Again, / think is, firstly, an expression of activity; the Ego is posited as thinking, and in so far as ac tive. It is also an expression of negation, of pas sivity; for thinking is a particular determination of the Ego, and the conception thereof excludes all other determinations. Hence, the conception of thinking is opposed to itself; it signifies an activity when related to the thought object, and a passi vity when related to the Ego generally, for the Ego must be limited if thinking is to be possible.
Every1 possible predicate of the Ego signifies a limitation tlicrcof. The subject Ego is the abso lutely active, or self-positing. Through the predi cate, I think, I represent, etc., this activity is in cluded in a determined sphere, It is now clear enough how the Ego can deter- IlS THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, mine through its activity its passivity, and how it can be both active and passive together. It deter mines itself, is the determining, the active, in so far as through absolute spontaneity it posits itself in one of all the spheres contained in the totality of its reality; and in so far as we reflect merely on this its absolute positing itself into the sphere, and not on the limit of the sphere.
Jt is determined, passive, in so far as we look upon it merely as posited in this limited sphere, abstract ing from the spontaneity of the positing. We have found the original synthetical act of the Ego, where by our contradiction has been solved; and through it we have discovered a new synthetical conception which we have still to examine a little closer. Like the above conception of causality, it is a closer determined reciprocal determination; and we shall obtain in both conceptions the completest insight by comparing them with each other.
According to the rules of general determination, both conceptions, that of causality and our new one, must be, ist, Equal to reciprocal determina tion; 2d, Opposed to it; 3d, Equal to each other; and, 4th, Opposed to each other.
They are equal to reciprocal determination in this, that in them, as in it, activity is determined through passivity, or reality through negation, and vice versa.
Opposed to it in this, that, whereas by the con ception of reciprocal determination a reciprocity is only posited, but not determined, these two concep- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 1 19 tions determine the order of the reciprocity, and fix the rule by which to go from reality to negation, or vice "versa.
Equal to each other, because in both conceptions the order is fixed.
Opposed to each other in regard to the order of the reciprocity. In the conception of causality, ac tivity is determined through passivity; in our pre sent conception, passivity is determined through activity.
In so far as the Ego is regarded as embracing the whole absolutely determined sphere of all real ities, it is substance. In so far as the Ego is posited in a not absolutely determined sphere, (how such a sphere may, nevertheless, be determined, we shall not investigate at present,) in so far the Ego is ac cidental; or, there is an accidence in the Ego. The limit, which separates acts of this particular sphere from the whole sphere, is that which makes the ac cidence accidence, or is the ground of distinction, between substance and accidence. This limit is in the whole sphere. Hence, the accidence is in and belonging to the substance; it excludes something from the whole sphere. Hence, the accidence is not substance.
No substance is thinkable without relation to an accidence; for only through the positing of possible spheres within the absolute sphere does the Ego become substance; only through possible accidences do realities arise; for otherwise the reality would be simply one. The realities of the Ego are its I2O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
modes of acting; the Ego is substance, therefore, in so far as all its possible modes of acting (all its possible modes of being) are posited in it No accidence is thinkable without substance; for, to know something as a determined reality, it must be related to reality in gaicral.
The substance is all reciprocity, (interchange,) thought in general; the accidence, a determined in- tcrclianging ii>ith another.
Originally there is only one substance, the Ego, In it are posited all possible accidences, hence all possible realities. How several accidences, having some f articular characteristic in common, may be comprehended together, and be themselves thought as substances, the accidences whereof are again mutually determined through the difference of those characteristics — this we shall see hereafter.
The conception here established is called the conception of Sztbstantiality. • In the development of this conception we have left altogether unnoticed, ist, That activity of the Ego whereby it distinguishes and relates itself as substance and accidence; and secondly, That which induces the Ego to undertake this act (The lat ter, we ma}' suppose from our first synthesis, will show itself to be induced by the Non-Ego.) Hence, as in ever}- synthesis, ever)' thing is properly unit ed and connected in the centre; but the two end- points are left unconnected.
