Th. In reality the Copernicans have experienced in the case of their adversaries that hypotheses recognized as such ceased not to be maintained with an ardent zeal; and the Cartesians are not less positive regarding their grooved particles and little balls of the second element l than if they were the theorems of Euclid; and it seems that zeal for our hypotheses is merely a result of the passion we have of making ourselves respected. It is true that those who condemned Galileo believed that the rest of the earth was more than an hypothesis, for they judged it in conformity with Scripture and reason. But since then it has been perceived that reason at least sustained it no longer; and as for Scripture, Father Fabry, Penitentiary of St. Peter, an excellent theologian and philosopher, publishing in Koine itself an Apology for the Observations of Eustachio Divini,2 1 Of. New Essays, Preface, ante, p. 51, line 11: Descartes, Prindp. Philos., Pt. III., §§ 52,!>0. The "grooved particles" and "little balls of the second element " are a part of the vortices-theory (ctf. ante, p. 552, note 1). For the "matter of the first and second element" and the genesis of the "perfect globes " or " balls of the second element," cf. Princip. Philos.. Pt. III., § 48 sq. The notes of J. H. von Kirchmann in his German trans, of this work of Des cartes (Philos. Kihliothek., Vol. 26, 2d ed., Heidelberg, 1887) are a valuable aid in the study of the theory. — Tit.
- Eustachio Divini, c. 1020 — c. KiliO, an Italian mechanician, optician, and astronomer, noted for his skill in making optical instruments, especially tel- 014 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv a famous optician, hesitated not to declare that it was only pro visionally that they understood in the sacred text a true move ment of the sun, and that if the view of Copernicus were found true, there would be no difficulty in explaining it in like man ner as this passage of Vergil: terrseque urbesque recedunt.1 However, they did not cease to continue in Italy and in Spain and even in the hereditary states of the emperor to suppress the doctrine of Copernicus, to the great detriment of these na tions whose scholars might have raised themselves to more beautiful discoveries had they enjoyed a reasonable and philo sophic liberty.
§ 12. Ph. The dominant passions appear to be in reality, as you say, the source of the love we have for hypotheses: but they also extend very much farther. The greatest probability in the world will avail nothing in showing his injustice to an avaricious and ambitious man; and a lover will have every facility in the world for allowing himself to be duped by his mistress, so long as it is true that we easily believe whatever we wish, and according to the remark of Vergil, qui amant ipsi sibi soinnia fingunt.2 This is what makes them make use of two means of escaping the most apparent probabilities when they attack our passions and our prejudices. § 13. The first is to think that there may be some sophistry concealed in the argument which they oppose to us. § 14. The second in supposing that we might put before hand wholly as good or even better arguments in order to beat the adversary, if we had the opportunity, or skill, or aid, which escopes, was the reputed author of a little work entitled Brevis annotatio in Si/sterna Sat tirni K/II Christiani Iluyenii [Hag. Com., 1(!59, 4to], Rome, 1660, 8vo, in which an attempt was made to refute Huygens' theory of the planet Saturn. Divini, however, was no Latinist, and probably had little share in the book, contributing merely "his pretended observation of the three sepa rate bodies"; the real author was most likely the Jesuit, Honore Fabri (<•/. unte,p.5SG, note 2). Huygens reprinted the work together with his reply, lircvis assertio systematic Saturnii sni, Hag. Com., 1660; and Divini pub lished his rejoinder, Septempedanus pro sua annotations in si/xt. Saturn. Ch. Hitr/enii, adversum ejus assert ionem, Rome, 1661. On the whole subject, cf. Huygens, (Euvres completes, La Haye, 1888-1893, 5 vols., passim. — TK.
