Th. The execution of our desire is suspended or stopped when this desire is not strong enough to move us and to over come the trouble or inconvenience there is in satisfying it; and this trouble consists sometimes only in an inactivity or insensible lassitude which discourages without our taking notice of it, and which is greatest in persons reared in indo lence or whose temperament is phlegmatic, and in those who are discouraged by age or by poor success. But when desire is strong enough in itself to move, if nothing prevents it, it can be stopped by contrary inclinations; whether they consist in a simple propensity which is as it were the element or be ginning of desire, or go as far as desire itself. But as these inclinations, these propensities, and these contrary desires are to be found already in the soul, it does not have them in its power, and consequently it could not resist them in a free and voluntary way in which the reason can share, if it had no other means of diverting the mind elsewhere. But how does it presume to do it in case of need? For there is the point, especially when one is occupied with a very strong passion.
CH. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 203 It is then necessary for the mind to be prepared in advance, and to find itself already in process of going from thought to thought, in order not to hesitate too much at a slippery and dangerous step. It is well for that reason to accustom our selves in general not only to think as it were in passing of certain things in order the better to preserve the freedom of the mind; but it is better to accustom ourselves to proceed methodically, and to fasten ourselves to a train of thoughts whose connection reason and not chance (i.e. insensible and casual impressions) makes. And for this purpose it is well from time to time to accustom ourselves to collect our thoughts and to raise ourselves above the present tumult of impres sions, to go forth, so to speak, from the place where we are, to say to ourselves: " Die cur Me? respice Jinem,1 where are we then? or let us come to the purpose,2 let us come to the point." Men would very often need some one officially appointed (as Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, had) to interrupt and call them to their duty. But in default of such an officer, it is well for us to be accustomed to render ourselves this ser vice. Now being once in a condition to stop the effect of our desires and passions, i.e. to suspend (their) action, we can find means to combat them, whether by contrary desires or inclina tions or by diversion, i.e. by occupations of another nature. It is by these methods and artifices that we become as it were masters of ourselves, and can make ourselves think and do at the time what we should wish to will and what reason com mands. But it is always through determined paths, and never without a reason or by means of the imaginary principle of perfect indifference or equilibrium, in which some would make the essence of freedom to consist; as if one could determine himself without a subject, and even against every subject, and go directly against the entire prevalence of impressions and propensities. Without a reason, I say, i.e. without the opposi tion of other inclinations, or without being in advance dis posed to turn aside the mind, or without any other means equally explicable; (to act) otherwise is to recu*- to the chimer- 1 Literally: Why are we here? Consider the end! — TR.
2 Erdmann and Jacques omit: "ou venous au propos," found in Ger- hardt.— TR.
204 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. n ical, as in the empty faculties or occult qualities of the scho lastics, in which there is neither rhyme nor reason.]
§ 48. Ph. [I am also for this intelligent determination of the will by what is in the perception and the understanding.] To will and do conformably to the final result of a sincere examination is rather a perfection than a defect of our nature. And this so far from being a suppression or an abridgement of freedom, is its greatest perfection and advantage. And the more we are prevented from determining ourselves in this way, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. In fact, if you suppose in the mind a perfect and absolute indifference which cannot be determined by the final judgment which it makes of good or evil, you put it in a very imperfect state.
Th. [All this is very much to my taste, and shows that the mind has not entire and direct power always to stop its desires, else it would never be determined, whatever examina tion it might make, and whatever good reasons or efficacious sentiments it might have, and it would always remain irreso lute and fluctuate eternally between fear and hope. It must, then, after all, be determined, and thus it could itself oppose only indirectly its desires, by itself preparing in advance the arms which fight them in time of need; as I have just ex plained.]
Ph. But a man is at liberty to lift his hand to his head or to let it lie quiet. He is perfectly indifferent regarding either of these acts, and it would be an iinperfection in him if he lacked that power.
Th. [To speak accurately, one is never indifferent regard ing two alternatives,1 whatever they may propose; for exam ple, turning to the right or the left,2 putting the right foot forward (as was necessary in the case of Trimalchio) or the left; for we do the one or the other without thinking of it, and this is an indication that a concurrence of internal disposi tions and external impressions (although insensible) deter mines us to the side that we take. But the prevalence is very 1 After " partis," Gerhardt reads: "qnelsqu'on puisse proposer," -which Erdmann and Jacques omit. — TR.
