He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be. Dread is a womanish debility in which freedom swoons. Psychologically speaking, the fall into sin always occurs in impotence. But dread is at the same time the most egoistic thing, and no concrete expression of freedom is so egoistic as is the possibility of every concretion. This again is the overwhelming experience which determines the individual s ambiguous relation, both sympathetic and antipathetic. In dread there isihe egoistic infinit y of possibility, which does A not temp A like a defmite-cnoice,. but alarms (anaster) and fascinates with i ts sweet anxiety (Be- ccngstelse).
In the later individual dread is more reflective. This may be expressed by saying that the nothing which is the object of dread becomes, as it were, more and more a something. We do not say that it really becomes something or really signifies something, we do not say that now instead of nothing there should be substituted sin or something else, for here what was true of Adam s innocence is true also of the later individual. All this applies only to freedom, and only when the individual himself by the qualitative leap posits sin. Here then the nothing of dread is a complex of presentiments which reflect themselves in themselves, coming nearer and nearer to the individual, notwithstanding that in dread they signify again essentially nothing, not, however, be it noted, a nothing with which the individual has nothing to do, but a nothing in lively communication with the ignorance of innocence. This reflectiveness is a predisposition which, before the individual becomes guilty, signifies essentially nothing, whereas when by the qualitative leap he becomes guilty it is the presupposition in which the individual goes beyond himself because sin presupposes itself, not of course before it is posited (that would be a predestination), but presupposes itself when it is posited.
We shall now consider a little more particularly that something which the nothing of dread may signify in the later individual. In the psychological deliberation it truly counts for something. But the psychological deliberation does not forget that if the individual were to become guilty simply by this something, then all reflection would be annulled.
This something, which signifies original sin stride sic dicta, is: 56 CHAPTER I A. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE FACT OF GENERATION It is a matter of course that nothing is to be said here about subjects which might concern a physician, like the fact that a man is born with a deformity, etc., neither should there be any question of reaching a result by statistical surveys. Here as in all such cases the point is to have a right sentiment. Thus, for example, when it is affirmed that hail and a failure of the crops is due to the devil, this may be very well meant, but essentially it is a witty remark 'which weakens our conception of evil and introduces an almost jesting note, just as it is an aesthetic pleasantry to talk of the "dumb devil." Thus too when in the concept of faith the historical factor is stressed so one-sidedly that we forget the pristine originality of faith in the individual, it becomes a petty finiteness instead of a free infinitude. The consequence of this is that one may become accustomed to talk about faith as did Jeronymus in Heiberg's play, 9 who says of Erasmus that he had opinions which lead astray from faith, because he affirmed that the earth is round, not flat as one generation after another in his village had believed. In that way one can stray from faith by wearing loose trousers when all the people in that village wear tight pants. When one furnishes statistical surveys of the incidence of sinfulness, with maps in color and relief which help the eye at once to make the survey, one attempts by that to deal with sin as a curious phenomenon of nature, which is not to be removed but only calculated, like the atmospheric pressure and the rainfall; and the mean or mathematical average which results is here an absurdity which has no parallel in those purely empirical sciences. It surely would be a very ludi- crous abracadabra if one were to say that the mathematical average is 3 3/8 inches of sinfulness for each man, that in Languedoc SUBJECTIVE DREAD it comes to only 2 1/4, but in Brittany to 3 7/8 — These examples are no more superfluous that those given in the Introduction, since they are drawn from the sphere within the limits of which the following argument is to move.
By sin sensuousness became sinfulness. This proposition has a double significance: by sin sensuousness became sinfulness; and by Adam sin came into the world. These definitions must constantly balance one another, for otherwise something untrue is said. The fact that once upon a time sensuousness became sinfulness is the history of generation; but that sensuousness continues to become this is due to the qualitative leap of the individual.
