied by approval.
But the Ego can not posit this harmony of im pulse and act without positing their distinction, or something wherein they are opposites. Such is the previous feeling, which is, therefore, necessarily accompanied by disapproval, (by a manifestation of disharmony between the impulse and the act) Not every yearning is necessarily accompanied by disapproval; but, when it has been satisfied, disap proval of the previous feeling necessarily arises, and that previous feeling now appears insipid, ab surd.
The objects X and Y, which are posited through ideal activity, are now determined not merely as opposites, but also by the predicates of approval and disapproval. And thus you can go on and determine infinitely; and all the internal determi nations of things, (determinations related to feel ing,) are nothing but degrees of approval and dis approval.
But this harmony or disharmony, approval or disapproval, which consists as yet only for an out side observer, must become/tr the Ego itself, must be posited by it Whatsoever is to be ideally posited, or to be felt, must be connected with an impulse; nothing is in the Ego without impulse.
328 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
We must show up, therefore, an impulse in the Ego which tends to produce that harmony.
Harmonious is that which may be regarded reci procally as the determined and determining. But here the harmonious is not to be a unit, but a two fold; and hence the relation must be thus: A must be in itself both the determined and determining; and so likewise must B. But both must have still another determination, (the determination of Jwjafar^) in regard to which A is posited as the de termining, if B is posited as the determined, and vice versa.
An impulse to produce such a harmony lies in the impulse of reciprocal determination. The Ego determines X through Y, and vice versa. Examine this act of the Ego, and you will find that in both determinations each act is determined through the other, for the object of each is determined through the other.
This impulse may be called the impulse of recip rocal determination of the Ego through itself; or the impulse to produce absolute unity and comple tion of the Ego in itsel£ REMARK.
(We have now completed the whole circle. First ly, Impulse to determine the Ego. Secondly, Im pulse through it to determine the Non-Ego; and — since the Non-Ego is a manifold, and since, there fore, no particular of the manifold can be in itself completely determined — impulse to determine the THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 329 Non-Ego through reciprocity or change; finally, impulse of the Ego to determine itself through it self by means of that change. This is, therefore, a reciprocal determination of the Ego and Non-Ego, which, by virtue of the unity of the subject, must change into a reciprocal determination of the Ego through itself. And thus the completeness of our deduction of the chief impulses of the Ego is at tested by the return into itself of the circle.)
The harmonious, the reciprocally through itself determined, is to be impulse and act Each is to be viewed as determined and determining together.
An impulse of this character (that is, determined and determining) would be an impulse which abso lutely produced itself, an absolute impulse, an im pulse for the sake of the impulse. (This is con science, the absolute circle, impelling without high er ground. Expressed as a law, it is the absolute law, or categorical imperative, tliou skaltf) The Widetermincdness of this impulse is clearly visible; for it impels without object, is merely formal. An act of this character (that is, determined and deter mining) would be an act which is done simply be cause it is done, with absolute self-determination and freedom. The whole ground, and all the con ditions of acting, are in the acting. The undeter mined here is also clear enough; for there is no act possible without object, and the act can not give its own object The relation between both impulse and act is to 33O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
be that of reciprocal determination. Such a rela tion requires, first of all, that the act may be re garded as produced by the impulse.
The act is to be absolutely free, hence not at all irresistibly determined, even not through the im pulse. But this does not prevent the act from having a characteristic, by virtue of which it may be recognized as determined or not determined through the impulse. The relation also requires that the impulse may be posited as determined through the act In the Ego there can be no opposites together. But impulse and act are here opposites. As sure, therefore, as the act arises, the impulse is broken off or limited. And thus arises a feeling. The act takes the possible ground of this feeling, and posits or realizes it Now, if the act is determined through the im pulse, then it follows that tlic object is also deter mined through the impulse. The impulse is now (idcaliter) determinable through the act; that is, it may be characterized as having been directed upon this act.
Hence results harmony, and there arises a feel ing of approval, which is here a feeling of satisfac tion, of complete fulfillment. (But this satisfaction lasts only a moment, since yearning returns.) But if the act is not determined through the impulse, then the object is in opposition to the impulse, and there arises a feeling of disapproval, of dissatisfac tion, of self-diremption of the subject. The impulse THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 331 in this case is also determinable through the act, but negatively; it was not an impulse directed upon this act.
The act whereof we speak here is, as ever, a mere ideal act, through representation. All our sensuous causality in the sensuous world, which we believe in, also only appertains to us mediately through representation.
THE DIGNITY OF MAN.
Speech delivered by Fichtc at the close of tht forego ing Scries of Lectures on the Scioice of Know ledge.
