whether our representation is or is not correct, and of this we can never furnish a strict conclusion, but only a probable proof Our science of knowledge has truth only on the condition and in so far as its representation is a correct one. We are not the legislators of the human mind, but its historians; not newspaper writers, it is true, but pragmatic his tory-writers.
INTRODUCTION. 57 Add to this the circumstance that a system may really be correct as a whole, though its separate parts have not complete evidence. Here and there an incorrect conclusion may have been drawn, sug gestive propositions may have been left out, other propositions which can be proven may have been asserted without proof or established by incorrect proof; and yet the most important results may be correct. This seems impossible; it seems as if a hair-breadth deviation from the straight line would necessarily lead to infinitely increasing deviation; and thus indeed it would be if man had to produce all his knowledge by clear conscious thinking; whereas rather the fundamental genius of reason unconsciously guides him and leads him by new errors from the straight path of his formalitcr and logically correct argument back to the matcrialitcr only correct result, which he would never have reached again had he persisted hi logically carrying out his wrong proposition.
Even, therefore, if a universally valid science of knowledge should be established, the philosophical judgment will still have an infinite field wherein to work its ultimate perfection; it will have to fill up blanks, to make more strict the proofs, and clearer to determine the determinations.
I have two more remarks to add: The science of knowledge presupposes the rules of reflection and abstraction as well known and valid; it must do so necessarily, and need not be ashamed or make a secret of it That science may 58 INTRODUCTION.
58 INTRODUCTION.
express itself and draw conclusions like any other science, it may presuppose all logical rules and ap ply all conceptions which it needs. But these pre suppositions are merely made to make itself intel ligible; hence, without drawing any consequences therefrom. Every thing provable must be proven; with the exception of that first and highest funda mental principle, all propositions must be deduced Hence, for instance, neither the logical proposition of opposition or contradiction, which is the ground of all analysis, nor the logical proposition of the ground, (nothing is opposite which is not related in a third, and nothing is related which is not op posed in a third, the proposition which is the ground of all synthesis,) is deduced from the ab solute first principle, though they are deduced from the two fundamental principles which rest upon it. These two latter principles are also fundamental principles, it is true, but they are not absolute, only part of them is absolute; hence, these fundamental principles as well as the logical propositions which rest upon them need not be proven, but must be deduced. I explain myself clearer.
That which the science of knowledge establishes is a proposition, thought and put into words; that in the human mind which corresponds to it is an act of that mind, which in itself need not be thought at all. Nothing must be presupposed to this act than that without which the act as act would be impossible; and this is not tacitly presupposed, but the science of knowledge has to establish it clearly INTRODUCTION. 59 and distinctly as that without which the act would be impossible. Let the act be, for instance, D, the fourth in the series A, B, C, D; then the act C must be preposited to the act D, and shown as the exclusive condition of the act D; to the act C, again, the act B must be preposited, etc., etc. But the act A, the first act, is absolutely and uncondi tionally possible; and hence nothing is to be pre posited as the condition of its possibility.
The thinking of this act A is, however, a quite different act, which presupposes far more. Suppose this thinking of A to be, in the series of acts about to be established, D, then A, B, and C must neces sarily be presupposed as grounds of its possibility; and since that thinking (of A) is to be the first business of the science of knowledge, A, B, and C must be tacitly presupposed. It is not till you get to D that the presuppositions of the first can be proven; but as soon as you get this proof, you will have presupposed something else. The form of the science is thus always in advance of its con tent; and this is the reason why the science as such can only attain probability. The represented and the representation are in two different series. In the first series nothing is presupposed which is not proven; but for the possibility of the second you always must presuppose what can not be proven till later. The reflection which rules in the whole science of knowledge, in so far as it is a science, is a representing. But from this it does not follow that every thing about which it reflects F 60 INTRODUCTION.