This remark shows us again, from a new side, the method of our science. We must always continue THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 121 to connect the opposites by central links; but this does not completely solve the contradiction, and only removes it further from us. True, by a new central link we remove the contradiction last shown up; but, in order to remove it, we have been forced to assume new end-points, which are again oppo sites, and must again be united.
The true and highest problem to be solved is this: How can the Ego and the Non-Ego imme diately determine each other, since they are both complete opposites?
We place some X between them, upon which both may direct their causality, and thus, at least indirectly, influence each other. But we soon dis cover that in this X there must also be a point somewhere in which the Ego and Non-Ego imme diately connect. To prevent this, we interpose a new link = Y. But we soon discover that in Y also there must be a point" wherein the opposites immediately connect. And in this way we should continue infinitely, if reason did not interpose its absolute assertion- — which the philosopher does not create, but simply show up. There shall be no Non-Ego! The Ego shall be absolutely self-de termined! Whereby the knot is not untied, but cut to pieces.
Or, in so far as the Ego is limited by the Non- Ego, it is finite; but in itself, as posited through its own absolute activity, it is infinite. These two, infinity and finity, are to be united in the Ego. But such a uniting is in itself impossible. For a 122 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
long time we allay the conflict through mediation; the infinite limits the finite. But finally, when the complete impossibility of the uniting is seen, finity must be altogether canceled; all limits must vanish, and the infinite Ego must remain alone as the one and as all.
Example.
Posit in space = A, in the point m, light; and in the point n, darkness. Now, since space is continuous, and since there is no hiatus between m and n, there must be between both points some where a point o, which point is both light and darkness. But this is a contradiction. Hence, you place between both a connecting link, dimness. Let this extend from p to q, and dimness will be limited by light in p, and by darkness in q. But thereby you have not solved the contradiction; for dimness is mixture of light and darkness. Now, light and darkness can limit each other in p only, if p is both light and dimness together; and since dimness is distinguished from light only in this, that it is also darkness, p must be both light and darkness together. So likewise in the point q. The contradiction can, therefore, be only solved thus: Light and darkness are not at all opposites, but are merely to be distinguished in degrees. Darkness is only a very small quantity of light.
It is precisely thus with the Ego and the Non- Ego.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 1 23 D.
SYNTHESIS OF THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE TWO DISCOVERED MODES OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINA TION, CAUSALITY AND SUBSTANTIALITY.
The Ego posits itself as determined through tJu Non-Ego; this was the chief synthesis from which we started, and which could not be canceled with out canceling the unity of consciousness. It in volved, however, contradictions; and these we had to solve. First arose the question: How can the Ego both determine and be determined? By means of the conception of reciprocal determination we were enabled to say, to determine and to be deter mined is one and the same; by positing a quantum of negation in itself, the Ego posits the same quan tum of reality in the Non-Ego, and vice versa. But the question remained: In which is reality to be posited, in the Ego or in the Non-Ego?
By means of the conception of causality we were enabled to say, negation or passivity must be posit ed in the Ego; and hence the same quantum of reality or activity is posited in the Non-Ego. Then the question arose: But how can passivity be posit ed in the Ego?
Finally, by means of the conception of substan tiality we were enabled to say, passivity and activity in the Ego is one and the same; for passivity is only a smaller quantum of activity.
But these answers have inclosed us in a circle.
K 124 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, If the Ego posits a smaller degree of activity in itself, then, of course, it posits passivity in itself, and activity in the Non-Ego. But the Ego can not have the power to absolutely posit a lower degree of activity in itself, since, according to the concep tion of substantiality, it posits all activity and noth ing but activity in itsell Hence, the positing of a lower degree of activity must be preceded by an activity of the Non-Ego, which must have first really canceled a part of the activity of the Ego. But this is equally impossible, since, according to the conception of causality, activity can be ascribed to the Non-Ego only in so far as a passivity is po sited in the Ego.
