326 PSYCHOLOGY gave way to science, religion was not touched by the process nor need it be in the present instance.
Evidence for This View. — It is frankly admitted that the position we have taken on implicit processes is largely an assump- tion, but one so reasonable and so backed up by the whole devel- opment of psychology, physiology and science generally that it is a perfectly safe one to work by until the hypothesis is made untenable by experimental findings and can be modified or trans- formed into another which is more in line with experimental facts. As a working basis its value becomes greater when we contrast it with the other view advocated by most psychologists. Upon their hypothesis thought per se will be as remote at the end of another million years of study as now, since, if we may use philosophical phrases, they make it transcendental by hypothesis, whereas we make it an immanent, constituting part of bodily organization and integration. In other words, when we study implicit bodily processes we are studying thought; just as when we study the way a golfer stands in addressing his ball and swing- ing his club we are studying golf.
The experimental evidence for this view is slight. A great many investigators have studied tongue movements and move- ments of the larynx (externally by attaching tambours to the neck) and have then set their subjects such problems as silent reading and subvocal arithmetic or the recall of a poem learned in childhood. In general, good evidence is found that orderly movements1 similar to those in speaking are found, but occasion- ally such records fail to appear even when a subvocal problem in arithmetic is worked out and the proper answer returned. Such processes are so evanescent and can slip from one motor region into another so rapidly that negative evidence obtained by our present inexact methods is no conclusive argument against our view. The word "harvest" can be uttered aloud in many differ- ent ways, for example, so as to bring the stomach walls into play or the chest walls or different parts of the pharynx. Just so one can take his pen in his right hand and write any given word hy using thirty or more different finger and palm combina- tions: for example, the first finger, which is usually employed, EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE HABITS 327 may be removed from the pen at any moment without affecting even the form of the writing, much less stopping it altogether. In trying to catch and record the action of throat muscles the stim- ulus offered by the apparatus makes equivalent action take place more easily somewhere else. An example of shifting, in this case in an instinctive function, is the breathing of an infant. Usually when we try to record its breathing (when it is lying on its back) the main action is thoracic. The moment we attach even the most delicate pneumograph, respiration slips into the abdominal type. While our position thus must remain an assumption for the pres- ent, we have hopes that refinement of instruments now in use may later prove of service.
Thoughts Issue in Action. — One reason why experimentation in this field is backward is due to the fact that the thoughts of those around us sooner or later eventuate in explicit bodily ac- tion— no one except possibly a certain type of schizophrenic remains for any length of time "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Even the philosopher occasionally breaks his im- plicit word chains and favors us with a morsel in the form of a spoken or written word. There is in general no practical need or even scientific need for recording thought, since, in the first place, as we have brought out, it finally eventuates in action and in the second place most of it in mankind is worthless from the standpoint of society. It merely keeps the individual under tension (equal action in flexor and extensor muscles plus the emo- tional drama) without freeing any overt action system, or con- sists of one train of reverie after another, day-dreaming, castle-building and the like. Any consistent series of thought processes which is of any social interest will, if sufficiently well integrated with other bodily action systems, take issue finally in overt action.
To get thought to issue in overt action is not left always to the person thinking. We arrange special situations to hasten or even to force the process along. The cleverness of the lawyer is gauged by his ability to twist the subject's overt words in such a way as to show contradictions in statements. The lawyer uses the contradictions to "prove" to the judge and jury that the 328 PSYCHOLOGY 328 PSYCHOLOGY individual's thought or intent was bad or good as the case may be. The psycho-pathologists, by word-association methods, analysis of dreams or constant conversation with the patient, create a situation by which the barriers to external action are broken down and thought becomes expressed in overt words or other acts. In this way conflicts in implicit organization may be noted. Society as a whole is under constant endeavor to get the individual to materialize his thoughts in overt speech or in deeds. The method and technic for bringing about a transition from thought to overt action have hardly been touched by conventional psychology. This is in part due to the fact that the laboratory is largely divorced from life. A clever lawyer, newspaper man, diplomat or adventuress knows a good deal more about, predict- ing thought in others and in devising methods for getting an issuance of thought into action than do most psychologists.