en. xx] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 615 we must have to discover- them. § 15. These means of shield ing themselves from conviction are sometimes good, but they are also sophisms when the matter is sufficiently explained and everything has been taken into account; for after that there are means of knowing with regard to all upon what side the probability is found. Thus there is no room for doubting that the animals have been formed by the movements of an intelli gent agent, rather than by a fortuitous concourse of atoms; as there is no one who doubts in the least whether the characters of printing which form an intelligent discourse have been brought together by an attentive man, or by a confused medley. I should think then that it does not depend upon us to suspend our assent in these instances; but we can give it when the probability is less evident, and we can even content ourselves with more feeble proofs which better agree with our inclina tion. § 16. It appears to me impracticable for the truth for a man to lean to the side upon which he sees the less probability; perception, knowledge and assent are not arbitrary, as it does not depend upon me to see or not to see the agreement of two ideas, when my spirit is turned toward them. We can how ever voluntarily arrest the progress of our researches; without this ignorance or error could not in any case be a sin. It is in this that we exercise our liberty. It is true that in the in stances where we have no interests, we embrace the common opinion, or the view of the first comer; but in the points where our happiness or misery is concerned, the mind applies itself more seriously to weighing the probabilities, and I think that in tliis case, that is, when we are attentive, Ave have no choice in determining ourselves for the side we prefer, if between the t\vo sides there are differences at once visible, and that it will be the greatest probability that will determine our assent.
Th. I am of your opinion at bottom, and Ave have given sufficient explanation upon this matter in our preceding con ferences when we spoke of liberty. I showed then that we never believe what we wish, but rather what we see is the most apparent; and that nevertheless we can make ourselves believe indirectly what we wish by turning aAvay the attention from a disagreeable object in order to apply ourselves to another which pleases us. This makes us in regarding more the reasons of a favorite side believe at last the more probable. As for the 616 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. iv opinions in which we take little interest and which we receive upon slight reasons, we do this because, noticing scarcely any thing which opposes them, we find that the opinion which makes us regard them favorably surpasses as much or more the opposite opinion, which has nothing in its behalf in our perception, as if it had had many reasons on both sides, for the difference between 0 and 1, or between 2 and 3, is as great as between 9 and 10, and we perceive this advantage, without thinking of the examination which would still be necessary in order to judge, but to which nothing impels us.
§ 17. Ph. The last false measure of probability that I in tended to notice is improperly understood authority, which keeps more people in ignorance and error than all the others together. How many people we see who have no other basis for their views than the opinions received among our friends or among the members of our profession or of our party, or of our coun try! Such a doctrine has been approved by venerable antiq uity; it comes to me under the passport of preceding centuries; other men yield to it; this is why I am shielded from error in receiving it. We have as much authority for tossing up in order to take these opinions, as to take them upon the basis of such rules. And besides the fact that all men are liable to error, I believe that if we could see the secret motives which actuate the scholars and chief men of a sect, we should find often something wholly different from the pure love of the truth. It is certain at least that there is no opinion so ab surd that it cannot be embraced upon this basis, since there is scarcely an error which has not had its partisans.
Tli. It must, however, be admitted that in many instances we cannot avoid yielding to authority. St. Aiigustine has pro duced quite a remarkable book " I)e utilitate credendi," J which deserves to be read on this subject, and as for the received opinions, they have for themselves something approaching to that which gives what is called presumption with the juriscon sults: and although we are not obliged to follow them always without proofs, we are no more authorized to destroy them in the mind of another without having contrary proofs. This it is which docs not allow us to change anything without reason.
1 Cf. Op»r((, Benedictine ed., Vol. 8, pp. 45-70, Paris, 1088; Migne, Patrol. s. Lut., Vol. 42 [Vol. 8 of Augustine], pp. G5-!12. — TR.
