OF GOVERNMENT. 107 (lie portion of good tilings, and advantages of education naturally due to him, without empire and dominion. That (if his father hath any) was vested in him, for the good and behoof of others: and therefore the son cannot claim or inherit it by a title, which is founded wholly on his own private good and advantage.
§. 94. We must know how the first ruler, from whom any one claims, came by his au- thority, upon what ground any one has empire, what his title is to it, before we can know who has a right to succeed him in it, and inherit it from him: if the agreement and consent of men first gave a sceptre into any one's hand, or put a crown on his head, that also must direct its descent and conveyance; for the same authority, that made the first a lawful ruler, must make the second too, and so give right of succession: in this case inheritance, or primogeniture, can in itself have no pretence to it, any farther than that consent, which established the form of the government, »hath so settled the succession. And thus we see, the succession of crowns, in several countries, places it on different heads, and he comes by right of succession to be a prince in one place, who would be a subject in another.
§. 95. If God, by his positive grant and re- vealed declaration, first gave rule and dominion to any man, he that will claim by that title, must have the same positive grant of God for his succession: for if that has not directed the 108 OF GOVERNMENT.
course of its descent and conveyance down to others, nobody can succeed to this title of the first ruler. Children have no right of inheri- tance in this; and primogeniture can lay no claim to it, unless God, the author of this constitution, hath so ordained it. Thus we see, the pretensions of Saul's family, who re- ceived his crown from the immediate appoint- ment of God, ended with his reign; and David, by the same title that Saul reigned, viz. God's appointment, succeeded in his throne, to the exclusion of Jonathan, and all pretensions of paternal inheritance: and if Solomon had a right to succeed his father, it must be by some other title, than that of primogeniture. A cadet, or sister's son, must have the preference in succession, if he has the same title the first law- ful prince had: and in dominion that had its foundation only in the positive appointment of God himself, Benjamin, the youngest, must have the inheritance of the crown, if God so direct, as well as one of that tribe had the first possession.
§. 96. If paternal right, the act of begetting, give a man rule and dominion inheritance or primogeniture can give no title: for he that cannot succeed to his father's title, which was begetting, cannot succeed to that power over his brethren, which his father had by paternal right over them. But of this I shall have oc- casion to say more in another place. This is plain in the mean time, that any government, OF GOVERNMENT. I Of) whether supposed to be at first founded in paternal rigid, consent of the people, or the positive appointment of God himself, which ran supersede either of the other, and so begin a new government upon a new foundation; I say, any government began upon either of these, can by right of succession come to those only, who have the title of him they succeed to: power founded on contract can descend only to him, who has right by that contract: power founded on begetting, he only can have that begets; and power founded on the positive grant or donation of God, he only can have by right of succession, to whom that grant directs it.
§. 97. From what I have said, I think this is clear, that a right to the use of the creatures, being founded originally in the right a man has to subsist and enjoy the conveniencies of life; and the natural right children have to inherit the goods of their parents, being founded in the right they have to the same subsistence and commodities of life, out of the stock of their parents, who are therefore taught by natural love and tenderness to provide for them, as a part of themselves; and all this being only for the good of the proprietor, or heir; it can be no reason for children's inheriting of rule and dominion, which has another original and a different end. Nor can primogeniture have any pretence to a right of solely inheriting either property or power, as we shall, in its due 110 OF GOVERNMENT.
place, see more fully. It is enough to have shewed here, that Adam's property, or private dominion, could not convey any sovereignty or rule to his heir, who not having a right to in- herit all his fathers possessions, could not thereby come to have any sovereignty over his brethren: and therefore, if any sovereignty on account of his property had been vested in Adam, which in truth there was not, yet it would have died with him.
§. 98. As Adams sovereignty, if, by virtue of being proprietor of the world, he had any authority over men, could not have been in- herited by any of his children over the rest, because they had the same title to divide the inheritance, and every one had a right to a portion of his father's possessions; so neither could Adams sovereignty by right of father- hood, if any such he had, descend to any one of his children: for it being, in our author's account, a right acquired by begetting to rule over those he had begotten, it was not a power possible to be inherited, because the right being* consequent to, and built on, an act perfectly personal, made that power so too, and impos- sible to be inherited: for paternal power, being a natural right rising only from the relation of father and son, is as impossible to be inherited as the relation itself; and a man may pretend as well to inherit the conjugal power the hus- band, whose heir he is, had over his wife, as he can to inherit the paternal power of a father OF GOVERNMENT. Ill OF GOVERNMENT. Ill over his children: for the power of the husband being founded on contract, and the power of the father on begetting, he may as well inherit the power obtained by the conjugal contract, which was only personal, as he may the power obtained by begetting-, which could reach no farther than the person of the begetter, unless begetting can be a title to power in him that does not beget.
