" It cannot, accordingly, be correct to define consciousness as the soul's knowing that it knows,1 or ' the power by which the soul knows its own acts and states,' 2 or the power to know that it is itself that knows.3 But consciousness is rather the souVs actual knowing with itself that it knows, that is, is that relation to itself into which the ego is brought by cognition of any object other than itself, is the ego as subject commun ing with itself as object through the mediation of some object distinct from itself. It is not a power of the soul but is a state,4 a condition, a function of the soul which always necessarily accompanies any normal or voluntary exercise of the soul's powers. Speaking figuratively and popularly, it is the mind's illumination of itself by its own action.
"That the foregoing is a correct account of consciousness seems evident: "1. From the difference between cognition and consciousness and the relation of the one to the other. Cognition is a voluntary act of the ego, and consciousness is an involuntary state or condition of the ego which always accompanies its cognitions, and neither one can by any possibility exist without the other. Simple cognition is only a given correlation of subject and object; whereas in consciousness, which must always accom- 1 Sir William Hamilton, Metaph., 133 5*7., 143 sq., Amer. ed.; Discussions, 2 President Noah Porter, Hum. Intellect, p. 83.
3 President Mark Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, p. 107.
4 In the oral exposition of this passage, Dr. Robinson remarked in substance as follows: "A 'state' is usually considered as something inert, stable, in active; but not so with Consciousness. Consciousness is an active state. ' State ' is preferable to ' act,' as the latter implies volition. Consciousness is an involuntary state or condition of the ego."
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 743 pany cognition, the knowing subject is in and by the cognitive act brought into correlation to itself as coexistent or conjunctive object.
"2. The very word consciousness, which all are agreed in using, implies in its composition a partnership and an intercommunication between self as knowing subject and self as known object, an intercommunication which occurs momentarily and continuously in every cognitive act. Whatever may have been the origin of the word, whether with philoso phers or the unlettered, it etyinologically vindicates the view of conscious ness here given.
":]. It is admitted on all hands that knowledge is impossible without consciousness. But if consciousness itself be a distinct kind of knowl edge, whether generic or specific, then since all knowledge is possible only in consciousness, consciousness itself must have its conditioning consciousness and so on ad injinitum. But not only does the conscious ness of every individual being have an absolute beginning, but every given instant of consciousness is as distinct and separate from the preceding as is every act of cognition from its preceding, and every given instant of consciousness is dependent on some given act of cogni tion. Consciousness, therefore, is not an act of cognition, nor a power to cognize, but is the simple reflex action of the ego upon itself in its own acts of cognition; and it cannot be the mind's power to know itself or to know that it is itself that knows, since it is a state or a relation of the ego to itself which is always dependent on the exercise of the power to know.
"If what has been said be true, then it is evident that consciousness, although always inseparable from bodily sensation, is predicable only of mind as active intelligence or intellect. It is by the mind alone as the perceiving, thinking power of the soul that any of the soul's energies, cognitive, cogitative, emotive, volitional, can be brought into exercise or continued in action, and since it is only by the exercise of these energies that consciousness exists, it is of the mind alone, the perceiving and thinking power of the soul, that consciousness is predicable. Again, it also follows that there can be but one kind of consciousness, that it is always spontaneous, the invariable and necessary accompaniment of cog nition, that is, it always accompanies cognition whether the cognition be of objects external or internal. It may vary in degree according to degrees of attention in acts of cognition, but it never changes from itself into consciousness of another kind.
" The so-called self-consciousness or the reflective, acquired, philo sophical consciousness, is nothing else than that act of mind by which the ego itself, its acts or states or its consciousness are made objects of attention. This does not differ from any other act of cognition and knowledge. It furthermore, like every other act of knowledge, is always accompanied by a consciousness of the act, and the consciousness of our consciousness, when it is made an object of attention and knowledge, is just as clear as the consciousness we have when we perceive an external object or when we make a percept, a concept, or an inward emotion an object of attention and scrutiny."
