G 82 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. i which are given to the stone or the marble indifferently, and between those which its veins already indicate, or are disposed to indicate, if the workman profits by them.
Ph. But is it not true that the truths are subsequent to the ideas of which they are born? Now, the ideas come from the senses.
Th. The intellectual ideas, which are the source of neces sary truths, do not come from the senses; and you admit that there are some ideas which are due to the reflection of the mind upon itself. For the rest, it is true that the express knowledge of truths is subsequent (tempore vel natura) to the express knowledge of ideas; as the nature of truths depends upon the nature of ideas, before we expressly form one or the other, and the truths, into which enter ideas which come from the senses, depend upon the senses, at least in part. But the ideas which come from the senses are confused, and the truths which depend upon them are likewise confused, at least in part; while the intellectual ideas, and the truths dependent upon them, are distinct, and neither the one nor the other have their origin in the senses, although it may be true that we would never think of them without the senses.
Ph. But, in your view, numbers are intellectual ideas, and yet it is found that the difficulty therein depends upon the express formation of the ideas; for example, a man knows that 18 and 19 equal 37 with the same evidence that he knows that 1 and 2 equal 3; but a child does not know the first propo sition so soon as the second, a condition arising from the fact that he has not formed the ideas as soon as the words.
Th. I can agree with you that often the difficulty in the express formation of truths depends upon that in the express formation of ideas. Yet I believe that in your example the question concerns the use of ideas already formed. For those who have learned to count as far as 10, and the method of passing farther on by a certain repetition of tens, understand without difficulty what are 18, 19, 37; viz., 1, 2, or 3 times 10 with 8, or 9, or 7; but, in order to draw from it that 18 plus 19 make 37, more attention is necessary than to know that 2 plus 1 are 3, which at bottom is only the definition of 3.
§ 18. Ph. Furnishing propositions in which you infallibly acquiesce as soon as you hear them is not a privilege attached en. i] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 83 to the numbers or to the ideas, which you call intellectual. You meet these in physics and in all the other sciences, and the senses even furnish them. For example, this proposition: two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time, is a truth of which you are not otherwise convinced than of the following maxims: It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be in the same time; white is not red; the square is not a circle; yellowness is not sweetness.
Tli. There is a difference between these propositions. The first, which declares the impenetrability of bodies, needs proof. All those who believe in true and strictly formed condensa tion and rarefaction, as the Peripatetics and the late Chevalier Digby,1 reject it, in fact; without speaking of the Christians who believe, for the most part, that the contrary view — namely, the penetration of space — is possible to God. But the other propositions are identical, or very nearly so, and identi cal or immediate propositions do not admit of proof. Those who look upon the senses as furnishing them, as that one who says that yellowness is not sweetness, have not applied the general identical maxim to particular cases.
Ph. Every proposition composed of two different ideas, of which one is the denial of the other — for example, that the square is not a circle, that to be yellow is not to be sweet — will be as certainly received as indubitable, as soon as its terms are understood, as this general maxim: It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be in the same time.
Th. That is, the one (namely, the general maxim) is the principle, and the other (that is to say, the negation of one idea by another opposed to it) is its application.
Ph. It seems to me rather that the maxim depends upon this negation, which is its ground; and that it is, besides, much easier to understand that tvhat is the same thing is not different, than the maxim which rejects the contradictions. Now, according to this statement, it will be necessary for you to admit as innate truths an infinite number of propositions of this kind which deny one idea by another without speaking 1 Sir Kenelm Dighy, 1003-1605, an eminent English physical philosopher, who lived for a time in France, where he enjoyed the friendship of Descartes and other learned men, and wrote his Treatise on the Nature of Bodies and other works. — TR.
84 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [HK. i of other truths. Add to this, that a proposition cannot be innate unless the ideas of which it is composed are innate; it will be necessary to suppose that all the ideas which we have of colors, sounds, tastes, figures, etc., are innate.
Th. I do not well see how this: what is the same thing is not different, is the origin of the principle of contradiction, and easier; for it appears to me that you give yourself more freedom in advancing that A is not B than in saying that A is not non-A. And the reason that prevents A from being B is that B includes non-A. For the rest this proposition: the siveet is not the bitter, is not innate, according to the sense which we have given to the term innate truth. For the sen sations of sweet and bitter come from the external senses. Thus it is a mixed conclusion (liybrida conclusio}, where the axiom is applied to a sensible truth. But as regards this proposition: the square is not a circle, you can affirm that it is innate, for, in considering it, you make a subsumption or application of the principle of contradiction to what the un derstanding itself furnishes as soon as you are conscious of innate thoughts.
