172 OF GOVERNMENT.
dukes of Edom, and join them with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as examples of the exercise of true patriarchal government, if the exercise of patriarchal jurisdiction were intermitted in the world, whenever the heirs of Jacob had not supreme power? I fear, supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was not only intermitted, but from the time of the Egyptian bondage quite lost in the world, since it will be hard to find, from that time downwards, any one who exercised it as an inheritance descending to him from the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 1 imagined monarchical government would have served his turn in the hands of Pharaoh, or any body. But one cannot easily discover in all places what his discourse tends to, as par- ticularly in this place it is not obvious to guess what he drives at, when he says, the exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction in Egypt, or how this serves to make out the de- scent of Adams lordship to the patriarchs, or any body else.
§. 153. For I thought he had been giving us out of scripture, proofs and examples of mo- narchical government, founded on paternal au- thority, descending from Adam; and not an history of the Jcivs: amongst whom yet we find no kings, till many years after they were a people: and when kings were their rulers, there is not the least mention or room for a pretence that they were heirs to Adam, or kings by paternal authority. I expected, talk- OP GOVERNMENT. 173 OP GOVERNMENT. 173 ing so much as ho does of scripture, that he would have produced thence a series of mo- narch*, whose titles were clear to Adam's fatherhood, and who, as heirs to him, owned and exercised paternal jurisdietion over their subjects, and that this was the true patriarchi- cal government; whereas he neither proves, that the patriarchs were kings; nor that either kings or patriarchs were heirs to Adam, or so much is pretended to it: and one may as well prove, that the patriarchs were all absolute monarchs; that the power both of patriarchs and kings was only paternal; and that this power descended to them from Adam: I say all these propositions may be as well proved by a confused account of a multitude of little kings in the West- Indies, out of Ferdinando Soto, or any of our late histories of the Nor- thern America, or by our author's seventy kings of Greece, out of Homer, as by any thing he brings out of scripture, in that multitude of kings he has reekoned up.
§. 154. And methinks he should have let Homer and his wars of Troy alone, since his great zeal to truth or monarchy carried him to such a pitch of transport against philosophers and poets, that he tells us in his preface, that there are too many in these days, who please themselves in running after the opinions of phi- losophers and poets, to find out such an original of government, as might promise them some title to liberty, to the great scandal of Christi- 174 OF GOVERNMENT.
unity, and bringing in of atheism. And yet these heathens, philosopher Aristotle, and poet Homer, are not rejected by our zealous Chris- tian politician, whenever they offer any thing that seems to serve his turn; -whether to the great scandal of Christianity and bringing in of atheism, let him look. This I cannot but observe, in authors who it is visible -write not for truth, how ready zeal for interest and party is to entitle Christianity to their designs, and to charge atheism on those who will not with- out examining submit to their doctrines, and blindly swallow their nonsense.
But to return to his scripture history, our au- thor farther tells us, p. 18. that ajter the return of Me Israelites out of bondage, God, out of a special care of them, chose Moses and Joshua successively to govern as princes in the place and stead of the supreme fathers. If it be true, that they returned out of bondage', it must be into a state of freedom, and must imply that both before and after this bondage they were free, unless our author will sav, that chanirina: of masters is returning out of bondage; or that a slave returns out of bondage, when he is removed from one galley to another. If then they returned out of bondage, it is plain that in those days, whatever our author in his preface says to the contrary, there were difference between a son, a subject and a slave; and that neither the patriarchs before, nor their rulers after this Egyptian bondage, numbered their OF GOVERNMENT. 175 softs or subjects amongst their possessions, and disposed of them with as absolute a dominion, as they did their other goods.
§. 155. This is evident in Jacob, to whom Reuben offered his two sons as pledges; and Judah was at last surety for Benjamins safe return out of Egypt: which all had been vain, superfluous, and but a sort of mockery, if Jacob had had the same power over every one of his family as he had over his ox or his ass, as an owner over his substance; and the offers that Reuben or Judah made had been such a security for returning of Benjamin, as if a man should take two lambs out of his lord's flock, and offer one as security, that he will safely re- store the other.
