Ph. This consideration appears to me a good one, and it is 1 Cf. The'odice'e, Discours prelim., especially §§ 2, 5, 23, 56; New Essays, Preface, ante, pp. 55, 60; Annotatiunculse subilanse ad Tolandi libruni, De christianiismo mysteriis carente, 1701, Duteus, Leibnit. op. om., 5, 142, 143; Pichler, Theol. d. Leibniz, 1, 208-225; K. Fischer, Gesch. d. n. Philos., Bd. II., According to Leibnitz, reason and faith are not absolutely opposed. Reason must be capable of apprehending the supernatural as fact, even though in its present stage of development — and perhaps in all its development — it may never be able to comprehend it exhaustively. The supernatural, while it may be outside of and beyond any present or future possible finite experience, is not then contrary to reason. In fact, to be apprehended or accepted as fact at all, it must present such intrinsic rationality as is sufficient to induce be lief, i.e. it must show itself to be intrinsically possible and not contrary to any well-established knowledge. In this sense it is not wholly above reason, — if it were, it would not at all concern us, — and may therefore become a part of the sum-total of our knowledge. The contention of both Leibnitz and Locke is, in fact, that the opposition is not between reason and faith, but rather between reason and unfounded authority. Leibnitz rejects entirely both belief based on blind submission to mere authority, and that ultra- rationalism which refuses to admit the existence of anything not coming entirely within the range of experience, particularly that experience which is sensuous and individual and excludes that which is spiritual and uni versal.— TR.
580 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv thus that I wish my definition to be understood. This same consideration confirms me also in my present opinion that the manner of speaking which opposes reason to faith, although it has weighty authority, is improper; for it is by reason that we verify what we must believe.1 Faith is a firm assent, and assent, regulated as it should be, can only be given upon good reasons. Thus he who believes without any reason for be lieving may be in love with his fancies, but it is not true that he seeks the truth, nor that he renders lawful obedience to his divine Master, who would have him make use of the faculties with which he has enriched him in order to preserve him from error.- Otherwise if he is in the good way, it is by chance; and if in the bad, it is by his fault, for which he is accountable to God.
Th. I commend you strongly, sir, when you wish faith to be grounded in reason: without this why should we prefer the Bible to the Koran or to the ancient books of the Brahmins? Our theologians also and other learned men have clearly recog nized it, and it is this which has caused us to have such fine works concerning the truth of the Christian religion, and so many excellent proofs as have been put forward against the heathen and other unbelievers, ancient and modern. Wise persons also have always regarded as suspicious those who have maintained that it was not necessary to trouble them selves about reasons and proofs when it was a question of belief; an impossibility in fact unless to believe signifies to recite or repeat or to let pass without troubling themselves, as many people do, and as indeed is the character of some nations more than others. This is the reason why, when some Aristo telian philosophers of the fifteenth or sixteenth century, whose remains were still extant a long time after (as we may judge by the letters of the late Mr. Naude2 and the Naudeana), 1 Gerharflt reads: "car c'est par la raison que nous verifious ce que nous devons croire." Erdmaim, Jacques, and Janet read: " car c'est par la raison que nous devons croire." — Tit.
2 Gabriel Naude, I()00-l(i53, a celebrated French scholar, bibliographer and librarian, who at first studied medicine and was physician to Louis XIII, but who afterwards devoted himself entirely to literary and library work. He was the creator of the celebrated Jlibliotheque Mazarine. His Nmtdcana, a collection of anecdotes drawn from his conversations, appeared at Paris, 1701.
en. xvn] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 581 desired to maintain t\vo opposite truths, one philosophical, the other theological, the last Lateran Council under Leo X was right in opposing them, as I think I have already remarked.1 And a dispute wholly similar was raised at Helmstadt in former times between Daniel Hofmann, a theologian, and Corneille Martin, a philosopher, but with this difference, that the philosopher reconciled philosophy to -revelation and the theologian wished to decline its use. But the Duke Julius, 1 Cf. Thtfodicee, Discours prelim., §§7, 8, 11. The "Aristotelian philoso phers " here referred to, were divided into two schools, the Alexandrists and the Averroists, according as they followed the interpretation of Aristotle given by Alexander of Aphrodisias, c. 200, or Averroes, 112(5-1198. Both schools denied the immortality of the individual soul; the Averroists ground ing their denial on, and finding a compensation for such immortality in, the unity of the intellect — the rationally active part of the soul (roO?) — in all men; while the Alexandrists regarded individual souls, including this rational part, as naturally mortal.