§. 90. Which makes it a reasonable question to ask, whether Adam, dying before Eve, his heir, (suppose Cain or Seth) should have by right of inheriting Adam s fatherhood, sovereign power over Eve his mother: for Adams father- hood being nothing but a right he had to govern his children, because he begot them, he that inherits Adams fatherhood, inherits nothing, even in our author's sense, but the right Adam had to govern his children, because he begot them: so that the monarchy of the heir would not have taken in Eve; or if it did, it being nothing but the fatherhood of Adam descended by inheritance, the heir must have right to govern Eve, because Adam begot her; for fatherhood is nothing else.
§. 100. Perhaps it will be said with our author, that a man can alien his power over his child; and what may be transferred by compact, may be possessed by inheritance. I answer, a father cannot alien the power he has over his child: he may perhaps to some degrees forfeit it, but cannot transfer it; and if any 112 OF GOVERNMENT.
112 OF GOVERNMENT.
other man acquire it, it is not by the fathers grant, but by some act of his own. For ex- ample, a father, naturally careless of his child, sells or gives him to another man; and he again exposes him; a third man finding him, breeds up, cherishes, and provides for him as his own: I think in this case, nobody will doubt, but that the greatest part of filial duty and subjection was here owing, and to be paid to this foster-father; and if any thing could be demanded from the child by either of the other, it could only be due to his natural father, who perhaps might have forfeited his right to much of that duty comprehended in the com- mand, Honour your parents, but could transfer none of it to another. He that purchased, and neglected the child, got by his purchase and grant of the father, no title to duty or honour from the child; but only he acquired it, who by his own authority, performing the office and care of a father, to the forlorn and perishing infant, made himself, by paternal care, a title to proportionable degrees of paternal power. This will be more easily admitted upon consi- deration of the nature of paternal power, for which I refer my reader to the second book.
§. 101. To return to the argument in hand; this is evident, That paternal power arising only from begetting, for in that our author places it alone, can neither be transferred nor inherited: and he that does not beget, can no more have paternal power, which arises from OF GOVERNMENT. 113 thence, than he can have a right to any thing, who performs not the condition, to which only it is annexed. If one should ask, by what law has a father power over his children? it will be answered, no doubt, by the law of nature, which gives such a power over them, to him that begets them. If one should ask likewise, by what law does our author's heir come by a right to inherit? I think it would be answered, by the law of nature too: for I find not that our author brings one word of scripture to prove the right of such an heir he speaks of. Why then the law of nature gives fathers paternal power over their children, because they did beget them; and the same law of nature gives the same paternal power to the heir over his brethren, who did not beget them: whence it follows, that either the father has not his paternal power by begetting, or else that the heir has it not at all; for it is hard to understand how the law of nature, which is the law of reason, can give the paternal power to the father over his children, for the only reason of begetting; and to the first-born over his brethren without this only reason, i. c. for no reason at all: and if the eldest, by the law of nature, can. inherit this paternal power, without the only reason that gives a title to it, s<> may the youngest as well as he, and a stranger as well as either; for where there is no reason for any our, as then- is not, but for him that begets, all have an equal title. I am i 1 14 OF GOVERNMENT.
sure our author offers no reason; and when any body does, we shall see whether it Avill hold or no.
§. 102. In the mean time it is as good sense to say, that by the law of nature a man has right to inherit the property of another, because he is of kin to him, and is known to be of his blood; and therefore, by the same law of nature, an utter stranger to his blood has right to inherit his estate; as to say that, by the law of nature, he that begets them has paternal power over his children, and therefore, by the law of nature, the heir that begets them not, has this paternal power over them; or suppo- sing the law of the land gave absolute power over their children, to such only who nursed them, and fed their children themselves, could any body pretend, that this law gave any one, who did no such thing, absolute power over those, who were not his children?
