2 (lerhardt's reading; Erdmann and Jacques read: " Schwartzach," " Wiserach." — TR.
302 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. in have made Visurgis, as from Her, llerach, they have made Ilargus. From aqua, aigues, auue the French have finally made eau, which they pronounce oo, in which there no longer remains anything of its origin. Auwe, Auge with the Ger mans is to-day a place which water often overflows, suitable for pasturage, locus irriguus, pascuus; but more particularly it signifies an island, as in the name of the monastery of Reiclienau (Augia dives), and many others. And this (process) must have gone on among many of the Teutonic and Keltic peoples, for thence it has come that everything which is, as it were, isolated in a kind of plain has been called Auge or Ouge, oculus. Thus it is they name spots of oil upon water among the Germans; and among the Spaniards ojo is a hole. But Auge, Ooge, oculus, occhio, etc., have been applied more particularly to the cei'Z, as it were, pre-eminently, which makes this isolated brilliant foramen in the countenance; and doubt less the French ceil comes from it also, but its origin is not at all recognizable, unless by the concatenation I have just given; and the o/x/xa and ctyis of the Greeks appear to come from the same source. Oe or Oeland is an island among the inhabitants of the North, and there is some trace of it in the Hebrew, where ^, Ai, is an island. Bochart * believed that the Phoenicians derived the name which he thinks they gave to the.^Egean Sea, full of islands, from the same source. Augere, augmentation, comes also from Auue or Auge, i.e. from the effusion of waters, as ooken, auken in old Saxon was to augment; and Augustus, when speaking as Emperor, was trans lated by Ooker. The river of Brunswick, which comes from the Hartz Mountains, and consequently is much subject to sudden accretions, is called Ocker, formerly Ouacra. And I mention in passing that the names of rivers, having ordinarily 1 Samuel Bochart, 1599-1667, an eminent French scholar and Protestant theologian, a distinguished orientalist, and a man of profound erudition, thoroughly familiar with all the principal oriental languages, including Hehrew, Chaldaic, Syriac, and Arahic, and so enthusiastic in linguistic studies that even when far advanced in years he desired to learn Ethiopic. His favorite study was Phoenician, and though modest and candid he seeks to derive all languages etymologically " from the Hebrew or Phoenician," a pro cedure which led him into many fanciful etymologies. Cf. Dutens, Leibnit. opera omnia, Vol. 6, Pt. II., pp. 223, 226. His complete works were published under the title, Sam. Bochart, opera omnia. Leyden, 1675, 2 vols. fol., 1692, 1712, 3 vols. fol. Leibnitz prized and often cited them. — TK.
CH. n] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 303 corne from the farthest known antiquity, show best the old language and the ancient inhabitants; hence they deserve particular investigation. And languages in general being the most ancient monuments of peoples, before writing and the arts, show best the origin of cognations and migrations. Hence etymologies much extended would be curious and sig nificant; but it is necessary to unite the languages of many peoples, and not to make too many leaps from one nation to another far distant without having good verifications, in which process it is especially useful to have intervening peoples as guarantees. And in general credence must be given to ety mologies only when there is a quantity of concurrent evidence; to do differently is to goropise.
Ph. To goropise? What does that mean?
Th. It means that the strange and often ridiculous etymol ogies of Goropius Becanus,1 a learned physician of the sixteenth century, have passed into a proverb, although otherwise he may not have been excessively wrong in claiming that the German language, which he calls Cimbric, has as many, yes, more, marks of a primitive character than the Hebrew itself. I remember that the late Mr. Clauberg,2 an excellent philoso- 1 John Becan, 1518-1572, a Belgian physician and scholar, whose real name was Van Gorp — Latinized as Goropius Becanus. He practised medicine for some years at Antwerp, but tinally gave himself wholly to the study of antiquity, belles-lettres, and ancient languages. In a public lecture at Liege, he attempted to demonstrate that the language of Adam was the Flemish or Teutonic, a view which he set forth at length in his Origines Antioerpianse sive Cimmeriorum Becceselana, etc., Antwerp, 1569, fol.; and, as at that time he considered the Netherlands to be the site of Paradise, to derive language in general from the Low-German, which he calls the Cimbric, in his paper Hermathena, Bk. II., p. 25 sq. Cf. Joannis Goropii Bccani opera hactenus in lucem non edita; nempe, Hermathena, etc., Antwerp, 1580, fol. — TR.