744 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE THE COMPONENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THEIR REALITY " When we make consciousness an object of attention and analyze it into its component parts, we find it always to consist of three distinguish able elements, namely: the ego cognizing, the object cognized, and the communion of the ego with itself in the cognitive act; that is, we find the soul communing with itself in the act of knowing something which is not itself. But these three elements, when themselves analyzed, reve&l the existence of but two distinct quantities or entities, the ego and the object of its knowledge. Out of these two factors, subject and object, carefully analyzed, come directly or indirectly the entire materials of mental phi losophy.
" As to the real existence of these factors of consciousness, the subject and its objects, we may begin with the objects. If there be any doubt as to the reality of the mind's objects, the so-called subject-objects, whether they be sensations, feelings, perceptions, ideas, volitions, or whatever else simple or complex, there is still stronger reason for doubting the existence of an external world from which as cause or occasion these subject-objects have sprung, and reasons stronger still for doubting the existence of our doubt. If mental objects be unreal, doubt has no existence. The truth is, if there be any reality anywhere it is in the mind's own acts of subjec tive cognition.
"In like manner, if the object in consciousness has a real existence, still more indubitably real is the existence of the personal ego that knows the object in consciousness. This is evident in three ways: "First. We are conscious only while one of our mental faculties or powers is in exercise. In the act of its exercise the ego immediately intuits itself as exercising its own energy. Self immediately cognizes self as active in every successive moment of consciousness.
" Second. It is plain that the objects cognized on which the existence of' consciousness is always dependent, even the most subjective and subtle of them, are clearly distinguishable from the ego that cognizes the object. In fact, no object in consciousness is ever cognized unless the cognizing self clearly distinguishes between itself and the object. Such discrimina tion cannot take place unless the ego that makes it has an indubitably real existence.
" Third. The existence of memory proves the real existence of the per sonal ego. Consciousness is a succession of instants each of which is distinct from the preceding and following and each of which changes with the ever-changing objects of cognition and thought, and yet these vanishing instants so leave their traces on the personal ego that it can at will recall long series of them. Thus memory not only proves the exist ence but the persistent identity of the ego that has an object of thought with its accompanying consciousness to-day which it can reproduce to morrow, the next day, and with indefinite frequency thereafter.
"Finally. The real existence of object and subject being indubitably established, it necessarily follows that the existence of consciousness, ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 745 within which both subject and object are found, and consequently its trustworthiness as a source of knowledge in Psychology, must be unhesi tatingly admitted." (Lects. on Psychol., MS., §§ 12, 13, as given to the class of 1884.)
REQUISITES AND DIFFICULTIES IN CONSULTING CONSCIOUSNESS " That is, in practising the so-called self-consciousness.
"First. Requisites: It is necessary that there be close and concen trated attention, patience and persistence in observation, frequent and varied observations, careful discrimination between different classes as well as between different species of the same class of mental phenomena; that each particular phenomenon be analyzed and traced to its cause or causes; that there be a distribution of phenomena according to their nature and causes so far as these can be ascertained.
" But with the utmost care, attention, and discrimination in the anal ysis and classification of the phenomena given in consciousness, there is a constant liability to error. The nature, relations, and causes of the phenomena to be observed are many of them so subtle and obscure that diversity and even conflict of view may be inevitable, but the disagree ments, it must be remembered, turn chiefly on the theories respecting the origin of the phenomena and their relation to realities and not on the reality of the existence of the mental phenomena themselves.
"Second. Difficulties: The observation and examination of the phe nomena of consciousness, however, as compared with the observation and examination of phenomena in the external world, is attended with various, and to inexperienced minds with serious, difficulties. Thus: " (({) So large a portion of early life is spent among and in the obser vation of the phenomena of the outer world that it is difficult for many persons to acquire the habit of accurate observation of the subjective phenomena of mind. This difficulty is heightened: " (/;) By the necessity the conscious subject is under of becoming the object of its own observation, the necessity of compelling himself to act and to observe himself at the same instant. Upon the phenomena of the outer world the mind can concentrate an undivided attention, but when the mind makes its own action an object of attention there is requisite the double effort to produce mental movement and to observe oneself in the process, the result being at best but constrained and halting action of which from divided attention we can catch only hasty and imperfect views.
