Set up and electrotyped. Published March, 1908. Reprinted August, 1908.
NortoootJ J. 8. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
PREFACE IN 1906 and 1907 I gave, as a part of my regular work at the Summer School of Har vard University, an " Introduction to Ethics, with Special Reference to the Interests of Teachers." A few lectures, summing up the main principles that lay at the basis of this ethical course as it had been given in the summer of 1906, were delivered in January and February, 1907, before a general academic audience, during a brief visit of mine at the University of Illinois. In several other places, both in the West and in the East, I have also presented portions of my views upon ethics; and in the summer of 1907 four general lectures on the topic were repeated before the Summer School of Theology at Harvard. In November and December of 1907 the lectures that constitute the present book were delivered for the first time before the Lowell Institute in Boston.
vi PREFACE vi PREFACE In preparing this new statement of my case for the Lowell Institute course, I thus had the opportunity to use the experience and the criticisms that had resulted from several previous efforts of mine to set forth my views about the topics treated in this " Philosophy of Loyalty." The Lowell Institute lectures were, in fact, substantially a fresh presenta tion of the material, — only Lecture V, on " American Problems," retaining any large portion of the text of any of my former lec tures. But, as the reader may see from the foregoing statement, the general doctrine con tained in " The Philosophy of Loyalty " here worked out has been discussed, in various forms, and with a good many friends, pupils, and critics. I hope, therefore, that this book bears marks of the aid that I have gained from such contact with many sorts of minds, in widely different places.
During the present academic year, 1907- 1908, the doctrine here presented has also been put into the form of a regular college course, which I have been permitted, as PREFACE vii visiting lecturer, to give to undergraduate students at Yale University in weekly class- meetings.
The present book, although in this way related to present and past academic tasks, is, nevertheless, not a text-book, and does not mean to be an elaborately technical philo sophical research. It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals, and who may also be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philosophical spirit. Loyalty is indeed an old word, and to my mind a precious one; and the general idea of loyalty is still far older than the word, and is immeasurably more precious. But this idea has nearly always been confused in men's minds by its chance social and traditional associations. Everybody has heard of loyalty; most prize it; but few perceive it to be what, in its in most spirit, it really is, — the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all duties. In order to be able to see that this is the true meaning of the idea of loyalty, one has to free viii PREFACE this idea from its unessential if somewhat settled associations with this or that special social habit or circumstance. And in order to accomplish this latter end, one has indeed to give to the term a more exact meaning than popular usage defines.
It is this freeing of the idea of loyalty from its chance and misleading associations; it is this vindication of the spirit of loyalty as the central spirit of the moral and reasonable life of man, — it is this that I believe to be some what new about my " Philosophy of Loyalty." The conception of " Loyalty to Loyalty," as set forth in my third lecture, constitutes the most significant part of this ethical task. For the rest, if my philosophy is, as a theory, more or less new, I am still only trying to make articulate what I believe to be the true spirit and meaning of all the loyal, whoever they may be, and however they define their fidelity.
The result of conceiving duty in terms of the conception of loyalty which is here ex pounded is, indeed, if I am right, somewhat deep-going and transforming, not only for PREFACE ix ethics, but for most men's views of truth and reality, and of religion. My own general philosophical opinions have been set forth in various works some time since (most elabo rately in the volumes entitled " The World and the Individual "). I have no change to report in my fundamental metaphysical theses. But I have not published any formulation of my ethical opinions since the brief review of ethical problems in the first part of my " Religious Aspect of Philosophy " (published in 1885). One learns a good deal about ethics as one matures. And I believe that this present statement of mine ought to help at least some readers to see that such philo sophical idealism as I have long maintained is not a doctrine remote from life, but is in close touch with the most practical issues; and that religion, as well as daily life, has much to gain from the right union of ethics with a philosophical theory of the real world.
