condition of "indefinite restlessness" toward a "plan" is the diagnosis, the definition of the restlessness. This involves the re-presentation in consciousness of the activities, out of which the restlessness has arisen. This re-presentation is also the beginning of the reconstruction. The diagnosis of the singing activity as being "out of tune" is the negative side of beginning to sing in tune. It is now a commonplace of psychology that all representation is reconstruction. And this is where Mr. Royce's emphasis of the symbolic, the algebraic, as against the copy type of representation, has its application. All we want here is some sort of an image--visual, auditory, motor, it matters not--that shall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities until they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the "pause of satisfaction."[203] But nowhere in all this is there any reference to the idea's object in the absolute system. Nor does there appear to be any call or place for such reference. The representation here is a part of the very process of forming the plan of further reconstruction out of the materials of the specific situation. Representation is not the plan's own end and aim. This is to stimulate a new set of activities that shall lead out of the present state of unrest and dissatisfaction.
It is also true, as already mentioned, that in the process of fulfilling the plan, of realizing the idea, further determination and specification is produced in the plan itself. The idea as a plan is certainly not formed all at once. Nor does it reach and maintain a fixed content. No purpose is ever realized in its original content. But this does not mean that its realization is, therefore, "partial," "incomplete," or "fragmentary." It is a part of its business to change. The purpose is not there for its own sake. The purpose is there as a _means_ to the reorganization and reconstruction of experience. It exists, as Mr. Royce says, as an instrument, "as a tool" for "introducing control into experience." And as, in the process of use, a tool always undergoes modification, so here, as an instrument for reconstructing habit, the plan, too, undergoes reconstruction. Indeed, as regards its content, it is itself, as Mr. Royce says, as much a habit, as much "the product of association," as any part of experience. The purposing function, the purposing activity, remains; its content is constantly shifting.
Here, too, is where "the submission of the idea to the object" takes place. Only, here, it is not a submission to an object already constituted as it is in Mr. Royce's conception of the absolute system.
The idea as an hypothetical plan of action, as a trial construction, must be tested by the activities it is attempting to reconstruct. That is to say, at this point the question is: Does the plan apply to the activities actually involved in the unrest? Has it diagnosed the case properly, and is it therefore one in and through which these activities can operate and come to unity again? The "submission" here is the submission of the purpose, the end, to the material out of which it is formed, and with which it must work. But again this material to which the idea submits itself is anything but finally fixed and "complete" in form. On the contrary, as we have seen, it is just the fragmentary and incomplete condition of this material that calls for the idea. Yet the idea as a plan must be true to its mission, and to this material, and in this sense must submit itself to whatever modifications and reconstruction the material "dictates" as necessary in order that it may function in and through the plan.[204] On the other hand--and this is the point to which Mr. Royce gives most emphasis--it is equally apparent that "the idea must determine its object." On this all philosophy, from Plato down, which approaches reality "from the side of ideas" is at stake. And this does not appear impossible if, again, the object is not already and eternally fixed and complete. If the object is one constructed out of the very mass of habit material which the idea is reconstructing, and if "determination" means not copying, but construction, then, indeed, must the idea "determine its object." Just for that does it have its being. That is its sole mission. Here the determination of the object by the idea is not a mere abstract postulate; it is not based upon a general consideration of the disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical assumptions, if it were not so determined. Here not only the general necessity for it, but the _modus operandi_ of this determination, is apparent. But, at the risk of tedious iteration, must it again be said that for the determination of the completed and perfected object in the absolute system not only is there nowhere any _modus_ to be found, but, even if there were, it is difficult to see what it would have to do with the kind of determination demanded by such a specific sort of unrest as "singing out of tune," etc. The process of submission is thus a reciprocal one. Neither in the object nor in the idea is there a fixed scheme or order _to_ which the other must submit and conform. And this is simply the logical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided affair, that determination must be reciprocal.