" (c) Subjective acts and states occurring in rapid succession can be observed only instantaneously, while most objects of sense remaining comparatively permanent in form can generally be examined repeatedly and at leisure. The most evanescent of physical phenomena give ample time for observation in comparison with the most enduring phenomena of mind.
" (d) Every individual consciousness is isolated from that of every 746 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE other, and the report of no one's consciousness, notwithstanding the unanimity in the deliverance of all consciousnesses, can be accepted or even understood by another without a personal scrutiny of his own; whereas in the natural sciences there may be many or few observers, and their reports can be understood and received without personal experiment.
" (e) The objects of consciousness are many of them complex in them selves and their causes and subtle in their relations to one another; they therefore are much more difficult of observation and require much more careful discrimination in observing them than objects in the external world, the mechanical and chemical origin of which are at once and pal pably discernible." (Lects. on Psychol., § 14, ed. of 1884.)
To the above, as presenting more completely Dr. Robinson's view of Consciousness, — a subject which "he regarded as fundamental to all order and rectitude of thought" in Psychology, and on which "he ex pended much time and thought" in perfecting his conception and its statement, — may be added what he dictated to his classes on the question: " CAN THERE BE AN UNCONSCIOUS MODIFICATION OF MlND?
" That is, can there be mental processes and the mind itself unaware of them? The answer must manifestly depend on the meaning attached to the word mind. If by mind be meant the thinking personal essence, or if it denotes the co-ordinated psychical forces which constitute personal being, there can be no good ground for doubting that there may be unconscious modifications of both its states and its powers. There are depths in the potentialities of the personal being which consciousness never reaches. Consciousness knows nothing of the inner sources of energy whence thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions emanate, but only of thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions after they have taken form in the mind. It is upon the existence of these that consciousness depends, and of their existence alone can consciousness inform us. There may therefore be modifications of states of soul, increments and diminu tions of intellectual and moral power, and losses of intellectual possessions of which we may be unconscious and of which we may remain uncon scious till we learn them from unwonted phenomena.
"So also thoughts and accompanying states of consciousness often spring from instinct and hereditary bias which have long lain latent and have existed and operated below consciousness. Instances of knowledge lost under some given condition of the brain and restored under other cerebral conditions are examples of the same kind of unconscious changes. Every species of mental action is more or less dependent on the state of the brain, but to ascribe these changes to unconscious cerebration is to assume that thought, is the equivalent of physical force, is both the quan titative and qualitative product of the brain alone, rather than the product of an active agent which uses the brain, and it is an assumption for which there is no sufficient ground.
" But if by mind be meant the soul's acquisitive and cogitative powers, ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 747 the intellect, the intelligence, the question whether it may not be uncon sciously modified is equivalent to the query whether there may not be an unconscious mental act or (which is the same thing) an unconscious state of consciousness, a contradiction of terms. Every modification of mind, in the sense of the word mind here under consideration, must be by some mental act. But any mental act in order to be such must be a conscious mental act. Cognition and consciousness always coexist. An uncon scious modification of mind would necessitate a mental act of which one was unconscious.
" The facts often cited in proof of an unconscious modification of mind do not seem to warrant the conclusions drawn from them; for instance, acts performed in obedience to any established habits, single but synthetic visions of complex objects, sudden and apparently unaccountable thoughts, sudden and mysterious recollection of long-forgotten persons and events, the apparently simultaneous carrying forward of several trains of thought. All these may be instances, not of unconscious cerebration or of unconscious modification of the mind, but of mental movements, the successive steps of which are too occult or too rapid and minute for the mind in the study of itself to follow. In compound and complex mental processes it is possible that simple steps may be so inadvertently taken as to be apparently taken unconsciously; but an analysis of the process will show that while the degrees of consciousness may be indefinitely numer ous, running down to the lowest stages of latent or sub-consciousness, yet unconsciousness is so far removed from ever so low a degree of con sciousness as to be separated from it by an impassable chasm. As there are many degrees in life but none in death, so there are degrees in con sciousness but none in unconsciousness." (Lects, on Psychol., § 20, ed.