2 After "gauche," Gerhardt reads: "de niettre lepied droitdevant (comme il falloit chez Trimalcion) ou le gauche, "which Erdmann and Jacques omit. For the allusion cf. Petronius, Satyricon, chap. 'M. — TR.
CH. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 205 small, and in case of need it is as if we were indifferent in this respect, since the least sensible subject which presents itself to us is capable of determining us without difficulty to one rather than to the other; and although there is a little trouble in lifting the arm to raise the hand to the head, it is so small that we overcome it without difficulty; otherwise, I admit it would be a great imperfection if man were less indifferent, and if he were wanting in power to determine easily to raise or not to raise his arm.]
Ph. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same indifference on all occasions, as when he would defend his head or his eyes from a blow, by which he saw he was about to be struck. [That is to say, it were as easy for him to stop this movement as others of which we have just spoken, and in which he is almost indifferent; for that would make its influence insufficiently strong and prompt in time of need. Thus determination is useful to us, and, indeed,1 very often necessary; for if we were less determined on every sort of occasion, and as it were insensible to reasons drawn from the perception of good or evil, we would be without effective choice.] And2 if we were determined by something else than the final result, which we have formed in our own mind accord ing as we have judged a certain action good or evil, we should not be free.
Tli. [Nothing is truer, and those who seek another free dom know not what they ask.]
§ 49. Ph. The superior beings who enjoy perfect happi ness are determined in the choice of the good more strongly than we, and yet we have no reason to think them less free than ourselves.
Tli. [For this reason theologians say that these blessed substances are confirmed in the good and exempt from all danger of falling.]
Ph. I believe indeed that, if it were proper for poor finite creatures like ourselves to judge of what an infinite wisdom and goodness could do, we could say that God himself can not choose what is not good, and that the freedom of this all 1 Gerhardt omits "niC-me," which Erdmann and Jacques insert after "et."— TR.
2 Gerhardt reads: " ct "; Erdmann and Jacques, "comine." — TK.
206 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. n powerful being does not hinder him from being determined by what is best.
Tli. [I am so persuaded of this truth that I believe we can boldly assure ourselves of it, wholly poor and finite creatures that we are, and that we should be very wrong in doubting it; for by so doing we should derogate from his wisdom, goodness and other infinite perfections. But choice, however determined the will be, should not be called necessarily and rigorously absolute; the prevalence of perceived good in clines without necessitating, although considered as a whole, this inclination is determinate and never fails to produce its effect.]
§ 50. Pli. To be determined by the reason to the best, is to be the freest. Who would wish to be foolish for the reason that a fool is less determined by wise reflections than a man of good sense? If freedom consists in throwing off the yoke of reason, fools and madmen will be the only free men; but I do not believe that for love of such freedom any one would wish to be a fool, save he who is one already.
Th. [There are people to-day who consider it clever to declaim against reason, and to treat it as an inconvenient pedant. I see little books, discourses about nothing, which make great pretensions, and I sometimes see verses even too beautiful to be employed in such false thoughts. In fact, if those who mock at reason spoke in earnest, it would be a new kind of extravagance unknown to past centuries. To speak against reason is to speak against truth; for reason is a concatenation of truths. It is to speak against one's self, against one's good, since the principal point of reason con sists in knowing the truth and following the good.]
§ 51. Ph. As then the highest perfection of an intelligent being consists in applying himself carefully and constantly to the search for true happiness, so the care we should employ not to take as real happiness that which is only imaginary, is the foundation of our freedom. The more we are bound to the invariable search for happiness in general which never ceases to be the object of our desires, the more our will finds itself freed from the necessity of being determined by the desire which bears us towards some particular good, until we have examined whether it agrees with or is opposed to our true happiness.
CH. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 207 Tli. The true good should always be the object of our desires, but there is room for doubt whether it is so: for often one thinks but little of it, and I have remarked here more than once, that unless appetite is guided by reason it tends to present pleasure and not to happiness, i.e. to enduring pleas ure, although it tends to protract it; see § 36 and § 41.
§ 53. Ph. If some extreme disturbance takes entire pos session of our mind, as the pain of a cruel torture, we are not enough masters of our mind. But in order to control our passions as much as possible, we should make our mind relish good and evil really and effectively, and not permit an ex cellent and considerable good to escape our mind without leav ing there some relish, until we have excited in ourselves desires proportioned to its excellence so that its absence renders us uneasy as well as the fear of losing it when we enjoy it.