§. 156. When they were out of this bondage, what then? God out of a special care of them, the Israelites. It is well that once in his book, he will allow God to have any care of the peo- ple; for in other places he speaks of mankind, as if God had no care of any part of them, but only of their monarchs, and that the rest of the people, the societies of men, were made as so many herds of cattle, only for the service, use, and pleasure of their princes.
§. 157. Chose Moses and Joshua successively to govern as princes; a shrewd argument our author has found out to prove that God's care of the fatherly authority, and Adams heirs, that here, as an expression of his care of his own people, he chooses those for princes over 176 OF GOVERNMENT.
them, that had not the least pretence to either. The persons chosen were, Moses of the tribe of Levi, and Joshua of the tribe of Ephraim, neither of which had any title of fatherhood. But says our author, they were in the place and stead of the supreme fathers. If God had any where as plainly declared his choice of such fathers to be rulers, as he did of Moses and Joshua, we might believe Moses and Joshua were in their jrfacc and stead: but that being the question in debate, till that be better proved, Moses being chosen by God to be ruler of his people, will no more prove that government be- longed to Adams heir, or to the fatherhood, than God's choosing Aaron of the tribe of Levi to be priest, will prove that the priesthood be- longed to Adams heir, or the prime fathers; since God would choose Aaron to be priest, and 3Ioses ruler in Israel, though neither of those offices were settled on Adams heir, or the fatherhood.
§. 158. Our author goes on, and after them likewise for a time he raised up judges, to de- fend his people in time of peril, p. 18. This proves fatherly authority to be the original of government, and that it descended from Adam to his heirs, just as well as what went before: only here our author seems to confess, that these judges, who were all the governors they then had, were only men of valour, whom they made their generals to defend them in time of peril; and cannot God raise up such men, unless fatherhood have a title to government?
OF GOVERNMENT. 177 §. 159. But says our author, when God gave the Israelites kings, he re-established the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government, p. 18.
§. 100. How did God re-establish it? by a law, a positive command? We find no such thing. Our author means then, that when God gave them a king, in giving them a king, he re-established the right, fyc. To re-establish de facto the right of lineal succession to pater- nal government, is to put a man in possession of that government which his fathers did enjoy, and he by lineal succession had a right to: for, first, if it were another government than what his ancestors had, it was not succeeding to an ancient right, but beginning a new one: for if a prince should give a man, besides his ancient patrimony, which for some ages his family had been disseized of, an additional estate, never before in the possession of his ancestors, he could not be said to re-establish the right of lineal succession to any more than what had been formerly enjoyed by his ancestors. If therefore the power the kings of Israel had, were any thing more than Isaac or Jacob had, it was not the re-establishing in them the right of succession to a power, but giving them a new power, however you please to call it, paternal or not: and whether Isaac and Jacob had the same power that the kings of Israel had, I desire any one, by what has been above said, to consider; and I do not think they will N N 178 OF GOVERNMENT.
find, that either Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, had any regal power at all.
§. 161. Next, there can be no re-establish- ment of the prime and ancient right of lineal succession to any thing, unless he, that is put in possession of it, has the right to succeed, and be the true and next heir to him he suc- ceeds to. Can that be a re-establishment which begins in a new family? or that the re- establishment of an ancient right of lineal suc- cession, when a crown is given to one, who has no right of succession to it, and who, if the lineal succession had gone on, had been out of all possibility of pretence to it? Saul, the first king God gave the Israelites, was of the tribe of Benjamin. Was the ancient and prime right of lineal succession re-established in him? The next was David, the youngest son of Jesse, of the posterity of Judah, Jacob's third son. Was the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government re-esta- blished in him? or in Solomon, his younger son and successor in the throne? or in Jeroboam over the ten tribes? or in Athaliah, a woman who reio-ned six vears an utter stranger to the royal blood? If the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government were re-established in any of these or their posterity, the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government belongs to younger brothers as well as elder, and may be re- established in any man living; for whatever OF GOVERNMENT. 179 younger brothers, by ancient and prime rigid of lineal succession, may have as well as the elder, that every living man may have a right to, by lineal succession, and Sir Robert as well as any other. And so what a brave right of lineal succession, to his paternal or regal go- vernment, our author has re-established, for the securing the rights and inheritance of crowns, where every one may have it, let the world consider.