In other words, under the conception of causality alone, it is well conceivable how an outside observer could ascribe activity to the Non-Ego; but not how the Ego itself could ascribe the cause of its passivity to the activity of the Non-Ego. The Ego might be determined, but could never posit itself as determined; for the passivity in the Ego would b? merely posited in the Ego, but not posited in the Ego/rr itself.
On the other hand, under the conception of sub stantiality, even supposing the Ego to have the power of absolutely limiting itself independently of any Non-Ego, and, moreover, the power of be coming conscious of this limitation; what warrant would the Ego have to refer its limitation to a Non- Ego? To assume a Non-Ego as cause of the limi tation? None at all; on the contrary, it would re- • THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 12$ gard itself as the cause thereof Hence, the Ego would be determined, but not determined through MLC Non-Ego.
Both conceptions in their separateness, therefore, do not explain what is to be explained, and the con tradiction remains: If the Ego posits itself as de termined, it is not determined through the Non- Ego; and if it is determined through the Non-Ego, it does not posit itself as determined.
Let us now establish this contradiction more definitely: The Ego can not posit itself as passive without positing activity in the Non-Ego; but it can not posit activity in the Non-Ego without positing pas sivity in itseK Hence, it can do neither alone.
Result: 1. The Ego does not posit passivity in itself, in so far as it posits activity in the Non-Ego, and vice 'versa; it, therefore, does not posit at all (Not the condition is denied, but the conditioned; not the rule of reciprocal determination generally, but its application to the present instance.)
2. But the Ego is to posit passivity in itself, and in so far activity in the Non-Ego, and vice versa.
The one proposition denies what the second one affirms; they are, therefore, related like negation and reality. These are united through quantity. Both propositions must be valid, hence they must be valid each only in part. Hence: The Ego posits partly passivity in itself, in so far af it posits activity in the Non-Ego; but it posits 126 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
partly not passivity in itself, in so far as it posits activity in the Ego, and vice versa.
The Ego posits partly passivity and partly not passivity in the Non-Ego, in so far as it posits ac tivity in the Ego.
That is to say, an activity is posited in the Ego, to which no passivity in the Non-Ego corresponds; and an activity in the Non-Ego, to which no passi vity in the Ego corresponds. Let us call this sort of activity independent activity. But such an inde pendent activity in the Ego and Non-Ego contra dicts the law of oppositing, which has now been closer determined by the law of reciprocal determi nation; hence it contradicts chiefly the conception of reciprocal determination, which rules in our pre sent investigation. For that conception says: All activity in the Ego determines a passivity of the Non-Ego, and vice versa; and our new result estab lishes an independent activity in the Ego, which does not determine a passivity in the Non-Ego, and vice versa.
But both results must be valid. Hence, they must be united in quantity. Both must be vaKd only in part. The conception of reciprocal deter mination is to be valid only in part, that is, is itself to be determined, to have its validity confined by a certain rule to a particular extent Or the inde pendent activity of our result is to be independent only to a certain extent In the Ego is to be an activity determining and determined by a passivity in the Non-Ego; and in THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 12?
the Non-Ego is also to be an activity determining and determined by a passivity of the Ego. To this activity and passivity the conception of reciprocal •determination is applicable.
At the same time, there is to be in the Ego and in the Non-Ego an independent activity, not deter mining a passivity in the other.
Both propositions are to be valid. It must be possible, therefore, to think them as united through a synthetical conception in one and the same act.
Such a conception would be about as follows: The reciprocal activity and passivity determines ihc independent activity, and the independent activity determines the reciprocal activity and passivity. If this be true, then, 1. The independent activities of the Ego and Non-Ego do not reciprocally determine each other directly, but only indirectly, through their recipro cally determined activity and passivity.
2. And the law of reciprocal determination is valid only in so far as related to the reciprocal acti vity and passivity and independent activity; but is not valid as related to independent activity alone.
This result involves the following three proposi tions: 1. An independent activity is determined through reciprocal activity and passivity.