CH. xx] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 617 The argument drawn from the great number of the approvers of an opinion lias been much disputed since the late M. Nicole published his book on the church; J but all that may be drawn from this argument, when the question is of approving a reason and not of attesting a fact, may be reduced merely to what I have just said. And as one hundred horses do not run faster than one horse, though they can draw more, so it is with one hundred men as compared with one single man; they cannot go more justly, but they will work more effectively; they can not judge better, but they will be capable of furnishing more matter upon which the judgment may be exercised. This is the meaning of the proverb: plus vident oculi quam oculus. We notice it in the councils, where really a multitude of considera tions are put upon the carpet which would perhaps escape one or two, but they run a risk often of not taking the better side in concluding upon all these considerations, when there are no skilful persons charged with directing and weighing them. Hence some judicious theologians of the Eoman party, seeing that the authority of the church, i.e. that of the most exalted in dignity and the most supported by the multitude, could not be certain in a matter of reasoning, have reduced it to the mere attestation of the facts under the name of tradition. This was the opinion of Henry Holden,2 an Englishman, doctor of the Sorbonne, author of a book entitled " Analysis of the Faith," in which, following the principles of the " Commonitorium " of Vincent de Lerins,3 he maintained that we cannot make new 2 Henry Holden, 1596-1662, was an English Roman Catholic divine, who graduated at the Sorbonne, and was appointed Professor of Theology there. In 1647 he petitioned the House of Commons for toleration of the Catholics, provided they would take the oath of allegiance. His Diriitse Fidel Analysis, a concise exposition of the Catholic articles of faith as distinguished from matters of opinion, appeared at Paris, 1(152, with an appendix consisting of a short treatise on Schism. It was reprinted at Paris, 1(585, 1767, at Cologne, 1655, 1782, Eng. trans., hy " W. G.," 1658. Dupin, who gives a full abstract of the book in his Rlbl. des Aut. eccles., 1711, torn. 17, pp. 1SH-203, considers him one of the ablest controversialists of his time. In 1656 he was engaged in a controversy with Antoine Arnauld, the Jansenist (cf. ante, p. 463, note 4), and his letters to Arnauld were printed in later editions of the Analysis. — TK.
3 St. Vincent of Lerins, of Gallic origin, who died about 450. His Adncrsus profanas omnium novitates Htereticorum Commonitorium, written in 434, three years after the Council of Ephesus, energetically affirms the authority of tradition against all religious and doctrinal innovations. In chap. 2 of this short treatise occurs the famous threefold test of orthodoxy: "Quod semper, 618 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv decisions in the church, and that all the bishops assembled in council can do is to attest the fact of the doctrine received in their dioceses. The principle is specious so long as we continue in generalities; but when we come to the fact, it is found that in different countries different opinions have been received for a long time; and in the same countries also they have gone from one extreme to another, notwithstanding the arguments of Arnauld against insensible changes; besides often without confining themselves to attest them, they have taken it upon themselves to judge. It is also at bottom the opinion of Gret- ser,1 a learned Jesuit of Bavaria, author of another Analysis of Faith, approved by the theologians of his order, that the church may judge controversies by making new articles of faith, since the assistance of the Holy Spirit is promised it, although most frequently they try to disguise this view, especially in France, as if the church were only to explain doctrines already estab lished. But the explanation is a statement already received, or a new one which they believe may be drawn from the re ceived doctrine. Practice is most frequently opposed to the first sense, and in the second, what can the new statement which is established be but a new article? I am not, however, of the opinion that we despise antiquity in the matter of relig ion; and I also believe that we may say that God has pre served the truly ecumenical councils hitherto from all error contrary to wholesome doctrine. For the rest, sectarian prej udice is a strange thing. I have seen people embrace with ardor an opinion for the sole reason that it is received in their order, or even solely because it is contrary to that of a man of a religion or of a nation which they do not like, although the quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creclitnm est." The work has been edited by Baluze, Paris, 1(5(53, 16(59, 1(584, Kliipfel, Vienna, 1809, Pusey, Oxford, 1S38, Herzog, Breslau, 1839, and others; Eng. trans, by Flower. London, 18(i6. See also Migne, Patrol. Theol. cur. compl., Vol. 1, p. 911, Paris, 1^4ti. A full account of it is given in Smith-Wace, Diet, of Christ. Bioij., 4, 1154- 1 Jac. Gretser, 15(>1-1(!25, a learned Jesuit, was Professor of Philosophy and various parts of Theology at Ingolstadt for twenty-four years. A man of immense erudition, and a voluminous author, he was lacking in taste and critical power, and was very harsh and bitter in discussion. It is said of him that, when asked by the magistrates of Marckdorf in Swahia, his birthplace, for his portrait to be placed in the town hall, he refused it, saying they had no place therein for the head of an ass. His complete works appeared at Ratisbonne, 1739 sq., 17 vols., fol. — TB.