Both schools were opposed and condemned by the Church, and the theory of " the double truth ' ' (philosophical truth having its source in natural reason, theological in a supernatural revelation), held by both schools as a shield to protect them, in the exposition and dissemination of their views, from the interference and persecution of the Church, was adjudged heretical in the decree " Apostolic! Regiminis " of the fifth Lateran Council of December 19, 1512, under Leo X. This theory in the case of many of its advocates was, no doubt, the natural and " honest expression of the inner discord " resulting from the opposition of the two then prevalent authorities, Greek philosophy and religious tradition.
Chief among those who advocated this theory of "the twofold truth" was Pietro Pomponazzi, 14(52-1525, an Italian physician and philosopher, in his time one of the most sagacious and subtle interpreters of Aristotle of the Alexandrian school. He maintained, in his Tractatux de immortal itate animi, Bologna, 151(5, 8vo, that none of the reasons assigned for the dogma of immor tality were categorically demonstrative, and that therefore the doctrine must depend upon revelation. When accused of heresy, he stoutly asserted his in nocence, saying that he taught nothing contrary to the belief of the Church, but simply expounded Aristotle, and adding that he denied as a Christian what he affirmed as a philosopher. He attempted to discover a deeper foun dation for the theory of " the twofold truth," through the recognition of the twofold nature of reason, the speculative and the practical, the former furnishing the basis of philosophy, the latter that of theology and ethics.
On the whole subject, cf. M. Maywald, Die LeJirc v. d. zwcifachcn WaJtr- hf.lt, Berlin, 1871; Windelband, Hist, of Philos., trans, by Tufts, pp. 318 sq., 339.sv?., 359; Piinjer, Gexck. d. christ. Religionsphilos., 1, 28-29, 37, Eng. trans., 1,39 sq., 50-52; Stockl, Gesch.-d. Philos. d. MiW'lalters, III [Vol. 4], 202-207, and for an account of Pomponazzi and his philosophy, ibid. 213-244; cf. also L. Ferri, La Pxicoloyia di P. Pomponazzi, Rome, 1877. For the decree "Apostolic! Regiminis," cf. Acta Condi. Reg., Vol. 34, p. 333, Paris, Ki44, 37 vols., fol.; Labbc, Condi., torn. 19, col. 842; Stockl, op. dt.,lll [Vol.4], 582 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. iv founder of the university, decided for the philosopher.1 It is true that in our time a person of the most exalted position said that in a matter of faith he must put out his eyes in order to see clearly, and Tertullian says somewhere: this is true, because it is impossible: 2 it must be believed, for it is an absurdity. But if the intention of those who explain them selves in this way is good, these expressions are always ex aggerated and may do harm. St. Paul speaks more justly when he says that the wisdom of God is foolishness with men; because men judge of things only according to their experience, which is extremely limited, and everything not agreeing therewith appears to them an absurdity. But this judgment is very rash, for there is indeed an infinite number of natural things which would pass with us as absurd, if they were told us, as the ice which was said to cover our rivers appeared to the king of Siam. But the order of nature itself not being of any metaphysical necessity, is grounded only in the good pleasure of God, so that he may deviate therefrom by the superior reasons of grace,3 although he must proceed therein only upon good proofs which can come only from the testimony of God himself, to which we must defer absolutely when it is duly verified.
1 Cf. The'odicee, Discours prelim. § 13. On the controversy itself, extend ing from 1598-1601, cf. Piinjer, Gesch. d. cltrist. Religionsphilosophie, 1, 132- 141, Eng. trans., 1, 178-190. For the fullest accounts, cf. G. Thomasius, De Controvrsia Hofinanniana, Erlangen, 1844, and E. Schlee (who gives the external history with complete references to the literature), DerStrcit d. Dun. Hofttiann ii. d. Verhaltniss d. Philos. z. Theol., Marburg, 1862. Schaarschmidt refers to E. L. Th. Henke, Georg Calixtns it. seine Zeit, Einleitung, p. 73 sq., and says that Duke Julius [Henry Julius, son of the founder of the Uni versity, and the successor of his father in the government in 1589], who had examined the documents in the controversy and reached a decision, did rightly in protecting the philosopher against his opponents, who spread abroad the most horrible calumnies concerning him, and treated him in general very harshly. — TK.