<§. 103. When therefore it can be shewed, that conjugal power can belong to him that is not an husband, it will also I believe be proved, that our author's paternal power, acquired by begetting, may be inherited by a son; and that a brother, as heir to his father's power, may have paternal power, over his brethren, and by the same rule conjugal power too: but till then, I think we may rest satisfied, that the paternal power of Adam, this sovereign autho- rity of fatherhood, were there any such, could not descend to, nor be inherited by, his next OF GOVERNMENT. ] 15 OF GOVERNMENT. ] 15 heir. Fatherly power, I easily grant our author, if it will do him any good, can never be lost, because it will be as long in the world as there are fathers: but none of them will have Adams paternal power, or derive their's from him; but every one will have his own, by the same title Adam had his, viz. by begetting', but not by inheritance, or succession, no more than husbands have their conjugal power by inheri- tance from Adam. And thus we see, as Adam had no such property, no such paternal poiver, as gave him sovereign jurisdiction over man- kind; so likewise his sovereignty built upon either of these titles, [if he had any such, could not have descended to his heir, but must have ended with him. Adam therefore, as lias been proved, being neither monarch, nor his imagi- nary monarchy hereditable, the power which is now in the world, is not that which was Adam's, since all that Adam could have upon our author's grounds, either of property or fatherhood, necessarily died with him, and could not be conveyed to posterity by inheri- tance. In the next place we will consider, whether Adam had any such heir, to inherit his power, as our author talks of.
116 OF GOVERNMENT.
CHAPTER X.
Of the Heir to Adam's Monarchical Power.
§. 104. Our author tells us, Observations, 253. That it is a truth undeniable, that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever, either great or small, though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world, but that in the same multitude, con- sidered by itself, there is one man amongst them, that in nature hath a right to be king of all the rest, as being the next heir to Adam, and all the other subjects to him: every man by nature is a king or a subject. And again, p. 20. If Adam himself ivere still living, and now ready to die, it is certain that there is one man, and but one in the world, ivho is next heir. Let this multitude of men be, if our author pleases, all the princes upon the earth, there will then be, by our authors rule, one amongst them, that in nature hath a right to be king of all the rest, as being the right heir to Adam; an excellent way to establish the thrones of princes, and settle the obedience of their subjects, by setting- up an hundred, or perhaps a thousand titles (if there be so many princes in the world) against any king now reigning, each as good, upon our author's grounds, as his who wears the crown. If this right of heir carry any weight with it, if it be the ordinance of God, as our OF GOVERNMENT. 1 17 tuthor seems to tell us, Observations, 241. must not all be subject to it, from the highest to the lowest? Can those who wear the name of princes, without having the right of being heirs to Adam, demand obedience from their subjects by this title, and not be bound to pay it by the s;une law? Either governments in the world are not to be claimed, and held by this title of Adam's heir; and then the starting of it is to. no purpose, the being or not being Adam's heir, signifies nothing as to the title of dominion: or if it really be, as our author says, the true title to government or sovereignty, the first thing to be done, is to find out this true heir of Adam, scat him in his throne, and then all the kings and princes of the world ought to come and resign up their crowns and sceptres to him, as things that belong no more to them, than to any of their subjects.
§. 105. For either this right in nature, of Adams heir, to be king over all the race of men, (for all together they make one multitude) is a right not necessary to the making of a lawful king, and so there may be lawful kings without it, and then kings titles and power depend not on it; or else all the kings in the world but one are not lawful kings, and so have no right to obedience: either this title of heir to Adam is that whereby kings hold their crowns, and have a right to subjection from their subjects, and then one only can have it, ind the rest being subjects can require no 118 OF GOVERNMENT.