must also be merely a representing. In the science of knowledge the Ego is represented; but from this it does not follow that the Ego is represented as merely representing; for other determinations of the Ego may be discovered in it. The Ego as phi losophizing subject is undoubtedly merely repre senting; but the Ego as object of the philosophizing may be something more. Representing is the highest and absolute first act of the philosopher as such; but the absolute first act of the human mind may well be of another kind. That it will turn out to be so appears probable, in advance of all expe rience, from simply this reason: that the repre sentation may be completely exhausted, and that its acting is altogether necessary, and must, there fore, have a final ground of its necessity, which, as final ground, can have no higher one. A science, therefore, which is erected on the conception of representation, might well be a very useful intro duction to the science, but could not be the science of knowledge itself But this much follows cer tainly from the above, that the collective modes of acting of the intelligence, which the science of knowledge is to exhaust, can be received in con sciousness only in the form of representation; that is to say, only in so far as they are represented FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE WHOLE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
THE I. — FIRST AND ABSOLUTELY UNCONDITIONED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.
WE have to search for the absolute, first, and un conditioned fundamental principle of human know ledge. It can not be proven nor determined if it is to be absolute first principle.
This principle is to express that deed-act which does not occur among the empirical determinations of our consciousness, nor can so occur, since it is rather the basis of all consciousness, and first and alone makes consciousness possible. In represent ing this deed-act it is not so much to be feared that my readers will not think what they ought to think, as that they will think what they ought not to think. This renders necessary a reflection on what may perhaps for the present be taken for that deed-act, and an abstraction from all that does not really belong to it.
Even by means of this abstracting reflection, that deed-act, which is not empirical fact of conscious- 64 TJfE SCIENCE Of KNOWLEDGE.
ness, can not become fact of consciousness; but by means of this abstracting reflection we may recognize so much: that this deed-act must neces sarily be thought as the basis of all consciousness. The laws* according to which this deed-act must necessarily be thought as basis of human know ledge, or, which is the same, the rules according to which that abstracting reflection proceeds, have not yet been proven as valid, but are for the present tacitly presupposed as well-known and agreed upon. As we proceed we shall deduce them from that fun damental principle, the establishment whereof is correct only if they are correct This is a circle, but an unavoidable circle. (See our Introduction, § 7.) And since it is unavoidable and freely ad mitted, it is also allowable to appeal to all the laws of general logic in establishing this highest funda mental principle.
In undertaking this abstracting reflection we must start from some proposition which ever}' one will admit without dispute. Doubtless there are many such. We choose the one which seems to us to open the shortest road to our purpose.
In admitting this proposition, the deed-act, which we intend to make the basis of our whole science of knowledge, must be admitted; and the reflec tion must show that this deed-act is admitted the moment that proposition is admitted.
Our course of proceeding in this reflection is as • The laws of general logic THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 6$ follows: Any fact of empirical consciousness, ad mitted as such valid proposition, is taken hold of, and from it we separate one of its empirical deter minations after the other, until only that remains, which can no longer be separated and abstracted from.
As such admitted proposition we take this one: A is A.
Every one admits this proposition, and without the least hesitation. It is recognized by all as com pletely certain and evident If any one should ask a proof of its certainty, no one would enter upon such a proof, but would say: This proposition is absolutely (that is, without any further ground) certain; and by saying this would ascribe to himself the power si absolutely po siting something.
In insisting on the in itself certainty of the above proposition, you posit not that A is. The proposi tion A is A is by no means equivalent to A is. (Being when posited without predicate is something quite different from being when posited with a pre dicate.) Let us suppose A to signify a space in closed within two straight lines, then the proposi tion A is A would still be correct; although the proposition A is would be false, since such a space is impossible.
But you posit by that proposition: If A. is, then A is. The question vuJicthcr A is at all or not, does not, therefore, occur in it The content of the propo sition is not regarded at all: merely its/<?n«. The 66 THE SCIENCE Of KNOWLEDGE.
question is not whereof you know, but -what you know of any given subject. The only thing posit ed, therefore, by that proposition is the absolutely necessary connection between the two As. This connection we will call X.
