Spirit. I can completely place myself in thy posi- tion; and it is no purpose of mine to disown any im- pression which has an actual existence. But tell me, what is the effect you anticipate?
/. Dost thou not perceive and apprehend at a single glance, the surface? — I say the surface, — does it not stand there present before thee, entire and at once? — art thou conscious, even in the most distant and ob- scure way, of this extension of a simple red point to a line, and of this line to a surface, of which thou 64 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
hast spoken? It is an after-thought to divide this surface, and conceive of its points and lines. Wouldst thou not, and would not every one who impartially observes himself, maintain and insist, notwithstanding thy former conclusions, that he really saw a surface of such or such a colour?
Spirit. I admit all this; and on examining myself, I find that it is exactly so as thou hast described.
But, in the first place, hast thou forgotten that it is not our object to relate to each other what presents itself in consciousness, as in a journal of the human mind, but to consider its various phenomena in their connexion, and to explain them by, and deduce them from, each other; and that consequently none of thy observations, which certainly cannot be denied, but which must be explained, can overturn any one of my just conclusions.
7. I shall never lose sight of this.
Spirit. Then do not in the remarkable resemblance of this consciousness of bodies out of thyself, which yet thou canst not describe, to real perception, over- look the great difference nevertheless existing between them.
7. I was about to mention this difference. Each indeed appears as an immediate, not as an acquired or produced consciousness. But sensation is conscious- ness of my own state. Not so the consciousness of the object itself, which has absolutely no reference to me. I know that it is, and this is all; it does not concern me. If, in the first case, I seem like a soft strain of music which is modulated now in this way now in that, in the other, I appear like a mirror before which objects pass without producing the slightest change in it.
BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 65 This distinction however is in my favour. Just so much the more do I seem to have a distinct conscious- ness of an existence out of myself, entirely independ- ent of the sense of my own state of being; — of an existence out of myself, I say — for this differs alto- gether in kind from the consciousness of my own in- ternal states.
Spirit. Thou observest well — but do not rush too hastily to a conclusion. If that whereon we have al- ready agreed remains true, and thou canst be imme- diately conscious of thyself only; if the consciousness now in question be not a consciousness of thine own passivity, and still less a consciousness of thine own activity; — may it not then be an unrecognised con- sciousness of thine own being? — of thy being in so far as thou art a knowing being, — an Intelligence?
7. I do not understand thee; but help me once more, for I wish to understand thee.
Spirit. I must then demand thy whole attention, for I am here compelled to go deeper, and expatiate more widely, than ever. What art thou?
/. To answer thy question in the most general way, — I am I, myself.
Spirit. I am well satisfied with this answer. What dost thou mean when thou sayest " I "; — what lies in this conception, — and how dost thou attain it?
/. On this point I can make myself understood only by contrast. External existence — the thing, is something out of me, the cognitive being. 7 am my- self this cognitive being, one with the object of my cognition. As to my consciousness of the former, there arises the question, — Since the thing cannot know itself, how can a knowledge of it arise? — how can a consciousness of the thing arise in me, since I myself 66 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
am not the thing, nor any of its modes or forms, and all these modes and forms lie within the circle of its own being, and by no means in mine? How does the thing reach me? What is the tie between me, the subject, and the thing which is the object of my knowledge? But as to my consciousness of myself, there can be no such question. In this case, I have my knowledge within myself, for I am intelligence. What I am, I know because I am it; and that whereof I know immediately that I am it, that I am because I immediately know it. There is here no need of any tie between subject and object; my own nature is this tie. I am subject and object: — and this subject- objectivity, this return of knowledge upon itself, is what I mean by the term " I," when I deliberately at- tach a definite meaning to it.
Spirit. Thus it is in the identity of subject and object that thy nature as an intelligence consists?
7. Yes.
Spirit. Canst thou then comprehend the possibility of thy becoming conscious of this identity, which is neither subject nor object, but which lies at the founda- tion of both, and out of which both arise?
/. By no means. It is the condition of all my consciousness, that the conscious being, and what he is conscious of, appear distinct and separate. I can- not even conceive of any other consciousness. In the very act of recognising myself, I recognise myself as subject and object, both however being immediately bound up with each other.
Spirit. Canst thou become conscious of the mo- ment in which this inconceivable one separated itself into these two?