obedience from other men, who are but their fellow-subjects; or else it is not the title whereby kings rule, and have a right to obe- dience from their subjects, and then kings are kings without it, and this dream of the natural sovereignty of Adams heir is of no use to obedience and government: for if kings have a right to dominion, and the obedience of their subjects, who are not, nor can possibly be, heirs to Adam, what use is there of such a title, when we are obliged to obey without it? If kings, who are not heirs to Adam, have no right to sovereignty, we are all free, till our author, or any body for him, will shew us Adam's right heir. If there be but one heir of Adam, there can be but one lawful king in the world, and nobody in conscience can be obliged to obedience till it be resolved who that is; for it may be any one, who is not known to be of a younger house, and all others have equal titles. If there be more than one heir of Adam, every one is his heir, and so every one has regal power: for if two sons can be heirs together, then all the sons are equally heirs, and so all arc heirs, being all sons, or sons sons of Adam. Betwixt these two the right of heir cannot stand; for by it either but one only man, or all men are kings. Take which you please, it dissolves the bonds of government and obedience; since, if all men are heirs, they can owe obedience to nobody; if only • mi be obliged to pay ol>< di< m - him, till he be known, and his t it 1« made out OF GOVERNMENT 119 CHAPTER XI. Who HEIR?
§. 106. The great question which in all ages has disturbed mankind, and brought on them the greatest part of those mischiefs which have ruined cities, depopulated countries, and disordered the peace of the world, has been, not whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who should have it. The settling of this point being of no smaller mo- ment than the security of princes, and the peace and welfare of their estates and king- doms, a reformer of politics, one would think, should lay this sure, and be very clear in it: for if this remain disputable, all the rest will be to very little purpose; and the skill used in dressing up power with all the splendour and temptation absoluteness can add to it, without shewing who has a right to have it, will serve only to give a greater edge to man's natural ambition, which of itself is but too keen. What can this do but set men on the more eagerly to scramble, and so lay a sure and lasting foun- dation of endless contention and disorder, instead of that peace and tranquillity, which is the business of government, and the end of human society?
§. 107. This designation of the person our author is more than ordinary obliged to take 120 OF GOVERNMENT.
care of, because he, affirming that the assign- ment of civil poiver is by divine institution, hath made the conveyance as well as the power itself sacred: so that no consideration, no act or art of man, can divert it from that person, to whom, by this divine right, it is assigned; no necessity or contrivance can substitute another person in his room: for if the assign- ment of civil power be by divine institution, and Adams heir be he to whom it is thus assigned, as in the foregoing chapter our author tells us, it would be as much sacrilege for any one to be king, who was not Adams heir, as it would have been amongst the Jews, for any one to have been priest, who had not been of Aaron s posterity: for not only the priesthood in general being by divine institution, but the assignment of it to the sole line and posterity of Aaron, made it impossible to be enjoyed or exercised by any one, but those persons who were the offspring of Aaron: whose succession therefore was carefully observed, and by that the persons who had a right to the priesthood certainly known.
§. 108. Let us see then what care our author has taken, to make us know who is this heir, who by divine institution has a right to be king over all men. The first account of him we meet with is, p. 12. in these words: This sub- jection of children, being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God him- wff> it follows, that civil power, not only in OF GOVERNMENT. 121 general, is by divine institution, bat even the, assignment of it, specifically to Ike eldest parents. Matters of such consequence as this is, should be in plain words, as little liable, as might be, to doubt or equivocation; and I think, if language be capable of expressing any thing distinctly and clearly, that of kindred, and the several degrees of nearness of blood, is one. It were therefore to be wished, that our author had used a little more intelligible expressions here, that we might have better known, who it is, to whom the assignment of civil power is made by divine institution; or at least would have told us what he meant by eldest parents: for I believe, if land had been assigned or granted to him, and the eldest parents of his family, he would have thought it had needed an interpreter; and it would scarce have been known to whom it next belonged.
^. 109. In propriety of speech, (and certainly propriety of speech is necessary in a discourse of this nature) eldest parents signifies either the eldest men and women that have had children, or those who have longest had issue; and then our author's assertion will be, that those fathers and mothers, who have been longest in the world, or longest fruitful, have by divine insti- tution a right to civil potter. If there be any absurdity in this, our author must answer for it: and if his meaning be different from my explication, he is to be blamed, that he would not speak it plainly. This I am sure, parents 122 OF GOVERNMENT.
122 OF GOVERNMENT.
cannot signify heirs male, nor eldest parents an infant child: who yet may sometimes be the true heir, if there can be but one. And we are hereby still as much at a loss, who civil power belongs to, notwithstanding this assignment by divine institution, as if there had been no such assignment at all, or our author had said no- thing of it. This of eldest parents leaving us more in the dark, who by divine institution has a right to civil power, than those who never heard any thing at all of heir, or descent, of which our author is so full. And though the chief matter of his writing be to teach obedience to those, who have a right to it, which he tells us is conveyed by descent, yet who those are, to whom this right by descent belongs, he leaves, like the philosophers stone in politics, out of the reach of any one to discover from his writings.
