Fahr. 'TpHere is nothing of more importance to the General of an Army, than to have about him perfons that are faithful, experienced in war> and prudent in Coim- fel, with whom he may conftantly advife, and confer both about his own Men, and the Enemy; as which is the moft numerous, which the beft arm'd, which the beft mounted, which the beft exercifed, which the moft patient of labour and diftrefs, and whether the Horfe or the Foot are to be relied upon moft.
The next thing to be confidered is the place where he is, whether it be jjsore advan- tageous for the Enemy than for him; which is moft eafily fupply'd with provifions; whe- ther it be beft to fight prefently, or protraft; and what he may gain or fuffer thereby: for many times the Soldiers difgufted at the tedioufnefs of the war, grow lazy and re- mifs, and coming at length to be weary, they either grow mutinous, or run away. But above all things, I would advife a General to inform himfelf of the nature and qualifica- tion of his adverfary the Enemies General, whether he be ralli, or wary, and whatcoun- fel he has about him. The next thing he is to confider, is, whether he can confide in his Auxiliaries or not: and befure never to bring his Army to a Battle, if he finds them un- der any apprehenfion, or with the leaft diftruft of the Vidory; for the greateft fign of mifcarriage, is defpair, and when they think it impoflible to prevail. In this cafe there- fore you are to avoid fighting, either by following the example of Fahius MaximuSi (vrho encamped his Army in places of fuch advantage, that Hanihal durft not attack him) or elfe if you fufpeft the Enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments, and that you fhall not be able to defend them, your beft way will be to remove, divide your Ar- myi and difpofe them in parties into feveral Towns, that the tedioufnefs of afiege, and length of time, which will be required, n^ay difcourage the Enemy.
Zamhi. Is there no other way of avoiding a Battle, but to divide your Troops, and to difpofe them into feveral Towns?
CHAP. VII.
Which way a Battle is to he avoided, though prejfed never fo earnefily ly the Enemy.
Fahv*'!^ I be not miftaken I have difcourfed to fome of you before, how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when prelfed by an Enemy who will fight upon a- ny terms; and that the beft way he can take, is to keep himfelf at fifty miles diftance, that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance. Fabhts Maximus did not refufe fighting with Hanihal, but would fight at his own time, and advantage; and Hanihal was too wife to attack him, where he was fure he could do no good: for had he believed he could have conquered him, Fahius would have been conftrained to have fought him, or fled. Philip King of Macedon, Father of Perfeuf, being at war with the Romans, pofted his Army upon an high Mountain, that he might not be compelled to fight; but the Romans aflaulred, and defeated him. Cingentorix General of the Gauls to avoid fighting with Cafar who had paffcd a river contrary to his expeftation, quitted the Country, and march'd away with his Army. The Venetians in our times, if they had had no mind to have fought the French King, they fliould not have ftaid till his Army had pafled the Adda, but have removed farther oft, as Cingentorix did before them; but they ftaid fo long that they had time neither to draw up bandfomely to fight, nor to malje their retreat; for the French were fo near before the Venetians diflodged, that the French fell upon them, and put them to the rout. So then by what I have faid, it is manifcft that a Battle cannot be avoided, when the Enemy prefies it upon any difadvantage; and let not any body tell me of Fabiusy for Hanihal refufed to fight in that cafe as muchashe.
CHAP.
Book IV.
The An of WAR.
485 CHAR VIII.
How Soldiers are to he encouraged to fight; and how they are to he cooled and ajflvaged when their courage is too high.