PAGE 138, note 1. Add: For the letter of Molyneux here referred to, dated March 2, 1693, cf. Locke's correspondence with Molyneux, in Locke's jro)V,-.s, 9, 34, 12th ed., London, 1824, 9 vols. 8vo. Berkeley, An Essay toward a New Theory of Vision, §§ 132, 133, Eraser's ed., Vol. 1, pp. 9(5, 97, refers to it; also Locke, Philos. Wks., Bolm's ed., 1, 257-258, note t. On the relations of Locke and Molyneux, cf. Eraser, Locke, Blaekwood's Philos. Classics, Edinburgh and Philadelphia, 1890, p. 234 sq., the letter referred to, p. 238. Molyneux died as a result of a journey, undertaken when ill, to see Locke.
PACK 1o9, lines 17-20, "In this case...united with that sense-knowl edge with which touch has before furnished him." Cf. " The Mentor," a monthly, published by the Alumni Association of the Perkins Institu tion for the Blind, Boston, Mass., U.S.A., Vol. 2, No. 3, March 1892, pp. 81-8(5, "Sculpture by the sense of Touch," giving an account of a blind sculptor, Johnson M. Mundy, whose sight began to fail in his youth and slowly but surely grew less, until it practically vanished entirely. He learned the sculptor's art between the ages of 22 and 29, and practised it for twenty years till the loss of sight compelled him to give it up. Unable, 748 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE however, long to endure " the monotony of an idle and useless existence '• and " with unabated aspiration and fondness for his art," he resumed his work, performing the actual work of sculpture by the sense of touch. His last work up to the date of the article here referred to was a heroic statue of Washington Irving.
PAGE 144, note 1. Add: Cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 0, 522-528, letter 5 to Sophie Charlotte ("hitherto not published," Gerhardt, op. cit., 6, 477, note * — he should have said ' published entire,' as Foucher de Careil, Lettres ct opuscules inedits de Leibniz, Paris, 1854, pp. 252-254, published a fragment of the same), in which Leibnitz subjects Bouhours' book to a sharp critique. Leibnitz also refers to Bouhours in his letter to Sebastian Kortholt, Sept. 30, 1708, Kortholt, Leibnit. Epistolce, 1, 282; Dutens, Leibnit. op. om., 5, 306-307; to Fried. Wilhelm Bierling, Oct. 24, 1709, Kortholt, op. cit., 4, 8; Dutens, op. cit., 5, 355; Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 7, 487: " Bouhursius mihi contemtu vindicandus, nee verbis a Germanis, sed rebus refellendus videbatur." Cf., also, Dutens, op. cit., 5, 190: " Mediocris vir fuit Bouhursius, qui neglecto religionis suse, cui se addixerat, habitu. Damaretum quendam effingere, et fcemi- neam elegantiam exprimere satagebat."
PAGE 147, line 2 from bottom, " Modes." Cf. Descartes, Prin. Philos., Bk. I., § 56, ed. Cousin, 3, 98; Veitch's English trans., 217; German trans, by J. H. v. Kirchmann, 2d ed., Heidelberg, 1887 (Bd. 26 of his Philos. Bibliothefc), p. 28: " Lorsque je dis ici fagon ou mode, je n'entends rien que ce que je nomine ailleurs attribut ou qualite". Mais lorsque je considere que la substance en est autrement dispose'e ou diver- sifide, je me sers particulierement du nom de mode ou fa§on; et lorsque, de cette disposition ou changement, elle peut etre appele"e telle, je nomine qualite's les diverses fagons qui font qu'elle est ainsi nomme'e; enfin, lorsque je pense plus ge'ne'ralment que ces modes ou qualite's sont en la substance, dans les conside'rer autrement que comme les ddpendances de cette substance, je les nomme attributs. Et, parceque je ne dois conce- voir en Dieu aucune varied ni changement, je ne dis pas qu'il y ait en lui des modes ou des qualite's, mais plutot des attributs; et meme dans les choses cre'e'es, ce qui se trouve en elles toujours de meme sorte, comme 1'existence et la dure"e en la chose qui existe et qui dure, je le nomme attribut, et non pas mode ou qualite"." Cf., also, New Essays, Bk. II., PAGE 147, note 1. Dele "Appendix, p.." and substitute " Duncan, 71-80." Cf., also, New Essays, Bk. IV., chap. 10, § 7, Th., ad fin., infra, PAGE 149, line 15 from bottom, "The shortest great-arc of a circle." The French text is: " La longueur du plus petit grand-arc de cercle," etc.