In regard to A itself nothing has as yet been posited. The question, therefore, arises: Under what condition is A?
X at least is in the Ego, and posited through the Ego, for it is the Ego which asserts the above proposition, and so asserts it by virtue of X as a law, which X or law must, therefore, be given to the Ego; and, since it is asserted absolutely, and without fur ther ground, must be given to the Ego through it self.
Whctlicr and hoiv A is posited we do not know; but since X is to designate a connection between an unknown positing of A (of the first A in the propo sition A is A) and a positing of the same A, which latter positing is absolute on condition of the first positing, it follows that A, at least in so far as that connection is posited, is posited in and through the Ego, like X. Proof: X is'only possible in relation to an A; now X is really posited in the~Ego; hence, also, A must be posited in the Ego, in so far as X is related to it.
X is related to that A, in the above proposition, which occupies the logical position of subject, and also to that A which is the predicate, for both are united by X. Both, therefore, are posited in the Ego, in so far as they arc posited; and the A of the predi- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 67 cate is posited absolutely if the first one is posited. Hence, the above proposition may be also express ed: If A is posited in the Ego, then it is posited, or then it is.
Hence, by means of X, the Ego posits: that A if absolutely for the asserting Ego, and is simply be cause it is posited in the Ego; or that there is something in the Ego which always remains the same, and is thus able to connect or posit; and hence the absolutely posited X may also be ex pressed, Ego=Ego, or I am I.
Thus we have already arrived at the proposition 7 am; not as expression of a deed-act, it is true, but, at least, as expression of a. fact.
For X is absolutely posited; this is a fact of empirical consciousness, as shown by the admitted proposition. Now, X signifies the same as I am I; hence, this proposition is also absolutely posited.
Eut Ego is Ego, or I am I, has quite another sig nificance than A is A. For the latter proposition had content only on a certain condition, namely, if A is posited. But the proposition I am I is uncon ditionally and absolutely valid, since it is the same as X; it is valid not only in form, but also in con tent. In it the Ego is posited not on condition, but absolutely, with the predicate of self-equality; hence, it is posited, and the proposition may also be expressed, I am.
This proposition, / am, is as yet only founded upon a fact, and has no other validity than that of a fact. If "A=A" (or X) is to be certain, then 68 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
" I am " must also be certain. Now, it is fact of empirical consciousness that we are compelled to regard X as absolutely certain; hence, also," I am" is certain, since it is the ground of the X. It fol lows from this, that the ground of explanation of all facts of empirical consciousness is this: before all positing, the Ego must be posited tlirough itself.
(I say of all facts; and to prove this I must show that X is the highest fact of empirical conscious ness, is the basis of all others, and contained in all other facts; which, perhaps, would be admitted by all men without proof, although the whole science of knowledge busies itself to prove it) The proposition A=A is asserted. But all as serting is an act of the human mind; for it has all the conditions of such an act in empirical con sciousness, which must be presupposed as well known and admitted in order to advance our re flection. Now, this act is based on something which has no higher ground, namely, X or I am.
Hence, that which is absolutely posited and in it self grounded is the ground of a certain (we shall see hereafter of all) acting of the human mind; hence its pure character; the pure character of activity in itself, altogether abstracting from its par ticular empirical conditions.
The positing of the Ego through itself is, there fore, the pure activity of the Ego. The "Ego posits itself; and the Ego is by virtue of this its mere self- positing. Again, vice versa: the Ego is and posits its being, by virtue of its mere being. It is both THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 69 the acting and the product of the act; the active and the result of the activity; deed and act in one; and hence the I am is expressive of a deed-act; and of the only possible deed-act, as our science of knowledge must show.
