nature of body in particular \vill be completed by a given figure, a given magnitude, etc. And,, indeed, he himself says, Book 3, chapter (text.) 24, Phys., that all natural science is concerned with magnitude (with which figure is connected), motion, and time. Aristotle often says the same, that movable being, is the subject of physics, that natural science treats of matter and motion; he himself also makes heaven the cause of all things which take place in the sublunary worlds. Now heaven, he says, does not act upon the bodies below it except through motion. But motion does not produce anything but motion or termini of motion, namely magni tude and figure, and from these the resulting position, distance, number, etc. From these, therefore, everything in nature must be explained. The same Aristotle likewise often says (as Book I. of the "Phys. Aud.," chap. 69) that the relation of the brass to the figure of the statue is the same as that of the matter to the form. But I might prove that the figure is the substance, or rather that the 1 Abdias Trew, 1597-1069, was Professor of Physics and Astronomy in the University of Altdorf, where he erected, 1657, the first observatory seen in that part of the world. He made discoveries in the theory of music, espe cially as regards the most accurate temperament, which he set forth in his Janitor lycssi imtsici, Rothenburg, o. T., 1635. His chief work was in astron omy and meteorology, and he carefully observed all the comets appearing during his lifetime. As a chronologer he contributed to the adoption of the Gregorian calendar by the Protestant states. He published, among other works, Directorium mathematicum, Nuremberg, 1657; Lehrbuch d. sphdri- schcn Astronomic, Nuremberg, 1637; Grundllche Calendarkunst,'LunQbeT:g, 2T 642 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE space is the substance, that the figure is something substantial, because all science is concerned with substance; further it cannot be denied that geometry is a science. You replied that you could produce the place in which Aristotle had denied that geometry was a science sooner than I would produce that in which he affirmed it. I do not indeed doubt, illustrious sir, that there are some places of Aristotle which can be drawn or twisted to this purpose, but yet I think that these are overthrown by a very large number of his other expressions. For what is more frequent in all the books of the " Analytics " than examples of geometers, so that he seems to have wished geometrical demonstrations to be, as it were, the measure of the rest. Now the more ignoble is absurdly constituted the measure of the more noble. And so meanly, indeed, did the Scholastics think of mathematics at first, that they made every effort to exclude mathe matics from the number of the perfect sciences, principally by means of this argument, because it does not always demonstrate from causes. But if we consider the matter more accurately, it will appear that it does demonstrate from causes. For it demonstrates figures from motion: from the motion of the point is produced the line, from the motion of the line the surface, from the motion of the surface the body. From the motion of the right line upon right lines arises the rectangle. From the motion of a right line about an immovable point arises the circle, etc. The constructions of figures, therefore, are motions; now from constructions relations (affectiones) con cerning the figures are demonstrated. Therefore from motion, and consequently a priori, and from cause. Geometry, therefore, is a true science. Therefore with Aristotle's consent its subject, namely space, will be a substance. Nor is it so very absurd that geometry treats of the substantial form of bodies. For behold the passage of Aristotle, 13 " Met." chap. 3, in which he expressly says that geometry abstracts from matter, from the final and the efficient cause; in accordance with which supposition it follows that he treats either of the substantial or accidental form. But he does not treat of the accidental, because the accidental form in its own real definition involves the subject or matter in which it is, although Aristotle nevertheless says that geometry abstracts from matter. Therefore geometry treats of the substantial form. Hence there immediately arises in my mind as I write these things a certain beautiful harmony of the sciences, the matter, of course, having been accurately con sidered: theology or metaphysics treats of the efficient cause of things, namely mind; moral philosophy (whether practical or civil, for, as I learned from you, it is one and the same science) treats of the final cause of things, namely the good; mathematics (I mean the pure, for the rest is a part of physics) treats of the form or idea of things, namely figure; physics treats of the matter of things, and of the APPENDIX 643 single affection resulting from its combination with other causes, namely motion. For the mind in order to obtain for itself a good and pleasing figure and position of things, supplies motion to matter. For matter by itself is devoid of motion. For the origin of all motion is mind, as Aristotle also rightly saw.