2. An independent activity determines the reci procal activity and passivity.
3. Both are mutually determined through each •other; and it is all the same whether we proceed 128 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
from reciprocal activity and passivity to indepen dent activity, or vice versa.
An independent activity is dctcrmiiud through re ciprocal activity and passivity.
Concerning this proposition, we have first to in quire its significance, and next to apply it to the conceptions of causality and substantiality in their contradiction.
Its significance. We have said before, that our present undertaking involves a restriction of the conception of reciprocal determination. This is done by showing the ground of the application of that conception.
According to that conception, by positing acti vity in the one, (the Ego or Non-Ego,) passivity is immediately posited in its opposite, and vice versa. It is also clear from the rule of opposition, that, if a passivity is to be posited, it must be posited in the opposite of the active. But why is passivity to be posited at all, that is, why is a reciprocal deter mination to occur at all?
Activity and passivity, as such, are opposed; and yet passivity is immediately posited through acti vity, and vice versa. Hence, they must be equal to- each other in a third conception, = X, which makes possible the transition from the one to the other,, without destroying the unity of consciousness. This third is the ground of relation between activity and passivity in the reciprocity, (§ 3.)
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 129 This ground of relation is not dependent upon reciprocal determination, but the latter is depen dent upon it, becomes possible only through that ground of relation. True, in reflection, this ground is posited through reciprocal determination, but also posited as independent of it and its reciprocity.
This ground is, moreover, determined in reflection through the reciprocity; that is, if the reciprocal de termination is posited, the ground of relation of its activity and passivity is posited in that sphere, which contains within it the sphere of reciprocal determination. In other words, through this ground of relation a higher sphere is posited round about the sphere of reciprocal determination. The ground of relation fills up the sphere of determination in general, while reciprocal determination fills up only a part of that sphere.
This ground is a reality; or, if reciprocal deter mination is thought as an act, is an activity. And thus an independent activity is determined through reciprocal activity and passivity.
APPLICATION UNDER CONCEPTION OF CAUSALITY.
By means of this conception, which gave us the first instance of an activity and passivity mutually determining each other, an activity of the Non-Ego is posited through a passivity of the Ego. This first instance of a reciprocal determination (of a re ciprocity, as we shall usually call it) is now to de termine and posit an independent activity.
130 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
The reciprocal determination in this instance starts from passivity. Passivity is posited, and through and by means of passivity activity is posit ed. The passivity is posited in the Ego. Hence, if an activity is posited in opposition to the passi vity, the activity must be posited in the Non-Ego, the opposite, according to the conception of reci procal determination. Of course, in this transition from the Ego to the Non-Ego, there is also a ground of relation which we know already as quantity. (The absolute totality of reality or activity is always the same. If only part of it is posited in the Ego, or if passivity is posited in the Ego, the correspond ing part of reality or activity is posited in the Non- Ego.) This ground of relation can be properly called here the ideal ground; and, hence, the passi vity of the Ego is the ideal ground of the activity of the Non-Ego. (Namely, since the whole activity is not posited in the Ego, the part not posited in the Ego is posited in the Non-Ego.)
But why is an activity to be posited at all as op posite of the passivity in tJic Ego, from which the conception of reciprocal determination starts. If it is posited, it must, certainly, as we have shown, be posited in the Non-Ego; but why is it to be posited at all, why is the conception of reciprocal determi nation to be applied here at all?
In the Ego is posited a passivity; that is, a quan tum of its activity is canceled. This passivity, or this diminution of its activity, must have a ground; for the canceled activity is a quantum, and every THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
quantum is determined through another quantum, by means of which it is neither a smaller nor a larger quantum, but precisely this quantum, accord ing to the law of determination in general, (§ 3.)
In the Ego the ground of this diminution can not be, for the Ego only posits activity in itself, and not passivity; it posits itself as being, not as not-being. Hence, the ground, by virtue of the law of opposi tion, (§ 2,) must be posited in the Non-Ego; or the Non-Ego contains the ground of this diminution.