We have completed the survey of the human mind; we have created a foundation, upon which a scientific system, as the correct representation of the original system in man, may be built In conclusion, let us take a glance at the whole.
Philosophy teaches us to look for every thing in knowledge — in the Ego. Only through it is order and harmony brought into the dead, formless mat ter. From man alone does regularity proceed, and extend around him to the boundary of his percep tion; and in proportion as he extends this boun dary are order and harmony also extended. His observation marks out for each object of the infinite diversity its proper place, so that no one may crowd out the other, and brings unity into this infinite 332 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
•variety. By his observations are the heavenly bo- •dies kept together, and form but one organized body; by it the suns move in their appointed •courses. Through reason there arises the immense gradation from the worm to the seraph; in it is hidden the system of the whole spirit-world; and .man expects justly that the law, which he gives it and himself, shall be applicable to it; expects justly the future universal acknowledgment of that law. In reason we have the sure guarantee that from it there will proceed, in infinite development, order and harmony, where at present none yet exists; that .the culture of the universe will progress simulta neously with the advancing culture of mankind. All that is still unshaped and orderless will, through man, develop into the most beautiful order, and that which is already harmonious will become ever more harmonious, according to laws not yet deve loped. Man will extend order into the shapeless mass, and a plan into universal chaos; through him will corruption form a new creation, and death call to another glorious life.
Such is man, if we merely view him as an ob serving intelligence; how much greater if we think, him as a practical, active faculty? Not only does he apply the necessary order to existing things. He gives them also that order which he selected voluntarily, wherever his footsteps led him. Na ture awakens wherever his eyes are cast; she pre pares herself to receive from him the new, brighter •creation. Even his body is the most spiritualized THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 333 that could be formed from the matter surrounding h-m In his atmosphere the air becomes softer, the climate milder, and nature assumes a brighter smile from the expectation to be changed by him into a d«refling-place and a nurse of living beings. Man commands coarse matter to organize itself accord ing to his ideal, and to furnish him the substance \rnich he needs. What was formerly dead and coid arises at his command from the earth into the Etxirishing corn, the refreshing fruit, and the ani- razting grape, and will arise into other things as soon as he shall command otherwise. In his sphere lae animals become ennobled, cast aside under his intelligent eye their primitive wildness, and receive healthier nourishment from the hand of their mas ter, which they repay by willing obedience.
Still more: around man souls become ennobled; tae more a man is a man the more deeply and ex tensively does he influence men; whatsoever car ries the stamp of pure humanity will never be mis apprehended by mankind; every human mind, every human heart opens to each pure outflow of fcirmanity. Around the nobler man his fellow- beings form a circle, in which he approaches near est to the centre who has the greatest humanity. Their souls strive and labor to unite with each other to form but one soul in many bodies. All are one reason and one will, and appear as co-labor ers in the great, only possible destination of man kind. The higher man draws by force his age upon a higher step of humanity; the age looks 334 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
back and is astonished at the gap over which it has leaped; the higher man tears with giant arms whatever he can seize from the year-book of the human race.
Break the hut of clay in which he lives! In his being he is independent of all that is outward; he is simply through himself; and even in that hut of clay he is occasionally, in the hours of his exalta tion, seized with a knowledge of this his real exist ence; in those hours, when time and space and every thing that is not himself vanish, when his soul tears itself by force from his body — returning to it afterward voluntarily in order to carry out those designs, which it would like to carry out yet by means of that body. Separate the two last neighboring atoms, which at present surround him, and he will still be; and he will be, because it will be his will to be. He is eternal through himself, and by his own power.
Oppose, frustrate his plans! You may delay them; but what are thousand and thousand times thousand years in the year-book of mankind? — a light morning dream when we awake. He conti nues and he continues to act, and that which ap pears to you as his disappearance is but an exten sion of his sphere; what you look upon as death is but ripening for a higher life. The colors of his plans, and the outward forms of them may vanish to him, but his plan remains the same, and in every moment of his existence he tears something from the outward into his own circle; and he will con- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 335 tinue thus to tear unto himself until he has devour ed every thing; until all matter shall bear the im press of his influence, a.nt7. all spirits shall form one spirit with his spirit.