Let us again consider the proposition / am I, The Ego is absolutely posited. Let us assume that the first Ego of this proposition (which has the position of formal subject) is the absolutely posi ted Ego, and that the second Ego (that of the pre dicate) is the being Ego; then the absolutely valid assertion that both are one signifies: the Ego is, because it has posited itsel£ (This is, indeed, the case according to the logical form of the proposition. In A=A the first A is that which is posited in the Ego, (either absolutely, like the Ego itself, or conditionally, like any non- Ego;) and in this positing of A the Ego is abso lute subject; and hence the first A is also called the subject. But the second A designates that which the Ego, in now making itself the object of its own reflection, discovers thus as posited in itself, (since it has just before itself posited the A in itself.) The Ego, in asserting that proposition A=A, predicates in truth not something of A, but of itself, namely, that it has found an A posited in itself; and hence the second A is called predicate.) The Ego in the former and the Ego in the latter significance are to be absolutely equal. Hence, the above proposition may be turned around, and then it reads: The Ego posits itself simply because it is.
7O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
It posits itself through its mere being, and is through its mere being posited.
This, then, will explain clearly in what signifi cance we here use the word Ego, (I,) and will lead us to a definite explanation of the Ego as absolute subject. The Ego as absolute subject is tJiat, tJu being (essence) whereof consists merely in positing itself as being. As soon as it posits itself, it is; and as soon as it is, it posits itself; and hence the Ego is for the Ego absolute and necessary. What soever is not for itself is not an Ego.
Illustration.
Illustration.
The question has been asked, What was I before I became self-conscious? The answer is, / was not at all, for I was not I. The Ego is only, in so far as it is conscious of itself. The possibility of that question is grounded upon a mixing up of the Ego as subject, and the Ego as object of the reflection of the absolute subject; and is in itself altogether improper. The Ego represents itself, and in so far takes itself up in the form of representation, and now first becomes a somewhat, that is, an object Consciousness receives in this form of representa tion a substrate, which is, even without the real consciousness, and which, moreover, is thought bodily. Such a condition is thought, and the ques tion asked, What was the Ego at that time? that is, what is the substrate of consciousness? But even in this thought you unconsciously add in thinking the absolute subject as looking at that sub- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 7 1 strata; and hence you unconsciously add in thought the very thing whereof you wanted to abstract, and thus you contradict yourself The truth is, you can not think any thing at all without adding in thought your Ego as self-conscious; you can not abstract from your self-consciousness; and sll questions of the above kind are not to be an swered, since, maturely considered, they can not be asked.
If the Ego is only in so far as it posits itself, then it also is only for the positing, and posits only for the being Ego. The Ego is for iJic Ego; but if it posits itself absolutely, as it is, then it posits itself necessarily, and is necessary for the Ego. / am enly for me; but for me I am necessarily. (By saying for me, I already posit my being.)
To posit itself and to be is, applied to the Ego, the same. Hence, the proposition I am because I have posited myself, can also be expressed: I am absolutely because I am.
Again, the Ego as positing itself and the Ego as being are one and the same. The Ego is as ivliat it posits itself, and posits itself as what it is. Hence, / am absolutely ivJiat I am.
The immediate expression of the thus developed deed-act may be given in the following formula: / cm absolutely because I am, and J am absolutely wJiat I am for myself.
If this narration of the original deed-act is to be placed at the head of a science of knowledge 72 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
as its highest fundamental principle, it may perhaps be best expressed thus: THE EGO POSITS ORIGINALLY ITS OWN BEING.
(In other words, the Ego is necessarily identity of subject and object; is itself subject-object; and it is this without further mediation.)
We started from the proposition A=A, not as if the proposition, I am, could be proven by it, but be cause we had to start from some one certain propo sition, given in empirical consciousness. And our development, also, has shown that A=A does not contain the ground of " I am," but, on the contrary, that the latter proposition is the ground of the former.
By abstracting from the content of the proposi tion I am, and looking merely to its form, namely, the form of drawing a conclusion from the being posited of something to its being, as we must ab stract for the sake of logic, we thus obtain as fun damental priwiple of logic the proposition A=A, which can only be proven and determined through the science of knowledge. Proven: for A is A be cause the Ego which has. posited A is the same as the Ego in which A is posited. Determined: for whatever is, is only in so far as it is posited in the Ego, and there is nothing outside of the Ego. No possible A (no thing] can be any thing else but an A posited in the Ego.