Fahr. jT many times happens that your Soldiers are impatient to be fighting, but if you do not find it convenient in refped of the number of your Army, the dif- advantage of the place, or fome other confidcration, you would do well to turn them from that inclination. It happens again that neceffity or occafion conftrains you to fight when your Soldiers are diffident or adverfe: in one cafe it is neceflary that you affright them, in the other that you excite them. In thefirft cafe, when remonftrances and ex- hortations will do no good, the bcft way is to fuffer fome of them to be cut oflF by the enemy, that thofe who have fought, and thofe who have not, may believe you another time. What Fabius Maximtis did by accident, may be done on purpofe, and by art. You know the Army of Fabius was very fierce to be fighting with Hnmbaly and his Mafter of the Horfe was of the fame mind with the Army: Fabius was of another opinion, and thought it better to protradt; and this diverfity of opinions occafioned the dividing of the Army: Fabius kept his divifion in his trenches, the Mafter of the Horfe went out, fought, was worfted, and had certainly been cut off, had not Fabim relieved him; by which example the Mafter of the Horfe, and the whole Army were convinced that theit wifeft way was to have obeyed the orders of Fabius. As to the other point of animating your Soldiers, and raifing their courages to a pitch, it is good to incenfe them by pof- feffing them of the contumacy and infolence of the enemy: by pretending intelligence among them, and that you have corrupted a confiderable party; by porting your Army fo near them, that they may fee one another, and skirmifh with them (lightly every day, (for things which are done daily, we eafily defpifc) by counterfeiting your felf angry, and in a folemn and grave oration reprehending and upbraiding their backwardnefs, and tel- ling them, that if they leave you, you will charge the enemy alone. But to make your Soldiers bold and couragious, you are by no means to permit any of them to fend any thing to their own houfes (or to depofit it any where elfe) till the war be done, that they may know that though in running home they may fave their lives, yet it muft be with the lofs of their Prize; the love of which renders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives.
Zanobi. You fay that Soldiers may be encouraged, and difpofed to fight, by a fpeech or oration: do you intend it fljould be delivered to the whole Army, or only to the Officers?
CHAP. IX.
A General ought to he skilful and eloquent to perfuade or dijfuade as he fees occajton* Fabr. TT is an eafy matter to perfuade or difluade anything with a fmall number of per* fons, becaufe if words will not do, you have force and authority to back them: but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the Multitude, when it is contrary to your own judgment, or the intereft of the publickj for there you can ufc nothing but words, which muft be heard and underftood by every body, if you would have every body convinced. For this reafon it is requifite an excellent General fhould be a good Orator, to inflame or affwage the Courage of his Soldirs as he has occafion; for unlefs they can tell how to fpeak to a whole Army, there is little good to be expefl:- cd; and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid afide. Look over the Life of Alexander the Great, and fee how often he was put to fpeak in publick to his Army; and had he not done it, he would never have been able to have conduced it (when laden with fo much riches and prey) thorow the deferts of Arabia^ and in In- dia, where it endured fo much mifery and diftrqfs; for there is fcarce a day but fomc- thing or other happens that caufes confufion and mine to an Army where the General is either ignorant or carelefs of fpeaking to them. The way of making fpeeches to them takes away their fear, quickens their courage, augments their confidence, difcovers their cheats, fecures their rewards, remonftrates their dangers, and the ways to avoid them. In Ihort, by thofe kind of Orations a General reprehends, entreats, threatens, en- 486 The Jrt of WA R. Book IV.
encourages, commends, reproaches, and doesevery thing that may eithercnhance, orde- prefs the paflionsof his men; wherefore that Prince or that Commonwealth that ftould defign to eftablifli a new Militia, and give it a reputation, is to accurtom his Soldiers to the harangues of their chief Officers, and to chufe fueh Officers as know how to ac- coft them.
CHAP. X.
Qertain confideratiom which encourage Soldiers^ 4nd make them ai virtuous as valiant.