CH. xx] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 619 question had almost no connection with the religion or the interests of the people. They did not know perhaps what was in reality the source of their zeal; but I knew that, upon the first news that such an one had written this or that thing, they would ransack the libraries and puzzle their brains to find something to refute it. This it is which is practised so often by those who maintain theses in the universities and who seek to distinguish themselves against their adversaries. But what shall we say of the doctrines prescribed in the Symbolic books of the sect, even among l the Protestants, which we are often obliged to embrace with an oath? which some think signi fies with xis only the obligation to profess what these books or formularies contain of Holy Scripture; in which they are contradicted by others. And in the religious orders of the Roman party, without contenting themselves with the doctrines established in their church, they prescribe narrower limits to those who teach them; witness the propositions the teaching of which in their schools the General of the Jesuits, Claudio Acquaviva2 (if I am not mistaken), defends. It would be well (to mention it in passing) to make a systematic collection of the propositions determined and censured by councils, popes, bishops, superiors, faculties, which would be of use in ecclesi astical history. We may distinguish between teaching and embracing an opinion. There is no oath in the world nor pro hibition which can force a man to abide in the same opinion, for opinions are involuntary in themselves: but he may and should abstain from teaching a doctrine which is regarded as dangerous, unless he finds himself compelled thereto by his conscience. In this case he must declare himself sincerely and leave his post when he has been charged with teaching; sup posing, however, that he can do so without exposing himself to an extreme danger which might force him to leave without 1 Gerhardt, Erdmann, and Jacques read: "parini"; Janet reads: "par," 2 Claudius Aquaviva, 1543-1015, General of the Jesuits, 1581-KJ15. For a brief account of his Ratio Studiorum, 15!)!), cf. Hughes, Loyola and the. Edu cational Sy fit fin of the Jesuits, pp. 141 xq. (in The Great Educators Series, ed. by Nicolas Murray Butler), New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 18!»2. For the text of the Ratio, and a full account of its growth from its preliminary to its final form, with the letters of Aquaviva and other documents, cf. Mwiumenta Germanise Pxdayoqica, Berlin, A. Hofmann & Co., 188(! sq., Bd. V., Tom. II.
620 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. rv fame. We see but little other means of reconciling the rights of the public and of the individual; the one being under obli gation to prevent what it judges bad, and the other not being able to dispense with the duties demanded by his conscience.
§ 18. Ph. This opposition between the public and the indi vidual and even between the public opinions of different sects is an inevitable evil. But often these very oppositions are only apparent and consist only in the formulas. I am obliged also to say, in order to be just to the human race, that there are not so many people involved in error as is ordinarily supposed. Not that I think that they embrace the truth, but because in reality upon the doctrines upon which they make so much stir, they have absolutely no positive opinion, and because without having examined anything and without having in the mind the most superficial ideas upon the matter in question, they are resolved to hold themselves fast to their party, as soldiers who do not examine the cause they defend: and if the life of a man shows that he has no sincere regard for religion, it is sufficient for him to have the hand and tongue ready to maintain the common opinion, in order to commend himself to those who can procure him support.
Th. This justice which you render to the human race does not redound to its praise; and men would be more excusable in following their opinions than in disguising them for the sake of their interests. Perhaps, however, there is more sincerity in their deeds than you seem to give any one to understand. For without any knowledge of a reason, they can perhaps attain to an implicit faith by submitting themselves in general and some times blindly, but often in good faith, to the judgment of others whose authority they have once recognized. It is true that the interest they find therein contributes to this submission, but this does not prevent them at last from forming an opinion. They are contented in the Roman church with this almost implicit faith, not perhaps having any article thereupon, due to the revelation which is judged absolutely fundamental thereto and which is considered as necessary necessitate medii, i.e. the belief of which is a condition absolutely necessary to salvation. And they are all necessitate prce.cepti, by the necessity therein taught of obeying the church, as they call it, and of giving all attention to that which is proposed therein, all under pain of CH. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 621 mortal sin. But this necessity demands only a reasonable docil ity and does not compel absolute assent, according to the most learned doctors of this church. Cardinal Bellarmine himself believed, however, that nothing was better than this faith of a child who submits himself to an established authority, and he relates with approval the statement of a dying man, who escaped the devil by this circle, which they heard him often repeat: I believe all that the church believes, The church believes what I believe.