§. 162. But says our author however, p. 19. Whensoever God made choice of any special per- son to be king, he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof, as being compre- hended sufficiently in the person of the father, although the father wets only named in the grant. This yet will not help out succession; for if, as our author says, the benefit of the grant be intended to the issue of the grantee, this will not direct the succession; since, if God give any thing to a man and his issue in general, the claim cannot be to any one of that issue in particular; every one that is of his race will have an equal right. If it be said, our author meant heir, I believe our author was as willing as any body to have used that word, if it would have served his turn: but Solomon, who succeeded David in the throne, being no more his heir than Jeroboam, who succeeded him in the government of the ten tribes, was his issue, our author had reason to avoid saying. That God intended it to the 180 OF GOVERNMENT.
180 OF GOVERNMENT.
heirs, when that would not hold in a succes- sion, which our author could not except against; and so he has left his succession as undetermined, as if he had said nothing about it: for if the regal power be given by God to a man and his issue, as the land of Canaan was to Abraham and his seed, must they not all have a title to it, all share in it? And one may as well say, that by God's grant to Abraham and his seed, the land of Canaan was to be- long only to one of his seed exclusive of all others, as by God's grant of dominion to a man and his issue, this dominion was to belong in peculiar to one of his issue exclusive of all others.
§. 163. But how will our author prove that whensoever God made choice of any special person to be a king, he intended that the (I suppose he means his) issue also should have benefit thereof? has he so soon forgot Moses and Joshua, whom in this very section, he says, God out of a special care chose to govern as princes, and the judges that God raised up? Had not these princes, having the authority of the supreme fatherhood, the same power that the kings had; and being specially chosen by God himself, should not their issue have the benefit of that choice, as well as David's or Solomons? If these had the paternal authority put into their hands immediately by God, why 1 1 ad not their issue the benefit of this grant in a succession to this power? or if they had it OF GOVERNMENT. 181 as Adams heirs, why did not their heirs enjoy it after them by right descending- to them? for they could not be heirs to one another. Was the power the same, and from the same origi- nal, in 3Ioses, Joshua and the Judges, as it was in David and the Kings; and was it inheritable in one, and not in the other? If it was not paternal authority, then God's own people were governed by those that had not paternal authority, and those governors did well enough without it: if it were paternal authority, and God chose the persons that were to exercise it, our author's ride fails, that whensoever God makes choice of any perso?i to be supreme ruler (for I suppose the name king has no spell in it, it is not the title, but the power makes the difference) he intends that the issue should have the benefit of it, since from their coming out of Egypt to David s time, four hundred years, the issue was never so sufficiently comprehended in the person of the father, as that any son, after the death of his father, succeeded to the government amongst all those judges that judged Israel. If, to avoid this, it be said, God always chose the person of the successor, and so, transferring the fatherly authority to him, excluded his issue from succeeding to it, that is manifestly not so in the story of Jeph- tha, where he articled with the people, and they made him judge over them, as is plain, Judges xi. §. 104. It is in vain then to say, that when- 182 OF GOVERNMENT.
soever God chooses any special person to have the exercise of paternal authority, (for if that be not to be king, 1 desire to know the difference between a king and one having the exercise of paternal authority) he intends the issue also should have the benefit of it, since we find the authority, the judges had, ended with them, and descended not to their issue; and if the judges had not paternal authority, I fear it will trouble our author, or any of the friends to his principles, to tell who had then the paternal authority, that is, the government and supreme power amongst the Israelites; and I suspect they must confess that the chosen people of God continued a people several hundreds of years, without any knowledge or thought of this paternal authority, or any appearance of monarchical government at all.