This brings us to what might as well have been our introductory as our concluding observation. It has just been said that the determination of the object by the idea is a vital matter in any philosophy which approaches reality "from the side of ideas." Such a way of approach must assert "the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as a fact."[205] Mr. Royce thus further states the case: I am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea, and how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality, you attack the world knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its meshes. This way is of course very ancient. It is the way of Plato...It is in a different sense the way of Kant. If you view philosophy in this fashion, you subordinate the study of the world as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea. Begin by accepting upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the world as fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery...The world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange contrasts...It baffles you with caprices like a charming and yet hopelessly wayward child, or like a bad fairy. The world of fact daily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery.[206] Here we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures the position which we have seen to be fraught with so many difficulties: the position, namely, which accepts to start with the opposition of the world as idea and the world as fact, as something given, instead of something to be accounted for; and which assumes that this opposition stands in the way of reaching reality, whereas it possibly may be of the very essence of reality. To be sure, the above statement of this opposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the expository starting-point. And it is true that the rest of the argument is occupied in the attempt to close this breach. But, as we have seen, except where the idea is expounded as a specific purpose, arising out of a specific experience of unrest, such as singing out of tune, etc.--except in this case, the breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is made by working forward from the opposition as given instead of back to its source. This opposition, of course, has its forward goal, but the difficulty is to find it without an exploration of its source. It is back in that matrix out of which the opposition has arisen that the line of direction to the goal is to be found.
Moreover, in starting from this opposition of fact and idea as given, the only method of quelling it seems to be either that of reducing one side to terms of the other, or of appealing to some new, and therefore external unifying, agency. But if the factors in the opposition are found, not one in submission _to_ the other, nor having the "primacy" _over_ the other, but as co-ordinate and mutually determining functions, developed from a common matrix and co-operating in the work of reconstructing experience, some of the difficulties involved in the alternative methods just mentioned appear to drop out.[207] The point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and ask just what is meant by "the defiantly mysterious," "baffling," and "capricious" character of the world as fact--as "brute reality." First, if by the world as "fact;" as "brute reality," we mean experience so brute that it is not yet "lighted up with ideas," it is difficult to see how it could be mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear only when experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes and an inquiry for connections and meanings has begun. That is to say, there can be neither mystery nor caprice except in relation to some sort of order. And order is always a matter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Royce's own statement on this point: We all of us from moment to moment have experience. This experience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade, sound and silence, pain and grief and joy...These given facts flow by; and were they all, our world would be too much of a blind problem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless presence.[208] If next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-ordinate with the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here, certainly, are not all on the side of the fact. Here, again, must they be functions of the relation between fact and idea. We have seen that without thought there is neither mystery nor caprice. The idea then cannot take part in the production of mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood. Of course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of this co-ordinate opposition of fact and idea. They are but the _first_ fruits--the relatively unorganized embryonic mass which through the further activities of the parent functions shall develop into the symmetry of truth and law.
There appears then no ultimate "primacy" of either idea or fact over the other. Nor does either appear as a better way of approach _to_ reality than the other. It is only when we say: "Lo! here in the idea," _or_ "Lo! there in the fact is reality," that we find it "imperfect," "incomplete," and "fragmentary," and must straightway "look for another." But surely not in "a certain absolute system of ideas," which is "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of faith and work, but never of present finding," shall we seek it. Rather precisely in the loving and hoping, desiring and willing, believing and working, shall we find that reality in which and for which both the "World as fact" and the "World as idea" have their being.
INDEX ABSOLUTE: as constituting reality, 348; as related to truth and error, 363 ff.; as a hypostatized abstraction, 369.
ABSOLUTE SELF, 330.
ACCESSORY: thought as, 58 ff.
ACTIVITY: as social, 74; thought as, 78; interrupted, and judgment, 154; and hypothesis, 170; (see Function, Reconstruction).
ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE: appreciative rather than reflective, 255; not a form of valuation, 339, 340.
ALTERNATIVES: in judgment, 155; (see Disjunction).
in relation to habit, 176.
ANAXAGORAS: in relation to the One and the Many, 219; his [Greek: nous], 220, 221.
ANAXIMANDER: and the infinite, 209; his process of segregation, 214, 215.
ANAXIMENES: his [Greek: archê], 209; his scheme of rarefaction and condensation, 209, 213, 215, 224.