Here we speak no longer of mere quantity, but of quality. Passivity is opposed to the Ego here in so far as the Ego is only activity, and hence the ground of it can not be posited in the Ego, but must be posited in the Non-Ego. Now, the ground of a quality is called real ground. An activity of the Non-Ego, independent of the reciprocal deter mination of the two opposites of activity and pas sivity, nay, presupposed for the very possibility of that reciprocity, is thus the real ground of the pas sivity of the Ego; and this independent activity is posited, so that wre may have a real ground of that passivity. Hence, through the above reciprocity is posited an independent activity, (of the Non-Ego.; We have now seen how, through the reciprocity between passivity of the Ego and activity of the Non-Ego, an independent activity of the Non-Ego is posited and determined. It is posited in order to get a ground for a passivity posited in the Ego; and hence extends no further than this passivity. There is, hence, no original reality and activity of 132 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
the Non-Ego for the Ego, except in so far as the Ego is passive. No passivity in the Ego, no acti vity in the Non-Ego. This result is valid even when this activity is spoken of as an activity, indepen dent of the conception of causality. Even the thing in itself is only in so far as the conception of causality extends, and has validity only in so far as, at least, the possibility of passivity is presupposed in the Ego. (A result which will receive its com plete determination and applicability only in the practical part of our science.)
Let it, therefore, be well remembered, that the conclusion as to the Non-Ego being real ground is- valid only in so far as it is true that the passivity in the Ego is qualitative; which it is only in the conception of causality.
As soon as we get to the second reciprocal con ception, substantiality, we shall see that under that conception the passivity of the Ego can not be thought at all as qiialitativc, but only as quantita tive, as diminished activity; and that under that conception, therefore, the Non-Ego again becomes merely ideal ground.
A philosophy which starts from positing the Non- Ego as cause of all representation, and the repre sentation as its effect, and which thus posits the Non-Ego as the real ground of all, the Non-Ego being simply because it is and what it is, (Spino za's Fate,) and the Ego being simply an accidence of the Non-Ego, and not substance at all; such a system is a dogmatic Realism, (or material Spinoz- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 133 ism,) a system which presupposes the impossibi lity of making the highest abstraction, namely, abstraction from the Non-Ego; and which is ut terly ungrounded, as it does not establish any final ground On the other hand, a system which makes the Ego the substance of representation * and represen tation the accidence of the Ego, the Non-Ego be ing not real ground thereof at all, but merely ideal ground, and having, therefore, no reality beyond re presentation — such a system is a dogmatic Ideal ism. In such a system no ground can be assigned for the limitation of reality in the Ego, (for the affection through which a representation arises.) Such a system has certainly undertaken the highest abstraction, and is therefore completely grounded But it is incomplete, because it does not explain what is to be explained.
The true question in dispute between dogmatic Realism and dogmatic Idealism is, therefore, in which manner shall we explain Representation? Through the conception of Causality! asserts Real ism. Through the conception of Substantiality! asserts Idealism.
In the theoretical part of our science this ques tion will remain undecided; or, rather, it will be answered thus: Both modes of explanation are cor rect. Under certain conditions you must take the one, and under certain conditions the other. (A system which shows up this is a Critical Idealism, such as Kant has established in completest form.)
134 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
But this answer involves human — that is, all finite — reason in self-contradiction; and this con tradiction must be solved. It is solved in the prac tical part of our science.
The absolute being of the Ego can not be relin quished -without annihilating the Ego itself, and hence the question is finally decided in favor of the Ego, precisely as dogmatic Idealism decides it Our Idealism, however, not being dogmatic, does not assert this to be so, but shows, that it SHALL be so. In other words, our system explains the problem by positing the Ego (which is in so far practical) as an Ego which shall contain in itself the ground of the existence of the Non-Ego, through which the ac tivity of the Ego as intelligence is diminished. This "being an (in time) infinite idea, our explanation, in stead of explaining, rather shows that and v.'/ry what is to be explained can not be explained. (Or, that to ask for an explanation is a self-contradiction.)