For to come to this point, Aristotle seems nowhere to have pictured to himself any such substantial forms, which are in themselves the cause of motion in bodies, as the Scholastics conceive; he indeed defines nature as the origin of motion and rest, and form and matter he calls nature, but form in a higher degree than matter, but from this what the Scholastics mean (uolunt) does not follow, that form is a certain immaterial entity, irrational nevertheless in bodies, which itself spontaneously without the impact of an external thing gives motion downwards to a body, for example, to a stone. For the form, indeed, is a cause and source of motion, but not at first. For a body is not moved, except from the outside, as Aristotle rightly not only says, but also demonstrates; for example, a globe may be in a plane, if it is once at rest it will not move of itself forever, unless in consequence of an added external impulsor, for example, another body. If this now approaches, the second body is the source of the impressed motion, but the figure, namely globosity, is the source of the motion taken up, for if globosity were absent, having been produced by chance according to circumstances, the body would not yield to the second body so easily. From this it is evident that the scholastic concept does not follow from the defi nition of the Aristotelian form. Form, therefore, is the source of motion in its own body, and body itself is the source of motion in another body, I confess; but the primary source of motion is the primary and in reality from matter abstracted form (which at the same time is efficient), namely mind. Hence liberty and spontaneity occur in minds alone. Therefore it is not absurd that of the substan tial forms mind only is called the primary source of motion, the others having their motion from mind. And by this argument he1 ascends to the first mover. To this objection you give a twofold reply; first, this argument can avail nothing with Epicurus, who bestows upon his atoms per se downward motion. I admit that this argument can avail nothing with him, unless it be previously demon strated to him that this itself is absurd and impossible, namely, that a body has motion from its own self, a thing which Cicero also if I am not mistaken already at that time did in his books " De natura Deorum," gracefully laughing at Epicurus because he introduced in this way something without cause and reason in his hypotheses. For in the nature of things nothing is down save as regards us, 614 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE and so there is no reason why any body should move in this rather than in that direction (plagam). Therefore we shall easily answer Epicurus, denying that whatever is moved is moved by another outside itself, and shall vindicate the laboring certainty of the existence of God. Second, you object that Aristotle seems to have reasoned not so much from this axiom that the source of all motion is outside the moved body, as from the other that progress into infinity is not granted. But in truth, most noble sir, consider carefully whether or not either connection of ideas is needed. For unless it is admitted that what is moved extraneously is moved, plainly we shall arrive at no progress, still less at infinity; for the opponent will resist steadfastly from the beginning and any given body will reply that it is itself sufficient to produce its own motion through its own substantial form, and needs therefore no mover, much less the first. Therefore that ladder will tumble down as soon as the first step, and as it were the foundation, is taken away. Then also Epicurus was wont to admit progress into infinity; there fore we must consider not so much what Epicurus admits or does not admit, as what can certainly be demonstrated. The Aristotelian philosophy, the inevitable result of the reformed philosophy itself, must be briefly touched upon.1 It is plain that what must be dis cussed by the theologians must be discussed by the philosophers also. The holy fathers illustrated the Holy Scripture by the best interpretations: soon the monks obscured them by superstitions. The light of souls having arisen, the reformed theology is three fold: the one heretical, which rejects the scriptures themselves, as of the fanatics; the second schismatical, which harmonizes the an cient fathers, the doctors of the church, with the sacred scripture and the primitive church, as of the Evangelicals.2 In like manner the Greek interpreters 3 illustrated Aristotle, the Scholastics obscured 1 The Latin text reads: " Aristotelicam philosophiam reformats ipsius philosophise iiievitabilis eventus hreviter attingenda est." Gerhardt's note reads: " In diesem Satze fehlt etwas," i.e. In this sentence something is want ing. Erdmann gives the following: "Observ. Thomasii. Sic scriptum erat a librario, sed hiat alias haec period us: nee lectionem ejus constituo," i.e. Note of Thomasius. Thus it was written by the copyist, but this sentence is other wise lacking: I do not determine its reading. — TR.