At the moment there is much speech, in current philosophical literature, regarding the "nature of truth" and regarding " pragx PREFACE matism." An ethical treatise very naturally takes advantage of this situation to discuss the relation between the " practical " and — the Eternal. I have done so in my closing lectures. In order to do so, I have had to engage in a certain polemic regarding the problem of truth, — a polemic directed against certain opinions recently set forth by one of the dearest of my friends, and by one of the most loyal of men; my teacher for a while in my youth; my honored colleague for many years, — Professor William James. Such a polemic would be indeed much out of place in a book upon Loyalty, were it not that my friend and myself fully agree that, to both of us, truth indeed " is the greater friend." Had I not very early in my work as a student known Professor James, I doubt whether any poor book of mine wrould ever have been written, — least of all the present one. What I personally owe him, then, I most heartily and affectionately acknowledge. But if he and I do not see truth in the same light at present, we still do well, I think, as friends, PREFACE xi PREFACE xi each to speak his mind as we walk by the way, and then to wait until some other light shines for our eyes. I suppose that so to do is loyalty.
Meanwhile, I am writing, in this book, not merely and not mainly for philosophers, but for all those who love, as I said, ideals, and also for those who love, as I may now add, their country, — a country so ripe at present for idealism, and so confused, nevertheless, by the vastness and the complication of its social and political problems. To simplify men's moral issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win hearts for loyalty, — this would be, in this land, a peculiarly precious mission, if indeed I could hope that this book could aid, however little, towards such an end.
Amongst the numerous friends to whom (whether or no they agree with all my views) I am especially indebted for direct and in direct aid in preparing this book, and for criticisms and other suggestions, I must men tion: first, my wife, who has constantly xii PREFACE xii PREFACE helped me with her counsel, and in the revision of my text; then, my sister, Miss Ruth Royce, of San Jose, California, with whom I discussed the plan of the work in the summer of 1907; then, Doctor and Mrs. R. C. Cabot of Boston; Doctor J. J. Putnam of Boston; and, finally, my honored col league, Professor George H. Palmer.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, CONTENTS LKOTUKK PAOB I. NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY.. 1 II. INDIVIDUALISM...49 III. LOYALTY TO LOYALTY...99 IV. CONSCIENCE 147 V. SOME AMERICAN PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELA TION TO LOYALTY 197 VI. TRAINING FOR LOYALTY...249 VII. LOYALTY, TRUTH, AND REALITY...299 VIII. LOYALTY AND RELIGION 349 xiii I NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY LECTURE I THE NATURE AND THE NEED OF LOYALTY ONE of the most familiar traits of our time is the tendency to revise tradition, to reconsider the foundations of old beliefs, and sometimes mercilessly to destroy what once seemed indispensable. This disposition, as we all know, is especially prominent in the realms of social theory and of religious be lief. But even the exact sciences do not escape from the influence of those who are fond of the reexamination of dogmas. And the modern tendency in question has, of late years, been very notable in the field of Ethics. Conventional morality has been required, in company with religion, and also in com pany with exact science, to endure the fire of criticism. And although, in all ages, the moral law has indeed been exposed to the assaults of the wayward, the peculiar moral situation of our time is this, that it is no longer either the flippant or the vicious who 3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY are the most pronounced or the most dan gerous opponents of our moral traditions. Devoted reformers, earnest public servants, ardent prophets of a coming spiritual order, — all these types of lovers of humanity are represented amongst those who to-day de mand great and deep changes in the moral standards by which our lives are to be gov erned. We have become accustomed, during the past few generations, — during the period of Socialism and of Individualism, of Karl Marx, of Henry George, of Ibsen, of Nietz sche, of Tolstoi, --to hear unquestionably sincere lovers of humanity sometimes declar ing our traditions regarding the rights of property to be immoral, and sometimes as sailing, in the name of virtue, our present family ties as essentially unworthy of the highest ideals. Individualism itself, in many rebellious forms, we often find asserting that it speaks in the name of the true morality of the future. And the movement begun in Germany by Nietzsche — the tendency towards what that philosophical rhapsodist NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY called the "transmutation of all moral val ues " - has in recent years made popular the thesis that all the conventional morality of the past, whatever may have been its in- evitableness, or its temporary usefulness, was in principle false, was a mere transition stage of evolution, and must be altered to the core. "Time makes ancient good uncouth": in this well-known word one might sum up the spirit of this modern revolt against moral traditions. Now when we review the recent moral controversies that express this sort of ques tioning, some of us find ourselves especially troubled and bewildered. We all feel that if the foundations of the exact sciences are to be criticised by the restless spirit of our reforming age, the exact sciences are indeed well able to take care of themselves. And as for religion, — if its fortunes have indeed, of late, deeply troubled and perplexed many gentle hearts, still both believers and doubters have now generally come to view with a cer tain resignation this aspect of the fate of our time, whether they regard religious doubt as 5 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY the result of God's way of dealing with a way ward world, or as a sign of man's transition to a higher stage of enlightenment.
But restlessness regarding the very founda tions of morality - - that seems to many of us especially discouraging. For that concerns both the seen and the unseen world, both the truths that justify the toil spent upon exact science, and the hopes for the love of which the religions of men have seemed dear. For what is science worth, and what is religion worth, if human life itself, for whose ennoble ment science and religion have both labored, has no genuine moral standards by which one may measure its value? If, then, our moral standards themselves are questioned, the iron of doubt — so some of us feel — seems to enter our very hearts.
I In view, then, of the fact that the modern tendency to revise traditions has inevitably extended itself, in new ways, to the region of morals, I suppose that a study of some of 6 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY the foundations of the moral life is a timely undertaking. It is such an undertaking that I propose as the task of the present course of lectures. My purpose, in these discussions, is both a philosophical and a practical pur pose. I should indeed be glad, if there were time, to attempt, in your company, a systematic review of all the main problems of philosoph ical ethics. That is, I should like, were that possible, to discuss with you at length the nature, the foundation, and the truth of the moral law, approaching that problem from all those various sides which interest philoso phers. And, as a fact, I shall indeed venture to say something, in the course of these lec tures, regarding each of these topics. But I well know that there is no space, in eight lectures, for any adequate treatment of that branch of philosophy which is called Ethics. Nor do you come here merely or mainly for the sake of hearing what a student of philoso phy chances to think about the problems of his own calling. Accordingly, I shall not try, in this place, to state to you any system of moral 7 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY philosophy. Rather is it the other aspect of my purpose in appealing to you — the prac tical aspect, which I must especially try to bear in mind throughout these lectures.
Our age, as I have said, is a good deal per plexed regarding its moral ideals and its stand ards of duty. It has doubts about what is really the best plan of human life. This per plexity is not wholly due to any peculiar way wardness of our time, or to any general lack of moral seriousness. It is just our moral leaders, our reformers, our prophets, who most perplex us. Whether these revolutionary moral teachers are right or wrong, they beset us, they give us no rest, they call in doubt our moral judgments, they undertake to "trans mute values." And the result, for many of us, is a practical result. It tends to deprive us of that confidence which we all need in order to be ready to do good works. It threatens to par alyze the effectiveness of many conscientious people. Hence any effort to reason calmly and constructivelv about the foundations of the «/ moral life may serve, not merely to clarify our 8 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY minds, but to give vigor to our deeds. In these lectures, then, I shall ask you to think indeed about moral problems, but to think for the sake of action. I shall try to give you some fragments of a moral philosophy; but I shall try to justify the philosophy through its appli cation to life. I do not much care whether you agree with the letter of any of my philo sophical formulas; but I do want to bring to your consciousness, by means of these formu las, a certain spirit in terms of which you may henceforth be helped to interpret the life that we all in common need to live. Meanwhile, I do not want merely to refute those reformers and prophets of whose perplexing assaults upon our moral traditions I have just spoken, nor yet do I want to join myself with them in perplexing you still further. I want, as far as I can, to indicate some ways whereby we may clarify and simplify our moral situation.
I indeed agree with the view that, in many ways, our traditional moral standards ought to be revised. We need a new heaven and a new earth. We do well to set out to seek for both, 9 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY however hard or doubtful may be the quest. In so far as our restlessness about moral matters — our unsettlement — implies a sense of this need, it is a good thing. To use a com parison suggested by modern Biblical criticism — our conventional morality is indeed a sort of Pentateuch, made up of many ancient docu ments. It has often been edited afresh. It needs critical re examination. I am a student of philosophy. My principal business has always been criticism. I shall propose noth ing in this course which I have not tried to submit to critical standards, and to revise repeatedly.
But, on the other hand, I do not believe that unsettlement is finality. Nor to my mind is the last word of human wisdom this: that the truth is inaccessible. Nor yet is the last word of wisdom this: that the truth is merely fluent and transient. I believe in the eternal. I am in quest of the eternal. As to moral stand ards, in particular, I do not like that mere homesickness and spiritual estrangement, and that confusion of mind about moral ideals, 10 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY which is nowadays too common. I want to know the way that leads our human practical life homewards, even if that way prove to be infinitely long. I am discontented with mere discontent. I want, as well as I can, not merely to help you to revise some of your moral standards, but to help you to give to this revision some definitive form and tendency, some image and hint of finality.
Moreover, since moral standards, as An tigone said, are not of to-day or yesterday, I believe that revision does not mean, in this field, a mere break with the past. I myself have spent my life in revising my opinions. And yet, whenever I have most carefully re vised my moral standards, I am always able to see, upon reviewing my course of thought, that at best I have been finding out, in some new light, the true meaning that was latent in old traditions. Those traditions were often better in spirit than the fathers knew. We who revise may sometimes be able to see this better meaning that was latent in forms such as are now antiquated, and perhaps, in their 11 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY old literal interpretation, even mischievous. Revision does not mean mere destruction. We can often say to tradition: That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die. But we can sometimes see in the world of opinion a sort of resurrection of the dead, — a resur rection wherein what was indeed justly sown in dishonor is raised in honor, — glorified, — and perhaps incorruptible. Let us bury the natural body of tradition. What we want is its glorified body and its immortal soul.
II I have entitled these lectures, "The Phi losophy of Loyalty." I may as well confess at once that my title was suggested to me, early last summer, by a book that I read — a recent work by a distinguished ethnologist, Dr. Ru dolf Steinmetz of The Hague, entitled "The Philosophy of War." War and loyalty have been, in the past, two very closely associated ideas. It will be part of the task of these lec tures to break up, so far as I can, in your own minds, that ancient and disastrous association, 12 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY and to show how much the true conception of loyalty has been obscured by viewing the warrior as the most typical representative of rational loyalty. -Siejnjnefe, however, accepts, /^ in this respect, the traditional view. According to him, war gives an opportunity for loyal devotion ^o notable and important that, IT" war were altogether abolished, one of the greatest goods of civilization would thereby be hopelessly lost. I am keenly conscious of the sharp contrast between Steinmetz's theory of v^ loyalty and my own. I agree with Steinmetz, as you will later see, regarding the significance of loyalty as a central principle of the moral life. I disagree with him very profoundly as to the relation of war both to true loyalty and to civilization in general. The very contrast has suggested to me the adoption of the form of title which Steinmetz has used.
The phrase, "Philosophy of Loyalty," is intended to indicate first, that we are here to consider loyalty as an ethical principle. For philosophy deals with first principles. And secondly, my title means to suggest that we 13 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY are to view the matter critically and dis criminatingly, as well as practically. For philosophy is essentially a criticism of life. Not everything, then, that calls itself loyalty, and not every form of loyalty, shall be put in our discussion on the same level with every other moral quality that uses or that deserves the ancient name in question. Moreover, the term "loyalty" comes to us as a good old^ popular wordT without any exact definition. We are hereafter to define ourjterm as.pre cisely as possible, yet so as to preserve the spirit of the former usage. In estimating the place of loyalty in the moral life, we are, more over, to follow neither traditional authority nor the voice of private prejudice. We are to use our reason as best we can; for philoso phy is an effort to think out the reasons for our opinions. We are not to praise blindly, nor to condemn according to our moods. Where loyalty seems to be a good, we are to see why; when what men call loyalty leads them astray, we are to find wherein the fault lies. Since loyalty is a relative term, and al- 14 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY ways implies that there is some object, some cause, to which any given loyalty is to be shown, we must consider what are the fitting objects of loyalty. In attempting an answer to these various questions, our philosophy of loyalty must try to delve down to the roots of human conduct, the grounds for our moral standards, as far as our time permits.
But when all these efforts have been made towards a philosophical treatment of our topic, when certain discriminations between true and mistaken loyalty have been defined, when we have insisted upon the fitting objects of loyalty, and have throughout indicated our reasons for our theses, there will then stand out one great practical lesson, which I shall try to illustrate from the start, and to bring to its fruition as our lectures close. And the lesson will be this: In loyalty, when loyalty is N >Jf properly defined, is the fulfilment of the whole moral law. You can truthfully centre your en tire moral world about a rational conception of loyalty. Justice, charity, industry, wisdom, spirituality, are all definable in terms of 15 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY enlightened loyalty. And, as I shall maintain, this very way of viewing the moral world - this deliberate centralization of all the duties and of all the virtues about the one conception of rational loyalty — is of great service as a means of clarifying and simplifying the tangled moral problems of our lives and of our age.
Thus, then, I state the task which our title is intended to set before us. The rest of this opening lecture must be devoted to clearing our way — and to a merely preliminary and tentative view of our topic. I must first at tempt a partial and provisional definition of the term "loyalty" as I shall use that term. I wish that I could begin with a final and ade quate definition; but I cannot. Why I can not, you will see in later lectures. At the mo ment I shall try to direct your minds, as well as I can, merely to some of the features that are essential to my conception of loyalty.
Ill Loyalty shall mean, according to this.pre^ liminary definition: The willing and practical 16 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY and thoroughgoing devotion^ey a person to a cause...A man is loyal^BenTfirst, he has some cause to which he is loyal; when, secondly, he willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when, thirdly, he expresses his devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting steadily in the service of his cause. Instances of loyalty are: The devotion of a patriot to his country, when this devotion leads him actually to live and perhaps to die for his country; the devotion of a martyr to his reli gion; the devotion of a ship's captain to the requirements of his office when, after a disaster, he works steadily for his ship and for the saving of his ship's company until the last possible service is accomplished, so that he is the last man to leave the ship, and is ready if need be to go down with his ship.
Such cases of loyalty are typical. They involve, I have said, the willingness of the loyal man to do his service. The loyal man's cause is his cause by virtue of the assent of his own will. His devotion is his own. He chooses, it, or, at all events, approves it. Moreover/ THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY his devotion is a practical one. He does something. This something serves his cause. Loyalty is never mere emotion.._ Adoration and affection may go with loyalty, but can never alone constitute loyalty. Further more, the devotion of the loyal man in volves a sort of restraint or submission of his natural desires to his cause. Loyalty without self-control is impossible. The loyal man serves. That is, he does not merely follow his own impulses. He looks to his cause for guidance. This cause tells him what to do, and he does it. His devotion, furthermore, is entire. He is ready to live or to die as the cause directs.
And now for a further word about the hard est part of this preliminary definition of loyalty: A loyal man, I have said, has a cause. I do not yet say that he has a good cause. He might have a bad one. I do not say, as yet, what makes a cause a good one, and worthy of loyalty. All that is to be considered here after. But this I now premise: If one js. loyal, he has a cause which he indeed per is NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY sonally values. Otherwise, how could he be devoteoTto it? He therefore takes interest in the cause, loves it, is well pleased with it. On the other hand, loyalty never means the mere emotion of love for your cause, and never means^merely following your own pleasure, viewed as youi^private pleasure and interest. For if you are loyal, your cause is viewed by you as something outside of you. Or if, like your country, your cause includes yourself, it is still much larger than your private self. It has its own value, so you as a loyal person believe. This essential value it would keep (so you believe) even if your private interest were left out of account. Your cause you take, then, to be something objective — some thing that is not your private self. It does not get its value merely from your being pleased with it. You believe, on the contrary, that you love it just because of its own value, which it has by itself, even if you die. That is just why one may be ready to die for his cause. In any case, when the loyal man serves his cause, he is not seeking his own private advantage.
19 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY Moreover, the cause to which a loyal man is devoted is never something wholly impersonal. It concerns other men. Loyalty is social. If one is a loyal servant of a cause, one has at least possible fellow-servants. On the other hand, since a cause, in general, tends to unite the many fellow-servants in one service, it con sequently seems to the loyal man to have a sort of impersonal or superpersonal quality about it. You can love an individual. But you can be loyal only to a tie that binds you and others into some sort of unity, and loyal to individuals only through the tie. The cause to which loyalty devotes itself has always this union of the personal and the seemingly superindividual about it. It binds many indi viduals into one service. Loyal lovers, for instance, are loyal not merely to one another as separate individuals, but to their love, to their union, which is something more than either of them, or even than both of them viewed as distinct individuals.
So much for a preliminary view of what loyalty is. Our definition is not complete.
20 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY It raises rather than solves problems about the nature of loyalty. But thus indeed we get a first notion of the general nature of loyalty.
IV But now for a next step. Many people find that they have a need of loyalty. Loyalty is a good thing for them. If you ask, however, why loyalty may be needed by a given man, the answer may be very complex. A patriot may, in your opinion, need loyalty, first because his country needs his service, and, as you add, he actually owes this service, and so needs to do his duty, viz. to be loyal. This first way of stating a given man's need of a given loyalty, turns upon asserting that a specific cause rightly requires of a certain man a certain service. The cause, as one holds, is good and worthy. This man actually ought to serve just that cause. Hence he stands in need of loyalty, and of just this loyalty.
But in order thus to define this man's need of loyalty, you have to determine what causes are worthy of loyalty, and why this man ought 21 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY to serve his own cause. To answer such ques tions would apparently presuppose a whole system of morals, — a system which at this stage of our argument we have not yet in sight. But there is another, — a simpler, and, at the outset, a lower way of estimating the value of loyalty. One may, for the time, abstract from all questions as to the value of causes. Whether a man is loyal to a good cause or to a bad cause, his own personal attitude, when he is loyal, has a certain general quality. Whoever is loyal, whatever be his cause, is devoted, is active, surrenders his private self- will, controls himself, is in love with his cause, and believes in it. The loyal man is thus in a certain state of mind which has its own value for himself. To live a loyal life, whatever be one's cause, is to live in a way which is certainly free from many well-known sources of inner dissatisfaction. Thus hesitancy is often cor rected by loyalty; for the cause plainly tells the loyal man what to do. Loyalty, again, tends to unify life, to give it centre, fixity, stability.
22 NATURE AND NEED OF LOYALTY Well, these aspects of loyalty are, so far as they go, good for the loyal man. We may therefore define our need of loyalty in a certain preliminary way. We may take what is indeed a lower view of loyalty, regarding it, for the moment, in deliberate abstraction from the cause to which one is loyal. We may thus regard loyalty, for the moment, just as a personal attitude, which is good for the loyal man himself.
Now this lower view of our need of loyalty is the one to which in the rest of this lecture I want you to attend. All that I now say is preliminary. Results belong later. Let us simply abstract from the question whether a man's cause is objectively worthy of his loyalty or not. Let us ask: What does a man gain by being loyal? Suppose that some cause, outside of and also inclusive of his private self, so appeals to a man that he believes it to be worthy, and becomes heartily loyal co it. What good does he get personally out of his loyalty? In order to answer this question, even in this preliminary way, I must indeed go 23 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY rather far afield, and define for you, still very tentatively, one of the best-known and hardest of the problems of our personal life.
V