APPLICATION UNDER CONCEPTION OF SUBSTAN TIALITY.
By means of the conception of substantiality, through activity in the Ego a passivity in the Ego is posited and determined. The reciprocal deter mination of this activity and passivity in the Ego was the second instance of reciprocal determination which we discovered; and this reciprocity is also to determine an independent activity.
In themselves, passivity and activity are oppo- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWELDCE. 135 sites; and we have seen how it is possible that, through one and the same act which posits a cer tain quantity of activity in the one, the same quan tity of passivity can be posited in its opposite. But it is an evident contradiction that activity and pas sivity should both together be posited, not in two opposites, but in one and the same, (in the Ego.)
True, this contradiction has been partly solved in the general deduction of substantiality, by show ing that passivity is in its quality nothing but di minished activity, and is in its quantity only not the totality of activity; and that it, therefore, can be related to the totality of activity, and can thus be posited as diminished activity. The ground of re lation between both being thus activity.
But if the Ego posits within itself diminished activity, and if the Non-Ego is also to have dimi nished activity, how are both these diminished acti vities to be distinguished? that is, how are the Ego and Non-Ego to be distinguished? For the ground of distinction between the Ego and the Non-Ego Juts been destroyed.
Unless this distinction is possible, the required reciprocal determination is also not possible, and indeed none of our deduced determinations are pos sible. All our deductions would be canceled.
Hence, the diminished activity of the Ego must • have a character altogether peculiar to itself, whereby it may be characterized as the activity of the Ego, and can never be taken for activity of the Non-Ego. This character is absolute positing, (§ I.) But ab- 136 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
solute signifies unlimited, and yet that activity of the Ego is to be diminisJicd, limited. The dimi nished activity is, therefore, to be both absolute and limited. That is, in so far as it is an acting in general, it is absolute, unconditioned; you may act or not But in so far as it is directed upon an object, it is limited; when you act, the act must be directed upon this object, and can not be directed upon any other.
We see, therefore, how this reciprocal determina tion posits an independent activity. For the acti vity in that reciprocity is itself independent, not however, in so far as it stands in that reciprocity, but in so far as it is activity. In so far as it enters the reciprocity, it is limited, and in so far passivity. We see, also, how the reciprocity determines this independent activity, that is, in the mere reflection. For the activity was assumed as absolute only in so far as to make possible the reciprocity. Hence, this activity is posited as absolute only in so far as reciprocal activity and passivity arc to be determined by it; and itself is, therefore, determined by the ex tent of this reciprocity. (It is not an absolute acti vity in general?) An absolute activity of this cha racter is called Power of Imagination, as we shall see in time.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 137 IL AN INDEPENDENT ACTIVITY DETERMINES A RECI PROCAL ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY.
Let us first obtain the significance of this propo sition, and its distinction from the former. The former had reference merely to the content of the reciprocity, not to its form. It simply said, if a reciprocity is to be, then there must be links which stand in reciprocal relation and can be interchanged. Thus the question arose: How are these links pos sible? And then we were led to show up an inde pendent activity as ground of these links.
But now we have to start from that which con stitutes the reciprocal determination as reciprocity, as an interchange, as a going from one opposite to another. Here, therefore, we do not seek the ground of the content of the reciprocity, but the ground of its fonn. This formal ground of the re ciprocity is also to be an independent activity; and it is this we now have to prove.
Illustration.
Illustration.
The magnet attracts iron; iron is attracted by the magnet. These are two exchangeable proposi tions; that is, through the one the other is posited. This is a presupposed fact, presupposed as ground- €d; and hence, if you look to the content of this re ciprocal relation, you do not ask, Who posits the one proposition through the other, and tww does this 738 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
positing occur? You assume the reciprocity as Jiav- ing occurred if you look to the content of the reci procity; and you only ask, Why are these t'jjo pro positions contained among the sphere of proposi tions, which can be thus posited the one through the other? There must be something in both which makes it possible to interchange them. Hence, you look up this, their material content, which makes them interchangeable.