Such is man; such is every one who can say to himself: I am man. Should he not then carry within him a holy self-reverence, and shudder and tremble at his own majesty? Such is every one who can say to me: I am. Wherever thou mayest live, thou, who carryest but a human face; whether thou plantest sugar-cane under the rod of the over seer, as yet scarcely distinguishable from the brute creation; or whether thou warmest thyself on the shores of the Fireland at the flame, which thou didst not kindle, until it expires, and weepest bit terly because it will not keep burning by itself; or whether thou appearest to me the most miserable and degraded villain, thou art, nevertheless, what I am; for thou canst say to me: I am. Thou art, nevertheless, my comrade and my brother. Ah! at one time surely I also stood on that step of humanity on which thou now standest — for it is a step of humanity, and there is no gap in the deve lopment of its members — perhaps without the faculty of clear consciousness, perhaps hurrying over it so quickly that I had not time to become conscious of my condition; but I certainly stood there also at one time— and thou wilt also stand certainly at some time, even though it lasted million and million times million years — for what is time? '—upon the same step on which I now stand; and 336 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
thou wilt surely at some time stand upon a step, where I can influence thee and thou me. Thou also wilt at some time be drawn into my circle, and wilt draw me into thine. Thee also will I recog nize at some time as my co-laborer in my great plan. Such is to me, who am I, every one, who is I. Should I not tremble at the majesty in the form of man, and at the divinity which resides in the temple that bears his impress, though perhaps concealed in mysterious darkness?
Earth and heaven and time and space, and all the limits of materiality, vanish in my sight at this thought, and should not the individual vanish? I shall not conduct you back to him.
All individuals are included in the one great unity of pure spirit Let this be the last word with which I recommend myself to your remem brance, and the remembrance to which I recom mend myself to you.
RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
THE following fragments have been appended to this work in the hope that they might make more clear certain of its results.
They were occasioned by charges preferred against FlCHTE accusing him of teaching atheism. The clear manner in which these fragments set forth the religious significance of the science of knowledge, determined us to give them this place in the present work.
THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, HE who wishes to understand my doctrine of religion sufficiently to have a competent judgment respecting it, must accurately know, and, as I be lieve, possess the system of transcendental idealism, and the pure moralism inseparably united there with.
I say, must possess it, that is, must occupy the transcendental stand-point. For, so far as I have been able to observe in my experience, though I would not definitely decide upon it, the mere his torical knowledge of that system is not sufficient. For, whenever it is to be concretely applied, it is often forgotten, and those who talk about it as the only truth, suddenly let go their hold of it, and fall back upon the stand-point of realism.
I also say, he who wishes to understand it so as to have a competent judgment respecting it Stu dents may exercise themselves upon all parts of transcendental idealism, and seek to penetrate it 34° THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
from every side; but unless they have compre hended the complete series of grounds, and finished the whole extent of that system, they only under stand it halfway s, or historically. Perhaps they may be attracted by the system, may not find it so very uneven; but they have no decisive judgment respecting it, unless they have fully comprehended it in all its parts.
Add to this the many philosophical presupposi tions from which critics start. Unless the critics first agree with us concerning the fundamental principles, we can not dispute with each other. It is only concerning the deductions that discussions may be entered into.
Was it necessary to remark this with reference to a discussion which has arisen concerning a part of a system which can not be understood except as part of a whole? It seems to me this ought to have occurred naturally to all critics. Or is it rea sonable to pass judgment upon this one part, picked up out of the whole, without the least knowledge of the premises of that one part, or of the termino logy used in its representation, or of the object which is determined by the whole only? Is it fair to place this isolated part into another utterly op posite system, to interpret its language by the meaning of that opposite system, and then — to pass sentence upon it? Or is it fair to complain about indefiniteness, when the simple meaning of the part can not be found, solely because the whole is un known?
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 34* Is it true or not, that the first originators of this discussion had never read any thing from my pen but that single article; much less studied my sys tem? Nay, did they not, in passing judgment upon my system, connect it with utterly different sys tems? Is it, therefore, to be wondered at, that my system has been so vastly misrepresented? But whose fault is it?
What none of my opponents evidently possesses, and yet what alone is decisive in this matter, is a knowledge of the true essence and tendency of cri tical or transcendental philosophy. (Both expres sions here mean the same; for on this point KANT and the better Kantians surely agree with me.) I must again call to mind this tendency of transcen dental philosophy, and would request the philoso phical public to give me no occasion to do so again.
There are two very different stand-points of thinking, that of natural and ordinary thinking, from which objects are immediately thought, and that of so-called artificial thinking, from which thinking itself is thougJit, consciously and purpose ly. The former stand-point is occupied by ordinary life and science, (wat-crialitcr sic dicta;) the latter by transcendental philosophy, which, for that very reason, I have called science of knowledge.
The philosophical systems before Kant did not generally recognize their stand-point truly, and thus wavered between the two. The system of Wolf and Baumgarten, which immediately preceded Kant, placed itself with consciousness, on the stand-point S42 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE,