When a king finds it possible to achieve the results of victory single-handed in a very short time, then he may march (against his frontal enemy) after proclaiming war against his rear-enemies; otherwise he should march after making peace (with his rear-enemies).
When a king finds himself unable to confront his enemy single-handed and when it is necessary that he should march, then he should make the expedition in combination with kings of inferior, equal, or superior powers.
When the object aimed at is of a definite nature, then the share of spoils should be fixed; but when it is of a manifold or complex Kautilya's Arthashastra nature, then with no fixity in the share of the spoils. When no such combination is possible, he may request a king either to supply him with the army for a fixed share, or to accompany him for an equal share of the spoils.
When profit is certain, then they should march with fixed shares of profit; but when it is uncertain, with no fixity of shares.
* Share of profit proportional to the strength of the army is of the first kind; that which is equal to the effort made is the best; shares may be allotted in proportion to the profit earned or to the capital invested.
[Thus ends Chapter IV, "Neutrality after Proclaiming War or after Concluding a Treaty of Peace; Marching after Proclaiming War or after Making Peace; and the March of Combined Powers," in Book VII, "The end of the Six-fold Policy" of the Arthasdstra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and second chapter from the beginning.]
CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT MARCHING AGAINST AN ASSAILABLE ENEMY AND A STRONG ENEMY; CAUSES LEADING TO THE DWINDLING, GREED, AND DISLOYALTY OF THE ARMY; AND CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE COMBINATION OF POWERS.
WHEN two enemies, one an assailable enemy and another a strong enemy, are equally involved in troubles, which of them is to be marched against first?
The strong enemy is to be marched against first; after vanquishing him, the assailable enemy is to be attacked, for, when Kautilya's Arthashastra a strong enemy has been vanquished, an assailable enemy will volunteer of his own accord to help the conqueror; but not so, a strong enemy.
Which is to be marched against— an assailable enemy involved in troubles to a greater degree or a strong enemy troubled to a lesser degree?
My teacher says that as a matter of easy conquest, the assailable enemy under worse troubles should be marched against first.
Not so, says Kautilya: The conqueror should march against the strong enemy under less troubles, for the troubles of the strong enemy, though less, will be augmented when attacked. True, that the worse troubles of the assailable enemy will be still worse when attacked. But when left to himself, the strong enemy under less troubles will endeavour to get rid of his troubles and unite with the assailable enemy or with another enemy in the rear of the conqueror.
When there are two assailable enemies, one of virtuous character and under worse troubles, and another of vicious character, under less troubles, and with disloyal subjects, which of them is to be marched against first?
When the enemy of virtuous character and under worse troubles is attacked, his subjects will help him; whereas, the subjects of the other of vicious character and under less troubles will be indifferent. Disloyal or indifferent subjects will endeavour to destroy even a strong king. Hence the conqueror should march against that enemy whose subjects are disloyal.
Which is to be marched against— an enemy whose subjects are Kautilya's Arthashastra impoverished and greedy or an enemy whose subjects are being oppressed?
My teacher says that the conqueror should march against that enemy whose subjects are impoverished and greedy, for impoverished and greedy subjects suffer themselves to be won over to the other side by intrigue, and are easily excited. But not so the oppressed subjects whose wrath can be pacified by punishing the chief men (of the State).
Not so, says Kautilya: for though impoverished and greedy, they are loyal to their master and are ready to stand for his cause and to defeat any intrigue against him; for it is in loyalty that all other good qualities have their strength. Hence the conqueror should march against the enemy whose subjects are oppressed.
Which enemy is to be marched against— a powerful enemy of wicked character or a powerless enemy of righteous character?
The strong enemy of wicked character should be marched against, for when he is attacked, his subjects will not help him, but rather put him down or go to the side of the conqueror. But when the enemy of virtuous character is attacked, his subjects will help him or die with him.
* By insulting the good and commending the wicked; by causing unnatural and unrighteous slaughter of life; * by neglecting the observance of proper and righteous customs; by doing unrighteous acts and neglecting righteous ones; * by doing what ought not to be done and not doing what ought to be done; by not paying what ought to be paid and exacting what ought not to be taken; * by not punishing the guilty and severely punishing the less guilty; by arresting those who are not to be caught hold of and leaving Kautilya's Arthashastra those who are to be arrested; * by undertaking risky works and destroying profitable ones; by not protecting the people against thieves and by robbing them of their wealth; * by giving up manly enterprise and condemning good works; by hurting the leaders of the people and despising the worthy; * by provoking the aged, by crooked conduct, and by untruthfulness; by not applying remedies against evils and neglecting works in hand; * and by carelessness and negligence of himself in maintaining the security of person and property of his subjects, the king causes impoverishment, greed, and disaffection to appear among his subjects; * when a people are impoverished, they become greedy; when they are greedy, they become disaffected; when disaffected, they voluntarily go to the side of the enemy or destroy their own master.
Hence, no king should give room to such causes as would bring about impoverishment, greed or disaffection among his people. If, however, they appear, he should at once take remedial measures against them.
Which (of the three) is the worst— an impoverished people? greedy people? or disaffected people?
An impoverished people are ever apprehensive of oppression and destruction (by over-taxation, etc.), and are therefore desirous of getting rid of their impoverishment, or of waging war or of migrating elsewhere.
A greedy people are ever discontented and they yield themselves to the intrigues of an enemy.
A disaffected people rise against their master along with his Kautilya's Arthashastra enemy.
When the dwindling of the people is due to want of gold and grain, it is a calamity fraught with danger to the whole of the kingdom and can be remedied with difficulty. The dearth of efficient men can be made up by means of gold and grain. Greed (is) partial and is found among a few chief officers, and it can be got rid of or satisfied by allowing them to plunder an enemy's wealth. Disaffection or disloyalty (virdga) can be got rid of by putting down the leaders; for in the absence of a leader or leaders, the people are easily governed (bhogya) and they will not take part in the intrigues of enemies. When a people are too nervous to endure the calamities, they first become dispersed, when their leaders are put down; and when they are kept under restraint, they endure calamities.
Having well considered the causes which bring about peace or war, one should combine with kings of considerable power and righteous character and march against one's enemy.
'A king of considerable power,' means one who is strong enough to put down or capture an enemy in the rear of his friend or to give sufficient help to his friend in his march.
'A king of righteous character,' means one who does what one has promised to do, irrespective of good or bad results.
Having combined with one of superior power, or with two of equal power among such kings, should the conqueror march against his enemy?
It is better to march combined with two kings of equal power; for, if combined with a king of superior power, the ally appears to move, caught hold of, by his superior, whereas in marching with two kings of equal power, the same will be the result, only, when Kautilya's Arthashastra those two kings are experts in the art of intrigue; besides it is easy to separate them; and when one of them is wicked, he can be put down by the other two and made to suffer the consequence of dissension.
Combined with one of equal power or with two of lesser power, should a king march against his enemy?
Better to march with two kings of lesser power; for the conqueror can depute them to carry out any two different works and keep them under his control. When the desired end is achieved, the inferior king will quietly retire after the satisfaction of his superior.
* Till his discharge, the good conduct of an ally of usually bad character should be closely scrutinised either by suddenly coming out at a critical time from a covert position (sattra) to examine his conduct, or by having his wife as a pledge for his good conduct.
* Though actuated with feelings of true friendship, the conqueror has reason to fear his ally, though of equal power, when the latter attains success in his mission; having succeeded in his mission, an ally of equal power is likely to change his attitude even towards the conqueror of superior power.
* An ally of superior power should not be relied upon, for prosperity changes the mind. Even with little or no share in the spoils, an ally of superior power may go back, appearing contented; but some time afterwards, he may not fail to sit on the lap of the conqueror and carry off twice the amount of share due to him.
* Having been satisfied with mere victory, the leading conqueror should discharge his allies, having satisfied them with their shares he may allow himself to be conquered by them instead of attempting to conquer them (in the matter of spoils); it is thus that a king can win the good graces of his Circle of States.
Kautilya's Arthashastra [Thus ends Chapter V, "Considerations about Marching against an Assailable Enemy and a Strong Enemy; Causes Leading to the Dwindling, Greed, and Disloyalty of the Army; and Considerations about the Combination of Powers" in Book VII, "The end of the Sixfold Policy" of the Arthasdstra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and third chapter from the beginning.]
CHAPTER VI. THE MARCH OF COMBINED POWERS; AGREEMENT OF PEACE WITH OR WITHOUT DEFINITE TERMS; AND PEACE WITH RENEGADES.
THE Conqueror should thus over-reach the second element, (the enemy close to his territory):— He should engage his neighbouring enemy to undertake a simultaneous march with him and tell the enemy: "Thou, march in that direction, and I shall march in this direction; and the share in the spoils is equal."
If the booty is to be equally divided, it is an agreement of peace; if otherwise, it is overpowering the enemy.
An agreement of peace may be made with promise to carry out a definite work (paripanita) or with no such promise (aparipanita).
When the agreement is to the effect that "Thou, march to that place, and I shall march to this place," it is termed an agreement of peace to carry out a work in definite locality.
When it is agreed upon that "Thou, be engaged so long, I shall be engaged thus long," it is an agreement to attain an object in a fixed time.
When it is agreed upon that "Thou, try to accomplish that Kautilya's Arthashastra work, and I shall try to finish this work," it is an agreement to achieve a definite end.
When the conqueror thinks that "my enemy (now an ally) has to march through an unknown country, which is intersected with mountains, forests, rivers, forts and deserts which is devoid of food-stuffs, people, pastoral grounds, fodder, firewood and water, and which is far away, different from other countries, and not affording suitable grounds for the exercise of his army; and I have to traverse a country of quite the reverse description," then he should make an agreement to carry out a work in a definite locality.
When the conqueror thinks that "my enemy has to work with food stuffs falling short and with no comfort during the rainy, hot or cold season, giving rise to various kinds of diseases and obstructing the free exercise of his army during a shorter or longer period of time than necessary for the accomplishment of the work in hand; and I have to work during a time of quite the reverse nature," then he should make time a factor of the agreement.
When the conqueror thinks that "my enemy has to accomplish a work which, not lasting but trifling in its nature, enrages his subjects, which requires much expenditure of time and money, and which is productive of evil consequences, unrighteous, repugnant to the Madhyama and neutral kings, and destructive of all friendship; whereas, I have to do the reverse," then he should make an agreement to carry out a definite work.
Likewise with space and time, with time and work, with space and work, and with space, time, and work, made as terms of an agreement, it resolves itself into seven forms.
Long before making such an agreement, the conqueror has to fix his own work and then attempt to overreach his enemy.
Kautilya's Arthashastra When, in order to destroy an enemy who has fallen into troubles and who is hasty, indolent, and not foresighted, an agreement of peace with no terms of time, space, or work is made with an enemy merely for mutual peace, and when under cover of such an agreement, the enemy is caught hold of at his weak points and is struck, it is termed peace with no definite terms (aparipanita). With regard to this there is a saying as follows:- "Having kept a neighbouring enemy engaged with another neighbouring enemy, a wise king should proceed against a third king, and having conquered that enemy of equal power, take possession of his territory."
Peace with no specific end (akritachikirshd), peace with binding terms (kritasleshana), the breaking of peace (kritavidushana), and restoration of peace broken (apasirnakriyd) are other forms of peace.
Open battle, treacherous battle, and silent battle {i.e. killing an enemy by employing spies when there is no talk of battle at all), are the three forms of battle.
When, by making use of conciliation and other forms of stratagem and the like, a new agreement of peace is made and the rights of equal, inferior, and superior powers concerned in the agreement are defined according to their respective positions, it is termed an agreement of peace with no specific end (other than self-preservation).
When, by the employment of friends (at the Courts of each other), the agreement of peace made is kept secure and the terms are invariably observed and strictly maintained so that no dissension may creep among the parties, it is termed peace with binding terms.
Kautilya's Arthashastra When, having proved through the agency of traitors and spies the treachery of a king, who has made an agreement of peace, the agreement is broken, it is termed the breaking of peace.
When reconciliation is made with a servant, or a friend, or any other renegade, it is termed the restoration of broken peace.
There are four persons who run away from, and return to, their master: one who had reason to run away and to return; one who had no reason either to run away or to return; one who had reason to run away, but none to return; and one who had no reason to run away, but had reason to come back.
He who runs away owing to his master's fault and returns in consideration of (his master's) good nature, or he who runs away attracted by the good nature of his master's enemy and returns finding fault with the enemy is to be reconciled as he had reason to run away and to return.
Whoever runs away owing to his own fault and returns without minding the good nature either of his old or new master is a fickle-minded person having no explanation to account for his conduct, and he should have no terms of reconciliation.
Whoever runs away owing to his master's fault and returns owing to his own defects, is a renegade who had reason to run away, but none to return: and his case is to be well considered (before he is taken back).
Whoever returns deputed by the enemy; or of his own accord, with the intention of hurting his old master, as is natural to persons of such bad character; or coming to know that his old master is attempting to put down the enemy, his new master, and apprehensive of danger to himself; or looking on the attempt of his new master to destroy his old master as cruelty, these should be Kautilya's Arthashastra examined; and if he is found to be actuated with good motives, he is to be taken back respectfully; otherwise, he should be kept at a distance.
Whoever runs away owing to his own fault and returns owing to his new master's wickedness is a renegade who had no reason to run away, but had reason to come back; such a person is to be examined.
When a king thinks that "This renegade supplies me with full information about my enemy's weakness, and, therefore, he deserves to remain here; his own people with me are in friendship with my friends and at enmity with my enemies and are easily excited at the sight of greedy and cruel persons or of a band of enemies," he may treat such a renegade as deserved.
My teacher says that whoever has failed to achieve profit from his works, lost his strength, or made his learning a commercial article, or is very greedy, inquisitive to see different countries, dead to the feelings of friendship, or has strong enemies, deserves to be abandoned.
But Kautilya says that it is timidity, unprofessional business, and lack of forbearance (to do so). Whoever is injurious to the king's interests should be abandoned, while he who is injurious to the interests of the enemy should be reconciled; and whoever is injurious to the interests of both the king and his enemy should be carefully examined.
When it is necessary to make peace with a king with whom no peace ought to be made, defensive measures should be taken against that point where he can show his power. * In restoring broken peace, a renegade or a person inclined towards the enemy should be kept at such a distance that till the Kautilya's Arthashastra close of his life, he may be useful to the State.
* Or, he may be set against the enemy or may be employed as a captain of an army to guard wild tracts against enemies, or thrown somewhere on the boundary.
* Or, he may be employed to carry on a secret trade in new or old commodities in foreign countries and may accordingly be accused of conspiracy with the enemy.
* Or, in the interests of future peace, a renegade who must be put to death may at once be destroyed.
* That kind of wicked character which has from the beginning grown upon a man owing to his association with enemies is as ever fraught with danger as constant living in company with a snake; * and is ever threatening with destruction just as a pigeon living on the seeds of plaksha (holy fig-tree) is to the salmali (silk-cotton) tree.
* Whenbattle is fought in daylight and in some locality, it is termed an open battle; threatening in one direction, assault in another, destruction of an enemy captured while he was careless or in troubles; * and bribing a portion of the army and destroying another portion, are forms of treacherous fight; and attempt to win over the chief officers of the enemy by intrigue, is the characteristic of silent battle.
[Thus ends Chapter VI, "The March of Combined Powers; Agreement of Peace with or without Definite Terms; and Peace with Renegades," in Book VII, "The end of the Sixfold Policy" of the Arthasdstra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and fourth chapter from the beginning.]
CHAPTER VII. PEACE AND WAR BY ADOPTING THE Kautilya's Arthashastra DOUBLE POLICY.
THE conqueror may overpower the second member (i.e., the immediate enemy) thus:— Having combined with a neighbouring king, the conqueror may march against another neighbouring king. Or if he thinks that "(my enemy) will neither capture my rear nor make an alliance with my assailable enemy against whom I am going to march; (for otherwise) I shall have to fight against great odds; (my ally) will not only facilitate the collection of my revenue and supplies and put down the internal enemies who are causing me immense trouble, but also punish wild tribes and their followers entrenched in their strongholds, reduce my assailable enemy to a precarious condition or compel him to accept the proffered peace, and having received as much profit as he desires, he will endeavour to endear my other enemies to me," then the conqueror may proclaim war against one and make peace with another and endeavour to get an army for money or money for the supply of an army from among his neighbouring kings.
When the kings of superior, equal or inferior power make peace with the conqueror and agree to pay a greater, or equal, or less amount of profit in proportion to the army supplied, it is termed even peace; that which is of the reverse character is styled uneven peace; and when the profit is proportionally very high, it is termed deception (atisandhi).
When a king of superior power is involved in troubles, or is come to grief or is afflicted with misfortune, his enemy, though of inferior power, may request of him the help of his army in return for a share in the profit proportional to the strength of the army supplied. If the king to whom peace is offered on such terms is powerful enough to retaliate, he may declare war; and otherwise he Kautilya's Arthashastra may accept the terms.
In view of marching for the purpose of exacting some expected revenue to be utilised in recouping his own strength and resources, an inferior king may request of a superior the help of the latter's army for the purpose of guarding the base and the rear of his territory in return for the payment of a greater share in the profit than the strength of the arm supplied deserves. The king to whom such a proposal is made may accept the proposal, if the proposer is of good intentions; but otherwise he may declare war.
When a king of inferior power or one who is provided with the aid of forts and friends has to make a short march in order to capture an enemy without waging war or to receive some expected profit, he may request a third king of superior power involved under various troubles and misfortunes the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the strength of the army supplied deserves. If the king to whom this proposal is made is powerful enough to retaliate, he may declare war; but otherwise he may accept the proposal.
When a king of superior power and free from all troubles is desirous of causing to his enemy loss of men an money in the latter's ill-considered undertakings, or of sending his own treacherous army abroad, or bringing his enemy under the clutches of an inimical army, or of causing trouble to a reducible and tottering enemy by setting a inferior king against that enemy, or is desirous of having peace for the sake of peace itself and is possessed of good intentions, he may accept a less share in the profit (promise for the army supplied to another) and endeavour to make wealth by combining with an ally if the latter is equally of good intentions; but otherwise he may declare war (against that ally).
Kautilya's Arthashastra A king may deceive or help his equal as follows:— When a king proposes peace to another king of equal power on the condition of receiving the help of the latter army strong enough to oppose an enemy's army, or to guard the front, centre, and rear of his territory, or to help his friend, or to protect any other wild tracts of his territory in return for the payment of a share in the profit proportionally equal to the strength of the army supplied, the latter may accept the terms if the proposer is of good intentions; but otherwise he may declare war.
When a king of equal power, capable of receiving the help of an army from another quarter requests of another king in troubles due to the diminished strength of the elements of sovereignty, and with many enemies, the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the strength of the army supplied deserves, the latter, if powerful, may declare war or accept the terms otherwise.
When a king who is under troubles, who has his works at the mercy of his neighbouring kings, and who has yet to make an army, requests of another king of equal power the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit greater than the strength of the army supplied deserves, the latter may accept the terms if the proposer is of good intentions: but otherwise war may be declared.
When, with the desire of putting down a king in troubles due to the diminished strength of the elements of sovereignty, or with the desire of destroying his well-begun work of immense and unfailing profit, or with the intention of striking him in his own place or on the occasion of marching, one, though frequently getting immense (subsidy) from an assailable enemy of equal, inferior, or superior power, sends demands to him again and again, Kautilya's Arthashastra then he may comply with the demands of the former if he is desirous of maintaining his own power by destroying with the army of the former an impregnable fortress of an enemy or a friend of that enemy or laying waste the wild tracts of that enemy, or if he is desirous of exposing the army of the ally to wear and tear even in good roads and good seasons, or if he is desirous of strengthening his own army with that of his ally and thereby putting down the ally or winning over the army of the ally.
When a king is desirous of keeping under his power another king of superior or inferior power as an assailable enemy and of destroying the latter after routing out another enemy with the help of the latter, or when he is desirous of getting back whatever he has paid (as subsidy), he may send a proposal of peace to another on the condition of paying more than the cost of the army supplied. If the king to whom this proposal is made is powerful enough to retaliate he may declare war; or if otherwise, he may accept the terms; or he may keep quiet allied with the assailable enemy; or he may supply the proposer of peace with his army full of traitors, enemies and wild tribes.
When a king of superior power falls into troubles owing to the weakness of the elements of his sovereignty, and requests of an inferior king the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit proportionally equal to the strength of the army supplied, the latter, if powerful enough to retaliate, may declare war and if otherwise, accept the terms.
A king of superior power may request of an inferior the help of the latter's army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the cost of the army supplied; and the latter, if powerful enough to retaliate, may declare war, or accept the terms otherwise.
* The king who is sued for peace and also the king who offers peace should both consider the motive with which the proposal of Kautilya's Arthashastra peace is made, and adopt that course of action which on consideration seems to be productive of good results.
[Thus ends Chapter VII "Peace and War by Adopting the Double Policy" in Book VII, "The end of the Six-fold Policy" of the Arthasdstra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and fifth chapter from the beginning.]
CHAPTER VIII. THE ATTITUDE OF AN ASSAILABLE ENEMY; AND FRIENDS THAT DESERVE HELP.
WHEN an assailable enemy who is in danger of being attacked is desirous of taking upon himself the condition which led one king to combine with another against himself, or of splitting them from each other, he may propose peace to one of the kings on the condition of himself paying twice the amount of profit accruing from the combination. The agreement having been made, he may describe to that king the loss of men and money, the hardships of sojourning abroad, the commission of sinful deeds, and the misery and other personal troubles to which that king would have been subjected. When the king is convinced of the truth, the amount promised may be paid; or having made that king to incur enmity with other kings, the agreement itself may be broken off.
When a king is inclined to cause to another, loss of men and money in the ill-considered undertakings of the latter or to frustrate the latter in the attempt of achieving large profits from well-begun undertakings; or when he means to strike another at his (another's) own place or while marching; or when he intends to exact subsidy again in combination with the latter's assailable enemy; or when he is in need of money and does not like to trust to his ally, he may, for Kautilya's Arthashastra the time being, be satisfied with a small amount of profit.
When a king has in view the necessity of helping a friend or of destroying an enemy, or the possibility of acquiring much wealth (in return for the present help) or when he intends to utilize in future the services of the one now obliged by him, he may reject the offer of large profit at the present in preference of a small gain in future.
When a king means to help another from the clutches of traitors or enemies or of a superior king threatening the very existence of the latter, and intends thereby to set an example of rendering similar help to himself in future, he should receive no profit either at the present or in the future.
When a king means to harass the people of an enemy or to break the agreement of peace between a friend and a foe, or when he suspects of another's attack upon himself, and when owing to any of these causes, he wants to break peace with his ally, he may demand from the latter an enhanced amount of profit long before it is due. The latter under these circumstances may demand for a procedure (krama) either at the present or in the future. The same procedure explains the cases treated of before.
The conqueror and his enemy helping their respective friends differ according as their friends are such or are not such as undertake possible, praiseworthy or productive works and as are resolute in their undertakings and are provided with loyal and devoted subjects.
Whoever undertakes tolerable work is a beginner possible work: whoever undertakes an unblemished work is a beginner of praiseworthy work; whoever undertakes work of large profits is a beginner of a productive work; whoever takes no rest before the Kautilya's Arthashastra