And in truth actually in the world we observe that all things take place according to the laws of the eternal verities not only geomet rical but also metaphysical, that is, not only according to material necessities, but also according to formal reasons; and that is true not only generally in that reason of the existing rather than non- existing, and the so rather than otherwise existing world which we have now explained (which certainly is to be sought from the tend ency of possibilities to existence), but also by descending to specials we see, by a wonderful plan in all nature, the metaphysical laws of cause, power, action, have place, and these prevail over the purely geometrical laws themselves of matter, as in giving the reasons of the laws of motion I have observed to such an extent that I was finally compelled to abandon, as elsewhere I have more at length ex plained, the law of the geometrical composition of impulses (conatuum), defended formerly by me, a youth, when I was more materialistic.
Thus, therefore, we have the ultimate reason of reality both of essences and of existences in one, which assuredly greater, above and before the world itself is necessarily existent, since through itself not only existences, which the world embraces, but also possibilities, LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE have reality. But this can be sought only in one source on account of the connection of all things with each other. It is evident, more over, that from this source existing things continually spring forth (promanare) and are produced and the products exist, since it is not apparent why one state of the world rather than another, yesterday rather than to-day, flows from itself. It is also evident how God acts not only physically but also freely, and is in himself not only the efficient but also the final cause of things, and how an account is taken by him, not only of grandeur and power in the mechanism of the universe already constituted, but also of goodness and wisdom in that to be constituted.
And lest any one may think that moral perfection or goodness is here confounded with metaphysical perfection or magnitude, and the latter being granted may deny the former, it is to be understood that it follows from what has been said, not only that the world is the most perfect physically, or, if you prefer, metaphysically, or that that series of things has been produced in which the greatest pos sible reality is actually manifest, but also that it is the most perfect morally, because in reality moral perfection in souls themselves is physical. Whence the world is not only an especially admirable mechanism, but also, as far as it is composed of souls, is the best llepublic, through which there is brought to souls the greatest pos sible felicity or joy in which their physical perfection consists.
But, you will say, we experience the contrary in the world, for the best very often fare the worst, the innocent, not only beasts, but also men, are struck down, and even killed with torture; finally, the world, especially if the government of the human race be regarded, seems rather a certain confused chaos than a thing arranged by a certain supreme wisdom. So at first view I confess it seems, but the contrary must be established by a more thorough inspection; a priori, it is evident from these very considerations which have been brought for ward, that the highest possible perfection, namely, of all things, and so also of mind, is obtained.
And in truth it is unjust to judge, unless after an investigation of the whole law, as the jurisconsults say. We know a small part of the eternity extending into immensity; for how little is the memory of a few thousands of years which history recounts for us. And yet, from so small experience we judge rashly concerning the immense and the eternal, as men in a prison, or, if you prefer, born and educated in the subterranean salt-pits of the Sarmatians, thought that there is no other light in the world but that dim lamp light scarcely sufficient to direct their steps. We look at a very beautiful picture, we cover this entirely, reserving a small portion; what else in this will appear, even if you look very attentively, nay, how much more will you observe from near by than a certain confused congeries of colors without APPENDIX 697 choice, without art; and nevertheless, when the whole covering is removed, and you shall see the whole picture in the proper position, you will know that that which seemed thoughtlessly spread upon the canvas has been done with the highest art by the author of the work. What the eyes observe in pictures, the ears perceive in music. Eminent composers very often mix discords with concords in order to arouse, and, as it were, sting the hearer, and as more solicitous concerning the outcome, all having soon been restored to order, that he may rejoice so much the more, in short, that we may take pleasure in petty dangers or experiences of evils by the sense itself, or by the display of either our power or happiness; or, as we delight in the spectacle of the rope-dancers, or in the sword-dance (saltatione inter ylaflios — sauts perilleux, Leibnitz), things that themselves excite terror, and we, our very selves, half let down the children in sport, as it were, now almost about to throw them before us, just as the ape bore Christian, king of Denmark, when an infant, and wrapped in swaddling clothes, to the roof of the house, and while all were anxious, like one in sport bore him safe back again into his cradle. In accord with the same principle, it is insipid always to eat sweet things; sharp, sour, nay more, bitter things which excite the taste, are to be mixed with them. He who has not tasted the bitter, has not deserved, nay more, will not appreciate the sweet. This itself is the law of joy, that pleasure does not proceed uninterruptedly; for this produces disgust, and makes us inert, not joyful.