Fuhr. 'TpHe worfhip which the ancients paid to their God^^ (though they were faife^ Rc- ligion, and the Oath which was taken before they were lifted in the Army, was in thofe days fufficient to keep their Soldiers to their duty; for upon every mifde- imeanor they were threatned not only with fuch punifhments as they were to exped froni their Officers, but fuch as could be inflifted (as they thought) by nothing but theit Gods J which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and fuperftiti- ons, made all enterprifes eafy to the Generals of thofe times, and would do fo ftill, ■were we as careful and obfervant of our Religion as they were^f theirs. S.'rmius knew how to make his advantage that way, pretending conference with a white Hart, which (as he gave out among his Soldiers) came from Heaven to afliire him of Vidory. Sylla to make his defigns the more credible, pretended to difcourfe with an Image that he had taken out of the Temple of Jpoffo, which direded him how he was to fleer. Others have pretended dreams and villons that have commanded them to fight: in the days of our Fathers, Charles the Seventh ot France, during his wars with the EngHJIj, pre- tended to be advifed by a maid that was fent from Heaven to give him inftruftioris, which maid was called the Pucelle Orleans, and gained him many a Vidory. There are other ways of making an Enemy contemptible; /Ige/ilaus the Spartan having taken feveral Perfians, ftrip'd them naked, and fhew'd them to his men, to the end that feeing the delicacy and tendernefs of their contexture, they mighthave lefs occafion to fear them. Some have by defign brought their men into extremity, that they might be ncccilitated to fight, as having taken from them all hopes of prefervation, but in Vidory; whith indeed is the fureftand befl way to make your Soldiers fight, and to infuTe courage into them, and then this courage and obflinacy is highly encreaftd by their confidciice in their General, and their love to their Country. Their love to their Country is natural,• their confidence iri their Captain is more from his experience and condud, than from any thing elfe. There may be many other obligations, but none fo Itrong as that which binds you either to conquer, or die.
THE The Art of WA R.
487 THE Fifth BOOK.
C H A P. I.
How the Romans marched in an Enemies Country^ and in what maH' tier they are to he imitated.
Fair, "m" Have fhewn you Iiow an Army is drawn up and marfiialled in order to a ■ Batde; I have told yoii how an Enemy is overcome, and feveral circumflan- ■ ces which occur therein. So that it is time now to inform you how an Ar- ^ _ my is to be ordered, which has not an Enemy in view, but is in continual probabihty of an aflault: This may happen when an Army marches in an enemies Coun- try, or at leaft a Country that is fufpeded. And firft you mull: underftand the Roman Armies had always forae Troops of Horfe which were fcouting abroad, in order to the difcovery of the Roads. After which followed the right Wing, and after them the Car- riages which belonged to that Squadron: Then followed a Legion, and after themtheic Carriages. Then another Legion and their Carriages; and after them the left Wing, and the remainder of the Cavalry after them. This in fliort was the manner in which the Romans marched moft: commonly; and if it happened in their march that their Ar- my was aiTauIted either in the front or the rear, they caufed all their Carriages to with- draw to the right wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and moft agreeable with the nature of the place; and then when they were cleared of their Baggage, and difin- cumbered, all of them unanimoufly made head again the Enemy. If they were aflaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that fide where they were like to be moft fafe, and then addrefs'd themfelves againft the Enemy.
This way being good and well govern'd, ought in my Judgment to be imitated, by fending your light Horfe to fcout about the Country; and having four Battalions of Foot, they are to follow one the other fuccefTively, each of them with its Carriages in the rear: And becaufe Carriages are of two forts, one belonging to particular Perfons, and others for the common ufe of the Camp, I would divide the publick Carriages in- to four parts, and affign one to every Battalion; I would likewife divide the Artillery, and the followers of the Camp into four parts, that each Battalion fhould have equal fharc in their Impediments and Carriages. But becaufe it happens many times that you march through a Country not only fufpeded, but fo openly your Enemy that you ex- peft every hour to be aflaulted; it will be neceflary, that to fecure your felf, you change the form of your march, and put your felf into fuch a pofture, as that neither the Pea- fants, nor the Enemies Army may be able to offend you, tho' they come upon you never fo fuddenly. In thefe cafes your Generals of old were wont to march in a fquare or- der, which they called a fquare; not that it was exadly of that figure, but becaufe ic was ordered fo, as it was able to fight in four places at once, and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight. I (hall follow this model for ordering ray two Battalions, which I have chofen to chat purpofe inftead of a compleat Army.