CHAPTER XXI OF THE DIVISION OP THE SCIENCES § 1. Ph. Here we are at the end of our course, and all the operations of the understanding are explained. Our purpose is not to enter into the detail indeed of our knowledge, yet it will perhaps be proper here, before we conclude, to make a general review by considering the division of the sciences. All that can enter into the sphere of human understanding is either the nature of things in themselves, or in the second place, man in the character of an agent, tending towards his end and in particular towards his happiness, or in the third place the means of acquir ing and communicating knowledge. Science then is divided into three kinds. §2. The first is Physics or Natural Philoso- phy, which comprises not only 'bodies and their properties, as number, figure, but also spirits, God himself and the angels. § 3. The second is Practical PhilosopJiy or Ethics, which teaches the means of obtaining good and useful things, and proposes to itself not only the knowledge of the truth, but also the practice of that which is right. § 4. Finally, the third is Logic or the knowledge of signs, for Xdyos signifies word. We need signs of our ideas to enable us to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as to register them for our own use. Perhaps if we should consider distinctly and with all possible care that this last kind of science revolves about ideas and words, we should have a logic and criticism! different from that which has i Locke has: "critic," Philos. Wks., Vol. 2, p..338, Bohn's ed.; Fraser, Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, Vol. 2, p. 462. — Tit.
022 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [JJK. iv hitherto been seen. And these three kinds, Physics, Ethics, and Logic, are like three great provinces in the intellectual world, entirely separate and distinct the one from the other.
Th. This division has already been a celebrated one among the ancients; for under Logic they comprised, as you do, all that relates to words and to the explication of our thoughts: Artes dicendi. Nevertheless, there is some difficulty therein; for the science of reasoning, of judgment, of invention appears very different from the knowledge of the etymologies of words and the use of languages, which is something indefinite and arbitrary. Farther, in explaining words, we are obliged to make an incursion into the sciences themselves, as appears by the dictionaries; and on the other hand, we cannot treat of science without giving at the same time definitions of the terms. But the principal difficulty found in this division of the sciences is that each part appears to absorb the whole; in the first place, Ethics and Logic will fall into Physics, taken as generally as you have just stated; for in speaking of spirits, i.e. of sub stances having understanding and will, and in explaining this understanding to the bottom, you will make it include all logic: and in explaining in the doctrine of spirits what belongs to the will, it would be necessary to speak of good and evil, of happi ness and misery, and it \yill only depend upon you to push this doctrine far enough to make it include all practical philosophy. In return, all might be included in practical philosophy as serv ing for our happiness. You know that Theology is rightly con sidered as a practical science, and Jurisprudence as well as Medicine are not less so; so that the doctrine of human happi ness or of our good and ill will absorb all these branches of knowledge, should we desire to explain sufficiently all the means serving the end which reason proposes to itself. Thus it is that Zwinger has included all in his " Magnum theatrum vitee humani," which Beyerling has disturbed by arranging in alpha betical order.1 And in treating all matters in dictionaries fol- 1 Laurent Beyerlinck, or Beierlynck, 1578-16'27, a Flemish scholar, Professor of Poetry and Rhetoric at Vanlx, and Canon of the Antwerp Cathedral, pub lished, with additions and corrections, the Theatrum vitas humansB of Zwinger (cf. ante, p. H48, note 1), with the title Magnum theatrum rltas hnmanas, Cologne, Kiiil, 8 vols., fol. Schaarschmidt states that this new edition in alphabetical order is, in fact, worth less than the old redaction of the book, which handled the materials systematically in their essential aspects. — -Til.
cir. xxi] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 623 lowing the order of the alphabet, the doctrine of languages (which you with the ancients put in Lofji<:\ i.e. in discursive logic, takes possession in its turn of the territory of the two others. Here, then, your three great provinces of encyclopedia are in continual war, since one is always encroaching upon the rights of the others. The Nominalists believed that there were as many particular sciences as truths,1 which they composed after the wholes according as they arranged them; and others compare the entire body of our knowledge to an ocean, which is all of a piece and which is divided into Caledonian, Atlantic, Ethiopic, Indian only by arbitrary lines. It is usually found that one and the same truth may be put in different places, according to the terms it contains, and also according to the mediate terms or causes upon which it depends, and according to the inferences and results it may have. A simple categoric proposition has only two terms; but a hypothetic proposition may have four, not to speak of complex statements. A remark able history may perhaps be placed in the annals of universal history and in the history of the country where it happened, and in the history of the life of a man who was interested