Th. Not at all, for the thoughts are acts, and the knowledge or the truths, in so far as they are within us, even when we do not think of them, are habitudes or dispositions; and we are well acquainted with things of which we think but little.
Ph. It is very difficult to conceive that a truth may be in the mind if the mind has never thought of that truth.
Th. It is as if some one said it is difficult to conceive that there are veins in the marble before we have discovered them. This objection seems also to approach a little too much the begging of the question.1 All those who admit innate truths, without grounding them in the Platonic reminiscence, admit some of which they have not yet thought. Besides, this reasoning proves too much; for, if truths are thoughts, we shall be deprived not only of the truths of which we have never thought, but also of those of which we have thought, and of which we no longer actually think; and if truths are not thoughts, but habits and aptitudes, natural or acquired, nothing prevents there being in us some of which we have never thought, nor will ever think.
1 Petitio principii. — TR.
CH. n] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 85 § 27. Ph. If general maxims were innate, they would appear more vividly in the mind of certain persons where, however, we see no trace of them; I may mention children, idiots, and savages,1 for of all men these are they who have the mind less altered and corrupted by custom and by the impress of extraneous opinions.
Th. I believe we must reason here very differently. Innate maxims appear only through the attention which is given to them; but these persons have little of it, or have it for entirely different things. Their thoughts are mostly confined to the needs of the body; and it is reasonable that pure and detached thoughts be the reward of cares more noble. It is true that children and savages have the mind less altered by customs, but they also have it exalted by the teaching which gives attention. It would not be very just that the brightest lights should shine better in minds which less deserve them, and which are enveloped in thicker clouds. I would not then have one give too much honor to ignorance and barbarism when one is as learned and as clever as you are, Philalethes, as well as your excellent author; that would be lowering the gifts of God. Some one will say that the more ignorant we are, the more we approach the advantage of a block of marble or of a piece of wood, which are infallible and sinless. But, unfortunately, it is not by ignorance that we approach this advantage; and, as far as we are capable of knowledge, we sin in neglecting to acquire it, and we shall fail so much the more easily as we are less instructed.
c CHAPTER II c CHAPTER II NO IXXATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES § 1. Ph. Ethics is a demonstrative science, and yet it has no innate principles. And, indeed, it would be very difficult to produce a rule of ethics of a nature to be settled by an assent as general and as prompt as this maxim: Wliatever is, is.
1 For an excellent exposition of the content of the term savage, cf. Andrew Lang, Mi/th, Ritual, and Religion, Vol. 1, p. 31, and note; also chap. 3, pp. 40 sq., London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1887. — TR.
86 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. i Th. It is absolutely impossible that there be truths of reason as evident as those which are identical or immediate. And, although you can truly say that ethics has principles which are not demonstrable, and that one of the first and most practical is, that we ought to pursue joy and avoid sorrow, it is needful to add that this is not a truth which is known purely by reason, since it is based upon internal experience, or upon confused knowledge, for we do not feel what joy or sadness is.
Ph. It is only through processes of reasoning, through lan guage, and through some mental application, that you can be assured of practical truths.
Th. Though that were so, they would not be less innate. However, the maxim I just adduced appears of another na ture; it is not known by the reason, but, so to speak, by an instinct. It is an innate principle, but it does not form a part of the natural light, for it is not known luminously. But this principle admitted, you can draw from it scientific con sequences, and I commend most heartily what you just said of ethics as a demonstrative science. Let us note also that it teaches truths so evident that thieves, pirates, and bandits are forced to observe them among themselves.
§ 2. Ph. But bandits keep the rules of justice among them selves without considering them as innate principles.
Th. What matters it? Does the world concern itself about questions of theory?
Ph. They observe the maxims of justice only as convenient rules, the practice of which is absolutely necessary to the con servation of their society.