ANIMISM, 49 note.
ANTECEDENTS OF THOUGHT (see Stimulus).
APPLIED LOGIC: Lotze's definition, 6.
APPRECIATION: distinguished from reflection, 255, 339; not to be identified with valuation, 320-24, 338.
[Greek: Archê]: meaning of search for, 211 ff.
ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS: refers to meanings, 33, 34; connection with thought, 80; doctrine of: analogous to subjectivism in ethics, 261; presupposes a mechanical metaphysics, 330, 331 note.
ATOMISTS: treatment of the One and the Many, 221.
AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS, 307, 333.
AUTHORITY AND CUSTOM: logic of attitude of obedience to, 286; social conditions compatible with dominance of, 286; failure of, as moral control, 286.
BACON: extreme empirical position, 156 ff.; view of induction, 157, 158.
"BAD": practical significance of, as moral predicate, 259; relation to "wrong," 335.
Becoming: as relative, 206.
"BEGRÜNDUNG" AND "BESTÄTIGUNG": Wundt's distinction of, 179; BIOLOGY: view of sensation, 58; use of, in logic, 374, 375.
(see Study V).
BRENTANO, 250 note.
BUTLER, J., 277.
CERTAIN, THE: relation to tension, 50, 51; as datum, 57.
COEFFICIENTS OF REALITY, PERCEPTION, AND RECOGNITION: defined, 263-7; present in economic and ethical experience, 267-9.
CONCEPTIONS: Lotze's view of, 59; Bacon's attitude toward, 157; relation to fact, 168; function in Greek philosophy, 342; (see Idea, Image, Hypothesis).
CONCEPTUAL LOGIC: as related to idea and image, 188-92.
CONSCIENCE: evolution of, 286, 287; ambiguous and transitional character of, 287; metaphysical implications of, as moral standard, 288; not autonomous, 288.
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: dangers of, consequent upon ideal of self-realization, 316; Green's defense of, referred to, 316 note.
CONSERVATION: of energy and mass, 206; (see Energy).
CONTENT OF KNOWLEDGE: and logical object, originates in tension, 49; thought's own, 65; and datum, 69; as truth, 79 ff.; as static and dynamic, 73, 93 ff., 110 ff.; (see Study IV; Objectivity, Validity).
CONTROL: idea and, 75, 129.
CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS, 171; in relation to habit, 176.
COPERNICUS: his theory, 178; compared with Galileo's supposition, 179-81.
COPULA, 118 ff.; scheme of mediation between subject and predicate, 208, 214 ff.
CORRESPONDENCE: of datum and idea, 51; as criterion of truth, 82 ff., 353 ff.
DATUM OF THOUGHT, 7, 8, 24; Lotze's theory of, stated, 55; criticised, 56 ff.; relation to induction, 61; and content, 60, 70; (see Study III; Content, Fact, Stimulus).
DEFINITION: invented by Socrates, 203.
DEMOCRITUS: attempts at definition, 203.
DEMONSTRATIVE JUDGMENT, 134.
DETERMINATION: as criterion of truth, 362 ff.; impossibility of complete, in finite experience, 364.
DEWEY, JOHN, 58 note, 86 note, 266 note 2, 316 note, 381 note.
DIALECTIC: Zeno as originator of, 203.
DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA, 222 ff.
DISJUNCTION: in judgment, 115, 138.
DYNAMIC: ideas as, and as static, 73, 76; reality as, 126.
EARTH: as an element, 213.
ECONOMIC JUDGMENT: involves same type of process as physical, 235; a process of valuation, 236; type of situation evoking, 241-6, 293-5, 302, 303; distinguished from ethical, 243 note, 246 note, 271, 302, 303; relation to physical, 246 note 3; subject of, the means of action, 259, 304; analysis of process of, 304-12; distinguished from "pull and haul," 237, 238; psychological account of, 310, 311; EHRENFELS, C. VON, 318 note.
EIDOLA: Bacon's view of, 157.
ELEATICS: their logical position, 216 ff.
ELEMENTS: as four, 213; as infinite, 213 ff.