2 (.If. Tertullian, De Carrie Christi, chap. 5: " Mortuus est dei filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepnltus resurrexit; certum est, quia im- possibile est." Leibnitz also refers to this passage in the Theodicee, Discours cir. xvin] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 583 CHAPTER XVIII OF FAITH AND REASON AND THEIR DISTINCT LIMITS § 1. Ph. Let us accommodate ourselves meanwhile to the received mode of speech, and suffer faith to be distinguished in a certain sense from reason. It is proper that this sense be very accurately explained and the limits existing between these two tilings be established; for uncertainty regarding these limits has certainly produced in the world great disputes and perhaps caused even great disorders. It is at least manifest that, until these have been determined, it is in vain for us to discuss, since we must employ reason in discussing faith. § 2. I find that each sect uses reason with pleasure so long as it believes it can derive therefrom any aid: but as soon as reason fails, they cry out: it is an article of faith, which is above reason. But the opponent could make use of the same evasion if any one took it upon himself to argue against him, unless we indicate why that would not be permitted him in a case seemingly parallel. I suppose that reason is here the discovery of the certitude or probability of propositions drawn from knowledge which we have acquired by the use of our natural faculties, that is to say by sensation and by reflection; and that faith is the assent given to a proposition based upon revelation, that is to say upon an extraordinary communication from God which has made it known to man. § 3. But a man inspired of God cannot communicate to others any new simple idea, because he uses only words or other signs which awake in us the simple ideas that custom has attached to them or their combination; and whatever new ideas St. Paul received when he was carried lip to the third heaven, all that he could say was: they are things eye hath not sven, ear hath not heard, and which have never entered into the heart of man.1 Suppose there were creat ures in the planet Jupiter provided with six senses and that God in a supernatural way gave to a man among us the ideas of this sixth sense, he could not by means of words make them 584 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv spring up in the minds of other men.1 We must then distin guish between original and traditional revelation. The first is an impression which God makes immediately upon the mind, and to this we can fix no limits; the other comes only by the ordinary means of communication and cannot give new simple ideas. § 4. It is true, however, that the truths which may be discovered by reason can be communicated to us by a tradi tional revelation, as if God had desired to communicate to men geometrical theorems, but this would never amount to so great a certainty as if we had their demonstration drawn from the connection of ideas. It is also as if Noah had a more certain knowledge of the deluge than that which we have acquired from the book of Moses and as if the assurance of one who has seen that Moses actually wrote it and that he did the miracles which justify his inspiration was greater than ours. § 5. This it is which makes it impossible for revelation to go against the clear evidence of reason, because whenever the revelation is immediate and original we must know with certainty that we are not deceived in attributing it to God and that we compre hend its meaning; and this evidence can never be greater than that of our intuitive knowledge; and consequently no proposi tion can be received as divine revelation when it is contradic torily opposed to this immediate knowledge. Otherwise there would no longer remain any difference in the world between truth and falsehood, any measure of the credible and incredi ble. And it is inconceivable that a thing comes from God, this beneficent author of our being, which received as true must overturn the foundations of our knowledge and render all our faculties useless. § 6. Those who have revelation only medi ately, or by tradition from mouth to mouth or by writing, have again more need of reason to assure themselves of it. § 7. Meanwhile it is always true that the things which are beyond what our faculties can discover are the proper matters of faith, 1 Cf. Lessing's amplification of a similar thought, perhaps suggested by this passage of Leibnitz, in his Fragment: Das* ine.hr a I ft fiinf Shine fur den Menxchen, se.iii kii/i»e>t, Sain nit. Schrift, ed. Laclimann-Malt/ahn, Leipzig, 185.V1857, Vol. 11, Pt. 2, p. 458. On the relation of Lessing to Leibnitz, cf. Zimmermann, Leibniz und Lcssinr/, Eine Stutlie, Wieu, 1X55; Piinjer, Gesch. d. Christ. Reliffionsphilosophie, 1, 421-425, Eng. trans., 1, 5(>(>-570; Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie, 1, 143, Eng. trans., 1, 1-15-146; K. Fischer, Gesch. d. n. Phiios., Bd. II., Leibniz, 3d ed., pp. 617-019. — TR.
CH. xvni] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 585 as the fall of the rebellious angels, the resurrection of the dead. § 9. Here we must listen solely to revelation. And even as regards probable propositions an evident revelation will determine us against the probability.