/. How can I, since my consciousness first be- BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 67 comes possible in and through their separation, — since it is my consciousness itself that thus separates them? Beyond consciousness itself there is no consciousness.
Spirit. It is this separation, then, that thou neces- sarily recognisest in becoming conscious of thyself? In this thy very original being consists?
/. So it is.
Spirit. And on what then is it founded?
7. I am intelligence, and have consciousness in myself. This separation is the condition and result of consciousness. It has its foundation, therefore, in myself, like consciousness.
Spirit. Thou art intelligence, thou sayest, at least this is all that is now in question, and as such thou becomest an object to thyself. Thy knowledge, there- fore in its objective capacity, presents itself before thyself, i. e. before thy knowledge in its subjective capacity; and floats before it, but without thou thy- self being conscious of such a presentation?
/. So it is.
Spirit. Canst thou not then adduce some more ex- act characteristics of the subjective and objective ele- ments as they appear in consciousness?
7. The subjective appears to contain within itself the foundation of consciousness as regards its form, but by no means as regards its substance. That there is a consciousness, an inward perception and concep- tion,— of this the foundation lies in itself; but that pre- cisely this or that is conceived, — in this it is dependent on the objective, with which it is conjoined and by which it is likewise borne along. The objective, on the contrary, contains the foundation of its being with- in itself; it is in and for itself, — it is, as it is, because it is The subjective appears as the still and passive 68 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
mirror of the objective; the latter floats before it. That the former should reflect images generally, lies in itself. That precisely this image and none other should be reflected, depends on the latter.
Spirit. The subjective, then, according to its es- sential nature, is precisely so constituted as thou hast previously described thy consciousness of an existence out of thyself to be?
7. It is true, and this agreement is remarkable. I begin to believe it half credible, that out of the in- ternal laws of my own consciousness may proceed even the presentation of an existence out of myself, and independent of me; and that this presentation may at bottom be nothing more than the presentation of these laws themselves.
Spirit. And why only half credible?
/. Because I do not yet see why precisely such a presentation — a presentation of a mass extended through space — should arise.
Spirit. Thou hast already seen that it is only thine own sensation which thou extendest through space; and thou hast had some forebodings that it is by this extension in space alone that thy sensation becomes transformed for thee into something sensible. We have therefore to do at present only with space itself, and to explain its origin in consciousness.
/. So it is.
/. So it is.
Spirit. Let us then make the attempt. I know that thou canst not become conscious of thy intelligent activity as such, in so far as it remains in its original and unchangeable unity; — i. e. in the condition which begins with thy very being, and can never be destroyed without at the same time destroying that being; — ana such a consciousness therefore I do not ascribe to thee, BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 69 But thou canst become conscious of it in so far as it passes from one state of transition to another within the limits of this unchangeable unity. When thou dost represent it to thyself in the performance of this function, how does it appear to thee — this internal spiritual activity?
/. My spiritual faculty appears as if in a state of internal motion, swiftly passing from one point to another; — in short, as an extended line. A definite thought makes a point in this line.
Spirit. And why as an extended line?
/. Can I give a reason for that beyond the circle of which I cannot go without at the same time over- stepping the limits of my own existence? It is so, absolutely.
Spirit. Thus, then, does a particular act of thy consciousness appear to thee. But what shape then is assumed, not by thy produced, but by thy inherited, knowledge, of which all specific thought is but the revival and farther definition? — how does this present itself to thee? Under what image does it appear?
/. Evidently as something in which one may draw lines and make points in all directions, namely, as space.
Spirit. Now then, it will be entirely clear to thee, how that, which really proceeds from thyself, may nevertheless, appear to thee as an existence external to thyself, — nay, must necessarily appear so.