Th. [Very well. You could say nothing better in general in respect to all men. And thus it is that these laws are written in the soul, namely, as the consequences of our preservation and of our true welfare. Do you imagine that we suppose that truths are in the understanding as independent the one of the other as the edicts of the praetor were on his placard or album? I put aside here the instinct which prompts man to love man, of which I shall presently speak, for now I wish to speak only of truths in so far as they are known by the reason. I admit, also, that certain rules of justice cannot be demon strated, in all their extent and perfection, without supposing CH. ii J ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 87 the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and these, where the instinct of humanity does not impel us, are written in the soul only as other derivative truths.] Those, however, who base justice only upon the necessities of this life and upon the need they have of it, rather than upon the pleas ure they ought to take in it, which is the greatest when God is its ground, are liable to resemble a little the society of bandits.
Sit spes t'allendi, miscebunt sacra profanis.1 § 3. Ph. I agree with you that nature has put in all men the desire for happiness and a strong aversion to misery. These are the truly innate practical principles, and principles which, according to the purpose of every practical principle, have a continual influence upon all our actions. But they are inclinations of the soul toward the good, and not impressions 2 of some truth which is written in our understanding.
Th. [I am delighted, sir, to see that you admit in effect innate truths, as I shall presently say. This principle agrees sufficiently with that which I just indicated, which prompts us to seek joy and shun sorrow. For felicity is only a last ing joy. Our inclination, however, does not tend to felicity proper, but to joy — that is to say, to the present; it is the reason which prompts to future and enduring welfare. Now, the inclination, expressed by the understanding, passes into a precept or practical truth; and if the inclination is innate, the truth is innate also, there being nothing in the soul which may not be expressed in the understanding, but not always by a consideration actually distinct, as I have sufficiently shown. The instincts also are not always practical; there are some which contain theoretical truths, and such are the internal principles of the sciences and of reasoning, when, without rec ognizing the reason in them, we employ them by a natural instinct. And in this sense you cannot dispense with the recognition of innate principles, even though you might be willing to deny that derivative truths are innate. But this would be a question of name merely after the explanation I 1 Cf. Hor. Epist., 1, 1(5, 54. Horace has "miscebis." — TK.
2 Erdmann and Jacques read, " des imperfections de qnelque verite." Ger- hardt reads, "des impressions de quelque ve'rite." Locke lias, "impressions of truth." Book I., chap. 3, § 3. Vol. 1, p. 158, line 5, Bonn's edition.— TR.
88 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. i have given of what I call innate. And if any one desires to give this appellation only to the truths which are received at first by instinct, I shall not contest the point with him.]
Ph. That is well. But if there were in our soul certain characters imprinted there by nature, like so many principles of knowledge, we could only perceive them acting in us, as we feel the influence of the two principles which are constantly active in us — namely, the desire of happiness and the fear of misery.
Th. [There are principles of knowledge which influence us as constantly in our reasoning processes as these practical prin ciples influence us in our volitions; for example, everybody employs the rules of deduction by a natural logic without being aware of it.
§ 4. Ph. The rules of Morality need to be proved; they are then not innate, like that rule which is the source of the vir tues which concern society: Do to another only ivhat you would have him do to yourself.
Th. You always make me the objection which I have al ready refuted. I agree with you that there are moral rules which are not innate principles; but that does not prevent them from being innate truths, for a derivative truth will be innate, supposing that we can draw it from our mind. But there are innate truths, which we find in us in two ways — by insight and by instinct. Those which I have just indicated, show by our ideas what natural insight accomplishes. But there are conclusions of natural light which are principles in relation to instinct. It is thus that we are prompted to acts of human ity, by instinct because it pleases us, and by reason because it is just. There are then in us truths of instinct, which are innate principles, which we feel and approve, although we have not the proof of them which we obtain, however, when we give a reason for this instinct. It is thus that we make use of the laws of deduction conformably to a confused knowledge, and as by instinct, but logicians show the reason of them, as mathematicians also give a reason for what they do without thinking in walking and leaping. As for the rule which states that we ought to do to others only what we would have them do to us, it needs not only proof, but also to be proclaimed. We should wish too much for ourselves if we could have our own CH. n] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 89 way; shall we say then that we also owe too much to others? 1 You will tell me that the rule means only a just will. But thus this rule, very far from being adequate to serve as a measure, would itself need one. The true sense of the rule is, that the place of another is the true point of view for equi table judgment when we attempt it.]