EMPEDOCLES: attempts at definition, 203; treatment of the One and the Many, 218 ff.
and rationalism, 80; criticised, 156; Jevons, 169; treatment of imagery, 186-8.
ENDS: controlling factors in acquisition of knowledge, 229; may themselves be objects of attention and judgment, 233; judgment of, inseparable from factual judgment, 234; conflict of, related, the occasion for ethical judgment, 238-41; indirect conflict of unrelated, the occasion for economic judgment, 241-3; the subject-matter of ethical judgment, 258, 259; definition of, the goal of all judgment, 264, 272; not always explicit in judgment-process, 269, 270; nature of relation between, in ethical judgment, 273, 274, 291, 292; types of factual condition implied in acceptance of, 275, 276; warranted by factual judgment, 276; nature of, unrelatedness of, in economic judgment, 293-5, 302, 303; (see Purpose).
ENERGY: principle of conservation of, 206, 299, 300; not valid in sphere of valuation, 328.
principle of, in economic judgment, 308, 309; meaning of, 309 note.
origin of problem of, 344, 345.
ERDMANN, BENNO: concerning induction, 173.
ERROR: criterion of, 371.
ETHICAL JUDGMENT: involves same type of process as physical, 235; a process of valuation, 236, 332; type of situation evoking, 237-41, 291-4; distinguished from mechanical "pull and haul" between ends, 237, 238; distinguished from economic judgment, 243 note, 246 note, 271, 302, 303; subject of, an end of action, 258; analysis of process of, 295-302; EXISTENCE: EXPERIENCE: duality of, 16; logic of, 19-21; how organized, 42; relation of thought to organization of, 43-8; as disorganized, 75; (see Absolute, Functions).
EXPERIMENT: as form of deduction, 212.
FACT: as equivalent to datum, 26, 50 ff.; criteria for determining, 106 ff.; as reality, 110; in relation to both idea and reality, 380 ff.; and theory, conflict between, 150, 151; mutual dependence of, 168; Whewell's view of, 163; (see Datum, Idea, Reality, Truth).
FACTUAL JUDGMENT: inadequate to complete mediation of conduct, 230-34; controlled by ends, 269; incidental to judgments of valuation, 272, 295; types of, implied in acceptance of an end, 275, 276; presents warrant for acceptance of ends, 277.
FITE, W., 331 note.
FRAGMENTARY, 72; as quality of internal meaning, 360, 361; as an attribute of finite experience, 364, 376; (see Stimulus, Tension).
FUNCTIONS: OF EXPERIENCE, 16; logic of, 18, 23; distinguished from status, 16; total, as stimulus to thought, 36-8, 80; different, and logical distinctions, 42; different, confused by Lotze, 56; sensations as, 58.
GENETIC: method, significance of, 14, 15, 187; effect of ignoring, 53, 62, 71; (see Psychology).
"GOOD": practical significance of, as moral predicate, 259; relation to "right," 335.
GORGIAS, 225.
GREEK VIEW OF THOUGHT AND REALITY, 342 ff.
HABIT: relation of judgment to, interruption and resumption of, 154; and hypothesis, 170; and analogy, 176; and simple enumeration, 176; and conversion, 176; and logical meaning, 198; logical function of, 375, 376.
HERACLITUS: his position, 215 ff.
HIPPO, 209.
HOBBES, THOMAS, 301.
HOMOGENEITY: of the world-ground, 207; of the world, 209, 210.
HUTCHESON, F., 301.
HYPOTHESIS: nature of, VII, 143-83; unequal stress commonly laid on its origin, structure, and function, 143-5; relation of data and hypothesis strictly correlative, 145, 152, 168; as predicate, 146, 183; negative and positive sides of, 146, 155; came to be recognized with rise of experimentalism, 159; and test, 174, 175, 177 ff.; origin of, 170, 171 ff.; supposition and, 178; interdependence of formation and test of, 182.