Thou hast penetrated to the true source of the pres- entation of things out of thyself. This presentation is not perception, for thou perceivest thyself only; — as little is it thought, for things do not appear to thee as mere results of thought. It is an actual, and in- deed absolute and immediate consciousness of an exist- 70 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
ence out of thyself, just as perception is an immediate consciousness of thine own condition. Do not permit thyself to be perplexed by sophists and half-philoso- phers; things do not appear to thee through any rep- resentation;— of the thing that exists, and that can exist, thou art immediately conscious; — and there is no other thing than that of which thou art conscious. Thou thyself art the thing; thou thyself, by virtue of thy finitude — the innermost law of thy being — art thus presented before thyself, and projected out of thyself; and all that thou perceivest out of thyself is still — thyself only. This consciousness has been well named INTUITION. In all consciousness I contemplate my- self, for I am myself: — to the subjective, conscious being, consciousness is self-contemplation. And the objective, that which is contemplated and of which I am conscious, is also myself, — the same self which con- templates, but now floating as an objective presenta- tion before the subjective. In this respect, conscious- ness is an active retrospect of my own intuitions; an observation of myself from my own position; a pro- jection of myself out of myself by means of the only mode of action which is properly mine, — perception. I am a living faculty of vision. I see (consciousness) my own vision ( the thing of zvhich I am conscious. ) Hence this object is also thoroughly transparent fo thy mind's eye, because it is thy mind itself. Thou dividest, limitest, determinest, the possible forms of things, and the relations of these forms, previous to all perception. No wonder, — for in so doing thou divid- est, limitest, and determinest thine own knowledge, which undoubtedly is sufficiently known to thee. Thus does a knowledge of things become possible. It is not in the things, and cannot proceed out of them. It BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 71 proceeds from thee, and is indeed thine own nature.
There is no outward sense, for there is no outward perception. There is, however, an outward intui- tion;— not of things, but this outward intuition — this knowledge apparently external to the subjective be- ing, and hovering before it, — is itself the thing, and there is no other.,By means of this outward intuition are perception and sense regarded as external. It re- mains eternally true, for it is proved, — that I see or feel a surface, — my sight or feeling takes the shape of the sight or feeling of a surface. Space, — illumina- ted, transparent, palpable, penetrable space, — the pur- est image of my knowledge, is not seen, but is an intuitive possession of my own mind; in it even my faculty of vision itself is contained. The light is not out of, but in me, and I myself am the light. Thou hast already answered my question, " How dost thou know of thy sensations, of thy seeing, feeling, &c.? " by saying that thou hast an immediate knowledge or consciousness of them. Now, perhaps, thou wilt be able to define more exactly this immediate conscious- ness of sensation.
/. It must be a two-fold consciousness. Sensation is itself an immediate consciousness; for I am sensible of my own sensation. But from this there arises no knowledge of outward existence, but only the feeling of my own state. I am, however, originally, not merely a sensitive, but also an intuitive being; not merely a practical being, but also an intelligence. I intuitively contemplate my sensation itself, and thus there arises from myself and my own nature, the cog- nition of an existence. Sensation becomes trans- formed into its own object; my affections, as red, smooth, and the like, into a something red, smooth, 72 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
&c. out of myself; and this something, and my rela- tive sensation, I intuitively contemplate in space, be- cause the intuition itself is space. Thus does it be- come clear why I believe that I see or feel surfaces, which, in fact, I neither see nor feel. I intuitively re- gard my own sensation of sight or touch, as the sight or touch of a surface.
Spirit. Thou hast well understood me, or rather thyself.
I. But now it is not at all by means of an inference, either recognised or unrecognised, from the principle of causality, that the thing is originated for me; it floats immediately before me, and is presented to my con- sciousness without any process of reasoning. I can- not say, as I have formerly said, that perception becomes transformed into a something perceivable, for the perceivable, as such, has precedence in conscious- ness. It is not with an affection of myself, as red, smooth, or the like, that consciousness begins, but with a red, smooth object out of myself.
Spirit. If, however, thou wert obliged to explain what is red, smooth, and the like, couldst thou possibly make any other reply than that it was that by which thou wert affected in a certain manner that thou namest red, smooth, &c.?
/. Certainly not, — if you were to ask me, and I were to enter upon the question and attempt an ex- planation. But originally no one asks me the question, nor do I ask it of myself. I forget myself entirely, and lose myself in my intuition of the object; become conscious, not of my own state, but only of an exist- ence out of myself. Red, green, and the like, are properties of the thing; it is red or green, and this BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 73 is all. There can be no farther explanation, any more than there can be a farther explanation of these af- fections in me, on which we have already agreed. This is most obvious in the sensation of sight. Colour appears as something out of myself; and the common understanding of man, if left to itself, and without farther reflection, would scarcely be persuaded to de- scribe red, green, &c. as that which excited within him a specific affection.