By abstracting, moreover, from all asserting as a determined acting, and looking merely to the gene ral wanner of acting of the human mind, which is THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 73 given through that form, we obtain the category of reality. Every thing to which the proposition A=A is applicable has reality, in so far as tliat proposition is applicable to it. That which is posited through the mere positing of any thing (in the Ego) is its reality, its essence, Remarks.
Remarks.
Kant, in his deduction of the -categories, has hint ed at our proposition as absolute fundamental prin ciple of all knowledge; but he has never definitely established it as fundamental principle. Before Kant, Descartes has suggested a similar one, Cogito, ergo sum; which, however, is not necessarily the minor and conclusion of a syllogism, of which the major would have to be, Quodcunquc cogitat, est; but which he may also have viewed as immediate fact of consciousness. In that case it would signify, Cogitans su?n, ergo sum, (or, as we should say, Sum, frgo sitm.} But in that case the word cogitans is completely superfluous; you do not think necessa rily when you arc, but you are necessarily when you think Thinking is not the essence, but merely a particular determination of the Ego; and there are many other determinations of the Ego.
Reinhold speaks of representation, and his fun damental principle would read in the Cartesian form, Rcpr&scnto, ergo sum; or, more correctly, Repra;scn- tans sum, ergo sum. He goes considerably further than Descartes, but not far enough; for representa- 74 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
tion, also* is not the essence of the Ego, but merely a particular determination of the Ego; and there are many other determinations of the Ego, although thcy^ certainly must pass tJirough t/ie medium of rep- ~cscntation in order to enter empirical consciousness.
Spinoza, on the other hand, goes beyond our proposition in its established significance. He does not deny the unity of empirical consciousness, but he utterly denies its pure consciousness. According to him the whole series of representations of a sin gle empirical subject is related to the only one pure subject, as a single representation is related to the whole series. In his view the Ego (that is, that which he calls his Ego, or which I call my Ego) is not absolutely because it is, but because something- else is. True, he considers the Ego to be Ego for the Ego; but he asks what it may be for something outside of the Ego. Such an " outside of the Ego" would also be an Ego, of which the posited Ego (for instance, my Ego) and all possible Egos would be modifications. He separates the pure and the empirical consciousness. The first he posits in God, who never becomes self-conscious, since pure con sciousness never attains consciousness; the latter he posits in the particular modifications of the God head. His system, thus established, is perfectly logical and not to be refuted, because he has entered a sphere where reason can not follow him; but his system is also groundless, for what justified him in going beyond the pure consciousness given in empirical consciousness?
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 75 § 2. SECOND, AND IN REGARD TO ITS CONTENT, CONDITIONED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.
For the same reason why the first fundamental principle could not be proven or deduced, the sec ond, also, can not be proven. Hence, we here, also, proceed from a fact of empirical consciousness in the same manner.
The proposition not A is not A will doubtless be recognized by every one as certain, and it is scarce ly to be expected that any one will ask for its proof If, however, such a proof were possible, it must in our system be deduced from the proposition A=A.
But such a proof is impossible. For let us as sume, at the utmost, that the above proposition is the same as — A is — A, (and hence that — A is equal to some Y posited in the Ego,) and that for this reason our proposition signifies now: r/"the opposite of A is posited, then it is posited; still we should only have the same connection posited (X) which we obtain ed in our § I, and our proposition, — A is not A, in stead of being derived from A=^=A, would, after all, be only the very same proposition. The chief question, Is the opposite of A posited, and under what condition of fain of mere acting is it posited? is altogether ignored. If our second proposition were a derived one, then this condition of the form of acting would have to be derived from the propo sition A=A. But how can the proposition A=A, o •5 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
which involves only the form of positing, also in volve the form of oppositing? Hence, that form of acting, the oppositing, is posited absolutely, and with no attached condition. — A is posited as such simply because it is posited.