It was observed in Chapter I, §6, that the creation of Eve already prefigured symbolically the consequence of generation. In a way she represented the derived individual. The deriv ed is never as perfect as the original.* In this case, however, the difference is "only A quantitative. The later individual is essentially as original as the first. The difference common to all later individuals is derivation; but for the particular individual derivation may again signify more or less. A.V A This derivation of woman explains also in what sense she is nWHveaker than man, a fact which has been assumed in all times, whether it is a pasha who speaks or a romantic knight. The difference, however, does not mean that man and woman are not essentially alike in spite of the difference. The expression for the difference is that dread is more reflected in Eve than in Adam. This is due to the fact that woman is more sensuous than man. Here of course it is not a question of an empirical condition or of an average but of a difference in the synthesis. If in one part of the synthesis there is a "more," the consequence will be that when the A spirit posits itself the cleft in the division will be more profound, and dread will find in the possibility of freedom more ample scope. In the account in Genesis it is Eve who seduces Adam. From this it does not by any means follow that her guilt is greater than Adam's, and still less that dread is an imperfection, since on the contrary the greatness of it is prophetically a measure of the perfection.
*Of course this holds true only of the human race, because the individual, is characterized as spirit. On the other hand, in animal species every later example is just as good as the first, or, to put it better, to be the first has no significance whatsoever.
58 CHAPTER I Here already the investigation sees that sensuousness corresponds proportionally with dread. As soon as generation is posited what was said about Eve is merely a hint of what is characteristic of the relation of every later individual to Adam, that when sensuousness is increased by the fact of generation dread also is increased. The consequence of generation signifies a "more," in such a way that no individual escapes from that "more" characteristic of all individuals in comparison with Adam, but never does it amount to such a "more" that he becomes essentially different from Adam.
But before we go on to speak of this I would illustrate a little more fully the proposition that woman is more sensuous than man and has more dread.
The fact that woman is more sensuous than man is shown at once by her bodily organism. To follow this out more in detail is not my affair but is a theme for physiology. I shall prove my thesis, however, in a different way, by introducing her aesthetically in her ideal aspect, which is beauty, noting that the fact that this is her ideal aspect is precisely the proof that she is more sensuous than man. Next I shall introduce her ethically in her ideal aspect, noting that the fact that this is her ideal aspect is precisely the proof that she is more sensuous than man.
.Where beauty claims the right to rule it brings about a synthesis from which spirit is excluded. This is the secret of the whole Hellenic culture. Owing to this there is a sense of security, a quiet solemnity, which characterizes all Greek beauty; but precisely for this cause there was also a sense of dread, which the Greek likely did not notice, although his plastic beauty trembles with it. There is a carefreeness in the Greek beauty because the spirit is excluded, but therefore there is also a profound sorrow unexplained. Therefore sensuousness is not sinfulness but an unexplained riddle which causes dread; therefore this naivete is accompanied by an inexplicable nothing which is that of dread.
It is true that the Greek beauty conceives man and woman essentially in the same way, without consideration of spirit; but nevertheless it makes a distinction within this likeness. The spiritual finds expression in the countenance. But in manly beauty the face and its expression are more essential than in feminine beauty, even though the eternal youth of the plastic art constantly prevents the deeper spiritual meaning from showing itself. To follow this out SUBJECTIVE DREAD further is not my affair, but I will indicate this difference by a single suggestion. Essentially Venus remains equally beautiful whether she is represented sleeping or waking — indeed, she is perhaps most beautiful sleeping, and yet the sleepi ng statc i 3ircci s£ A the expression for the absence of spirit Hence it comes that the more spiritual and developed an individuality is, the less beautiful is such a person in sleep, whereas the child is most beautiful in sleep. Venus emerges from the sea and is represented in an attitude of repose, or in an attitude which reduces the expression of the face to the unessential. On the other hand, if Apollo is to be represented, it would not do to let him sleep, any more than in a Jupiter this would be appropriate. This would detract from the beauty of Apollo, and it would make Jupiter ridiculous. An exception could be made for Bacchus, but in Greek art he lepresents the point of indifference between manly and womanly beauty, and hence the lines of his figure are feminine. In the case of a Ganymede, on the other hand, the expression of his face is more essential.
When the conception of beauty became different, Romanticism again made the distinction within the essential likeness. Whereas the history of spirit (and it is precisely the secre t of spirit that.it always has history) dares to stamp itself upon the coun tenances? f man, so that all is forgotten if only its writin g is clear and noble, woman will make her effect in another way, as a totality, even though the face has acquired a greater importance than it had in classical art. The impression now must be of a totality which has no history. Therefore silence is not only woman's highest wisdom, but also her highest beauty.
Ethically regarded, woman culminates in procreation. Therefore the Scripture says that'her desire shall be to her husband. It is true also that the husband's desire is to her, but his life does not culminate in this desire, unless it is either a sorry sort of life or a lost life. But the fact that in this woman reaches her culmination shows that she is more sensuous.
Woman is more in dread than man. This is not implied in the fact that she has less physical strength, etc., for here there is no question about that sort of dread; but it is implied in the fact that she is more sensuous and yet essentially, like man, is qualified by spirit. What is so frequently said, that she is the weaker sex, leaves me completely indifferent, for notwithstanding this she might very well have less dread. Dread is constantly to be understood as ori 60 CHAPTER I ented towards freedom. So when the story in Genesis, running directly counter to all analogies, represents woman as seducing man, this upon closer inspection appears nevertheless perfectly natural, for this seduction is precisely a feminine seduction, since in fact it was only through Eve that Adam was seduced by the serpent. In other instances of seduction, language, speaking of deluding, talking around, etc., ascribes superiority to man.
That which can be assumed as the result of all experience I shall show merely by an experimental observation. If I picture to myself a young and innocent girl and then let a man fasten upon her a look of desire, she experiences dread. Besides that she may be indignant, etc., but first she feels dread. If on the other hand I imagine that a woman fixes a desirous glance upon an innocent young man, his feeling will not be dread, but at the most a sense of abhorrence mingled with shame, precisely because he is more characterized by spirit.
By Adam's sin came sinfulness into the world, and sexuality, which came to signify for him sinfulness. The sexual was posited. There has been much twaddle in the world, both written and oral, about naivete. However, only innocence is naive, but it is also ignorant. As soon as the sexual is brought to consciousness, it is thoughtlessness, affectation, and sometimes worse, namely, a cover for lust, to want to talk about naivete. But because man is no longer naive it does not follow by any means that he sins. It is only that vapid coquettishness which allures men, precisely by drawing attention away from the true, the moral.
The whole question about the significance of the sexual, and its significance in the particular spheres, has undeniably been poorly answered until now, and above all it is very seldom answered with the right feeling. To utter witticisms about it is a lowly art, to admonish is not difficult, to preach about it in such a way as to leave out the difficulties is not hard to do, but to talk about it in a fashion truly humane is an art. To let the theater and the pulpit undertake the solution and do it in such a way that the one is em barrassed to say what the other says, with the consequence that the explanation of the one is in violent contradiction to that of the other, is really to give the thing up and leave to men the heavy burden, which we do not put out a finger to lift, of finding a meaning in both explanations while the respective masters constantly teach only the one or the other. This incongruity would surely have been noticed long ago if men in these times had not perfected them- selves in thoughtlessness directed to wasting this life so full of fair promise, or to taking part noisily whenever there is a question of one SUBJECTIVE DREAD 61 grand, prodigious idea or another, for the execution of which they unite with unshakable faith in the power of union, even though this faith is just as marvelous as that of the alehouse keeper who sold his ale for a penny less than he paid for it and yet reckoned upon a profit, "for it is the many that will do it." Such being the case, it will not surprise me if in these times no one pays any attention to such a deliberation. But this I know, that if Socrates were now living, he would think about such things, doing it better or, if I may say so, more divinely than I am able to do it, and I am convinced that he would have said to me, "My dear, you do well to think about such things, which are worthy of being reflected upon. Ah! one can sit talking night after night and never be through with fathoming the wonders of human nature. And to me this assurance is worth more than all the bravos of my contemporaries; for this assurance makes my soul firm, applause would make it doubtful."
The sexual itself is not the sinful. Real ignorance of the sexual, when nonetheless it is present, is reserved for the beast, which therefore is enthralled in the blindness of instinct and acts blindly. An ignorance, but now one which is ignorant of that which is not present, is that of the child. Innocence is a knowledge which means ignorance. The difference between this ignorance and moral ignorance is that the former is oriented in the direction of knowledge. With ignorance begins a knowledge the first characteristic of which is ignorance. This is the concept of bashfulness (shame). In bashfulness there is a dread because at the extremest expression of the, difference composing the synthesis the spirit is determined in such a way that it is not merely qualified by relation to body but by relation to a body with the generic difference. Nevertheless bashfulness is surely a knowledge of the generic difference, but not as having relation to the generic difference, that is to say, the sexual impulse is not yet present as such. The real significance of bashfulness is that the spirit, so to speak, cannot recognize itself as the extreme point of the synthesis. For this reason the dread in bashfulness is so prodigiously ambiguous.. There is not a trace of sensuous lust, and nevertheless there is a sense of shame. At what? At nothing. And yet the individual may die of shame, and a wounded bashfulness is the deepest pain because it is the most inexplicable thing of all., Hence the dread in bashfulness can awaken by itself. But here of course it must be assumed that it is not lust which would like to play this role. An example of the latter may be found in a fairy tale by Fr. Schlegel (Sammtliche Werke, Vol. 7, p. 15, in the story of Merlin).
In bashfulness the generic difference is posited, but not in relation to 62 CHAPTER I its other. This relation is brought about by the sexual impulse. But since this impulse is not an instinct, or not merely an instinct, it has eo ipso a Te\o<? [end or aim], which is propagation, whereas the state of repose is love, the pure erotic. All this while the spirit is not posited in this company. As soon as it is posited, not merely as constituting the synthesis, but as spirit, the erotic is at an end. Hence the highest pagan expression is that the erotic is the comical. This of course must not be taken in the sense in which a voluptuary can only mean that the erotic is comical and material for his lascivious wit; but it is the power and predominance of the intelligence which neutralizes in the indifference of the spirit both the erotic and the moral relation to it. This has a very deep reason. The dread in bashfulness consisted in the fact that the spirit felt itself foreign; now the spirit has completely conquered and views the sexual as the foreign and the comical. This freedom of the spirit bashfulness of course could not have. The sexual is the expression for the prodigious contradiction (Wiederspruch) that the immortal spirit is characterized as sex. This contradiction expresses itself in the deep shame which conceals this and does not dare to understand it. In the erotic experience this contradiction is understood as beauty, for beauty is precisely the unity of the psychical and the corporal. But this contradiction which the erotic explains bv beauty is for the spirit at once beauty and the comical. Therefo re thp spirit's pxprpssion fntL. the erotic is that it is at once beauty and the comical. Here there is no sensuous reflex cast upon the erotic, for that is sensuality, and in that ca se the individual lies far below the level of erotic beauty; but here we have the maturity of the spirit. Naturally, few men have understood this thought in its purity. Socrates did. Therefore when Xenophon represents him 10 as having said that one ought to love ugly women, this saying, like everything else by the help of Xenophon, became a disgusting and narrow-minded philistinism, which is least of all like Socrates. The meaning is that he had reduced the erotic to indifference; and the contradiction which underlies the comic he expressed correctly by the corresponding ironic contradiction that one should love the ugly.* Such a view, however, is very seldom presented in its lofty purity. For that there is needed a remarkable concordance of a fortunate historical development and a pristine talent. If there is any, even the most remote, animadversion possible, this view is disgusting and an affectation.
In Christianity the religious has suspended the erotic, not merely by an ethical misunderstanding of it as the sinful, but as the indifferent, because in spirit there is no difference between man and woman. Here SUBJECTIVE DREAD 63 the erotic is not ironically neutralized but suspended, because it is the tendency of Christianity to lead the spirit further. When in bashfulness the spirit is in dread and fear of arraying itself in the generic difference, the individual suddenly leaps away, and instead of penetrating it ethically grasps an explanation drawn from the highest sphere of spirit. This is one side of the monastic * In this way must be understood what Socrates said to Critobulus about the kiss." I believe it must be obvious to everyone that Socrates could not in seriousness talk so pathetically about the danger of the kiss, and also that he was not a ninny who did not dare to look at a woman. It is true that in southern lands and among more passionate peoples the kiss means something more than here in the north (about which subject one can consult a letter of Puteanus to John. Bapt. Saccum: nesciunt nostrae virgines ullum libidinis rudimentum oculis aut osculis ittesse, ideoque fruuntur. Vestrae sciunt.' 2 CI. Kempius, Dissertatio de osculis, in Bayle's Lexicon), but nevertheless it is not like Socrates, either as an ironist or as a moralist, to talk in this way. As a matter of fact, when one assumes too lofty a tone as a moralist, one awakens desire and tempts the pupil almost against his will to become ironical against the teacher. Socrates' relation to Aspasia shows the same thing. He conversed with her without being at all concerned about the ambiguous life she led. He wanted only to learn from her (Athenaeus 13 ), and as a teacher she seems to have had talent, for it is related' 4 that husbands brought their wives with them to Aspasia merely that they might learn from her. On the other hand, as soon as Aspasia had wanted to make an impression upon him by her loveliness, Socrates presumably would have explained to her that one ought to love the ugly ones, and that she absolutely should not put her charms to any further strain, since to attain his purpose he had enough in Xantippe (cf. Xenophon's account of Socrates' view of his relation to Xantippe 15 ). — Since unfortunately it occurs again and again that people go about the reading of everything with a preconceived opinion, it is no wonder that everybody has a definite notion that a Cynic is almost a dissolute man. Yet it might be possible precisely among the Cynics to find an example of that interpretation of the erotic as the comical.
64 CHAPTER I view, whether that is more particularly characterized as ethical rigorism, or as a life in which contemplation is predominant.* As dread is posited in bashfulness, so it is present in all erotic enjoyment (not by any means because it is sinful), and this is so even though the priest were to bless the couple ten times. Even when the erotic expresses itself as beautifully and purely and morally as possible, without being disturbed in its joy by any wanton reflection, dread is nevertheless present, not as a disturbing element, however, but as a concordant factor.
In this field it is very difficult to conduct observations. Here one must first of all take the precaution physicians take of never trying the pulse without making sure that they are not counting their own instead of that of the patient; so in this case one must take care that the movement one discovers is not the uneasiness of the observer in carrying out his observation. One thing, however, is sure, that in describing love, pure and innocent as they may represent it, all poets associate with it an element of dread. To pursue this subject more in detail is the business of an aestheti- cist. But why this dread? Because in the culmination of the erotic the spirit cannot take part. I will speak here with Greek candor. The spirit indeed is present, for it is this which constitutes the synthesis, but it cannot express itself in the erotic experience; it feels itself a stranger. It says as it were to the erotic, "Mv dear. I cannot be a third party here, therefore I will hide myself for the time being." But this precisely is dread, and also this precisely is bashfulness; for it is a great stupidity to suppose that the wedding ceremony of the Church, or the husband's fidelity in keeping himself unto her alone, is enough. Many a marriage has been profaned, and that not by an outsider. But when the erotic is pure and innocent and beautiful, the dread is friendly and mild, and therefore the poets are right in speaking about the sweet uneasiness.
It is a matter of course, however, that the dread is greater on the part of woman.
Let us now return to the subject with which we were dealing above, the consequence for the individual of the fact of generation, which is the common "more" which every individual has in contrast with Adam. At the instant of conception the spirit is far ♦However strange it may appear to one who is not accustomed to regard phenomena boldly, there is nevertheless a perfect analogy between Socrates' ironical interpretation of the erotic as the comical, and the relation of a monk to mulieres subintroductae. The abuse occurs of course only in the case of those who have a taste for the abuse.
away, and therefore the dread is greatest. In this dread the new individual comes into existence. At the instant of birth dread culminates a second time in woman, and at this instant the new individual comes SUBJECTIVE DREAD 65 into the world. That a woman in childbirth has dread is well known. Physiology has its explanation, psychology must also have its own. In childbirth woman is again at the utmost point of one extreme of the synthesis, hence the spirit trembles, for at this instant, when there is nothing for it to do, it is as it were suspended. Dread, however, is an expression for the perfection of human nature, and it is therefore only among the lesser kinds one finds analogies to the easy delivery of the beasts.
But the more dread, the more sensuousness. The procreated individual is more sensual than the original, and this "more" is the usual "more" which the fact of generation entails for every later individual in relation to Adam.