IDEA: continuous with fact, 9, 10, 12; distinction from fact, 13, 110; association of, 33; contrast with datum, 52-4; functional conception of, 70, 112 ff.; objective validity of, 72-5; as entire content of judgment, 119; existential aspect of, 97, 99 ff., 113; in relation to reference, 97 ff., 103, 129; representational theory of, 100 ff., 113 ff., 141, 347 ff., 372 ff.; universality of, 97 ff., 113 ff.; as not referred to reality, 97 ff.; as forms of control, 129; function in judgment, 153, 154; distinguished from image, 183-93; distinction criticised, 199-202; problems accompanying discovery of, 341; in Greek thought, 342; instrumental and representative functions of, 346 ff., 372 ff.; purposive character of, 347 ff.; external and internal meaning of, 347 ff.; Royce's absolute system of, 348; triple relation to purpose in Royce's account, 349 ff.; logical _versus_ memorial, 351; in relation to fact and reality, 379 ff.; (see Hypothesis, Image, Predicate).
IDEAS: Platonic, 247.
IMAGE: as merely fanciful, 53; in relation to meaning, 54; place of, in judgment, 154; distinction from idea, 189-93; distinction criticised, 199-202; as direct and indirect stimulus, 195-7.
IMAGERY: empirical criteria of, 186; function of, 187; as representative, 186-8, 194; psychological function of, 193-7; logical function of, 198, 199.
IMMEDIATE: as related to mediation, 342, 350 ff.
IMPRESSION: objective determination of, 30, 31; objective quality of, 31, 68; as psychic, 53; as transformed by thought into meanings or ideas, 67 ff.; (see Idea, Meaning, Sensation).
INDETERMINATE: as quality of finite experience, 364.
INDUCTION: Bacon's view of, 157; by enumeration and allied processes, 171; and habit, 176; INFERENCE: Lotze's view of, 60; in relation to judgment, 117.
INSTRUMENTAL: as character of thought, 78-82, 128, 140, 346 ff., 372 ff.; (see Purpose).
INTERACTION: physical, 218 ff.
INTEREST: direction of, 205.
INVENTION: form of deduction, 212.
JAMES, WILLIAM, 81 note, 352 note, 375.
JONES, HENRY, 43 note, 59 note, 66.
JUDGMENT: Lotze's definition of, 59 and note; relation of, to ideas, 60; structure of, 75 note; Bosanquet's theory of, 86 ff.; as a function, 107 ff.; dead and live, 108; definition of, 86, 111; relation to inference, 116 ff.; limits of single, 123 ff.; negative, 114 ff.; of perception, 88 ff., 96; parts of, 118 ff., 207, 208; time relations of, 120 ff.; as individual, 136; as instrumental, 128, 140; as categorical and hypothetical, 136; as impersonal, 131; as intuitive, 139; various definitions of, 147 ff.; analysis of, 149 ff.; disjunctive, 155; psychology of, 153; purpose of, 154; and interrupted activity, 154; unique system of, 224-30; general analysis of, 230-32; purposive character of, 353 ff.; universal, 354; particular, 358; mathematical, 354 ff., 370; (see Economic, Ethical, Factual judgments, Copula, Predicate, Reflection, Subject).
KEPLER, 146, 181.
KNOWLEDGE: in relation to reality, 102 ff.; meaning and, 128; "copy" and "instrumental" theories of, 129, 140, 141; (see Judgment, Truth).
KÜLPE, O., 250 note.
LOGIC: origin of, 4; types of, 5-22; as generic and specific, 18, 23; effect of modern psychology upon, 345; relation to genetic method, 15-18; problems illustrated, 19, 20; social significance of, 20; eristic the source of formal, 203; pre-Socratic, 203; and epistemology, 341, 342; (see Epistemology, Psychology).
LOTZE: criticised, Studies II, III, IV; applied logic, 6; thought as accessory, 56; view of judgment, 147; similarity between him and Whewell, 165 note; MANY: the, and the One, 210 ff., 218 ff.
MARGINAL UTILITY: principle of, 307, 337 note.
Martineau, J., 262.
MATHEMATICS: certain forms of proof in, 172 ff.; judgments of, 354 ff., 370.
MEANING: as content of thought, 66 ff.; three types of, 68; as property of independent idea, 73-5; and association of ideas, 33, 80; and reference, 97; equivalent to response, 198; inner and outer, 347 ff.; (see Content, Idea, Reference).