Spirit. But, doubtless, it would if asked regarding sweet or sour. It is not our business at present to inquire whether the impression made by means of sight be a pure sensation, or whether it may not rather be a middle term between sensation and intui- tion, and the bone by which they are united in our minds. But I admit thy assertion, and it is extremely welcome to me. Thou canst, indeed, lose thyself in the intuition; and unless thou directest particular at- tention to thyself, or takest an interest in some external action, thou dost so, naturally and necessarily. This is the remark to which the defenders of a groundless consciousness of external things appeal, when it is shown that the principle of causality, by which the existence of such things might be inferred, exists only in ourselves; they deny that any such inference is made, and, in so far as they refer to actual conscious- ness in particular cases, this cannot be disputed. These same defenders, when the nature of intuition is explained to them from the laws of intelligence itself, themselves draw this inference anew, and never weary of repeating that there must be something external to us which compels us to this belief.
/. Do not trouble thyself about them at present, 74 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
but instruct me. I have no preconceived opinion, and seek for truth only.
Spirit. Nevertheless, intuition necessarily proceeds from the perception of thine own state, although thou art not always clearly conscious of this perception, as thou hast already seen. Even in that consciousness in which thou losest thyself in the object, there is always something which is only possible by means of an unrecognised reference to thyself, and close ob- servation of thine own state.
7. Consequently, at all times and places the con- sciousness of existence out of myself must be accom- panied by an unobserved consciousness of myself?
Spirit. Just so.
I. The former being determined through the lat- ter,— as it actually is?
Spirit. That is my meaning.
/. Prove this to me, and I shall be satisfied.
Spirit. Dost thou imagine only things in general as placed in space, or each of them individually as occupying a certain portion of space?
/. The latter, — each thing has its determinate bulk.
Spirit. And do different things occupy the same part of space?
/. By no means; they exclude each other. They are beside, over or under, behind, or before, each other; — nearer to me, or further from me.
Spirit. And how dost thou come to this measure- ment and arrangement of them in space? Is it by sensation?
/. How could that be, since space itself is no sen- sation?
Spirit. Or intuition?
/. This cannot be. Intuition is immediate and in- BOOK //. KNOWLEDGE. 75 fallible. What is contained in it does not appear as produced, and cannot deceive. But I must train my- self to estimate, measure and deliberate upon, the size of an object, its distance, its position with respect to other objects. It is a truth known to every beginner, that we originally see all objects in the same line; that we learn to estimate their greater or lesser dis- tances; that the child attempts to grasp distant ob- jects as if they lay immediately before his eyes; and that one born blind who should suddenly receive sight would do the same. This conception of distances is therefore a judgment; — no intuition, but an arrange- ment of my different intuitions by means of the under- standing. I may err in my estimate of the size, dis- tance, &c. of an object; and the so-called optical de- ceptions are not deceptions of sight, but erroneous judgments formed concerning the size of the object, concerning the size of its different parts in relation to each other, and consequently concerning its true fig- ure and its distance from me and from other objects. But it does really exist in space, as I contemplate it, and the colours which I see in it are likewise really seen by me; — and here there is no deception.
Spirit. And what then is the principle of this judg- ment,— to take the most distinct and easy case, — thy judgment of the proximity or distance of objects, — how dost thou estimate this distance?
/. Doubtless by the greater strength or feebleness of impressions otherwise equal. I see before me two objects of the same red colour. The one whose colour I see more vividly, I regard as the nearer: that whose colour seems to me fainter, as the more distant, and as so much the more distant as the colour seems fainter, 76 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
Spirit. Thus thou dost estimate the distance ac- cording to the degree of strength or weakness in the sensation; and this strength or weakness itself, — dost thou also estimate it?
/. Obviously only in so far as I take note of my own affections, and even of very slight differences in these. — Thou hast conquered! All consciousness of objects out of myself is determined by the clearness and exactitude of my consciousness of my own states, and in this consciousness there is always a conclusion drawn from the effect in myself to a cause out of my- self.
Spirit. Thou art quickly vanquished; and I must now myself carry forward, in thy place, the contro- versy against myself. My argument can only apply to those cases in which an actual and deliberate esti- mate of the size, distance, and position, of objects takes place, and in which thou art conscious of mak- ing such an estimate. Thou wilt however admit that this is by no means the common case, and that for the most part thou rather becomest conscious of the size, distance, &c. of an object at the very same undi- vided moment in which thou becomest conscious of the object itself.