CHAP.
The An of WA R. Book V.
C H A p. II.
i^oiv an Army is to he Marjhalled to march in an Enemies Country.
Pair. 'npO march (therefore) fecurely in an Enemies Country, and to be able ro make good every part when furprized, and afJaulted by the Enemy, I am to reduce my Army into a fquarc, according to the model of the ancients. 1 would have a fquare whofe area, or vacuity within, fliould confift of 212 yards, in this manner j I would firft place my flanks diftant one from the other 212 yardsj I would have five Battalia's in each flank marching length Ways in files, and at three yards diftance the one Bat- talia from the other; fo that each Company taking up forty yards, all of them together (with the fpaces betwixt them) fhall take up 213 yards. Between the front and rhe rear of thefe two flanks, I would difpofe the other ten Companies, in each of them five; ordering them fo, that four of them ftiould be placed in the front of rhe right flank, and four in the rear of the left flank, leaving a fpace of four yards betwixt each Company; and of tlie two Companies that are left, I would have one placed at the head of tne Jeft flank, and the other in the rear of the right. And becaufe the /pace betwixt one flank and the other confifls of 212 yards, and thefe Battalia's drawn fideways in breadth rather than length, will take up (intervals and all) i 34 yards, there will remain a fpace of 78 yards betwixt the four Companies in the front of the right flank, and the hmz fpace will be poffefled by the four Companies in the rear; nor will there be any difie* rence but that one fpace will be behind towards the right wing, and the other before towards the lefr. In the fpace of 78 yards before, I woiJd put my ordinary Ve/ttes; in the fpace behind, my Valites extraordinary, which would not amount to a thoufand for each fpace. But to contrive it fo, that the great fpace within ftould confift of 212 yards fquare, it would be convenient that the five Companies which are placed in the front; and the five Companies in the rear, fhoukl take up none of that fp;ice which be- longs to the flanks; wherefore it is neceflary that the five Companies behind fhould with their front touch the rear of the flanks, and thofe five Companies in the Van with their rear fliould touch the front of the flanks; fo that there ftouid remain on each fide of the Army, a diftance fufilcientto receive another Company. And becaufe there arc four fpaces, I would take four Enfigns of the Pikes extraordinary, and place one in each of them, and the two Enfigns which would remain, I would place in the midft of the fpace of my whole Army in a fquare Battalion; at the head of which, the General of the Army fliould ftand with his Officers about him: But becaufe thefe Battalia's thus ordered, do march all of them oneway at once, but do not fo when they fight; when they are drawn up, thofe fides are to be put into a fighting pofture, which are not guard- ed by other Battalia's: And therefore it is to be confidered that the five Battalions m the front are defended on all fides, but juft in the front; fo that they are to be drawn up in great order with the Pikes before them; the five Companies behind arc guarded on all fides but behind, fo as they are likewife to be ordered with Pikes m their rear, as "we fhall fiiew in its place.
The five Companies in the right flank are guarded on every fide but only on the right: flank. The five in the left flank are the fame, only on the Jeft flank they arc open; and therefore in the managing your Army, you muft obferve to pl.ice your Pikes fo as they may turn about to that tiank which is naked and expofed; snd }our Corporals are to be in the front, and in the rear, that (being to fight) the whole Ai my, and every Mem- ber of it may be in th^ir proper places; and the manner of doing it, we have declared before, when we difcourfed of putting the Companies in order. I would divide niy Artillery, and plajce part of it without my right flank, and the other without my lefr. My light Horfe l would fend before to fcour the Country; my men at Arms I would difpofe part behind my right wing, and part behind my left, at about forty yards di- ftance from the Battalia's. And this general rule you are to obferve by all means in the drawing up your Army, that your Horle are to be placed either in the rear, or upon ihe flanks; for to place them before at the head of the Army, would occafion one of iheie two things, either they muft be placed at fuch diflance, that upon a rcpulfe they may have fpace and time enough to wheel off without failing foul upon the foot, or eifcdraw lip the foot with fuch intervals, that theHorfe may pal's thorough without purring them into dilorder. Cerrainly no body ougiit to look upon this as a thir<g of fmall impor- tance; for many have been ruined and routed by chcir own mt,n, for want of timely confidcration.