§. 110. This obscurity cannot be imputed to want of language in so great a master of style as Sir Robert is, when he is resolved with himself what he would say: and therefore, I fear, finding how hard it would be to settle rules of descent by institution, and how little it would be to his purpose, or conduce to the clearing and establishing the titles of princes, if such rules of descent were settled, he chose rather to content himself with doubtful and general terms, which might make no ill sound in nuns ears, who were willing to be pleased with them, rather than offer any clear rules of OF GOVERNMENT. 123 descent of this fatherhood of Adam, by which men's consciences might be satisfied to whom it descended, and know the persons who had a right to regal power, and with it to their obedience.
§. 111. How else is it possible, that laying so much stress, as he does, upon descent, and Adam's heir, next, heir, true heir, he should never tell us what heir means, nor the way to know who the next or true heir is? This, I do not remember, he does any where expressly handle; but, where it comes in his way, very warily and doubtfully touches; though it be so necessary, that without it all discourses of government and obedience upon his principles would be to no purpose, and fatherly poiver, never so well made out, will be of no use to any body. Hence he tells us, Observations, 244. That not only the constitution of power in general, but the limitation of it to one kind, (i. e.) monarchy, and the determination of it to the individual person and line of Adam, are all I /tree ordinances of God; neither Eve nor her children could either limit Adam's poiver, or join others with him; and what ivas given unto Adam ivas given in his person to his posterity. Here again our author informs us, that the divine ordinance hath limited the descent of Adam's monarchical power. To whom? To Adam's lint and posterity, says our author. A (table limitation, a limitation to all mankind: if our author can find any one amongst 124 OF GOVERNMENT.
mankind, that is not of the li?ie and posterity of Adam, he may perhaps tell him, who this next heir of Adam is: but for us, I despair how this limitation of Adam's empire to his tine and posterity will help us to find out one heir. This limitation indeed of our author will save those the labour, who would look for him amongst the race of brutes, if any such there were; but will very little contribute to the discovery of one next heir amongst men, though it make a short and easy determination of the question about the descent of Adam's regal power, by telling us, that the line and posterity of Adam is to have it, that is, in plain English, any one may have it, since there is no person living that hath not the title of being of the line and posterity of Adam; and while it keeps there, it keeps within our author's limitation by God's ordinance. Indeed, p. 19. he tells us, that such heirs are not only lords of their own children, but of their brethren; whereby, and by the words following, which we shall consider anon, he seems to insinuate, that the eldest son is heir; but he no where, that I know, says it in direct words, but by the instances of Cain and Jacob, that there follow, we may allow this to be so far his opinion concerning heirs, that where there are divers children, the eldest son has the right to be heir. That primogeniture cannot give any title to paternal power, we have already shewed. That a father may have a natural right to OF GOVERNMENT. 125 some kind of power over his children, is easily granted; hut that an elder brother has so over his brethren, remains to be proved: God or nature has not any where, that I know, placed such jurisdiction in the first-born; nor can reason find any such natural superiority amongst brethren. The law of Moses gave a double portion of the goods and possessions to the eldest; but we find not any where that na- turally, or by God's institution, superiority or dominion belonged to him, and the instances there brought by our author are but slender proofs of a right to civil power and dominion in the first-born, and do rather shew the contrary.
§. 1 12. His words are in the forecited place: And therefore ivefind God told Cain of his bro- ther Abel: his desire shall be subject unto thee, and thou shall rule over him. To which 1 answer, 1. These words of God to Cain, are by many interpreters, with great reason, understood in a quite different sense than what our author uses them in.
2. Whatever was meant by them, it could not be, that Cain, as elder, had a natural do- mion over Abel; for the words are conditional, If thou dost well: and so personal to Cain: and whatever was signified by them, did de- pend on his carriage, and not follow his birth- right; and therefore could by no means be an establishment of dominion in the first-born 120 OF GOVERNMENT.
in general: for before this Abel had his distinct territories by right of private dominion, as our author himself confesses, Observations, 210, which he could not have had to the prejudice of the heirs title, if by divine institution, Cain as heir were to inherit all his father's dominion.