27. The vividness of the picture, which comes to him or moves him, is derived either from the magni- tude or from the number of the previous perceptions. For, oftentimes, astrong impression brings about, all at once, the same effect as a long-continued habit or as a great many re-iterated, moderate perceptions.
28. Men act in like manner as animals, in so far as the sequence of their perceptions is determined only by the law of memory, resembling the ezmpor- ical physicians who practice simply, without any theory, and we are empiricists in three-fourths of our actions. For instance, when we expect that there will be day-light to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always happened so up to the present time. It is only the astronomer who uses his reason in making such an affirmation.
29. But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God. This is what is called in us the Rational Soul or the Mind.
30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through abstractions from them that we come to perform Reflective Acts, which cause us to think of what is called the I, and to decide that this or that is within us. It is thus, that in thinking upon ourselves we think of deg, of substance, of the szmple and composite, of a material thing and of God himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. These Reflective Acts furnish the principal objects of our reasonings.
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31. Our reasoning is based upon two great prin- ciples: first, that of Contradiction, by means of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction and that to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false.
32. And, second, the, principle » of | Sufficient Reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise. Most frequently, however, these reasons cannot be known by us.
33. There are also two kinds of Truths: those of Reasoning and» thoseriof; “Fact, ‘The ‘Erathsof Reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of Fact, however, are con- tingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into simpler ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those which are pri- mary.
34. It is thus that with mathematicians the Spec- ulative Theorems and the practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates.
35. There are finally simple ideas of which no definition can be given. There are also the Axioms and Postulates or, in a word, the primary principles which cannot be proved and, indeed, have no need of proof. These are identical propositions whose Opposites involve express contradictions.
36. But there must be also a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact; that is to say, for the sequence of the things which extend throughout the universe of created beings, where MONADOLOGY. 259 the analysis inte more particular reasons can be continued! into gieater detail without limit because of the:mmense variety of the things in nature and because ot the'fxfinite division of bodies. There is an infinity ot Gguves and of movements, present and past, whicn enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and in its final cause there are an infinity of slight tendencies and dispositions of my soul, present and past.
37. And as all this detail"again invo.ves other and more detailed contingencies, each of which again has need of a similar analysis in order to find its explanation, no real advance has been made. Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason must needs be outside of the sequence or series of these details of contingencies, however infinite they may be.
38. It is thus that the ultimate reason for things must be a necessary substance, in which the detail ot the changes shall be present merely potentially, as in the fountain-head, and this substance we call God.
39. Now, since this substance is a sufficient reason for all the above mentioned details, which are linked together throughout, there 7s but one God, and this God ts su ffictent.
40. We may hold that the supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary with noth- ing independent outside of it, which is further a pure sequence of possible being, must be incapable of limitation and must contain as much reality as pos- sible.
41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely per- fect, perfection being understood as the magnitude 260 LEIBNIZ.
of positive reality in the strict sense, when the limitations or the bounds of chose things which have them are removed. ‘There where there are no limits, that is to say, 'n God, perfection is abso- lutely infinite.
42. It follows also that created things derive their perfections through the influence of God, but their imperfections come from their own natures, which cannot exist without limits. It is in this latter that they are distinguished from God. An example of this original imperfection of created things is to be found in the natural inertia of bodies.
43. It is true, furthermore, that in God is found not only the source of existences, but also that of essences, in so far as they are real. In other words, he is the source of whatever there is real in the pos- sible. This is because the Understanding of God ts in the region of eternal truths or of the ideas upon which they depend, and because without him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would nothing be existent, nothing would be even possible.
44. For it must needs be that if there is a reality in essences or in possibilities or indeed in the eternal truths, this reality is based upon something existent and actual, and, consequently, in the existence of the necessary Being in whom essence includes exist- ence or in whom possibility is sufficient to produce ‘actuality.
45. Therefore God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this prerogative that if he be possible he must necessarily exist, and, as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which involves no bounds, no negation, and consequently, no contradiction, this MONADOLOGY. 261 alone is sufficient te establish a priori his existence. We have, therefore, proved his existence through the real- ity of eternal truths. But a little while ago we also proved it a posteriori, because contingent beings exist which can have their ultimate and sufficient reason only in the necessary being which, in turn, has the reason for existence in itself.