But what we have said of this part which can be disturbed while the harmony on the whole is preserved is not so to be interpreted as if no account is taken of the parts, or as if it would suffice that the whole world be complete in its own parts, although it can happen that the human race is wretched, and that there is no care for justice in the universe, or account taken of us, as some think, who judge not rightly enough concerning the totality of things. For we must know that, as in the best constituted republic, care is taken that it be as well as possible with individuals, so the universe Avould not be suffi ciently perfect unless, while the harmony of the universe is preserved, as much regard is had for particular interests. Of which thing no better measure could be constituted than the law itself of justice, saying that each should take part in the perfection of the universe, and in happiness proper in proportion to the measure of his own virtue and of that will which is a disposition of mind (affectus) toward1 the common good, by which that itself is completed which we call the affection and love of God, in which alone the force and also the power of the Christian religion consists, in the judgment even of the wise theologians. Nor should it seem wonderful that so much is conferred 1 Gerhardt reads, incorrectly," ergo "; Erdmann, correctly, " erga" — TB.
698 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE upon souls in the universe, since they very closely reproduce the image l of the supreme author, and are related to him not only as machines to the maker (like the rest), but also as citizens to the prince, and will continue in existence equally with the universe itself, and express and concentrate in a measure the whole in themselves, so that it can be said that souls are the entire parts.
But as regard^ the sufferings especially of good rnen, it must cer tainly be maintained that they result in their greater good, and that is true not only theologically, but also physically, as the grain cast into the earth suffers before it bears fruit. And on the whole, it can be said that sufferings, temporarily evil, are in effect good, since they are the short roads to greater perfection. So, in physics, those liquors which ferment slowly are improved more slowly, but those in which the fermentation is stronger are improved more readily, the parts being thrown off with greater force. And this is, as you would say, to go back, in order, by a greater effort, to leap forwards (qu'on recule pour mieux sauter, — you go back to take a better leap). These views, therefore, must be maintained to be not only pleasing and comforting, but also most true. And in general, I think there is nothing, both truer than happiness, and more propitious and more delightful than truth.
Respecting the increase also of the beauty and general perfection of the divine works, a certain perpetual and very free progress of the whole universe is to be recognized, so that it proceeds to ever greater culture. As for instance, a great part of our earth receives culture and will receive more and more. And although it is true that some times some parts grow wild again or are destroyed and depreciated, yet this must so be understood, as a little before we interpreted suf fering, namely, that this destruction and depreciation itself is useful in the attainment of something greater, so that in some measure we gain by the very loss.
And as to the objection which might be made that thus the world should long ago have been made a paradise, the reply is at hand: although already many substances have attained great perfection, nevertheless, on account of the divisibility of the continuum to infinity, there always remain in the abyss of things parts hitherto asleep, to be aroused and carried forwards to something greater and better, and, in a word, to a better culture. And accordingly, progress never comes to an end.
1 Both Gerhardt and Erdmann read, " imagine "; manifestly a typographi cal error for " imagiuern." — TK.
APPENDIX 699 APPENDIX 1 [From the Latin] Up to the present time, I have published no book, indeed, against the Cartesian philosophy, but often in the " Acta Eruditorum Lipsien- sium " and the " Journaux " of France and Holland hastily-thrown-off productions (Schediasmata) will be found inserted by me, in which I have borne witness to my dissent from it. But first (not to speak now of the others), about the nature of the body and what motive forces are in the body; in all others my opinion was the same. The Cartesians, it is true, place the essence of body in extension alone, but I, although with Aristotle and Descartes against Democritus and Gas- sendi I admit no vacuum, and against Aristotle with Democritus and Descartes think there is nothing but an apparent rarefaction and con densation, yet I think with Democritus and Aristotle against Des cartes, that thei'e is something passive in body besides extension, that, namely, by which body resists penetration; but besides this, I also recognize with Plato and Aristotle against Democritus and Descartes an active force or evreAe'xeia, so that I think Aristotle so far rightly denned nature as the source (principium) of motion and rest, not because I think any body, unless already in motion, can be moved by itself or be put in motion by any quality such as gravity, but because I think every body always has implanted in it motive force (motricem), nay, rather motion actually intrinsic (inotum intrinscum actualeiii), from the very beginning of things. Moreover, I agree with Democritus and Descartes against the multitude of the Scholastics, that the exercise of the motive (motricis) power and the phenomena of bodies can always be explained mechanically, the causes themselves of the laws of motion being withdrawn which spring from a higher source, namely, from the entelechy, which cannot be derived from the passive mass alone and its modifications.
But in order that my opinion may be better understood and its reasons also may be somewhat apparent, I think, in the first place, that the nature of body does not consist in extension alone, because in evolving the notion of extension we must notice that it is relative to something that is extended and signifies a diffusion or repetition 1 Gerhardt, Leibniz, math. Schrift., II, 2 [Vol. 6], 98-106; Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 4, 393^00; cf. G.'s Einleitung, ibid., 271-272. The letter to Honoratus Fabri, and this Appendix, were printed by Gerhardt from the Ms. in the Royal Library at Hanover.