Tli. If you take faith as that which is grounded in. the motives of credibility (as they are called) and detach it from the internal grace which immediately determines the mind, all that you say, sir, is beyond dispute. It must be admitted that there are many judgments more evident than those de pending upon these motives. Some are urged on by them far ther than others, and there are indeed many persons who have never known them and still less considered them and who con sequently have not even that which might pass as a motive of probability. But the internal grace of the Holy Spirit imme diately supplies it in a supernatural way, and this it is which produces what the theologians properly call a divine faith. It is true that God never gives it except when the belief it produces is founded in reason; otherwise he would destroy the means of knowing the truth and open the door to enthu siasm; but it is not necessary for all who have this divine faith to know these reasons and still less to have them always before their eyes. Otherwise simple-minded people and idiots, to-day at least, would never have the true faith, and the most enlightened would not have it when they were most in need of it, for they cannot always remember the reasons for their belief. The question of the use of reason in theology has been one of the questions most discussed, both between the Socinians and those who may be called Catholics in a general sense, and between the Reformers and the Evangelicals, as those are named by way of preference in Germany whom many inaptly call Lutherans. I remember to have read once a Meta- physic of one Stegmann,1 a Socinian (a different man from Joshua Stegmann,2 who himself wrote against them), which so 1 Cf. Thdixlicee, Discours prelim., § 10, where Leibnitz refers to him as Christopher Stegmann, a Sociniaii. He was the youngest brother of Joachim Stegmann, also a Socinian and author of many works on mathematics and theology, who died in exile at Clausenbnrg in Siebenbiirgen in 1632. Christo pher wrote a work entitled Dyas philosophica, which is, perhaps, the " Meta- pliysie" of which Leibnitz here speaks. For further account of him, cf. Jocher, AUgeineines Gelehr ten- Lex icon, Pt. IV., 794, Leipzig, 1750. — TR.
2 Joshua Stegmann, 1588-1(>32, a Lutheran divine, was Professor at Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Rinteln. and the author of many theological works, and of 586 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. iv far as I know has not yet been printed; on the other hand, one Kessler,1 a theologian of Saxony, has written a Logic and some other philosophical treatises expressly opposed to the Socinians. We may say in general, that the Socinians are too quick to reject everything which is not conformed to the order of nature, even when they cannot prove absolutely its impossi bility. But their opponents also sometimes go too far and push mystery to the verge of contradiction; in which they injure the truth they try to defend. I was surprised to see once in the " Summa Theologize " of Father Honore Fabry,2 who otherwise was one of the most clever of his order, which he denied in divine things (as do also some other theologians), this great principle which states that things ivhich are identical with a third thing are identical ivith each other. This is to give the famous German hymn, " Ach, bleib' mit deiner Gnade" (Eng. trans, in Lyra Germanica, 2, 120, " Abide among us with thy grace, Lord Jesus, ever more "). He was opposed to the Socinians or Photinians, and wrote against them his Photinianismus,h. e.Succincta Refutatio Errorum Photinianontm, quinquaginta sex disputationibus breviter comprehensa, Rinteln, 1623, 8vo; Frankfort, 1643. Leibnitz mentions him again in the Theodicee, Discours pre'lim., § 62. For further account of him, cf. Winer, Hd)i<lbucli d. theoloc/. Lit., 1, 354; 2, 748; Jo'cher, Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon, Ft. IV., 794, Leipzig, 1750. — TR.
1 Andreas Kessler, 1595-1643, a Lutheran divine, studied at Jena and Wittenberg, and was pastor at Eisfeld, Eisenach, and Coburg, where lie died in consequence of a stroke of apoplexy received while preaching. He wrote against the Socinians or Photinians his Physicss Photinianse examen, Eisfeld, 1628, Wittenberg, 165(1, 8vo; Metaphysicse Photlnianse examen, 3d ed., Witten berg, 1648, 8vo; Logicas Photinianse examen, 2d ed., Wittenberg, 1624, 4to, new ed. 1642, 8vo. His writings exhibit a good deal of method and exactness. Leibnitz also refers to him in the Theodicee, Discours prelim., § 16. For fur ther account of him, cf. Jocher, Allyemelnes Gelehrten-Lexicon, Ft. II., 2072, 2 Honore Fabri, 1607-1688, a French mathematician and philosopher, and a Jesuit, who taught philosophy and mathematics in the college of his order at Lyons, and later became Grand-Penitentiary at the holy oltice in Rome. Among his writings are, Synopsis geometrica, Lugd., 1669; Phi/sica sen sci- entia reruin corporearum in decent tractatus dixtributa, Lugd., 16(i9; Summ-ula Theologise, Lyons, 1669. Leibnitz regarded him as one of the most distin guished men of his time, and frequently mentioned him with praise. Cf. Theodicee, Ft. III., § 348; Ilypoth. phys. nova, §§ 56, 59, Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 4, 208, 214, 216; Theoria motiis abstract!, props fin., ibid., 240, and Appendix thereto, containing a letter of Fabri to Leibnitz, ibid., 241- 244, and of Leibnitz to Fabri, ibid., 244-261 (also Gerhardt, Leibniz, math. Schrift., II., 2 [Vol. <>], 81-98). For another Appendix to a letter of Leibnitz to Fabri, cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, math. Schrift., II., 2 [Vol. 6], 98-106, trans. infra, Appendix, pp. 699 sq. — TR.
CH. xvin]. ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 587 a gained case to the opponent without thinking and to deprive all reasoning of certainty. We must say rather that this principle is badly applied. The same author rejects in his philosophy the virtual distinctions, which the Scotists put into created things, because they reversed, he says, the prin ciple of contradiction: and when the objection is made to him that these distinctions must be admitted in God, he replies that faith orders it. But how can faith order that, whatever it be, which reverses a principle without which all belief, affirmation, or negation would be vain? Two propositions true at the same time must therefore necessarily not be wholly contradictory; and if A and C are not the same thing, it is clearly necessary that B which is identical with A be taken otherwise than B which is identical with C. Nicolaus Vedelius,1 a professor at Geneva and afterward at Deventer, once published a book entitled " Rationale Theologicum," to which Jean Musaeus,2 a professor at Jena (which is an Evan- 1 Cf. Theodice'e, Discours prelim., §§ 20, G7. Nicolas Vedel, a German Reformed (Calvinistic) divine, was Professor of Philosophy and minister at Geneva, of Theology and Hebrew at Deventer, 1G30-1G38, and of Theology at Franeker from 1638 till his death in 1042. He was a great adversary of the Arminians, and wrote against them his De Arcanis Arminianismi, Leyden, 1G32-16.'U. His Rationale theologicum, seu de necessitate et vero usu principiorum rationis ac philosophise in controversies theologicis, lib. tres, Geneva, 1028, was attacked by Barth. Nihus, 1584-1057, in his Morosophns seu Vedelius in suo rationali prorsus irrationalis, Cologne, 1040, as well as by Musjeus. On the controversy between Vedelius and Musains, ef. Piinjer, Gesch. d. christ. Religionsphilosophie, 1, 118-124, Eng. trans., 159-107. For further account of Vedel, cf. Winer, Handbuch d. theol. Lit., 1, 353, 375, 505: J. P. Niceron, Mem. d'hommes, Vol. 33, 1730. — TK.
2 Cf. Thtodicde, Discours prelim., §§ 20, 07. Johannes Musseus, 1013-1681, a Lutheran divine, was Professor of History, 1042-1040, and of Theology, KJ4G till his death, at Jena. He was the greatest Lutheran divine of his century after J. Gerhard, 1582-1637, and Geo. Calixtus, 158G-1G56. He distinguished between theology and the confessions and favored liberty of scientific and theological researches. He was everywhere acknowledged as a very learned man, and his writings are distinguished by philosophical acumen so that he was accused of "magis philosophari qnam quod loquatur eloquia Dei." He wrote in defence of Christianity against Herbert of Cherbury, 15S1-1G48, a work entitled De luminis natures et ei innixse theologise naturalis iiifniffidentia ad sahttein, Jena, 1067; against Spinoza, his Tractatus theolog.-polit., etc., Jena, 1074 (on Musams and Spinoza, cf. Piinjer, Gesch. d. christ. Religions- philos., 1, 322-323, Eng. trans., 1, 435). His De usu principiorum rationis et philosophise in controversies theologicis lib. tres Nic. Vedelii Rationali Theo- logico potissiminn oppositi appeared at Jena, 1044; 2d ed., 106f>. For further account of Musseus, cf. Herzog, Realencyklopiidie, 2d ed., 10, 376-380. — TB.
588 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. iv gelical university in Thuringia), wrote another book in oppo sition upon the same subject, i.e. upon "The Use of lleason in Theology." I remember to have considered these formerly, and to have remarked that the principal controversy was ob scured by incidental questions, as when it is asked, what a theological conclusion is, and whether it is necessary to judge of it by the terms which compose it, or by the means which prove it, and consequently whether Occam 1 was right or not in saying that the knowledge of one and the same conclusion is the same whatever 2 the means employed to prove it; and he delays upon a multitude of other minutiae of still less import ance, which concern only terms. Meanwhile Musseus agreed with him that the principles of reason necessary by a logical necessity, i.e. the opposite of which implies a contradiction, must and may be employed safely in theology; but he had reason to deny that what is only necessary by a physical neces sity (i.e. founded upon induction from that which is customary in nature, or upon natural laws which, so to speak, are of divine institution) is sufficient to refute the belief in a mystery or miracle, since it depends upon God to change the ordinary course of things. Thus it is according to the order of nature that we may be certain that one and the same person cannot be at the same time a mother and a virgin, or that a human body cannot fail to be obvious to the senses, although the contrary of both may be possible to God. Vedelius also appears to agree to this distinction. But we sometimes dis-