7. When once we learn to estimate the distances of objects by the strength of the impression, the rapid- ity of this judgment is merely the consequence of its frequent exercise. I have learnt, by a lifelong experi- ence, rapidly to observe the strength of the impression and thereby to estimate the distance. My present con- ception is founded upon a combination, formerly made, of sensation, intuition, and previous judgments; al- though at the moment I am conscious only of the present conception. I no longer apprehend generally BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 77 red, green, or the like, out of myself, but a red or a green at this, that, or the other distance; but this last addition is merely a renewal of a judgment formerly arrived at by deliberate reflection.
Spirit. Has it not then, at length, become clear to thee whether thou discoverest the existence of things out of thyself by intuition, or by reasoning, or both, — and in how far by each of these?
/. Perfectly; and I believe that I have now at- tained the fullest insight into the origin of my con- ceptions of objects out of myself.
1. I am absolutely conscious of myself, because I am this I, — myself; and that partly as a practical being, partly as an intelligence. The first con- sciousness is Sensation, the second Intuition — unlimited space.
2. I cannot comprehend the unlimited, for I am finite. I therefore set apart, in thought, a cer- tain portion of universal space, and place the former in a certain relation to the latter.
3. The measure of this limited portion of space is the extent of my own sensibility, according to a principle which may be thus expressed: — Whatever affects me in such or such a man- ner is to be placed, in space, in such or such relations to the other things which affect me. The properties or attributes of the object proceed from the perception of my own internal state; the space which it fills, from intuitive contemplation. By a process of thought, both are conjoined; the former being added to the latter. It is so, assuredly, as we have said before: — that which is merely a state or affection of myself, by being transferred or projected into space becomes an attribute of the object; but 78 THE VOCATION OF MAN.
it is so projected into space, not by intuition, but by thought, by measuring, regulating thought. Not that this act is to be regarded as an intellectual discovery or creation; but only as a more exact definition, by means of thought, of something which is already given in sensation and intuition, independent of all thought.
Spirit. Whatever affects me in such or such a man- ner is to be placed in such or such relations: — thus dost thou reason in defining and arranging objects in space. But does not the declaration that a thing affects thee in a certain manner include the assumption that it affects thee generally?
/. Undoubtedly.
Spirit. And is any presentation of an external ob- ject possible, which is not in this manner limited and defined in space?
/. No; for no object exists in space generally, but each one in a determinate portion of space.
Spirit. So that in fact, whether thou art conscious of it or not, every external object is assumed by thee as affecting thyself, as certainly as it is assumed as filling a determinate portion of space?
/. That follows, certainly.
Spirit. And what kind of presentation is that of an object affecting thyself?
I. Evidently a thought; and indeed a thought founded on the principle of causality already men- tioned. I see now, still more clearly, that the con- sciousness of the object is engrafted on my self-con- sciousness in two ways, — partly by intuition, and partly by thought founded on the principle of cau- sality. The object, however strange it may seem, is at once the immediate object of my consciousness, and the result of deliberate thought BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE. 79 Spirit. In different respects, however. Thou must be capable of being conscious of this thought of the object?
/. Doubtless; although usually I am not so.
Spirit. Therefore to thy passive state, thy affec- tion, thou dost superadd in thought an activity out of thyself, such as thou hast above described in the case of thy thought according to the principle of causality?
/. Yes.
Spirit. And with the same meaning and the same validity as thou didst describe it above. Thou think- est so once for all, and must think so; thou canst not alter it, and canst know nothing more than that thou dost think so?
/. Nothing more. We have already investigated all this thoroughly.
Spirit. I said, thou dost assume an object: — in so far as it is so assumed, it is a product of thy own thought only?
/. Certainly, for this follows from the former.
Spirit. And what now is this object which is thus assumed according to the principle of causality?
/. A power out of myself.
Spirit. Which is neither revealed to thee by sensa- tion nor by intuition?
/. No; I always remain perfectly conscious that I do not perceive it immediately, but only by means of its manifestations; although I ascribe to it an exist- ence independent of myself. I am affected, there must therefore be something that affects me, — such is my thought.
Spirit. The object which is revealed to thee in intuition, and that which thou assumest by reasoning, 8o THE VOCATION OF MAN.
are thus very different things. That which is actually and immediately present before thee, spread out in space, is the object of intuition; the internal force within it, which is not present before thee, but whose existence thou art led to assert only by a process of reasoning, is the object of the understanding.