PAGE 150, line 13, "Buratini." Cf. Dutens, Leibnit. op. om., 6, Pt. I., 319: " Gravius, Anglus, in descriptione ^Egypti apud Thevenot, Vol. 1, p. 14, mentionem facit, Titi Livii Buratini, jeune homme Venitien fort ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 749 spirituel, qui e"toit dans la compagnie. Thevenot in inargine annotat: IJuratini est maintenant niaitre de la monnoye du Koi de Pologne, et c'est de lui que 1'on vit il y a dix ou douze ans un uiodelle d'une machine pour PAGE 153, line 7, "Lessius." Leonard Lessius, 1554-1G23, a Flemish Jesuit, was Professor of Philosophy at Douay, and of Theology, 1583-1(523, at Louvain. He opposed the doctrine of grace of Thos. Aquinas, and was charged with favoring Semi-Pelagianism. He was well acquainted with theology, law, mathematics, medicine, and history. For two of his Opera, cf. Migne, Theol. cur. compl., 3, 787; 15, 445. Janet, (Euvres philos. di'. Leibniz, 1, 120, note 1, states that he was a celebrated casuist, often cited in Pascal's Provinciates, and adds that of his ethical works the chief is the De justitia et jure (Migne, op. cit., 15, 445); and that of the theological works we have De perfectionibus moribusque divinis; De Ubertate arbitrii et prcescientia Dei; De summo bono; De Providentia numinis.
PAGE 154, line 13, "Accidents or abstracts." The strong contrast between Locke's and Leibnitz's philosophies comes here again to the front. Locke regards substance as a mere creation of thought, a subjective expe dient of the understanding which "invents" it as a unitary support to, or bearer of, the accidents. Leibnitz looks upon the "substance-concept as the suitable expression of the idea of the actual, to which we refer back the accidents. Every phenomenon as such, in his view, presupposes an actual being, since through such an actual being the phenomenon is first possible. Substance, accordingly, is in the case of all phenomena that which is constantly to be presupposed, the non-irrational (Nicht-nichtzu- denkpnde.}, but in no sense a mere auxiliary concept of only subjective validity." — Schaarschmidt. Leibnitz is in the direct line of Hegel in his emphasis of the concrete rather than the abstract.
PAGE 154, line 4 from bottom, " Indefinite." Cf. Descartes, Prin. Philos., Pt. II., § 21, ed. Cousin, Vol. 3, p. 138: "Nous saurons aussi que ce monde, ou la matiere e"temlue qui compose 1'univers, n'a point de bornes, parceque, quelque part oil nous en voulions feindre, nous pouvons encore iniaginer au-dela des espaces inde"finiment e"tendus, que nous n'imaginons pas seulement, mais que nous concevons etre tels en effet que nous les imaginons; de sorte qu'ils contiennent un corps inde'finement e'tendu," i.e. We know that this world, or the extended matter which composes the universe, has no limits because, should we wish anywhere to feign such limits, we can still imagine beyond spaces indefinitely extended, which we do not imagine only, but which we conceive to be in fact such as we imag ine them, so that they contain an indefinitely extended body.
PAGE 154, note 1, line 4. Instead of "Appendix," read: Duncan, pp. 68-70; line 7, ditto, pp. 71-80; line 10, ditto, pp. 112-126.
PAGE 155, line 2(5, "Motion." Cf. Leibnitz's 4th letter to Clarke, ad fin., Gerhardt, 7, 377; Erdmann, 758; Jacques, 2, 437; Janet, 2, 040; 750 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE PAGK 150, note 1. Phys., VIII. [or H], 0, 2581' 10: t-rrd dt del Kivyffiv del eivai /ecu fj.7] 8ia\eiireiv, dvdyKtj eivai TL o wpCiTov Kivet, ttre ev efre -jr\eica, Kal TO Wp&TOV KiVOVV dKivrfTOV.