Now and then it would be advantageous to be able to record thought as we record speech. The psycho-pathologist would find it very helpful at times to get into the patient's thought stream especially in those cases where each implicit process ordinarily leading to overt action in a normal individual under a given situation, merely arouses in the patient another implicit process with a conflicting explicit motor outcome. The patient, hence, remains without action. Again, in legal work the jury and the judge would find the recording of implicit processes invaluable especially where the possible guilt of the defendant is based upon circumstantial evidence. There is no known direct method of detecting whether an individual is lying, notwithstanding the many plethysmographic and associational studies made upon that topic. From the romantic point of view the lover would, of course, always like to be able to read his mistress' thoughts. ' In all of these cases, though, continued observation of the thinker and the bringing to bear of data that can be noted usually pro- vide stimuli sufficient for the observer of the thinker to guide his own conduct or for society to take action.3 3 If the implicit processes could be recorded, the world would have to be made over. Women as a rule are "mysterious" to the male sex, and banking upon this many are at pains to build up a background of mystery EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE HABITS 329 Forms of Thought: 1 Logical. — Society has specified down to the minutest details how the individual may use words. Our conjugations, declensions and laws of syntax are examples of this fact. In argumentative work, oral or written, there are also definite moulds just as conventionalized as are the cases and tenses of the words themselves. The various propositions and syl- logisms in logic are examples. Whether the individual actually thinks in syllogistic forms or in accordance with the laws of syntax is extremely doubtful. Probably if he has been brought up in a family where careful diction and logical presentation are insisted upon from the start his thoughts wrill take the same orderly form. If, on the other hand, he is brought up as most children are, logical forms and nice grammatical construction will be put on in thought if at all only when his environment changes; for example, when he begins to go out in society, to debate or to begin his legal training. There is no more necessity for an individual to think in logical form than there is for him to shave, bathe and dress according to a rigidly specified routine.
2. Little Thought Work is of the Routine Type.— In most manual activity that is well organized we rarely go through any preliminary movements of a preparatory kind. The moment we take off our coats and take a billiard cue in our hands our acts are controlled in accordance with the movements of the ball. A similar thing is possible with laryngeal activity. The teacher used to speaking to his elementary classes rarely organizes anything he has to say in advance. The moment he steps upon the plat- form speech is mere progression comparable to swimming or any and capriciousness. It has been a wonderful cloak for lack of organization. On the other hand, it works in most cases and keeps the man in hand long enough while he is attempting to solve the enigma for acquaintanceship to ripen and for other factors to exert their potency,, If such processes could be recorded the " hard to understand " woman would lose her prestige. The pompous individual who hides behind a studious and severe exterior would also have to find some other way to cover up his shortcomings. Even those who are real thinkers would shrink from having exposed to an unkind world the prevalence in their thoughts of things banned by society and the frequency with which the trivial affairs connected with the day's work intrude.
330 PSYCHOLOGY I other bodily work (routine). On the other hand, when we have to do some work with our hands which we have not done before we must proceed in part at least by the trial and error process. A similar thing happens when we are performing new acts with the implicit laryngeal mechanism. Before the final word phrasing representing the completion of the adjustment occurs ("con- clusion") devious useless word acts are executed. This is con- structive work.