MEANS: as external and constitutive, 78; reapplication of, the problem of economic valuation, 242, 243, 246, 259, 260, 303, 304; objective in so far as not known adequately for one's purpose, 256; definition of, incidental to all judgment, 272; factual determination of, sometimes determinative of ends also, 270.
MEDIATION: in relation to the immediate, 350 ff.
MELISSUS: his dialectic, 214.
and logic of experience, 13; as natural history, 13-18; worth, 19-22; logical and, 72, 74; (see Epistemology, Logic).
MIXTURE: logical meaning of idea of, 219, 220, 222.
MONISM, 224.
MOTION: conservation of, 206.
NEGATION, 97, 114 ff.
his notes for philosophizing, 159 note.
[Greek: Nomô] _versus_ [Greek: physei], 226.
NORMATIVE AND GENETIC, 16; (see End, Purpose, Validity, Value).
OBEDIENCE: a factor in genesis of morality, 257 (see also Authority and Custom).
OBJECT: socially current, 230; real, individual in significance, 230; nature of the ethical, 240, 328; of the economic, 259, 260, 328; (see Substance).
OBJECTIVITY: Lotze's view of, 68 (see Study IV); types of, 68; Lotze's distinction of logical and ontological, 72, 73; distinction denied, 341, 342; scope of conception of, 235; commonly denied to other than factual judgments, 247, 248; not a property of sense-elements as such, 248, 249; a category of "apperception," 250; a mark of the problematic as such, 250, 251, 255; not ascertainable by any specific method, 252; "obtrusiveness" as evidence of, 253; "reliability" as evidence of, 263; conditions of experience of, 253-6; conditions of, present in the ethical and economic situations, 257-60; a real characteristic of ethical and economic judgment, 261-3; not dependent on social currency, 318-20; nor on possibility of social currency, 320-24; nor on permanence, 324-9; (see Reality, Validity).
ONE: the, and the Many, 210 ff., 218 ff.
PARMENIDES: his logical position, 216 ff.; influence on Platonic-Aristotelian logic, 217.
PARTICIPATION: significance of, in Plato, 342 ff.
PARTICULARITY: of an idea, 99, 113; of a judgment, 358.
PERCEPTION: judgments of, 88 ff., 96.
PERFECT, THE, 126.
PHYSICAL JUDGMENT (see Factual judgment).
[Greek: Physei] _versus_ [Greek: nomô], 226.
[Greek: Physis], 207, 224.
PLATO, 53 note; on ideas and reality, 342 ff., 378, 379.
PLURALISM, 81 note.
POSITING: thought as, 68.
PREDICATE: how constituted, 75 note; in relation to reality, 101, 103; develops out of imaged end, 232; interaction with subject, 232; in ethical judgment, 258, 291-6; (see Copula, Judgment, Hypothesis, Idea, Image).
PREDICATION, 118 ff.
PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY: in Royce's philosophy, 368.
PROBLEMATIC (see Tension).
PROOF: of hypothesis, 174, 175; relation of, to origin of hypothesis, 179-82; PROPOSITION: and judgment, 118.
PROTAGORAS, 226.
PRUDENCE: ethical status of, as a virtue, 246.
PYTHAGOREANS, THE: their logical position, 216; use of experiment, 216.
PSYCHICAL: distinguished from physical, 25; Lotze's view of impression as barely, 27, 28, 30; two meanings of, 38 note; psychical mechanism, 31; idea as, 53; problem of logical and, 54 and note, 64; activity of thought also made, by Lotze, 77 and note; subjective result, 84; (see Impression).
PSYCHOLOGY: principle of, functional, 229, 230; genesis of, 280, 281; logical value of functional, 293.
PSYCHOLOGISTS' FALLACY, 37.
PURPOSE: logical aspects of, Study XI; in an idea, 347 ff.; in judgment, 353 ff.; in criterion of truth and error, 361 ff.; origin of, as idea, 373 ff.; as method, 377; (see End, Reconstruction).