2 Gerhardt's note reads: "Auch hier scheint etwas zu fehlen," i.e. Here also something appears to be wanting. Erdmann gives the following: " Observ. Thomasii. Etiam hie aliquid deest; datnr enirn pro triplici theologia tantum duplex. Scripsisse puto: alia schismatica, alia vera, qnae priscos Patres, etc. Confer sequentem," i.e. Note of Thomasius. Here also something is wanting; for, instead of the threefold theology, only a twofold is given. I think he wrote: the second schismatic, the third true, which the ancient Fathers, etc. Cf. the following. — TR.
3 Gerliardt reads, " interpretes "; Erdmann, " Patres." — TR.
APPENDIX G45 him with trifles. The light having arisen, the reformed philosophy is threefold: the first stupid, like that of Paracelsus,1 llelmont,2 and of the others who utterly reject Aristotle; the second bold, which with small regard for the ancients, nay with open contempt for them, render(s) 3 (their) its own meditations even when good sus pected, such as that of Descartes; the third true, by whom Aristotle is recognized as a great man and in most things right.
The reformed philosophy having just been reconciled with Aris totle, it now remains to show its truth per se, precisely as the Chris tian religion can be proved both from reason and history and from the sacred Scripture. But it must be proved that no entities are given in the world besides mind, space, matter, motion. Mind I call thinking being. Space is a primarily extended entity or mathemati cal body, which manifestly contains nothing else than three dimen sions, and is also that universal place of all things. Matter is a secondarily extended entity, or that which besides extension or math ematical body has also physical body, that is, resistance, di/Tmm'av, density, the power of filling (repletivitatem') space, impenetrability, which consists in this, that it is compelled by the approach of another such being to move or to stop the other; from which nature of im penetrability therefore motion flows. Matter therefore is an entity which is in space or an entity coextensive with space. Motion is a change of space. But figure, magnitude, position, number, etc., are not entities really distinct from space, matter, and motion, but only conditions Qidbitudines) amid space, matter, motion, and their parts made by the supervenient mind. I define figure further as the ter minus of extension, magnitude as the number of parts in the exten sion. I define number as one, and one, and one, etc., or unities. Position is reduced to figure, for it is a formation (confguratio) of many (figures). Time is nothing else than magnitude of motion. And since every magnitude is a number of parts, what wonder Aristotle defined time as the number of motion? But thus far ter mini only have been explained, and the sense in which we use them set forth, but nothing as yet proved. Now let us show that there is no need of any other things in order to explain the phenomena of the 1 Theophrastus Paracelsus, 1473-1541. On his philosophy, cf. Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos.d. Mittelaltcrs, III. [Vol.4], 430-452; Lasswitz, Gexch. d. Atomistik, 2 Joh. Bapt. Van Helmont, 1577-1G44. On his philosophy, cf. Stockl, Gesch. d. Philof;. d. Mittelalters, III. [Vol.4], 458-472; Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 3 The Latin text reads, " suas suspectas reddunt," as though the writer had in mind those holding the view rather than the view itself with which the sentence hegan, and in consistency with which heginning the verb should have heeii " reddit." — TK.