700 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE of a certain nature. For every repetition (or multitude of the same things) is either discrete, as in numbers where aggregate parts are discerned; or is continuous, where the parts are indeterminate and can be assumed in infinite ways. Continua, however, are of two kinds; the one successive, as time and motion, the other simultaneous or consisting of coexisting parts, as space and body. And as in time we conceive nothing else than the disposition or series itself of varia tions, which can occur in itself, so in space we perceive nothing else than the possible disposition of bodies. And so when space is said to be extended, we accept the statement in the same sense as when time is said to endure or number to be numbered; for, in truth, time adds nothing to duration nor space to extension, but as successive variations are in time, in body those things are diverse which can be diffused. For, because extension is a simultaneous continuous repetition as duration is a successive one, as often as the same nature is diffused at the same time through many things, as ductility or specific gravity or the yellow-color in gold or the white- color in milk, extension is said to have place generally in body as resistance or impenetrability, although it must be confessed that that diffusion continuous in color, weight, ductility, and things similar in kind but homogeneous, is only apparent and has no place in parts however small, and so the extension of resistance alone which is diffused through matter preserves this name with the strict investi gator. But it is evident from these considerations, that extension is not an absolute predicate, but relative to that which is extended or diffused, and from the nature of which, diffusion can just as little be separated as number from the thing numbered. And hence those who assumed extension as an absolute primitive attribute, indefinable and apprjrov, erred by defect of analysis and took refuge in the occult qualities which for the rest they so despised, as if extension were something that cannot be explained.
The question now is asked, What is that nature whose diffusion constitutes body? We have already said that matter is constituted by the diffusion of resistance; but since in our opinion there is some thing else in body besides matter, the question is asked in what its nature consists. We say, therefore, it can consist in nothing else than ev TQ> 8vvafjLiK<S or the indwelling principle of change and per sistence. Whence also it uses the physical doctrine of the two mathe matical sciences to whose principles it was subordinated, geometry and dynamics, the elements of which latter science not yet sufficiently propounded, I have elsewhere promised. Moreover, geometry itself, or the science of extension, again is subordinated to arithmetic, be cause in extension, as I said above, there is repetition or multitude, and dynamics is subordinated to metaphysic which treats of cause and effect.
APPENDIX 701 Again, TO 8wa.fj.LK6v or power in body is twofold, — passive and active. Passive power properly constitutes matter or mass, active evreAe'^eia or form. Passive power is the resistance itself by which body resists not only penetration but also motion, and by which it happens that another body cannot enter into its place unless itself yields, but itself does not yield unless by retarding somewhat the motion of the impelling body, and so it attempts to continue steadfastly in its former state, not merely that it may not depart thence voluntarily, but also that it may resist change. And so there are therein two resistances or masses: the first antitypy, as they call it, or impenetra bility; the second resistance, or what Kepler calls the natural inertia of bodies, which Descartes also somewhere in his letters acknowledged, from the fact that bodies certainly receive no new motion unless by force, and so resist the impression and break its force. This would not happen if there were not in the body, besides extension, TO 8wa- /J.IKOV or the principle of the laws of motion, by which it happens that the quantity of forces cannot be increased, nor can a body even be impelled by another unless its own force is broken. This passive force in the body, moreover, is everywhere the same and proportional to its magnitude. For although some bodies appear more dense than others, this nevertheless happens because their pores are more filled with matter pertaining to the body, while, on the contrary, the rarer bodies have the nature of a sponge, so that another more subtile matter glides through their pores which is not reckoned with the body nor its motion followed or looked for.
Active force, which also absolutely is customarily called force, is not to be conceived as a simple common power of the schools, or as a receptivity of action, but involves a conatus or tendency to action, so that, unless something else hinders, action follows. And in this properly consists ei/T£\e'x«a, too little understood by the schools; for such a power involves act (actum), and does not persist in a naked faculty, although it does not always proceed wholly to the action (aciionem) to which it tends, as often, namely, as an impediment is thrown in its way. Again active force is twofold, — primitive and deri vative; that is, either substantial or accidental. Primitive active force, which is called by Aristotle evTtAe^eta rj Trpwri], generally the form of substance (forma substantice'), is another natural principle which with material or passive power completes the corporeal substance, which is, forsooth, a unum per se, not a mere aggregate of many substances; for there is much difference, for example, between an animal and a flock. And so this entelechy or soul, or something analogous to the soul, exists, and always naturally actuates some organic body, which itself separately assumed (quod ipsum separatim sumtiim), when the soul is separated forsooth or removed, is not one substance, but an aggregate of many; in a word, a natural machine.