§. 1G5. To be satisfied of this, he need but read the story of the Levite, and the war there- upon with the Benjamites, in the three last chapters of Judges: and when he finds, that the Levite appeals to the people for justice that it was the tribes and the congregation, that debated, resolved, and directed all that was done on that occasion; he must conclude, either that God was not careful to preserve the fatherly authority amongst his own chosen people; or else that the fatherly authority may be preserved, where there is no monar- chical government; if the latter, then it will follow, that though fatherly authority be never OF GOVERNMENT. Iii3 so well proved, yet it will not inter a necessity of monarchical government; if the former, it will seem very strange and improbable, that God should ordain fatherly authority to be so sacred amongst the sons of men, that there could be no power, or government without it, and yet that amongst his own people, even whilst he is providing a government for them, and therein prescribes rules to the several states and rela- tions of men, this great and fundamental one, this most material and necessary of all the rest, should be concealed, and lie neglected for four hundred years after.
§. 166. Before I leave this, I must ask how our author knows that whensoever Clod makes choice of any special person to be king, lie intends that the issue shoutd have the benefit thereof '? Does God by the law of nature or revelation say so? By the same law also he must say, which of his issue must enjoy the crown in succession, and so point out the heir, or else leave his issue to divide or scramble for the government: both alike absurd, and such as will destroy the benefit of such grant to the issue. When any such declaration of Gods intention is produced, it will be our duty to believe God intends it so; but till that be done, our author must shew ns some better warrant, before we shall be obliged to receive him as the authentic revealer of God's in- tentions.
§. 167. The issue, says our author, is cornpre- 184 OF GOVERNMENT.
hended sufficiently in the person of the father, although the father only was named in the grant: and yet God, when he gave the land of Canaan to Abraham, Gen. xiii. 15. thought fit to put his seed into the grant too: so the priesthood was given to Aaron and his seed; and the crown God gave not only to David, but his seed also: and however our author assures us that God intends, that the issue should have the benefit of it, when he chooses any person to be king, yet we see that the kingdom which he gave to Saul, without mentioning his seed after him, never came to any of his issue: and why, when God chose a person to be king, he should intend, that his issue should have the benefit of it, more than when he chose one to be judge in Israel, I would fain know a reason; or why does a grant of fatherly authority to a king more comprehend the issue, than when a like grant is made to a judge? Is paternal authority by right to descend to the issue of one, and not of the other? There will need some reason to be shewn of this difference, more than the name, when the thing given is the same fatherly authority, and the manner of giving it, God's choice of the person, the same too; for I suppose our author, when he says, God raised up judges, will by no means allow, they were chosen by the people.
§. 168. But since our author has so confi- dently assured us of the care of God to preserve the fatherhood, and pretends to build all he OF GOVERNMENT. 105 says upon the authority of the scripture, we may well expect that that people, whose law, constitution and history is chiefly contained in the scripture, should furnish him with the clearest instances of God's care of preserving the fatherly authority, in that people who it is agreed he had a most peculiar care of. Let us see then what state this 'paternal authority or government was in amongst the Jews, from their beginning to be a people. It was omitted, by our author's confession, from their -coming into Egypt, till their return out of that bondage, above two hundred years: from thence till God gave the Israelites a king, about four hundred years more, our author gives but a very slender account of it; nor indeed all that time are there the least footsteps of paternal or regal govern- ment amongst them. But then says our author, (rod re-established the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government.
§. 1G9. What a lineal succession to paternal government was then established, we have already seen. I only now consider how long this lasted, and that was to their captivity, about five hundred years: from thence to their destruction by the Romans, above six hundred and fifty years after, the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government was again lost, and they continued a people in the promised land without it. So that of one thousand, seven hundred and fifty years that they were Gods peculiar people, they had 186 OF GOVERNMENT.
hereditary kingly government amongst them not one third of the time; and of that time there is not the least footstep of one moment of paternal government, nor the re-establishment of the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to it, whether we suppose it to be derived, a> from its fountain, from David, Saul, Abraham, or, which upon our author's principles, is the only true, from Adam.
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
§. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse, 1. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended: 2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it: 3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that deter- mines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and conse- quently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined: 4. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adams posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretence to ha the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance: 188 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the ru- lers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adams private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; -so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disor- der and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (tilings that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of design- ing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
§. 2. To this purpose, 1 think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power; that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his ser- vant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happen- ing sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another, and shew the difference be- twixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 189 §. 3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the re- gulating' and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.
CHAPTER II.
Of the State of Nature.
§. 4. To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of pet fee I freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident 190 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
§. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judi- cious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,