3. Constructive Work. — In order to understand work of the constructive type let us take two contrasting situations, the one in constructive manual work, the other in constructive laryngeal work. I start in to build a bridle path to the top of a hill with no special instruments and never having built a road before. If the grade is too steep I build my road around the side of the hill, taking advantage of various level places to approach the top; where the stones are too large or cannot be easily dislodged I build the road around them, finally coming out at the top. The process of constructing such a path requires manual labor almost wholly. It is a type of task that the most uneducated ditch- digger can perform. Nevertheless, it is constructive work in the sense that a passable road is built which did not exist before. In the process, though, parts of many previously organized habit systems have been used momentarily in slightly new connections. Just so in simple thought work, for example, in a new and ex- tremely simple proposition in geometry: it may be only the work- ing out of a corollary or the production of a verse or a limerick. There is a similar trial and error use of the laryngeal organiza- tion until the adjustment is finally reached. The individual, of course, depends upon his past organization, but a new product is the outcome of his work. We can greatly complicate the com- plexity of our problem in manual labor, making it the con- struction of a new type of submarine. The amount of excess work done (actual manual work) and the number of false steps taken can be gathered from the heap of discarded models which litters up the.workshop. Likewise, we can complicate our ex- ample of thought work. The number of false starts made, wrong tentative conclusions reached in working up a new system of EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE HABITS 331 philosophy or chemical theory cannot be directly observed by the beholder as in the case of the submarine invention, but it can be gathered from the length of time it takes the individual to finally put his thought conclusions into final form (issuance of thought into overt action).
4. Play and Emotional Forms of Thought Activity. — Under the influence of certain emotional states overt activity takes cer- tain forms — whistling, dancing, singing, the playing of games and, best for present illustrative purposes, improvising on some musical instrument. In the latter example the performer is not under the sway of any particular, definite habit, that is, he is not playing any score ever played before. His fingers wander, as we say, idly over the keys. But his equipment and organiza- tion show at every moment and new combinations (a new prod- uct) are hit upon just as a new stroke is hit upon in tennis. A condition wholly analogous to this is found in thought in reverie. This is a form of play with the vocal equipment as improvised solo dancing is a form of play of the hand, arm, leg and trunk equipment. Solo dancing is not wholly manual play nor is reverie wholly verbal play. In contrasting these various types of thought activity with manual activity we have overemphasized the separation and distinction of the two. We can only insist once more that the separation is made for purely illustrative reasons.
The Word as a Stimulus. — If the student will learn to look upon a word (sounded, spoken, written or "laryngeated") as a stimulus and will class it along with the stimulus of the candle or that of the candy in our illustration of the genesis of habit in the preceding chapter, a good many things which now appear difficult to him in psychology will become clear. In considering the word as a stimulus! one sees quite clearly how wonderfully integrated the human organism becomes. Take the word * ' come, ' ' for example, and observe the number of ways in which it may serve as a stimulus. The word is spoken to you by your com- panion. You rise to your feet and join him in whatever activity the situation demands. Here the auditory word stimulus brings about the activity. A telegram is sent to you with the word ' ' come ' ' 332 PSYCHOLOGY • upon it. The sight of the written word starts your hand to your pocket for money; looking at your check-book in case cash is not available or borrowing from your friends if the check- book will not help you out of your difficulty. If the money is available you proceed to pack your trunk and take the journey demanded. If you were blind and deaf the tactual word im- pression would bring about the same sequence of events. Most frequently, however, the word stimulus arises in connection with the implicit processes going on within your own organism. The implicit word processes (aroused by whatever previous stimulus), "it's a fine day, I think I will go to the races; it's twelve o'clock now, I have just time to catch the train," serve to start you to get your hat and field-glasses. Some unfinished work meets your eye or other conflicting word processes are aroused, as ' * but I have to write those letters and I have a luncheon engagement with X. ' ' These tend to drive the organism as a whole into some other form of action; for a time there is a conflict (inhibition). Finally when the conflict is over the final word act issues, ' ' Well, I guess I '11 have to give up the races and write those letters and keep my engagement with X." Here we see implicit word processes tending to arouse overt acts and actually arousing the initial steps. But since the human individual is a complexly integrated affair, associated word processes arise which may drive the organism into a totally different form of activity from that which was first initiated.