§ 9. Ph. Bad acts are often committed without any remorse of conscience; for example, when cities are carried by storm, the soldiers commit, without scruple, the worst acts; some civilized nations have exposed their children, some Caribbees castrate theirs in order to fatten and eat them. Garcilasso de la Vega2 reports that certain peoples of Peru took prisoners in order to make concubines of them, and supported the children up to the age of thirteen, after which they ate them, and treated in the same manner the mothers so soon as they no longer bore children. In the travels of Baumgarten 3 it is re lated that there was a San ton4 in Egypt who passed for a holy man, eo quod non fo&minarum unquam esset ac puerorum, sed tantnm asellarum concubitor atque mularum.
Th. Moral science (over and above the instincts like that which makes us seek joy and shun sadness) is not otherwise innate than is arithmetic, for it depends likewise upon demon strations which internal light furnishes. And as the dem onstrations do not at once leap into sight, it is no great wonder, if men do not perceive always and at once all that they pos sess in themselves, and do not read quite readily the characters of the natural law, which God, according to St. Paid,5 has writ ten in their minds. As morality, however, is more important than arithmetic, God has given to man instincts which prompt 1 This sentence is found in the texts of Erdmann and Gerhardt; it is want ing in that of Jacques. — TR.
2 Garcilasso de la Vega, 1540-1016, the son of an Inca princess, and a Span ish conqueror, a companion of Pizarro. His Commentarios reales was pub lished in two parts, the first at Lisbon, 1009, giving an account of the native traditions, customs, and history previous to the Spanish conquest; the second under the separate title of Historia General del Peru, Cordova, 1017, treating of the Spanish conquest. The earlier and more important part of the work has been translated, with "learned and ingenious notes," by Clements R. Markham, and published in the collection of the Hakluyt Society, 2 vols., 3 Martin Baumgarten, 1473-1535, Trarrh through Egypt, Arabia, etc. In Churchill, O. and J. Col., Vol. 1, 1744. — TR.
90 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. i at once and without reasoning to some portion of that which reason ordains; just as we walk in obedience to the laws of mechanics without thinking of these laws, and as we eat, not only because eating is necessary for us, but further and much more because it gives us pleasure. But these instincts do not prompt to action in an invincible way; the passions may resist them, prejudices may obscure them, and contrary customs alter them. Nevertheless, we agree most frequently with these instincts of conscience, and we follow them also when stronger impressions do not overcome them. The great est and most healthy part of the human race bears them wit ness. The Orientals, the Greeks and Romans, the Bible and the Koran agree in respect to them; the Mahometan police are wont to punish the thing Baumgarten tells of, and it would be needful to be as brutalized as the American savage in order to approve their customs, full of a cruelty which sur passes even that of the beasts. Yet these same savages per ceive clearly what justice is on other occasions; 1 and although there is no bad practice, perhaps, which may not be authorized in some respects and upon some occasions, there are few of them, however, which are not condemned very frequently and by the larger part of mankind. That which has not been at tained without reason, and was not attained by reasoning alone, should be referred in part to the natural instincts. Custom, tradition, discipline, are mingled therein, but it is due to in stinct (le naturel) that custom is turned more generally to the good side of these duties. In the same way,2 the tradition of God's existence is due to instinct (le naturel). Xow nature 1 Cf. J. G. Sehurman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism, pp. 256-260, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1887. He states that " some gropings amid the general darkness incline me, at least tentatively, to the belief that, apart from the domestic virtues, there is no such great difference between the morals of Christians and the morals of savages" (p. 25(5). This statement is modified further on, pp. 258, 259, and finally takes the following form: "The fighting men, actual and potential, in every uncivilized community recognize the same rights, obligations, and duties toward one another as constitute the essence of civilized morality. You never find a man without a moral nature, a nature essentially like our own; but the objects he includes within the scope of its outgoings vary" (p. 259). For the real significance of such facts, cf. Ex- Pres. E. G. Robinson, of Brown University, Principles and Practice of Moral ity, p. 43, Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co., 1888. — TR.