2 John Clauberg, 1022-1G65, a German philosopher of the Cartesian school, who, first as a commentator merely and afterwards more independently, introduced and expounded the philosophy of Descartes in the universities at Herborn and Duisbnrg, where he was professor successively of theology and philosophy. He wrote a commentary on the Meditations of Descartes, and in his own speculations anticipated much of the subsequent development of Car- tesianism. In his De conjunctions aninife et corporis humrnii srriptinn, he maintained that bodily movements are antecedents only and not strictly causes of mental action, a view similar to that of Malebranche. He proposed for metaphysics the name Ontosophy or Ontology, a hint which Christian Wolf, 11)79-1754, afterwards followed. Cf. Erdmann, Grund. d. Gesch. (7. Phllns., §§ 2<>8, 4, 2<K), 4, Vol. 2, pp. 33, 187, ~3d ed., Berlin, 1878, and English trans, ad Ivc. His Ontvsophia, de coynitione Dei et nostri appeared at Muhlberg, 1087, 304 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. in pher, has published a brief essay upon the sources of the German language which makes one regret the loss of that which he had promised upon this subject. I have myself published some thoughts upon the subject, besides inducing the late Gerard Meier,1 a theologian of Bremen, to work upon it, which he did till death interrupted him. I hope, however, that the public will yet one day profit from his labors as well as from the similar labors of Mr. Schilter,2 a celebrated juris consult at Strasburg, but who also has just died. It is certain at least that the Teutonic language and antiquities enter into the majority of the researches into European origins, customs, and antiquities. And I wish that learned men would make as much of them in the languages of the Wallachians, Bis- cayans, Slavonians, Finns, Turks, Persians, Armenians, Geor gians, and others, the better to discover the harmony which would particularly be of service, as I have just said, in clearing up the origin of nations.]
§ 2. Ph. [This design is important, but at present it is time to leave the matter of words, and to return to their form, i.e. to 1 vol., 12mo; and his Opera philosophica at Amsterdam, 1691, 2 vols., 4to. Leibnitz had a high regard for him, both as a philologist and philosopher, and in one expression apparently places him even above Descartes; " Carte- sius voluit qusedam emendare in physicis, displicet tamen audacia et fastus nimius conjunctus cum stili obscuritate, confusione, malediceutia. Longe magis mi hi probatus Claubergins, discipulus ejus, plenns, perspicuus, brevis, method- icus." Cf. Otium Hanoveranum, ed. J. F. Feller, p. 181, Lipsire, 1718; Dutens, Lcibnit. opera omnia, Vol. 6, Pt. I., p. 311. Leibnitz frequently mentions him and his works, particularly the Meditationcs et collectanea linr/use Teutonicse, Duisburgi, 1003, and the booklet Ars etinnolor/ira Teutomnn; cf. Dutens, op. cit., Vols. 5, p. 334; 6, Pt. II., pp. 28, 179, 22o! In the Ars etymol. Teuton. Clauberg puts it forth as a fundamental proposition that the German must be explained as an original language. Cf. I,. Neff., G. W. Leibniz als Sprach- forscher imd Etymologe, Pt. I., p. 16 sq., Heidelberg, 1870. — TR.
1 Gerard or Gerhard Meier or Meyer, who was incited by Leibnitz to the study of German philology, and collected an abundance of select materials for a Grammatica Germanica and Glossarium Sayoniciim, but was prevented from completing the work begun by his early and sudden death; cf. Eccard, Collectanea etymoloyica, 2 vols., 8vo, Hannoverse, 1717, Einleitung, p. 52, and Dutens, Lcibnit. opera omnia, Vol. 6, Pt II., p. 145, note. Leibnitz states that the Glossar. Saron. was planned and undertaken with his encouragement, and that it will contain much erudition; cf. Dutens, op. cit., Vols. 5, p. 115; (!, 114, and note. For the correspondence between Meyer and Leibnitz, which exhib its Meyer's method in his etymological work, cf. Dutens, op. cit., Vol. 6, Pt. II., pp. 145-176. Leibnitz says: " His learning and character are esteemed by all " — " Doctrina ejus, et virtus apud omnes in pretio hahentur," Dutens, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 105. — TK. 2 cf. ante, p. 295, note 1. — TR.
en. n] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 305 the meaning which is common to the different languages.] Now you will agree with me in the first place, sir, that when one man speaks to another it is of his own ideas that he wishes to give signs; the words cannot be applied by him to things which he does not know. And until a man has ideas of his own he cannot suppose them to correspond to the qualities of things or to the conceptions of another.
Th. [It is true, however, that he intends very often to indicate what others think rather than what he himself thinks, as happens only too much in the case of the laity, whose faith is implicit. But I admit that he always means something general, however hollow and destitute of intelli gence the thought may be; and he takes pains at least to arrange his words according to the custom of others, content ing himself with the belief that their sense can be apprehended at need. Thus he is sometimes only the interpreter (truche- man] of thoughts, or the bearer of the word of another, just as a letter would be; and indeed this is the case oftener than you think.]
§ 3. Ph. [You are right in adding that he always means something general, however idiotic it may be.] A child hav ing noticed in what he hears called gold only a brilliant yellow color, gives the name of gold' to this same color which he sees in a peacock's tail; others will add great weight, fusibility, malleability.
Th. [I admit it; but often the idea you.have of the object of which you speak, is still more general than that of this child, and I doubt not that a blind person can speak pertinently of colors and make a speech in praise of the light which he does not know, because he has learned its effects and circum stances.]
§ 4. Ph. Your remark is quite true. Men often apply their thoughts more to words than to things, and because they have learned most of these words before becoming acquainted with the ideas which they signify, not only children, but also grown up men often speak like parrots. § 5. But men ordinarily mean to indicate their own thoughts, and further they attribute to words a secret relation to the ideas of another and to things themselves. For if the sounds were attached to another idea by the one with whom we are conversing, it would be necessary x 306 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. m to speak two languages. It is true that one does not stop too much to examine what the ideas of others are, and our idea is supposed to be that which the common people and the scholars of the country attach to the same word. § 6. This is particu larly the case as regards simple ideas and modes; but as regards substances the belief is more particularly that the words signify also the reality of things.
Th. [Substances and modes are equally represented by ideas; and things, as well as ideas, in both cases are indi cated by words; thus I see but little difference, save that ideas of substances and of sensible qualities are more fixed. For the rest, it sometimes happens that our ideas and thoughts are the matter of our discourse and constitute the thing itself which we desire to signify, and that reflective notions enter more than we think into those of things. We speak, indeed, sometimes of words in a material way, without in this case being able to substitute with precision in the place of the word its signification or its relation to the ideas or things.1 1 Leibnitz here points out a source of manifold, far-reaching and influential errors, especially fatal in philosophy, viz. the hypostasizing of concepts, i.e. regarding and using universal thought-symbols as substances, a consequence of the excessive use of abstract terms. To these errors thus arising from the imperfection and abuse of words and their influence on the mind, Francis Bacon, 1561-162B, in his Nov. Orrj. Bk. I., Aphor. 43, 59, 00, gives the name of idolafori, idols of the market-place, and says they are "omnium molestis- sima " — " the most troublesome of all." These words are either names merely of non-existent things or of things supposed to exist because of these names, or are names obtained by "vicious and unskilful abstraction" — "mala et imperita abstractione " — from a few objects and indiscriminately applied to all other things having the faintest analogy thereto. The best ed. of Bacon's Works is that of Ellis, Spedding, and Heath, 2d ed., 7 vols., London: Long mans, 1870-72. The Nov. Ory., in Latin, is in Vol. 1, the Eng. trans, in Vol. 4 of this ed. Editions of the Nov. Ore/. (Latin) have been published with Eng. notes, and an Eng. trans, in a separate vol., by G. W. Kitchin, Oxford: Clar endon Press, 1855; and with Introd., Notes, etc., by Thos. Fowler, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1878.
For Leibnitz's estimate of Bacon, whose De Aug. Scient. he mentions among the writings which happily chanced to come into his hands when a youth, and with others helped to direct his studies in the right path, whom he enumerates among " the founders of modern philosophy," and whose method he applied in his reform of the science of language, cf. Gerhardt, Die philos. Schrift. v. G. W. Leibniz, Vols. 1: 190; 3: 7, 10; 4: 143, Erdmann, Leibnit. opera philos., p. 61, b; G. 4: 04, E. 23, a; G. 4: 105, E. 45, a, also G. 7: 325, E. 110, b; G. 4: 337, 343; 7: 52, 53, E. 91, b, 92; G. 7: 67; 7: 495, Dutens. Leibnit. opera omnin, 5: 368; 6: 303; G. 7: 518, E. 421, a. Cf. also John Nichol, Bacon, Vol. 2, pp. 238-239 (Philos. Classics), Edinburgh: Win. Blackc-ir. in] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,307 This occurs not only in speaking as a grammarian, bnt also in speaking as a lexicographer, in giving the explication of the term.]
CHAPTER III OF GENERAL TERMS § 1. Ph. Although particular things alone exist, the larg est number of words are general terms, because it is impossible, § 2, for each particular thing to have a particular and distinct name; besides the fact that in such case a prodigious memory would be necessary, in comparison with which that of certain generals who could call by name all their soldiers would be nothing. The matter indeed becomes infinite, if every animal, every plant, and even every leaf of a plant, every grain, in short every grain of sand, which might need a name must have its name. [And how name the parts of things sensibly uniform, as water, fire?] § 3. Besides, these particular names would be useless, the principal end of language being to excite in the mind of him who listens to me an idea similar to mine. [Thus the similitude suffices, which is indicated by general terms.] § 4. And particular words alone would not serve to extend our knowledge, [nor to make us judge of the future by the past, or of one individual by another.] § 5. But as it is often necessary to mention certain individuals, particularly of our species, use is made of proper names; which are given also to countries, towns, mountains and other dis tinctions of place. And horse-jockeys give proper names even to their horses, as well as Alexander to his Bucephalus, in order to be able to distinguish this or that particular horse when he is out of their sight.
27*. [These remarks are good, and some of them agree with those I was about to make. But I would add, in accord ance with the observation I have already made, that proper names have been ordinarily appellatives, that is to say, general wood & Sons, 1880. For a brief comparison of Leibnitz and Bacon and of tbeir philosophies, cf. J. T. Merz, Leibniz, pp. 21, 71 (Blackwood's Pliilos. Classics), Edinburgh: 1884.— TR.
308 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. in in their origin, as Brutus, Ceesar, Augustus, Capito, Lentulus, Piso, Cicero, Elbe, Rhine, Ruhr, Leine, Ocker, Bucephalus, Alps, Brenner or Pyrenees; for you know that the first Brutus had this name from his apparent stupidity, that Caesar was the name of a child drawn by incision from the womb of his mother, that Augustus was a name of veneration, that Capito is a large head as also Bucephalus, that Lentulus, Piso, and Cicero were names given in the beginning to those who cultivated in particular certain kinds of vegetables. I have already said what the names of these rivers signify, Rhine, Ruhr, Leine, Ocker. And you know that all rivers are still called Elbe in Scandinavia. Finally Alps are mountains, covered with snow (with which agrees album, white) and Brenner or Pyrenees signifies a lofty pride, for bren was high or chief (as Brennus) in Keltic, as also brinck with Low- Saxons is pride, and there is a Brenner between Germany and Italy as the Pyrenees are between Gaul and Spain. Thus I would venture to say that nearly all words are originally gen eral terms, because it will only rarely happen that an express name will be invented without reason to indicate one such individual. We can say then that the names of individuals were names of a species which was given par excellence or otherwise to some individual, as the name large head to that one of the whole city who had the largest or who was the most important of the large heads which were known. Thus it is indeed that we give names of genera to the species, i.e. that we shall content ourselves with a term more general or more vague to designate more particular species, when we have no concern for their differences. For example, we are contented with the general name, wormwood, although there are so many species of it that one of the Bauhins1 has filled a book expressly with them.]
1 Jean Bauhin, 1541-1013, a Swiss physician and naturalist, who devoted himself chiefly to botany, and with his brother Gaspard, 15(iO-l(i24, also a physician and botanist, was born at Basel, whither his father, an eminent French physician, had fled in exile because of his conversion to Protestant ism. He studied with the celebrated botanist Fnchs at Tubingen, and after travelling and collecting plants in the Alps, in France, and in Italy, became, in 1570, physician to Duke Ulrich of Wiirtemberg at Montbeliard, where he remained till his death. The work of his to which Leibnitz here alludes is entitled De plantis absinthii nomen habcntibus. It appeared at Montbeliard en. in] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING "309 § G. Ph. Your reflections upon the origin of proper names are very just; but to come to that of appellative names or general terms, you will doubtless agree, sir, that words become general when they are signs of general ideas, and ideas become general when separated by abstraction from time, place, or such other circumstances as may determine them to this or that particular existence.
Th. [I do not deny this use of abstraction, but it is rather in ascending from species to genera than from individuals to species. For (paradoxical as it may appear) it is impos sible for us to have the knowledge of individuals, and to obtain the means of determining exactly the individuality of anything, at least of keeping it by itself; for all the circum stances may reappear; the smallest differences are to us insen sible; place or time, far from determining themselves, need themselves to be determined by the things they contain. The most important factor in the problem is the fact that individu ality includes infinity, and only he who is capable of com prehending it can have the knowledge of the principle of individuation of this or that thing. This arises from the influence (understanding it healthfully) of all things in the universe upon each other. It is true that this would be the case, if the atoms of Democritus existed, but in that case also there would be no difference between two different individ uals of the same form and size.]
§ 7. Ph. It is, however, wholly evident that the ideas which children frame of persons with whom they converse (to con fine ourselves to this example) are similar to the persons themselves, and particular only. The ideas they have of their nurse and their mother are very well traced in their minds, and the names nurse and mamma, which children use, relate only to these persons. Afterwards when time has shown them that there are many other beings resembling in 1593. His most important work, composed with the assistance of his fellow- countryman and son-in-law Cherler, and containing descriptions of about 5000 plants with 15577 figures, is the Ilistoria universalis plantarum nova ct absolu- tissima, Yverdun, 1(>50-K;51, 3 vols., fol. An abridgment of this great work was published by Chabree, of Geneva, with the title Sridi/raphin, KM!, con taining in one volume all the figures, together with all of importance on the nomenclature and number of species in the great work. He was one of the founders of modern botany. — Tu.
310 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. in their father or mother, they form an idea in which they find that all these particular beings equally share, and they, as others, give it the name of man. § 8. They acquire in the same way names and notions more general; for example, the new idea of animal is not produced by any addition, but only by removing the figure or the particular properties of man, and retaining a body accompanied by life, feeling, and spon taneous movement.
Th. [Very Avell; but that shows only what I just said; for as the child advances by abstraction from the observation of the idea of man to that of the idea of animal, he has come from the more specific idea observed in his mother or father and in other persons to that of human nature. For in order to discern that he had not the precise idea of the individual, it is sufficient to consider that an ordinary resemblance would deceive him easily and make him take as his mother another woman. You know the story of the false Martin Guerre,1 who deceived even the wife of the true, and the near relatives, by resemblance united with skill, and embarrassed for a long time the judges, even when the true Martin had arrived.]
§ 9. Ph. Thus this whole mystery of genus and species, which makes so much noise in the schools, but which outside of them is with reason so little regarded, this whole mystery, I say, reduces itself solely to the formation of abstract ideas more or less extended, to which certain names are given.2 1 Cf. Essais de Thtodic^e, Discours pre'Iiminaire, § 4'2, Gerhardt, 6, 74, Erdmann, 491, b, Jacques, 2, 48. In the sixteenth century, Martin Guerre, a gentleman of Gascony, disappeared from home. After a long absence, a man by the name of Arnaud du Thil suddenly appeared, claiming to be Martin Guerre, and was acknowledged by the wife of Guerre as her husband. She had by him two children. Learning, afterwards, that her true husband was in Flanders, she angrily delivered the impostor into the hands of justice. The long trial, one of the most celebrated cases of the century, was brought to an end by the sudden and unexpected arrival of the true Martin Guerre, and Du Thil was sentenced to death. For further details, and the sentence in full, cf. P. Larousse, Grand Diet. Universel de XIXe Siecle, Vol. 8, p. 1G03, b, c. A parallel case in recent times was the Tichborne trial in England. — TR.
2 The philosophies of Locke and Leibnitz present a sharp contrast on the question of genera and species, and the real existence of the universal. Accord ing to Locke, the question is a wholly empty one, an inheritance from the unprofitable discussions of scholasticism. The general term, the universal, is a purely subjective product of the more or less arbitrary activity of man in abstraction, and has nothing whatever to do with reality. Leibnitz maintains that the universal is the inner essence of things, and that the formation of en. in] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 311 Th. [The art of classifying things into genera and species is of no little importance and of much use both to the judg ment and the memory. You know how important this is in botany, not to speak of animals and other substances, and without mentioning also beings moral and notional,1 as some call them. Order largely depends upon it, and many good authors so write that their entire discourse can be reduced to divisions and subdivisions, according to a method which has some relation to genera and species, and is of use not only in retaining things, but also in rinding them.2 And they who have arranged all sorts of notions under certain titles or pre dicaments subdivided have done a very useful thing.]
§ 10. Ph. In defining words, we avail ourselves of the genus general terms is not a mere thought-expedient, but a legitimate and proper apprehension of the true and the real. Cf. G. Hartenstein, Locke's Lehre v. d. inenschl. Erkenntniss in Vergleichung m. Leibniz's Kritik derselben, V., pp. 52 sq., also in his Histnr. Philos. Abhandl., Leipzig, 1870, pp. 162 sq. — TR.
1 Notional or conceptional beings, begriffliche Wesen, entia rationis, are those which, as Schaarschmidt says, "serve to indicate that which without being in the ordinary sense of the word substantial (first substance in the language of Aristotle," cf. Cater/or. 5, 2a, 11; Wallace, Outlines of the Philos. of Aristotle, § 10, p. 25; Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., II., 2 [Vol. 4], p. 304 sq., 3d ed., 1879; but cf. also, Metuphys. VII., 7, 1032^, 2; Wallace, op. cit. § 34, p. 07, Zeller, op. cit. II. 2 [Vol. 4], p. 344 sq.) " can still lay claim to an ideal reality." For further discussion of the subjects of this and the note next preceding, cf. Neio Essays, Bk. III., chaps. 5, 6, Bk. IV., chaps. 4, G. — TR.
2 Cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift. 7, 67: " Fuere tamen autores non contemnendi, qui methodum rebus junxere nt Theodorus Zwingerus, Joh. Thomas Freigius, Barthol. Kechermannus, et diligentissimus Joh. Henr. Alstedius, cujus Encyclopaedia mi hi pro captu illorum temporum laudanda videtur." Alsted, 1588-1638, was Professor of Philosophy and Theology at Herborn in Nassau, but applied himself chiefly to systemizing the several branches of art and science. His Encyclopaedia, Herbornisc, 1630, 7 vols., fol., reprinted Lugduni, 1(!49, 4 vols., fol. Leibnitz often mentions it (cf. G. 4, 62, 74, E. 22, a, 28, b; Dutens, Leibnit. opera omnia, 5, 405, 567), and wrote down some thoughts — cor/itata quscdam — for its enlargement and improvement; cf. Dutens, 5, 183-185. The classified contents of the work are given in the article "Encyclopaedia," in the Encijclop. Brit. 9th ed., Vol. X, p. 176, b (American Reprint). Schaarschmidt states that the different works of It. Goden, as well as those of Alsted, are of the kind alluded to in the text. Goclen, 1547-1626, was Professor of Philosophy at Marburg, and published a Lexicon philosophicum, Marburg, 1013, 1 vol., 4to, which, though of little value, enjoyed from its novelty considerable celebrity at the time of its appear ance. Leibnitz refers to this work in his third letter to Clarke; cf. G. 7, 365, E. 752, b, J. 2, 426, D. 2, 122. Goclen was the 'discoverer and signalizer ' of the Inverse, Regressive, or Goclenian Sorites, in comprehension; cf. Hamilton, Lccts. on Lof/ic, XIX., p. 273, Amer. ed., and Goclenii Isagoyc in Oryanum Aristotelis, p. 255, Francof. 1598. — TR.