These considerations would lead us, if space permitted, into a discussion of the various types of. " reactors. ' ' The 1 1 impulsive ' ' is one which is immediately plunged into action by every stim- ulus— in such a one associated word processes with possibly con- flicting overt tendencies do not arise or do not arise until too late; that is, until overt action is so well started that any possible word process will not be a sufficient stimulus to check action. Again, there is the "deliberative" type, in the extreme forms of which the gamut of events is run, first with one tendency to action, then that being checked by a contrary tendency; service- able overt action takes place slowly or even not at all. Finally we have the " balanced" type of individual; he is neither unduly EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE HABITS 333 impulsive nor unduly deliberative. When the stimulus to action appears it has to run its course with associated competing stimuli (usually of the implicit word types); but one or another always leads to some kind of action. The popular ternj used to express the acts of such an individual is that he acts with "judgment." There are many subdivisions of these three classes. An indi- vidual may be of the balanced type along some lines and im- pulsive or deliberative along others.
Attention is called to the fact again that some words are stimuli expressly to overt action: such phrases, for example-, as 1 i shut the door, " " close the window, please, " " let 's take a walk, ' ' ' ' company, halt! " ' ' right face! ' ' throw the individual almost at once into overt action. On the other hand, many words have as their motor outcome simply another word action. This probably will be clearest in an example of an abbreviated quotation, "A fool and his money are — Instead of this group of words inducing me to act with my hands or arms, it induces me to act by saying or thinking the words "soon parted." While the discussion of these matters may seem somewhat difficult to the student at first sight, he cannot go wrong if he holds fast to the fact (1) that the word is a stimulus to overt action exactly as the sight of a man knocked down by an automobile induces a bystander to run to his aid; and (2) that when the word stimulus leads merely to a word action the case is not different in essence or in origin from that observed in fencing or boxing where your opponent's move leads you to make a movement of a definite kind.
Suggestion. — If the facts in the above paragraph are clear, the phenomenon of suggestion, which has been a fruitful field for charlatanism in psychology, should offer little difficulty. The human being has thousands of action systems organized and ready to function the moment an adequate stimulus is presented. Hence suggestion in the broadest sense of the term is co-extensive with the whole of psychology or with organization in general. When the dinner bell rings and you go to the table and sit down we have a first-class example of suggestion. When a young woman of your acquaintance says, ' ' There 's an awfully good show in town this week," and a little later remarks that she hasn't many 334 PSYCHOLOGY 334 PSYCHOLOGY engagements for the week, the suggestive factors are almost as obvious. The stimulus in suggestion, however, need not always be of the word type. The sight of a group of men smoking leads any new smoking individual entering the room to light up imme- diately. Crooking the elbow and raising the forearm is a potent suggestion to an initiated individual to have a drink. The dis- tinction, however, is sometimes made between suggestion and ordinary stimulus and response behavior such as we have con- sidered, to this effect, namely, that in suggestion the stimulus must be effective — must work. If you were to come into the room and say, "Please1 lend me five dollars " the stimulus would not work; I would not act on the suggestion. In the balanced indi- vidual, as we brought out above, any stimulus which may plunge the individual into action must be stronger than any other asso- ciated stimulus (of whatever type) that may arise. If an indi- vidual is of the impulsive type the suggestion to lend five dollars may immediately lead to the act. Those individuals who plunge into action at every suggested stimulus are popularly called "suggestible."
Hypnosis. — We see the process of suggestion, that is, of every stimulus leading to action without normal inhibitions, arising in the clearest way in hypnosis. Hypnosis is an extremely complex subject, and it is not our present purpose to do more than touch upon it. We wish merely to point out that the mechanism of hypnosis is certainly not different from the phenomena we have just studied in the preceding paragraphs. It is debatable, of course, whether or not some new factor enters in which makes the person more suggestible. As every one knows, the hypnotic state may be induced in a variety of ways: by having the subject fixate on intricate moving lights, by making "passes" over him or stroking his arm or head, by using words suggestive of sleep, and so on. A common view is that the only new factor that need be added is the arousal of a state of partial sleep or a represented ecstatic state, occasionally possibly sexual in character (many of the religious trances in India, among the negroes and poorly edu- cated whites seem to point to this) which is not too deep to permit of the functioning of many of the organized habits of the indi- EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE HABITS 335 vidual. "When in this state the normal associative mechanisms upon which the individual depends for inhibitory or counter- suggestions is in abeyance (but rarely wholly lost: for example, the subject will stab with a pasteboard knife but not usually with a steel one), hence the soil is prepared for each suggestion to plunge the organism into action.