2 Gerhardt reads, " C'est comme le naturel," etc.; Erdmann and Jacques, "Le naturel," etc. — TR.
c-a. n] OX HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 91 gives to man and also to most of the animals affectionate and tender feeling for those of their species. The tiger even par- cit cognatis masculis;1 whence comes this Ion mot of a Roman jurisconsult, Qtiia inter omnes homines natura cognationem constituit, unde hominum homini insidiari nefas esse. Spiders form almost the only exception, and these eat one another to this extent that the female devours the male after having enjoyed him. Besides this general instinct of society, which may be called philanthropy in man, there are some more par ticular forms of it, as the affection between the male and the female, the love which father and mother bear toward the chil dren, which the Greeks call crropy?/,2 and other similar inclina tions which make this natural law, or this image of law rather, which, according to Koman jurisconsults, nature has taught the animals. But in man in particular there is found a certain regard for dignity, for propriety, which leads him to conceal the things which lower us, to be sparing of shame, to have repugnance for incests, to bury dead bodies, not to eat men at all, nor living animals. One is led further to be careful of his reputation, even beyond need, and of life; to be subject to remorse of conscience, and to feel these laniatus et ictus, these tortures and torments of which Tacitus, following Plato, speaks;3 besides the fear of a future and of a supreme power which arises, moreover, naturally enough. There is reality in all that; but at bottom these natural impressions, whatever they may be, are only aids to the reason and indices of the plan of nature. Custom, education, tradition, reason, contrib ute much, but human nature ceases not to participate therein. It is true that without the reason these aids would not suffice to give a complete certitude to morals. Finally, will you deny that man is naturally led, for example, to withdraw from vile things, under a pretext that races are found who like to speak only of filth, that there are some, indeed, whose mode of life obliges them to handle excrements, and that there are people of Boutan, where those of the king pass as an aromatic? I think that you are of my opinion at bottom in regard to these natural instincts which tend toward what is right and decent; 2 The reading (noni. <rropy»j) of Erdmann and Jacques. Gerhardt's reading, opyr\v, is evidently an error. — TR. 3 Goryias, 524 E; Ann. 6, G. — TR.
92 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. i although you will say, perhaps, as you have said with regard to the instinct which prompts to joy and felicity, that these impressions are not innate truths. But I have already replied that every feeling is the perception of a truth, and that the natural feeling is the (perception) of an innate truth, but very often confused, as are the experiences of the external senses; thus you can distinguish the innate truths from the natural light (which contains only the distinctly knowable), as the genus must be distinguished from its species, since the innate truths comprehend both the instincts and the natural lightJ] § 11. Ph. A person who knew the natural limits of justice and injustice, and (who) would not cease confusing them with each other, could only be regarded as the declared enemy of the repose and the welfare of the society of which he is a mem ber. But men confuse them every moment, consequently they do not know them.
Th. [That is taking things a little too theoretically. It happens every day that men act contrary to their knowledge in concealing these (limits) from themselves when they turn the mind elsewhere, in order to follow their passions; otherwise, we should not see people eating and drinking what they know must cause them sickness and even death. They would not neglect their business; they would not do what entire nations have done in certain respects. The future and reason rarely make so strong an impression as the present and the senses. That Italian knew this well, who, before being put to torture, proposed to have the gallows continually in sight during the torments in order to resist them, and they heard him say some times, " lo ti vedo," which he explained afterward when he had escaped. Unless you firmly resolve to look upon the true good and the true evil with the purpose of following or shunning them, you find yourself carried away, and it happens, with re gard to the most important needs of this life, as it happens with regard to paradise and hell in the case of those, indeed, who believe in them the most: — Cantantur luec, laudantur hsec, Dicuntur, audiuntur. Scribuntur haec, leguntur hsec, Et lecta negliguntur.]
CH. n] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 93 Ph. Every principle which you suppose innate can only be known by each one as just and advantageous.
Th. [You always return to this supposition, which I have refuted so many times, that every innate truth is known always and by all.]
§ 12. Ph. But a public permission to violate the law proves that this law is not innate; for example, the law requiring the love and preservation of children was violated among the ancients when they permitted their exposure.
Th. [This violation supposed, it follows only that you have not well read these characters of nature written in our soul, but sometimes obscure enough by reason of our excesses, not to mention that, in order to have a perfectly clear perception of the necessity of duties, men must see the demonstration of them — a condition that is rarely fulfilled. If geometry were as much opposed to our passions and present interests as is ethics, we should contest it and violate it but little less, notwith standing all the demonstrations of Euclid l and of Archimedes,1 which you would call dreams and believe full of paralogisms; and Joseph Scaliger, Hobbes,2 and others, who have written against Euclid and Archimedes, would not find themselves in such a small company as at present. It was only the passion for glory, which these authors believed they found in the quad rature of the circle and other difficult problems, which could