646 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE world and to assign their causes, nay, also that there can be no other things, although if we show that there is no need of other things besides mind, matter, space, and motion, by this very thing it will be shown that the hypotheses of the moderns who employ these things alone in the assignment of phenomena are the better. For it is a defect in an hypothesis to assume unnecessary things. Now that all things in the entire world can indeed be explained from these alone, the reading of the modern philosophers sufficiently teaches, and it is evident from the considerations which I put down a little before when I was showing the possibility of an Aristotelic harmony. Then it must also be noted that these hypotheses are the better which are the clearer. Now, indeed, the human mind can imagine nothing else than mind (when, namely, it thinks of itself), space, matter, motion, and what results from these when united with each other; whatever else you add are words only, which can be named and variously combined with each other, but cannot be explained and understood. For who can imagine to himself a being which partakes of neither ex tension nor thought? What need therefore to posit souls of animals and plants, the incorporeal forms of the elements, the substantial forms of the inetals, devoid of extension? More correctly there fore Campanella x in his book "De Sensu rerum et Magia," and Marcus Marci,2 " De Ideis operatricibus," falsely indeed, yet in agreement nevertheless with their hypotheses, attributed to these substantial forms of inanimate things, deprived of extension, sense, knowledge, imagination, will. Nor is the occult philosophy of Agrippa,3 who adds an Angel as it were an obstetrician to everything, unlike it, nor the discussions of Scaliger Trepi Swa/tews TrAaortK^s and its intelligence. Thus it returns to as many little gods (deunculos) as substantial forms, and to a race almost TroXvOeio-^ov. For hence is attributed to them appetite, and the natural instinct from which also follows natural cognition, hence these axioms: Nature does nothing in vain, everything shuns its own destruction, like takes pleasure in like, matter desires a nobler form, and others of this description, since nevertheless there is, in truth, in nature no wisdom, no appetite, but a beautiful Order springs out of it, because it is the clock of God.
From these considerations it is evident that the hypotheses of the reformed philosophy are superior to the scholastic hypotheses for this 1 Tommaso Campanella, 1568-1639. Brief account of his views is given in Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 1, 340-343. Cf., also, Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. MMeMters, III. [Vol. 4], 343-366. — TR.'
3 Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheiin, 1486-1535. His Opera omnia, Lugduni, 1600; the De occulta philosophia in Vol. 1. For an account of his views, cf. Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. M'Melalters, III. [Vol. 4], 412-426; Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 1, 290-293. — TR.
APPENDIX 647 reason, because they are not superfluous, while, on the other hand, they are clear.
It remains for us to prove by more subtle reasoning that other entities than those I have mentioned cannot indeed be assumed in explaining the nature of bodies. It will be done thus: All call that body which is endowed with some sensible quality, then out of the sensible qualities many can be taken away, provided never theless that the body remains. For although a body is deprived of all color, odor, taste, yet it is called a body. For you will grant that air, for example, is a body, although it is transparent, and so not colored, besides it is devoid of taste, and for the most part also of both odor and sound. Therefore the qualities visible, audible, and those of taste and smell, may be cast aside as least constitutive of the nature of body. To tactile qualities, therefore, everything returns. And indeed these primary qualities — heat, moisture, dry- ness, cold — can each be absent; heat can be absent from water, moisture from the earth, dryness from the air, cold from the fire, and yet any of these is a body. The other tactile qualities — for example, smoothness, lightness, tenacity, etc., are acknowledged even by you not to belong to the constitutive nature of a body, for this very reason, because they are called secondary, and so have arisen from others, and further because there is no one of them which cannot be absent from a body. There remains, therefore, to be sought for some sensible quality which is competent to all and single bodies and from which as it were by a sign men may distinguish body from non-body. This without doubt is density (crassities), or dvTiTVTrta, taken with extension. Whatever men certainly think extension is (although in truth it always is body and has dvriTVTria, although insensible to us, yet perceptible by the intellect), they do not at once call that body, for they sometimes think that it is a mere appearance and <£dvrao7m. But whatever they not only see but also touch, that is, in which they find avTirvma, that they call body; but whatever lacks dvTiTUTria, that they deny to be body. In the two, therefore, men both educated and uneducated place the nature of body, in extension and dvTiTUTrio. taken together; they take that from sight, this from touch; whence also from the union of both senses we are wont to be certified concerning things that they are not phantasmata. But extension is nothing else than existence in space; avrtrvTrta is the inability to exist with another in the same space, but the one or the other (alterutrum} must be moved or keep quiet. From these con siderations it is evident that the nature of body is constituted by extension and antitypy, and since there is nothing in things without cause, nothing even must be assumed in bodies, the cause of which cannot be made to appear from their primary constitutive principles. Xow the cause cannot be made to appear from these except through 648 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE their definitions. Xothing, therefore, is to be assumed in bodies which does not flow from the definition of extension and antitypy. But there flow from this definition only magnitude, figure, position, number, mobility, etc. Motion itself does not flow from these. Whence, properly speaking, motion is not given in bodies as a real entity in them, but I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continually created, that bodies at any instant in assignable motion are some thing, at any intervening time between the instants in assignable motion are nothing, a thing which was unheard of till now, but which is plainly necessary and will shut the mouth of the atheists. From these considerations it is evident that the explanation of all qualities and changes must be taken from magnitude, figure, motion, etc., and that heat, color, etc., are nothing but subtile motions and figures. As to what remains, I dare affirm that atheists, socinians, naturalists, sceptics, would never have been truly met unless by this established philosophy; which I indeed believe a gift of God given to the old age of the world as an unique plank by which pious and prudent men are about to save themselves in the shipwreck of the now overhanging atheism. However small my knowledge of learned men after a little time, I nevertheless tremble as often as I think how many men at the same time intellectual and absolutely atheistic I have met. And there is flying through the hands of men an unknown book of Bodin l (and would, as I wish in the case of Naud;eus, it was never to be published), powerful certainly, which he calls, " Arcana sublimium," in which he is the professed enemy of the Christian religion. The dialogues of Vaniuus - are child's play when compared with it. I have read it carefully, and I thank God from my heart, because he furnished me with those defences of 1 Jean Bodin, 15:>0-1596 or 1507, the eminent writer on Political Science, and advocate of tolerance in religion, published his greatest work, — "the first elaborate attempt in modern times to construct a system of political science," — Les six Livres de la Republique, at Paris, 137(5. His I'niversss naturse t/i.eatrum appeared at Hanover, 1G05, the Preface dated February 25, 1596. For some account of its doctrine, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 1, 326- ;i27, 411-413. G. E. Guhrauer published an Abstract, in German, with a partial translation of the Latin text, of his very famous MS., here referred to by Leibnitz, the Colloquium heptaplomeres de abditis rerum sublimium arca- nis, Berlin, 1841, and the complete original text, from a MS. in the Giessen Library, was edited and published by L. Noack, Schwerin, 1857. The work is "a conversation between seven learned men, — a Jew, a Mahometan, a Lutheran, a Zwinglian, a Roman Catholic, an Epicurean, and a Theist "; and "the conclusion to which they are represented as coming is, that they will live together in charity and toleration and cease from further disputa tions as to religion." — TR.
2Lucilio Vanini, 1585-ll>19, who called himself by the name, among others, of Julius Caesar, was a disciple of Pomponatius (cf. ante, p. 581, n. 1). He denied the immortality of the soul, and advocated a doctrine of pantheistic APPENDIX 649 philosophy (in which I should be ungrateful, if I should deny that I owed much to you), by which I repelled his weapons with no difficulty. The labor of the distinguished Spizel is to be praised, which he now again expends in eradicating atheism. His letter on this subject, recently published (in these nine days), I think you have seen. Hear what happened to me in connection with him. I had written some time when at leisure, a leisure nevertheless disturbed in the inn, about two sheets, in which I was discussing the demonstration more accurately than usual of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. These I had sent to my friend. Through him they came into the hands of the Most Rev erend Spener,1 pastor at Frankfort, a neglected yet deserving author. Spener sent them to Spizel; 2 Spizel placed them at the end of that recent letter of his to Ant. Reiser3 on the eradication of atheism, under the title " Confessio natures contra atheistas." I do not blame him, but I am grieved, because that o-^e'cuov was so very incorrectly printed; that sorites, especially, by which I tried to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, was thrown into strange confusion by the misplacing of its opening lines. Spizel acknowl