One important factor which has not been brought out with sufficient clearness in the work on hypnosis is, namely, that the first few times a person is hypnotized very little of the later more complex behavior can be observed. After repeated hyp- nosis they do appear, as all agree. It is believed that the hypno- tist to a large extent by suggesting now this type of activity, now that, really begins to organize the person hynotized along lines which will fit in with his own (the hypnotizer's) point of view with respect to what ought to take place. This is a reason for the many varied reports about the behavior of the person under hypnosis. Hypnosis has never been studied from exactly the behavioristic angle and hence the various factors — such as auto- hypnosis, post-hypnotic suggestion, control of the autonomic processes as in the stopping of bleeding, crying with real tears (sometimes in only one eye), the burning of the hand by a coin at ordinary temperature when the hypnotizer tells the subject that it is red hot and the production of blisters — cannot be discussed with the data we have in hand. Our own view is that the condi- tioned reflex hypothesis will help us in explaining these phenom- ena. That such exist among autonomic processes has been shown earlier in the text. It should be said that such "control" can be obtained by only a few hypnotizers and over a very few sub- jects. May we not assume that he either builds them up on the various occasions in which the subject undergoes hypnosis, or else fortunately finds subjects in whom little or no building is necessary?
In general it may be said that in order to hypnotize any indi- vidual it is necessary for him to cooperate. If he places himself in the position to be hypnotized without being in the proper attitude for it, that is. if the situation arouses fear, negative tendencies and the like, ho cannot be hypnotized. Subjects are thus never 336 PSYCHOLOGY • hypnotized the first few times without active cooperation on their part, but after having undergone a state of hypnosis on several occasions, they may be hypnotized by the slightest word or ges- ture of the original hypnotizer. In such cases a letter or telegram sent by the hypnotizer to his subject occasionally has been known to produce it. In general the hypnotizer cannot transfer his rapport with the subject to any one else.
LABORATORY STUDIES IN LANGUAGE ORGANIZATION4 C. ACQUISITION AND IMPROVEMENT.
Types of Investigations in Language Functions. — Language acquisitions, both explicit and implicit, have been studied only incidentally in the laboratory and usually in their highly organ- ized and total forms such as solving arithmetical problems, com- mitting verse and prose to memory; with later retesting of such activities to obtain a measure of the factor of disuse. A few of the studies deal directly with the learning of a foreign language. Our more immediate concern here is the investigation of word organization. Several studies have been made upon adults. That of Ebbinghaus is best known. In 1885 he made a most care- ful study of the learning of nonsense syllables. Nonsense words or syllables are made by separating two consonants with a vowel as ver, gax and moc. Whenever a conventional word is formed by this combination it is discarded. It is possible to construct some two thousand three hundred nonsense words. In this way the attempt is made to get material uniform in difficulty and without wide associative connections. The organism in learning it is made to function on almost an infantile plane. Short or long lists of these nonsense syllables may be made up and pre- sented to the subjects through the eye or the ear. The presenta- * Space limitations deter us from giving any discussion of the acquisi- tion of writing ( Judd, Freeman and others); of the studies on the associated action of the eyes in reading (Judd, Holt, Huey and others), or of the formation of the various types of language habits in deaf mutes with and without blindness. All of the researches in these fields contribute to our data on language organization in general and of the connection of laryngeal action with manual. The pathological literature on speech defects and the functional cases of stuttering and stammering are also oontributive.
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE HABITS 337 tion is repeated again and again until a certain standard pro- ficiency in the habit is obtained. Usually unless the effect of overtraining is being studied the standard is the ability to repeat the whole series in order once without error (Ebbinghaus). Some of the later investigators have demanded the ability to repeat the whole series twice. Concerning such acquisition the following summary of results may be given: