stood this argument, and have taken it as a paralogism; in which respect they were altogether wrong, and Descartes, who studied quite a long time the scholastic philosophy at the Jesuit College of La Fleche, had great reason for re-establish ing it. It is not a paralogism, but it is an imperfect J demon stration, which assumes something that must still be proved in order to render it mathematically evident; that is, it is tacitly assumed that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible, and implies no contradiction. And it is already something that by this remark it is proved that, assuming that God is possible, lie exists, which is the privilege of divinity alone. We have the right to presume the possi bility of every being, and especially that of God, until some one proves the contrary. So that this metaphysical argument already gives a morally demonstrative conclusion, which de clares that according to the present state of our knowledge we must judge that God exists, and act in conformity thereto. But it is to be desired, nevertheless, that clever men achieve the demonstration with the strictness of a mathematical proof, and I think I have elsewhere 2 said something that may serve this end. The other argument of Descartes, which under takes to prove the existence of God because the idea of him is in our soul, and must have come from the original, is still less conclusive. For in the first place this argument has this de fect, in common with the preceding, that it assumes that there is in us such an idea, i.e. that God is possible. For what Descartes alleges, that in speaking of God we know what we 2], 49S. Spinoza also censures Aquinas for his rejection of the ontological argument; cf. Korte Verhandeliny ran God, in Spinoza, Opera, ed. Van Vlo- ten and Laud, Vol. 2, p. 265, and Schaarschmidt's German trans, of the same (Vol. 18 of J. H. v. Kirchmaun's Philos. tiibliothek), p. 6, 2d ed., Berlin, 1 Gerhardt reads " parfaite "; Erdmaun, Jacques, and Janet " imparfaite." The reading of G. is evidently a Ms. or typographical error, as the sense requires that of E., J., and J. — TR.
2 Leibnitz here probably refers to the I)e la demonstration Cartesienne, etc., 1701, Gerhardt, 4, 405, Erdmann, 177, Dutens, 2, Pt. I., 254, trans. Dun can, 136. But cf. also G. 4, 292-294, 401-403, trans. Duncan, 132-136; Animad- versiones in partem aeneralem Principiorum Uartesianorum, 1692, Pt. I., ad art. 14, 18, 20, G. 4, 358-60, trans. Duncan, 50-51, and Letters to Jacquelot, Nov., 1702, G. 3, 442 sq., Letter to Conring, Jan. 3, 1678, G. 1, 188, E. 78; cor respondence with Eckhard, G. 1, 212 xq.; and Stein, Leibniz it. Spinoza, Bei- lage VII., p. 306: Probatio existentise Dei ex ejas essentia. — Tu.
CH. x] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 505 are saying, and that consequently we have an idea, is a decep tive indication, since in speaking of perpetual mechanical movement, for example, we know what we are saying, and yet this movement is an impossible thing, of which, conse quently, we can have only an apparent idea. Secondly, this same argument does not sufficiently prove that the idea of God, if we have it, must come from the original. But I do not wish to delay here at present. You will say, sir, to me, that recognizing in us the innate idea of God, I ought not to say that we may question whether there is one. But I per mit this doubt only in relation to a strict demonstration based upon the idea alone. For we are otherwise sufficiently assured of the idea and of the existence of God. And you will re member that I have shown how ideas are in us, not always in such wise that we are conscious of them, but always in such wise that we may draw them from our own depths and make them perceivable. And this is also my belief concerning the idea of God, the possibility and existence of which I hold to be demonstrated in more than one way. And the pre-estab lished harmony itself furnishes a new and incontestable means of so doing.1 I believe also that nearly all the means which have been employed to prove the existence of God are good and might be of service, if we would perfect them, and I am not at all of the opinion that we should neglect that drawn from the order of things.2 § 9. Ph. It will perhaps be proper to insist a little upon this question, whether a thinking being can come from a non thinking being deprived of all sensation and knowledge such as matter may be. § 10. It is indeed quite evident that a part of matter is incapable of producing anything of itself, and of giving itself motion; its motion must then either be eternal or be impressed upon it by a more powerful being. If this motion were eternal, it would always be incapable of pro ducing knowledge. Divide matter into as many little parts as you please, in order, as it were, to spiritualize it, give it all 2 Leibnitz's idea is that all right thought, if thorough-going and deep enough, must at last lead back to God, its original source. None of the proofs of God's existence are therefore to be cast aside, but the essential significance of each is to be sought out and ascertained and its form perfected, and all are to be united into one organic whole. — TR.
506 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv figures and motions you wish, make it a globe, a cube, a prism, a cylinder, etc., whose diameters are only the one-millionth part of a gry, which is one-tenth of a line, which is one-tenth of an inch, which is one-tenth of a philosophical foot, which is one-third of a pendulum, each vibration of which in the latitude of forty-five degrees is equal to one second of time. This particle of matter, small as it is, will act upon other bodies of a size proportional to itself 110 differently than bodies of an inch or a foot in diameter act among them selves. And we may hope as rationally to produce feeling, thought, and knowledge, by putting together gross parts of matter in a certain figure and motion, as by means of the smallest parts of matter in the world. These last knock, push, and resist each other just as the great ones do, and this is all they can do. But if matter could draw from its bosom feeling, perception, and knowledge, immediately and with out machinery, or without the aid of figures and motions, then their possession must be an inseparable property of matter and of all its parts. To which one could add that, though the general and specific idea we have of matter leads us to speak of it as if it were a thing single in num ber, yet all matter is not properly one individual thing, which exists in a material being or a single body that we know or can conceive. So that if matter were the first eternal think ing being, there would not be one eternal infinite and think ing being, but an infinite number of eternal infinite 1 thinking beings, independent of one another, whose forces would be limited and thoughts distinct, and who consequently could never produce this order, harmony, and beauty which is seen in nature. Whence it necessarily follows that the eternal first being cannot be matter. I hope that you, sir, will be more content with this reasoning taken from the celebrated author of the preceding demonstration than you have appeared to be with his demonstration.
Th. I find the present reasoning the most solid in the world, and not only exact, but further profound and worthy of its author. I am perfectly of his opinion that no combination and modification of the parts of matter, however small they 1 Locke has "finite" here, Philos. Works, Vol. 2, p. 237, Bohn's ed. Ger- hardt, Erdmann, Jacques, and Janet all read " infiuis." — Tit.
CH. x] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 507 may be, can produce perception; forasmuch as the gross par ticles could not give it (as is manifestly admitted) and as all is proportional in the small parts to what may take place in the great. It is furthermore an important remark regard ing matter which the author makes here, that it must not be taken as a thing single in number, or (as I have been wont to state it) as a true and perfect monad or unity, since it is only a mass of an infinite number of beings. Here this excel lent author needed but a step to arrive at my system. For in fact I give perception to all these infinite beings, each one of which is like an animal endowed with a soul (or some active analogous principle which makes its true unity), together with what is necessary to this being in order to be passive and endowed with an organic body. Now these beings have received their nature, active as well as passive (i.e. what they have of immaterial and material), from a general and supreme cause, because otherwise, as the author very well says, being independent of one another, they could never produce this order, harmony, and beauty which is seen in nature. But this argument, which appears to possess only a moral certainty, is pushed to a necessity wholly metaphysical by the new kind of harmony I have introduced, which is the pre-established har mony. For each one of these souls expressing in its way what takes place outside it and being unable to have any influence on other particular beings, or rather, being obliged to draw this expression from the depths of its own nature, each one must necessarily have received this nature (or this internal reason of the expression of that which is outside) from a universal cause upon which all these beings depend and which makes one perfectly in accord and correspondent with another; a thing impossible without an infinite knowledge and power and with an artifice great as regards especially the spontane ous agreement of the mechanism with the acts of the rational soul. The illustrious author l who made objections against it 1 Leibnitz here refers to Pierre Bayle, lf>47-1706, a celebrated critic, philoso- pher, aiid controversialist, who published in his Dictionnaire historique et critique, Rotterdam, 1(595-97, 2 vols., 2d ed., revised and enlarged, 1702, article " Rorarius," a criticism of Leibnitz's Systeme nouveau de la nature, etc., pub lished in the " Jour, des Savants," June, 1(595, pp. 449 sq. Leibnitz sought to repel his criticisms in a writing, July, 1(598, addressed to Basnage de Beauval, editor of the " llistoire des ouvrages des Scavans," and published therein, 508 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv in his wonderful Dictionary doubted, as it were, whether this condition of tilings did not surpass all possible wisdom, saying that the wisdom of God did not appear to him too great for such an effect, and recognized at least that never had the feeble conceptions we may have of the divine perfection been so set in relief.
§ 12. Ph. How delighted I am at this agreement of your thoughts with those of my author! I hope you will not be dis pleased, sir, if I give you an account also of the rest of his reasoning upon this article. First he examines whether the thinking being, upon whom all the other intelligent beings depend (and with much stronger reason all other beings) is material or not. § 13. It is objected that a thinking being might be material. But he replies that if that were so, it is enough that this be an eternal being which, has an infinite knowledge and power. Further, if thought and matter can be separated, the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a thinking being. § 14. It will further be asked of those who make God material whether they imagine that every part of matter thinks. In that case it will follow that there would be as many Gods as particles of matter. But if each, part of matter does not think, then there is a thinking being composed of non-thinking parts, which has already been disproved. § 15. To say that any single atom of matter thinks, and that the other parts, July, 1698, p. 329 sq., cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 4, 517-24, Erdmann, 150-154, Jacques, 1, 481-87, Dutens, 2, Pt. I., 74-80. In the 2d ed. of his Diction- naire, p. 2599 sq., Eng. trans, from 2d ed., carefully collated with the several eds. of the original, 5 vols., London, 1738, 4, 900-916, Bayle again discussed Leibnitz's views, and to this discussion Leibnitz made a thorough and search ing reply, first published by Gerhardt, 4, 524-54, with the title: Extract du Dictionnaire dc M. Bayle, article, Rorarius, p. 2599 sqq. de I' Edition de Van 1702 avec mes remarques. Leibnitz pub. a revision of this detailed refutation, in 1712, in the " Histoire critique de la Republique des Lettres," Vol. 2, p. 78 sq. Gerhardt has published it, 4, 544-71, with many additions by Leibnitz. Cf. also Erdmann, 183-191, Dutens, 2, Pt. I., 80-93, Janet, 2, 579-94. Leibnitz elsewhere frequently refers to Bayle, especially in the Theodice'e, in the pre liminary essay entitled, Discours preliminaire sur conformite de lafoi avec la raison, in which Bayle's objections are carefully examined, and in Pts. II. and III., where he is cited on nearly every page, and which presents a continuous polemic against him. The composition of the Thtodicee was occasioned by the discussions held by Leibnitz with Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia on philo sophical and theological topics suggested by the reading of Bayle's Dictionary. For the correspondence of Leibnitz and Bayle, cf. Gerhardt, 3, 21 sq. — Tn.
CH. x] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 509 though equally eternal, do not think, is to make the gratuitous statement that one part of matter is infinitely above another and produces thinking beings not eternal.1 § 1C. If we will have it that the thinking eternal and material being is a cer tain particular mass of matter whose parts are non-thinking, we fall back upon the view which has been disprovexl; for the parts of matter are united in vain, they can acquire only a new local relation, which cannot give them knowledge. § 17. It matters not whether this mass is at rest or in motion. If at rest, it is only an inactive mass which has no privilege above one atom; if in motion, since this motion, which distin guishes it from other parts, is destined to produce thought, all these thoughts will be accidental and limited, each part by itself being without thought, and having nothing which regu lates its movements. Thus there will be neither freedom, nor choice, nor wisdom, any more than in simple brute matter. § 18. Some believe that matter is at least coeternal with God. But they do not say why: the production of a thinking being, which they admit, is much more difficult than that of matter which is less perfect. And perhaps (says the author) if we would withdraw ourselves a little from common ideas, give wings to our mind, and engage in the profoundest examina tion, we could make of the nature of things, we might be able to attain a conception, though in an imperfect manner, how matter may at first have been made, and how it commenced to exist by the power of this eternal first being. But we should see at the same time that to give being to a spirit is an effect of this eternal and infinite power much more difficult to comprehend. Biit because this would perhaps lead me too far (he adds) from the notions upon tvhich the philosophy now in the world is based, it would not be excusable in me to deviate so far from them or to inquire, so far as grammar would permit, whether at bottom the commonly established opinion is contrary to this particular view; it would be wrong, I say, for me to engage in this discussion, especially in this corner oftheivorld, where the received doctrine is good enough for my purpose, since it posits as an indubitable thing that if the creation or beginning of any substance whatever from nothing be once 1 Leibnitz anticipates this argument of Locke by his law of continuity. — Tu.
610 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv admitted, the creation of every other substance, except the Creator himself, may with the same facility be assumed.
Th. You have given me genuine pleasure, sir, by giving me some account of a profound thought of your clever author, which his too scrupulous prudence has prevented him from producing in its entirety. It would be a great wrong, if he should suppress it and leave us there, after having made our mouths water. I assure you, sir, that I believe there is some thing beautiful and important concealed behind this enigmati cal manner.1 The substance in large letters might make one suspicious that he conceives the production of matter in the same way as that of the accidents, which we find no difficulty in drawing from nothing: and in distinguishing his particular thought from the philosophy now prevalent in the world or in that corner of the earth, I do not know but that he had in mind the Platonists, who take matter as something fleeting and transi tory, after the manner of the accidents, and had an altogether different idea of spirits and souls.
§ 19. Ph. Finally, if some deny creation, by which things are made from nothing, because they cannot conceive it, our author, writing before he knew your discovery on the reason of the union of the soul and the body, holds against them, that they do not understand how voluntary movements are pro duced in bodies by the will of the soul, and they cease not to believe the fact, being convinced by experience; and he re plies with reason to those who answer that the soul being una ble to produce a new motion, produces only a new determina tion of the animal spirits, he replies to them, I say, that the one is as inconceivable as the other. And nothing can be better said than what he adds on this occasion, that to wish to limit what God can do to what we can comprehend, is to give an infinite extent to our comprehension, or to make God himself finite.
Th. Although now the difficulty regarding the union of the soul and the body has in my view been removed, there remain difficulties elsewhere. I have shown a posteriori by the pre- 1With regard to this riddle or enigma, Professor Schaarschmidt informs me that Raspe, in his ed. of the Nouveaux Essais, 17<>5, says, p. 409: " Mr. Coste 1'a explique d'apres le Chevalier Newton dans la remarque (2) an § 18, de ce chapitre. Edition de Locke d'Amsterdam, de 1755, p. 5-3." — TK.
en. xi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 511 established harmony, that all the monads have received their origin from God and depend upon him. But we cannot com prehend the how in detail; and at bottom their conservation is nothing else than a continual creation,1 as the Scholastics have very clearly recognized.
CHAPTER XI OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS § 1. Ph. As, then, the existence of God only has a necessary connection with ours, the ideas we may have of anything no more prove the existence of this thing than the portrait of a man proves his existence in the world. § 2. The certainty, however, I have of black and white upon this paper by means of sensation is as great as that of the motion of my hand, which is second only to the knowledge of our own existence, and of that of God. § 3. This certainly deserves the name of knowledge. For I do not believe that any one can seriously be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of things which he sees and feels. At least, he who can carry his doubts so far will never have any controversy with me, since he can never be certain that I say anything contrary to his opinion. The perceptions of sensible things § 4. are produced by exter nal causes which affect our senses, for we do not acquire these perceptions without the organs, and if the organs sufficed, they would always produce them. § 5. Further, I sometimes experience the fact that I cannot prevent these ideas from being formed in my mind, as, for example, the light, when I have my eyes open in a place into which the light may enter: while I can lay aside the ideas which are in my memory.
There must be, then, some external cause of this living im pression whose efficacy I cannot overcome. § 6. Some of these 1 Cf. Observatio ad Recensionem libri de Fidel et Rationis consensu a Do mino Jaqueloto editi, mcnse Octobri proximo prseccdenti factam, pub. in the " Acta Enid. Lips.," Dec. 1705, p. 553, ad fin., Gerhardt, G, 556-8, Enlmann, 43:5-4, Dutens, 2, Ft. I., 250-8; The'odicte', Ft. III., §§ 382, 385, 391-3, G. 6, 342, E. 014, Jacques, 2, 2!)0, Janet, 2, 388, Dutens, 1, 387; Fichler, Die The- olofjie des Leibniz, 1, 252, Miinchen, 1869; Monadoloyie, § 47, G. G, 014, E. 708, Jacques, 2, 397, Janet, 2, 001, trans. Duncan, 225; Noleii, Leibniz, La Mona- dologie, 3d ed., Paris, 1893, pp. 148, 211. — TR.
512 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. iv impressions are produced in us with pain, although afterwards we remember it without feeling the least inconvenience. And although mathematical demonstrations do not depend on the senses, yet the examination made of them by means of dia grams is of much use in proving the evidence of our sight, and seems to give to it a certainty approaching that of demonstra tion itself. § 7. Our senses also in many cases bear witness to each other. He who sees the fire may feel it if in doubt of it. And in writing this, I see that I can change the appear ance of the paper, and say beforehand what new idea it is going to present to the mind; but, when these characters are traced, I can no longer avoid seeing them as they are, in addition to the fact that the sight of these characters will make another man utter the same sounds. § 8. If any one thinks that all this is but a long dream, he may dream, if he pleases, that I make this response to him, that our certainty based upon the testimony of our senses is as perfect as our nature allows, and our condition demands. He who sees a candle burning, and tries the heat of the flame, which hurts him if he does not withdraw his finger, will not ask for a greater certainty in order to govern his actions, and if this dreamer did not so do (i.e. withdraw his finger) he would find himself awakened. Such an assurance then suffices us, which is also as certain as pleasure or pain, two things beyond which we have no interest in knowledge or the existence of things. § 9. But beyond our actual sensation, there is no knowledge, and it is only probability, as when I believe that there are men in the world; of which fact there is a high degree of probabil ity, although at present, alone in my chamber, I see none of them. § 10. It is also folly to expect a demonstration of every thing and to act not in accord with clear and evident truths though they are not demonstrable. A man who should so use them could be assured of nothing but of dying in a very short time.
Th. I have already remarked in our preceding conferences ..that the truth of sensible things is justified by their connec tion,1 which depends upon the intellectual truths grounded in reason and upon constant observations in the sensible things 1 Cf. New Essays, Bk. IV., chap. 2, § 14, Th. (2), ante, p. 422, note 1. From the idealistic point of view, the only possible criterion of the truth of the phe- CH. xi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 513 themselves even when the reasons do not appear. And as these reasons and observations give us the means of judging the future as related to our interest, and as success corresponds with our rational judgment, we could not demand, nor have indeed, a greater certainty regarding these objects. We can also give a reason for dreams themselves, and for their slight connection with other phenomena. Nevertheless, I believe that we might extend the appellation of knowledge and of certainty beyond actual sensations, since clearness and mani- festness go beyond, which I consider as a species of certainty; and it would undoubtedly be folly seriously to doubt whether there are men in the world when we do not see any. To doubt seriously is to doubt in relation to the practical, and we might take certainty as a knowledge of truth which we cannot doubt in relation to the practical without madness; and sometimes we take it still more generally, and apply it to cases where we could not doubt without deserving to be severely blamed. But evidence would be a luminous certainty, i.e. where we do not doubt because of the connection we see between ideas. According to this definition of certainty, we are certain that Constantinople is in the world, that Constantino, Alexander the Great, and Julius Csesar lived. It is true that some peas ant of Ardennes might justly doubt about these, for lack of information; but a man of letters and of the world could not do so without great derangement of mind.
§ 11. Ph. We are assured in truth by our memory of many things which are past, but we shall not be able to judge easily whether they exist still. I saw yesterday water, and a certain number of beautiful colors upon bubbles formed upon this water. Now I am certain that those bubbles as well as that water existed, but I do not know with any more certainty the present existence of the water than that of the bubbles, although the former is infinitely more probable because the water has been observed to be lasting and the bubbles to dis appear. § 12. Finally, outside of ourselves and God we know i other spirits only by revelation, and we have concerning them only the certainty of faith.
nomena of the senses is the constancy and regularity in their connection or consecution. Cf. also De. mo do distini/ucndl phenomena realia ab imar/ina- riis, Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 7, 319 sq.; Erdmann, 443-445. — TR.
514 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv Tli. It has already been remarked that cmr memory some times deceives us. And we put confidence in it or not, accord-