QUALES: of sensation, 55, 56, 60 note.
QUALITIES: primary and secondary, 221.
QUESTION: and judgment, 97, 114 ff.
RATIONALISM: criticised, 156 ff., 188 ff., 298 ff.
RATIONALITY: of world, 206.
REALITY: as constructed by thought, 94 ff., 104; as developing, 126; as including fact and idea, 108, 110, 125, 382; as independent of thought, 85, 87 ff., 104; as subject of subject, 88 ff.; popular criterion of, 105 ff.; possibility of knowledge of, 91 ff., 102 ff., 125; for the individual, 94 ff., 103, 112, 224 ff.; as relative to judging, 149; as given in sensation, 160; "perception" and "recognition" coefficients of, 263-7, 277; these present in ethical and economical experience, 267-9; apprehension of, emotional, 263; scope of complete conception of, 235, 340; degrees of, 340; Platonic conception of, 343 ff.; Royce's conception of, 348; as related to fact and idea, 379 ff.; (see Fact, Truth, Validity).
REASON, SUFFICIENT: principle of, 206.
RECONSTRUCTION: effect of denying this, 47, 71, 72; data and, 49 ff.; (see Habit, Stimulus, Tension).
REFERENCE: as social, 74; problem of reference of ideas, 82 ff.; as meaning, 97 ff.; functional conception of, 113; paradox of, 99; idea as, 129.
REFLECTION: as derived, 1-12; naïve, 3, 9; _versus_ constitutive thought, 43-8; distinguished, 255; general nature of, 269; end not always explicit in, 270; outcome of, statable in terms of end or means, 272; (see Judgment, Thought).
REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT, 134.
REPRESENTATION: as one of the two functions of an idea, 345, 347 ff., 372; significance of, in ideal reconstruction, 376.
RESPONSE: failure of, and origin of judgment, 154.
RESTLESSNESS: as source of reflection and purpose, 374 ff.; (see Tension).
RHETORIC: origin of, 203, 204.
"RIGHT" (see "Good").
ROYCE, JOSIAH: referred to, 76 note, 147; theory of ideas discussed, 346-82; SATISFACTION: pause of, as marking attainment of truth, 362 ff.
SCIENCE: relation to naïve experience, 10, 11; its historic stages, 11, 12; distinction of logical procedure from epistemology, 13; same history as philosophy, 21, 22.
SELF, EMPIRICAL: genesis and content of concept of, 290, 292, 331, 332 note 1.
SELF, "ENERGETIC": implied in experience of "warrant," 277, 278; stimulus to development of concept of empirical self, 279-81; essential principle in all valuation, 281-5; evolution of moral attitude of reference to, 285-9; logical function of, in valuation, 296; important place in economic valuation, 308, 309; not capable of being described in terms of purpose or ideal, 313-16; Bradley's misinterpretation of, 332 note.
SELF-REALIZATION (see also Green, T. H.): theory of, as moral ideal futile, 298; logically congruous with determinism and hedonism, 330, 331.
SENSATIONS: logical import of, 57; as functions of experience, 58; as point of contact with reality, 90; place in judgment, 154; and ideas, 164 ff.; (see Impressions, Psychical).
SHAFTESBURY, 301.
SIGWART, C.: view of judgment, 147.
SKEPTICISM, 50 note, 85.
"SOCIAL CURRENCY": implies an identity of aspect of an object to different persons, 229; object having, an abstraction like social individual, 229; not a test of objectivity, 318-29.
SOCRATES: function of concept, 342.
SOPHISTS, THE, 225.
STANDARD (see also Predicate): identified with predicate in ethical judgment, 238-40; function of, in ethical judgment, 274, 299, 300; morphology and mode of reconstruction of, 296, 297; an ultimate ethical, impossible, 299; objectivity of, 300, 301.
STIMULUS: view criticised, 30-36; confusion of datum with, 61; defined, 75; and judgment, 153-4; as condition of thinking, 193 ff.; as direct and indirect, 195-7; of ethical judgment, 238-41, 291; of economic, judgment, 241-6, 302; (see Content, Datum).
STOUT, G. F.: referred to, 349.