PAGE 158, note 1. Add: Spinoza regards all determination as a nega tion — Omnis determinatio est negatio — of this originally posited or necessarily presupposed absolute. Hegel likewise in his Logik maintains essentially the same position as Leibnitz, so that Leibnitz may rightly be said to be in the direct line of the philosophical development culminating in Hegel. Cf. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, 1st ed., 1874; 2d ed., revised and augmented, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1892-1894, passim.
PAGE 160, line 9, "Transcendent." Janet, (Euvres philos. de Leibniz, 1, 128, in his note to this passage, says: "Expressions of the scholastic mathematical language, rarely employed to-day. The surd (le sourd) is the incommensurable, for example, -\/2; le rompu — the broken — is the fraction, as £; the transcendent is that which cannot be calculated by a limited number of arithmetical operations, for example, log 3. These three terms are comprised between two whole numbers."
PAGE 162, note 1. Add: Locke's Essay, ed. Fraser, 1, 295, line 9 from bottom.
PAGE 102, note 2. Add: Cf. the note of Foucher de Careil, flur les trois sens du mot infini dans la philosophic de Leibniz, Nouvelles Lettres et Opuscules inedits de Leibniz, Paris, 1857, pp. 404-407; also A. Penjon, De infinite apud Leibnitium, Paris, 1878.
PAGE 162, note 3. Add: Locke's Essay, ed. Fraser, 1, 277, line 14. PAGE 106, note 1. Add: Locke's Essay, ed. Fraser, 1, 300, line 10.
PAGE 107, note 1. Add: The definition referred to runs as follows: " A mare autem sive diligere est felicitate alterius delectari, vel quod eodem redit, felicilatem alienam adsciscere [Erdmann — asciscere] in suam. Unde difficilis nodus solvitur, magni etiam in Theologia moment!, quomodo amor non mercenarius detur, qui sit a spe metuque et omni utilitatis respectu separatus: scilicet quorum utilitas [Erdmann — felici- tas] delectat, eorum fclicitas nostram ingi'editur, nam quse delectant per se expetuntur." Cf. Dutens, Leibnit. op. om., 4, Pt. IV., 295; Erdmann, 118, b. The entire preface to the Codex juris is given in Dutens, op. cit., ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 751 PAGE 168, note 1, ad fin. Add: Infra, pp. 177 sq., 188. Also, Tlteo- dicee, III., § 404, Gerhardt, 6, 357; Erdmann, 020; Jacques, 2, 300; Janet, 2, 402. Cf., also, J. H. v. Kirchmanii, Erliiuterunyen zur Theo- dicee von Leibniz (Bd. 80, of his Philos. Bibliothek, Leipzig, 1879), PAGE 172, line 4 from bottom, "Displeasure." Schaarschmidt says that neither Locke nor Leibnitz have yet reached the distinction between emotion and passion, as appears from the language of both; and that Kant first grasped the distinction and attempted to determine it more accurately.
PAGE 174, note 1. Add: Phys., T, 201a 10: rj TOV 5vv6.fi.fi fores evre- \«Xeta, 77 TOIOVTOV, Kivrjffis e<mv, olov TOV /uec aXXoiwroO, 77 i,\\ouar6f, dXXoi'axm, TOV 5t av^Tov Kal TOV drriKtlfltvov <f>0LTov (ovStv yap 6vo/j.a KOIVOV fir"1 Afupolv) autJTjcris Kal (pOiffis TOV d£ yfvrjTov Kal <f>6apTOV ytvecris Kal (pOopd, TOV d£ tpoprjTov <popd. Metaphys., K, 10651' 16: rrjv TOV Svvdfjiei 77 TOIOVTOV tffTiv evtpyeiav \<iyu Kivr,ffiv. Cf. /eller, Philos. d. Griech., II., 2 [Vol. 4], 351 sg., .'589 sq.; Wallace, Outlines of the, Philos. of Aristotle, § 42, p. 77, 3d ed.,