702 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE This natural machine, moreover, has this highest prerogative as compared with an artificial, that exhibiting a proof of a divine author, it consists of infinite organs wrapped up in itself, and so can never be utterly destroyed, just as it cannot be absolutely produced, but can be diminished only and increased, and be involved and evolved, this being to a certain extent itself a substance, and in it (however trans formed) a certain degree of vitality, or, if you prefer, of primitive activity being always preserved. For what is said of animate things must also be said proportionally of those which are not properly ani mals. Meanwhile, it must be maintained that intelligences, or the more noble souls which are also called spirits, are ruled by God not only as machines, but also as subjects, and are not liable to those changes to which other living beings are exposed.
Derivative force is that which some call impetus, aconatus evidently or tendency, so to speak, to a certain determinate motion, by which accordingly primitive force or the principle of action is modified. I have shown that this is not preserved the same in the same body, but yet, however distributed in many, it remains the same in the amount and differs from motion itself, whose quantity is not preserved. And this itself also is the impression which a body receives by impulse, by whose aid projectiles continue their motion and do not need any new impulse, which Gassendi also has illustrated by elegant experiments made on shipboard. Thus also some incorrectly think that projectiles have their motion continued by the air. Further, derivative force differs from action only as the instantaneous from the successive; for there is already force in the first instant, but action requires a period of time, and so is brought to pass by the prolongation of forces in time, which is perceived in any part of the body whatever. And so action is in reason composed of body, time, and force (vis) or energy (virtutis), since by the Cartesians the quantity of motion is estimated by the calculation of velocity in the body, and forces are considered far otherwise than as velocities, as will soon be stated.
To place active force in bodies moreover, many things compel us, and especially the experience itself, which shows that motions are in matter, although these motions must be attributed originally to the general cause of things, — God; immediately, however, and specifically, they must be attributed to the force placed in things by God. For to say that God in creation has given to bodies a law of action, is nothing unless lie has given at the same time something by which the law is observed; otherwise he himself will be obliged always to procure in an extraordinary manner the observance of the law. Yea, rather his law is efficacious, and makes bodies efficient; i.e. he gave to them natural (insitam) force. Further, we must consider that derived force and action is a certain mode (modale), since it admits change. But every mode is constituted by some modification of something persist- APPENDIX 703 APPENDIX 703 ing or more absolute. And just as figure is a certain limitation or modification of passive force or extended mass, so derivative force and moving action (actio matrix) is a certain modification not certainly of a thing merely passive (otherwise a modification or limit would involve more reality than the thing itself which is limited), but of something active, that is, of the primitive entelechy. Therefore, derivative and accidental or changeable force will be a certain modification of the primitive energy (virtutis) essential to and abiding in every corporeal substance. Whence the Cartesians, since they acknowledge no active principle substantial and capable of modification in the body, are compelled themselves to reject (abjudicare) all action, and to trans fer it to God alone, a far-fetched mechanical view (accersitum ex Macliina), which is not philosophical.
But primitive force is changed by derivative in the impacts of bodies, according as the exercise of primitive force is turned within or without. For in truth, every body has an internal motion, nor can it ever be brought to rest. This internal force, again, turns itself with out, when it performs the duty of elastic force, when, namely, internal motion is impeded in its accustomed course, whence every body is essentially elastic, water not even excepted, and how violently this rebounds, even the cannon balls (pilce tormentarice) show. And unless every body were elastic, the laws of motions could not be proved true and binding. Meanwhile this force does not always render itself conspicuous in the sensible parts themselves of bodies, since these manifestly do not sufficiently cohere. But the harder a body is, the more elastic it is and the more strongly it rebounds. Indeed in impact, when bodies mutually rebound from each other, this occurs through elastic force, whence indeed bodies always have their own special motion from impact by their own special force, to which a foreign impulse furnishes only an occasion of acting, and, so to speak, a determination.
Hence, moreover, we understand that, although that primitive force or form of substance (which, it is true, determines even the forms in matter, while it produces motion) is admitted, yet in ex plaining elastic force and other phenomena we must always proceed mechanically, certainly by the forms which are modifications of matter and by impulses which are modifications of form. And it is useless, when distinct and specific reasons should be given, to have recourse immediately and in general (r/enerice) to form or primitive force in a thing, as it is useless in explaining the phenomena of created things to recur to the first substance or God, unless his means or ends are at the same time specifically explained, and the proximate efficient or even the special final causes are rightly assigned, so that his powTer and wisdom appear. For in general (whatever Descartes may have said), not only efficient, but also final causes, belong to physical dis- 704 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE cussion (tractationis); precisely as a house is badly exhibited, if any of its parts betrays its structure only, not its use. I have further already pointed out above that, since we affirm that all things in nature are explained mechanically, the reasons themselves of the laws of motion or the principles of mechanics must be excepted, which should be deduced not from mathematics alone and the imagination of the sub ject, but from a metaphysical source, namely, from the equality of cause and effect, and from other laws of this kind which are essential to entelechies. Certainly, as has already been said, physics is subor dinate through geometry to arithmetic, through dynamics to meta physics.