Tli. [That sufficiently agrees with the remarks I have just made in §§ 31 and 35, and with what I have said more than once of luminous pleasures, where we understand how they improve us without putting us in danger of some greater imperfection, as do the confused pleasures of sense, against which we must guard ourselves, especially when we have not learned by experience that we shall be able surely to avail ourselves of them.]
Ph. And let no one say here that he cannot master his pas sions nor hinder them from breaking loose and forcing him to act; for what he can do before a prince or great man, he can do, if he will, when alone or in the presence of God.
Th. [That remark is very good and worthy of frequent reflection.]
§ 54. Ph. But the different choices men make in the world, prove that the same thing is not equally good for each of them. And if the interests of men did not extend beyond this life, the reason of this diversity which causes, for exam ple, these to plunge into luxury and debauchery, and those to prefer temperance to pleasure, would arise only from the fact that they placed their happiness in these different things.
Th. [It arises thence even now, although they all have or should have before their eyes this common object of the future life. It is true that the consideration of true happi- 208 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [HK. n ness, even in this life, should suffice to make those who dis card it prefer virtue to pleasure; although the obligation would not then be so strong or so decisive. It is also true that men's tastes are different, and it is said that we should not dispute about tastes. But as these are only confused per ceptions, we should hold fast to them only in the case of ob jects found to be indifferent and incapable of harm; otherwise, if one had a relish for poisons which would kill him or render him miserable, it would be ridiculous to say that his taste should not be called in question.]
§ 55. Ph. If there is nothing to hope for beyond the grave, the inference is certainly very just: let us eat and drink, let us enjoy all that gives us pleasure, for to-morrow ive die.
Th. [There is something to be said, in my opinion, regard ing this inference. Aristotle and the Stoics and many other ancient philosophers held another view, and I believe, indeed, that they were right. If there were nothing beyond this life, the peace of the soul and health of the body would not cease to be preferable to the pleasures which would be contrary thereto. And it is no reason whatever for neglecting a good because it will not endure forever. But I admit that there are cases where there would be no means of demonstrating that the most virtuous course would be the most useful. It is then the thought of God and of immortality only which ren ders the obligations of virtue and justice absolutely indispen sable. ] § 58. Ph. It seems to me that the present judgment we make of good and evil is always right. And as for present happiness or misery, when reflection goes no farther, and all consequences are wholly put aside, man never chooses amiss.
Th. [That is to say, if everything were limited to the pres ent moment, it would not be right to refuse the pleasure which presents itself. In fact, I remarked above that all pleasure is a feeling of perfection. But there are certain perfections which bring with them greater imperfections. If some one devoted himself during his entire life to throwing peas against pins, in order to learn not to fail to make them pierce them, after the example of him to whom Alexander the Great caused to be given as a recompense a bushel of peas, this man would attain a certain perfection, but very slight and unworthy of being CH. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 209 compared with so many other very necessary perfections which he would have neglected. Thus the perfection which is found in certain present pleasures should yield especially to the regard for the perfections which are necessary; in order that we be not plunged into misery, which is the state in which we go from imperfection to imperfection, from pain to pain. But if there be only the present, it would be necessary to be contented with the perfection which is present, i.e. with present pleasure.]
§ 62. Ph. ISTo one would voluntarily render his condition unhappy unless he were led by false judgments. I do not speak of mistakes which are the result of invincible error, and which scarcely deserve the name of false judgment, but of that false judgment which every man must confess in himself to be such. § 63. In the first place, then, the soul is mistaken when we compare present pleasure or pain with one to come which we measure by the different distance at which they are found with respect to us: like a spendthrift heir who for the present possession of a little something would renounce a large heritage, which could not fail him. Every one should recognize this false judgment, for the future will become present, and will then have the same advantage of nearness. If at the moment the man takes the glass in his hand, the pleasure of drinking were accompanied with the headache and pains in the stomach, which will follow in a few hours, he would not in the least wish to taste the wine. If a little difference in time causes so much illusion, with much stronger reason a greater distance will produce the same effect.
Th. There is some congruity here between the distance of places and that of times. But there is also this difference, that visible objects diminish their action upon the sight very nearly in proportion to their distance, and it is not at all the same as regards the future objects which act upon the imagination and the mind. Visible rays are straight lines proportionally distant, but there are curved lines which after some distance appear to fall into the straight line and are no longer sensibly divergent: thus are made the asymptotes, whose apparent interval diverges from the straight lines, although in the truth of things they abide eternally 210 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. n separate. We find indeed that at last the appearance of ob jects does not diminish in proportion to the increase of the distance, for the appearance soon1 disappears entirely al though the distance be not infinite. Thus a short distance of time robs us entirely of the future, as if the object had en tirely disappeared. There often remains only the name in the mind and that kind of thoughts of which I have already spoken, which are surd, and incapable of making an impres sion, unless you have attended to them methodically and habitually.]
Ph. I do not speak here of that kind of false judgment by which what is absent is not only diminished but suddenly annihilated in men's minds, when they enjoy all they can obtain for the present, and then conclude that no evil will happen to them.
TJi. [It is another kind of false judgment when the expec tation of good or evil to come is annihilated, because the result drawn from the present is denied or made doubtful; but beyond that, the error which annihilates the thought of the future is the same thing as this false judgment of which I have already spoken, which arises from a too feeble repre sentation of the future, which is considered only a little or not at all. For the rest, we might perhaps distinguish here between bad taste and false judgment, for often we do not even question whether the future good should be pre ferred, and act only upon impression without presuming to come to the examination. But when we think, one of two things happens, either we do not continue sufficiently our thought, and we pass on without pressing the question which has been touched; or we pursue the examination and form a conclusion. And sometimes in each case there remains greater or less self-condemnation: sometimes also there is no formido oppositi or scrupulousness at all, whether the mind turns aside at once, or is deceived by its prejudices.]
§ 64.2 Ph. The limited capacity of our mind is the cause of the false judgments we make in comparing good and evil. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, and still less can 1 Gerhardt reads after "entierement," " bientost," which Erdmann and Jacques omit. — TR.
2 Gerhardt. So also Locke, Philos. Works, Vol. 1, p. 402 (Bohn ed.). Erd mann has § 2!): Jacques, § 51). — TR.
CH. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 211 we enjoy any pleasure in the time that we are beset by pain. A little bitterness mixed in the cup prevents us from tasting its sweetness. The evil we feel is always the worst; we cry: Ah! any other pain rather than this!
Tli. [There is much variety in all this according to men's temperaments, the force of their feelings, and the habits they have contracted. A man who has the gout might be joyful because a large fortune fell to him, and a man who swims in delights, and who might live at his ease upon the earth, is plunged into sadness because of a disgrace at court. The fact is, joy and sadness arise from the result or from the prevalence of pleasures or pains, when there is a mixture of them. Lean- der scorned the inconvenience and danger of swimming over the sea at night, urged on by the attractions of the beautiful Hero.1 There are people who can neither drink nor eat2 nor satisfy other appetites without much pain, on account of some weakness or inconvenience; and yet they satisfy these appe tites even beyond necessity and just limits. Others are so effeminate or so delicate that they refuse pleasures with which any pain, disgust or any inconvenience is mingled. There are some persons who bravely place themselves beyond pains and pleasures present and ordinary, and act almost alone through fear and hope. Others are so effeminate that they complain of the least inconvenience, or run after the least sen sible and present pleasure nearly like children. These are the people to whom the present pain or pleasure always ap pears the greatest; they are like preachers or panegyrists of little judgment, with Avhom, according to the proverb: The idol of the day is always the greatest saint of paradise.3 But what ever variety is found among men. it is always true that they act only according to present perceptions, and when the future impresses them, it is always by means of an image they have of it, or by resolution and habit which they have contracted 1 Cf. Vergil, Geory. 3, 258; Ovid, Heroides, 18, 19 (17, 18, Ovid. Opera, ex recog. Rud. Merkelii, Vol. 1, p. 141 sq., Lipsiaj: B. G. Teubner, 1887); and, for " the final form " of " this poem of love and death," the poem of 340 hexameters by Musseus, the grammarian of the fifth century A.D., an extended abstract of which is given in J. A. Symonds' Studies of the Greek Poets, Vol. 2, chap. 22, pp. 345-362. New York: Harper & Bros., 1880. — TR.
2 Gerhardt reads after "manger," "on qui ne sanroient satisfaire d'autres appetits," which Erdmann and Jacques omit. — Tit.
3 The italics are mine. — Tit.
212 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. n in following even a simple name or other arbitrary character, without having any picture or natural sign, because it would not be without uneasiness, and sometimes without a feeling of chagrin, that they would oppose themselves to a strong reso lution already made, and, above all, to a habit.]
§ 65. Ph. Men are apt enough to diminish future pleasure, and to conclude in themselves that, when it comes to trial, it may perhaps not correspond to the hope it gives nor to the opinion they generally have of it; having often found by their own experience that not only the pleasures which others have magnified have appeared to them very insipid, but that what has caused themselves much pleasure at one time, has offended and displeased them at another.
Th. [These are mainly the reasonings of voluptuaries, but we ordinarily find that the ambitious and avaricious judge wholly otherwise honors and wealth, although they enjoy only moderately, and often, indeed, very little, these same goods when they possess them, being always occupied in going farther. I find it a beautiful invention of nature's architect to have rendered men so sensible to what appeals so little to their senses; and if they could not become ambitious or avari cious, it would be difficult in the present state of human nature for them to be able to become virtuous and reasonable enough to labor for their perfection in the face of the present pleas ures which turn them aside from it.
§ 66. Ph. As to things good or bad in their consequences and by their aptness to procure us good or evil, we judge them in different ways; either when we judge them incapable of really doing us as much evil as in fact they do, or when we judge that while the consequence is important it is not so certain that it may not happen otherwise, or at least that it may not be avoided by some means, as by industry, address, change of conduct, repentance.
Tli. It seems to me that if by the importance of the conse quence we understand that of the consequent, i.e. the great ness of the good or evil that may follow, we must fall into the preceding kind of false judgment, in which future good or evil is poorly represented. Thus there remains only the sec ond kind of false judgment, of which we shall presently treat, namely, that in which the consequence is doubtful.]
en. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 213 Ph. It would be easy to show in detail that the subterfuges which I have just alluded to are so many unreasonable judg ments; but I shall content myself with remarking in general that it is acting directly contrary to reason to hazard a greater good for a less [or to expose1 ourselves to misery in order to acquire a little good or to avoid a little evil], and that, too, upon uncertain conjectures and before we have entered upon a due examination.
Tli. [As these are two heterogeneous considerations (i.e. considerations which cannot be compared with each other), that of the greatness of the consequence and that of the greatness of the consequent, moralists in desiring to compare them are much perplexed, as appears in the case of those who have treated of probability. The truth is that here as in other estimates disparate and heterogeneous and, so to speak, of more than one dimension, the greatness of that which is discussed is in reason composed of both estimates, and is like a rectangle, in which there are two considerations, viz. that of length and that of breadth; and, as for the greatness of the consequence and the degrees of probability, we still lack that part of Logic which is to estimate them,2 and the most of the 1 Gerhardt reads: "exposer"; Erdmann and Jacques: "opposer." — TR.
2 I.e. the Calculus of Probabilities, the founder of which was Pascal, 1623-1662, who developed the mathematical theory of probability iu his cor respondence with Fermat, 1(501-1665, concerning certain questions on the equitable division of the stakes in games of chance proposed to Pascal by the Chevalier de Mere. Cf. I. Todhunter, History of the Theory of Probability from the time of Pascal to that of Laplace, pp. 7-21, 8vo. Cambridge and London, 18(55. Contributions were made to the theory by many of the dis tinguished mathematicians of the period and after, including James Bernoulli, 1<>54-1705; Huygens (vid. ante, p. 150, note 3); Demoivre, 16(17-1754, in his Doctrine of chances, or method of calculating the probabilities of events at play, 3d ed.( London, 1756; Laplace, 174!)-1827, in his Thtforie analytique des probability (Vol. 7 of his (Ear rex completes, publiecs sous les auspices de I'Academie des Sciences, seven vols., 4to Paris, 1878-188(5), since which but little advance has been made in the theory; and Poisson, 1781-1840, in his Recherches sur la probability des juf/ements en matieres crhninelles, etc., 4to Paris, 1837. Leibnitz became acquainted with Pascal's labors during his residence in Paris, 1672-167(5; cf. Guhrauer, Leibnitz. Leben, 1, 113 sq. He recognized the immense importance of this new " part of Logic," and thought to substitute it for the old and crude casuistry which had so long prevailed. In the letter to Bourguet, March 22, 1714, Gerhardt, 3, 570; Erd mann, 723, Leibnitz glances briefly at the historical rise of the calculus of probabilities. For the philosophical side of the question, rf. J. S. Mill, Lor/ic, Bk. III., chaps 18, 23, pp. 379.sv/., 416 sq., 8th eel., Harper and Bros., New