46. Yet we must not think that the eternal truths being dependent upon God are therefore arbitrary and depend upon his will, as Descartes seems to have held, and after him M. Poiret. This is the case only with contingent truths which depend upon fitness or the choice of the greatest good; necessarily truths on the other hand depend solely upon his understanding and are the inner objects of it.
47%. God alone is the ultimate unity or the original simple substance, of which all created or derivative monads are the products, and arise, so to speak, through the continual outflashings (fulgurations) oi the divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the creature to whom limitation is an essential.
48. In God are present: power, which is the source of everything; knowledge, which contains the details of the ideas; and, finally, will, which changes or pro- duces things in accordance with the pnnciple of the greatest good. To these correspond in the created monad, the subject or basis, the faculty of perception, and the faculty of appetition. In God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, while in the created monads or in the entelechies (perfectihabies, as Her- molaus Barbarus translates this word), they are imi- tations approaching him in proportion to the per- fection.
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49. A created thing is said to act otttwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to be acted upon by an- other in so far as it is imperfect. Thus action is attributed to the monad in so far as it has distinct per- ceptions, and passion or passivity is attributed in so far as it has confused perceptions.
50. One created thing is more perfect than another when we find in the first that which gives an a priors reason for what occurs in the second. This why we say that one acts upon the other.
51. In the case of simple substances, the influence which one monad has upon another is only ideal. It can have its effect only through the mediation of Ged, in so far as in the ideas of God each monad can rightly demand that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regarded it also. For since one created monad cannot have a physical influ- ence upon the inner being of another, it is only through the primal regulation that one can have dependence upon another.
52. It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging him to adapt the other to it; and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view, active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to give a reason for what occurs in another, and passive in so far as the reason for what occurs in it is found in what is distinctly known in another.
53. Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of MONADOLOGY. 263 God which determines him to select one rather than another.
54. And this reason is to be found only in the fitness or in the degree of perfection which these worlds possess, each possible thing having the right to claim existence in proportion to the perfection which it in- volves.
55. This is the cause for the existence of the great- est good; namely, that the wisdom of God permits him to know it, his goodness causes him to choose it, and his power enables him to produce it.
56. Now this interconnection, relationship, or this adaptation of all things to each particular one, and of each one to all the rest, brings it about that every simple substance has relations which express all the others and that it is consequently a perpetual living mirror of the universe.
57. And as the same city regarded from different sides appears entirely different, and is, as it were multiplied respectively, so, because of the infinite num- ber of simple substances, there are a similar infinite number of universes which are, nevertheless, only the aspects of a single one as seen from the special point of view of each monad.
58. Through this means has been obtained the great- est possible variety, together with the greatest order that may be; that is to say, through this means has been obtained the greatest possible perfection.
59. This hypothesis, moreover, which I venture to call demonstrated, is the only one which fittingly gives proper prominence to the greatness of God. M. Bayle recognized this when in his dictionary (article “Ro- rarius”) he raised objections to it; indeed, he was inclined to believe that I attributed too much to God, 264 LEIBNIZ.
and more than it is possible to attribute to him: But he was unable to bring forward any reason why this universal harmony which causes every substance tc express exactly all others through the relation which it has with them is impossible.
60. Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the a priori reasons why things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because God, in ordering the whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to each monad; and since the monad is by its very nature representative, nothing can limit it to represent merely a part of things. It is nevertheless true that this representation is, as regards the details of the whole universe, only a confused representation, and is distinct only as regards a small part of them, that is to say, as regards those things which are nearest or greatest in relation to each monad. If the represen- tatien were distinct as to the details of the entire universe, each monad would be a Deity. It is not in the object represented that the monads are limited, but in the modifications of their knowledge of the object. In a confused way they reach out to infinity or to the whole, but are limited and differentiated in the degree of their distinct perceptions.
61. In this respect composites are like simple sub- stances, for all space is filled up; therefore, all matter is connected. And in a plenum or filled space every movement has an effect upon bodies in proportion to this distance, so that not only is every body affected by those which are in contact with it and responds in some way to whatever happens to them, but also by means of them the body responds to those bodies ad- joining them, and their intercommunication reaches to any distance whatsoever. Consequently every body MONADOLOGY. 265 responds to all that happens in the universe, so that he who saw all could read in each one what is happen- ing everywhere, and even what has happened and what will happen. He can discover in the present what is distant both as regards space and as regards time; cvpmvota mavta,’ as Hippocrates said: A soul can, however, read in itself only what is there represented distinctly. It cannot all at once open up all its folds, because they extend to infinity.
62. Thus although each created monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it and of which it constitutes the entelechy. And as this body expresses all the universe through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which be- longs to it in a particular way. | 63. The body belonging to a monad, which is its entelechy or soul, constitutes together with the en- telechy what may be called a living being, and with a soul what is called an animal. Now this body of a living being or of an animal is always organic, because every monad is a mirror of the universe is regulated with perfect order there must needs be order also in what represents it, that is to say in the perceptions of the soul and consequently in the body through which the universe is represented in the soul.
64. Therefore every organic body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, infinitely surpassing all artifical automatons. Because a machine constructed by man’s skill is not a machine in each of its parts; for instance, the teeth of a brass_ 266 LEIBNIZ.
wheel have parts or bits which to us are not artificial products and contain nothing in themselves to show the use to which the wheel was destined in the ma- chine. The machines of nature, however, that is to say, living bodies, are still machines in their small- est parts ad infinitum. Such is the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between divine art and ours.
65. The author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely marvelous artifice, because each portion of matter is not only, as the ancients recognized, infinitely divisible, but also because it is really divided without end, every part into other parts, each one of which has its own proper motion. Other- wise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express all the universe.
66. Whence we see that there is a world of created things, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest particle of matter.
67. Every portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant, every member of an animal, and every drop of the fluids within it, is also. such a garden or such a pond.
68. And although the ground and air which lies between the plants of the garden, and the water which is between the fish in the pond, are not themselves plants or fish, yet they nevertheless contain these, usually so small however as to be imperceptible to us.
69. There is, therefore, nothing uncultivated, or sterile or dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, Save in appearance; somewhat as a pond would appear at a distance when we could see in it a confused MONADOLOGY. 267 movement, and so to speak, a swarming of the fish, without however discerning the fish themselves.
70. It is evident, then, that every living body has a dominating entelechy, which in animals is the soul. The parts, however, of this living body are full of other living beings, plants and animals, which in turn have each one its entelechy or dominating soul.
%1. This does not mean, as some who have misunder- stood my thought have imagined, that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter appropriated to it or attached to itself for ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings destined to serve it always; because all bodies are in a state of perpetual flux like rivers, and the parts are continually enter- ing in or passing out.
72. The soul, therefore, changes its body only grad- ually and by degrees, so that it is never deprived all at once of all its organs. There is frequently a meta- morphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or a transmigration of souls. Neither are there souls wholly separate from bodies, nor bodiless spirits. God alone is without body.
73. This is also why there is never absolute genera- tion or perfect death in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What we call generation is development and growth, and what we call death is envelopment and diminution.
74, Philosophers have been much perplexed in ac- counting for the origin of forms, entelechies, or souls. To-day, however, when it has been learned through careful investigations made in plant, insect and animal life, that the organic bodies of nature are never the product of chaos or putrefaction, but always come from seeds in which there was without doubt some 268 LEIBNIZ.
preformation, it has been decided that not only is the organic body already present before conception, but also a soul in this body, in a word, the animal itself; and it has been decided that, by means of conception the animal is merely made ready for a great trans- formation, so as to become an animal of another sort. We can see cases somewhate similar outside of gen- eration when grubs become flies and caterpillars but- terflies.
75. These little animals, some of which by conception become large animals, may be called spermatic. Those among them which remain in their species, that is to say, the greater part, are born, multiply, and are de- stroyed, like the larger animals. There are only a few chosen ones which come out upon a greater stage.
76. This, however, is only half the truth. I believe, therefore, that if the animal never actually commences by natural means, no more does it by natural means come to an end. Not only is there no generation, but also there is no entire destruction or absolute death. These reasonings, carried on a posteriori and drawn from experience, accord perfectly with the principles which I have above deduced a priori.
v7. Therefore we may say that not only the soul (the mirror of the indestructible universe) is inde- structible, but also the animal itself is, although its mechanism is frequently destroyed in parts and al- though it puts off and takes on organic coatings.
78. These principles have furnished me the means of explaining on natural grounds the union, or rather the conformity between the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws. They are fitted to each other in virtue of the preestablished harmony between all sub- MONADOLOGY. 269 stances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe.: 79. Souls act in accordance with the laws of final causes through their desires, ends and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or of motion. The two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in ae each with the other.
80. Descartes saw that souls cannot at all impart force to bodies, because there is always the same quan- tity of force in matter. Yet he thought that the soul could change the direction of bodies. This was, how- ever, because at that time the law of nature which affirms also that conservation of the same total direction in the motion of matter was not known. If he had known that law, he would have fallen upon my i Sipats ef preestablished harmony.
81. According to this system pede act as if. (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were rears the . other.
82. Although I find that essentially the same thing is true of all living things and animals, which we have just said (namely, that animals and souls begin from the very commencement of the world and that they no more come to an end than does the world) never- theless, rational animals have this peculiarity, that their little spermatic animals, as long as they remain such, have only ordinary or sensuous souls, but those of them which are, so to speak, elected, attain by. actual conception to human nature, and their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirits., 270 LEIBNIZ.
83. Among the differences that there are between ordinary souls and spirits, some of which I have al- ready instanced, there is aiso this, that while souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, spirits are also images of the Deity himself or of the author of nature. They are capable of knowing the system of the universe, and of imi- tating some features of it by means of artificial models, each spirit being like a small divinity in its own sphere.
84. Therefore, spirits are able to enter into a sort of social relationship with God, and with respect to them he is not only what an inventor is to his machine (as in his relation to the other created things), but he is also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children.
85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the city of God, that is to say, the most perfect state that is possible under the most perfect monarch.
86. This city of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world. It is what is noblest and most divine among the works of God. And in it consists in reality the glory of God, because he would have no glory were not his greatness and goodness known and wondered at by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine city that God properly has goodness. His wisdom and his power are shown everywhere.
87. As we established above that there is a perfect harmony between the two natural realms of efficient and final causes, it will be in place here to point out another harmony which appears between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God considered as the architect of the MONADOLOGY. 201 mechanism of the world and God considered as the monarch of the divine city of spirits.
88. This harmony brings it about that things pro- gress of themselves toward grace along natural lines, and that this earth, for example, must be destroyed and restored by natural means at those times when the proper government of spirits demands it, for chastisement in the one case and for a reward in the other.: 89. We can say also that God, the Architect, satis- fies in all respects God the Law-Giver, that therefore sins will bring their own penalty with them through the order of nature, and because of the very structure of things, mechanical though it is. And in the same way the good actions will attain their rewards in mechanical way through their relation to bodies, although this cannot and ought not always to take place without delay.
90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good action unrewarded and no evil action un- punished; everything must turn out for the well-being of the good; that is to say, of those who are not disaffected in this great state, who, after having done their duty, trust in Providence and who love and im- itate, as is meet, the Author of all Good, delighting in the contemplation of his perfections according to the nature of that genuine, pure love which finds pleasure in the happiness of those who are loved. It is for this reason that wise and virtuous persons work in behalf of everything which seems conformable to presump- tive or antecedent will of God, and are, nevertheless, content with what God actually brings to pass through his secret, consequent and determining will, recogniz- ing that if we were able to understand sufficiently well 272 ' LEIBNIZ.
the order of the universe, we should find that it sur- passes all the desires of the wisest of us, and that it is impossible to render it better than it is, not only for all in general, but also for each one of us in particular, provided that we have the proper attachment for the author of all, not only as the Architect and the effi- cient cause of our being, but also as our Lord and the Final Cause, who ought to be the whole goal of our ‘will, and who alone can make us happy.
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