But 9 BookV. The Art of WAR. 489 Bat to return to our bufinefs; the Carriages and the people anarmed are placed ir» the void place of the Army, and fo difpofed, that there is paflage left for any to pafs from one part of the Army to another. Thefe Companies (without the Horfe and Artillery) do take up a fpace of 282 yards: And bccaufe this fquare confifts of two Battalions, it is convenient to let you know what part of them makes one Battalion, and what the other. Now becaufe Battalions are denominated from the number, and each of them (as you know^ confifts of ten Battalias (or Companies) and a Colonel, I would have the firft Battalion place the five firft Companies in the front, the other five in the left flank, and the Colonel in the left angle of the front. The fecond Batta- lion fljould place its five firil Battalias upon the right flank, and the other five in the rear, vvith the Colonel in the right corner to fecure the rear, and perform the office of him whom the Romans called by the name of TefgiduHor.
CHAP. III.
How to put an Army prefently into order^ and draw it up^ fo as if upon a march it fhould be attack d^ it may defend it felf on all fides, Fahr. T_J Aving put your Army into this pofture, you are to caufe it to march, and in it^ march obferve the fame order; for without doubt it is fafe enough againfl the tumults and incurfions of the Peafants, againft which, it is fufficient if the Colonel commands out parties of H<)rfe, or certain Companies of his Velite$ to repel them* Nor is there any danger that thofe kind of people will ever come to handy ftrokes with you; for men without order ar^: always fearful of men in order, and 'tis the practice of fuch people to alarm you with great (bouts and crys, but never to come nearj like little Curs that bark at a MaftifF, but keep far enough off. When Hanihal invaded Italy with fo much detriment to the Romansy he pafled thorough France; was frequently in- fefted by the Boors, but he valued them not. But it is not fufficient to have your Ar- my in this order, but if you intend to march, you muft have Pioneers, and fuch kind of people to plain the ways, make your intrenchments, &c. and thefe Pioneers are to be fecured by the Horfe vvhich you fend up and down the Country. In this order an Army may march ten miles a day, and be time enough at their Journeys end to fup, and take up their (garters by day-light; for many times an Army will march in one day twenty miles. But if it happens to be attacked by a formed Army, it cannod be fo fudden, but you will have time to put your felf into a pofture of defence, becaufe an orderly Army marches (lowly, and you will have leifure to draw your felf up in Battalia, and put your Army either into the fame Figures I have prefcribed, or into fuch another. If you be aflaulted in the Van, you have no more to do but' to bring your Artillery thither out of the flanks, and bringing your Horfe out of the rear intd the Van, to put them into the fame place and diftance as I have direded. The 1000 VeUtes which are before, may advance, divide themfelves into two parties of five hun- dred a piece, and enter into their own place betwixr the Horfe and the wings of the Army and then into their place are to fucceed the two Companies of Pikes extraordi- nary, which I placed before in the great vacuity of the Army. The 1000 Velites in the rear are to remove from their poft, and dividing themfelves, repair to the two flanks and fortify them; and by the fpace and chafm which rhey leave at their departure, the Car- riages may march our, and all thofe who are unarmed, and put themfelves behind i« the rear: The fpace in the middle being now void, and every man in his place, the five Battalias which I ordered behind the Army may advance, by the void fpace betwixt the 1^ 0 flanks, and march towards thofe in the Van. Three of them may march up within 40 yards (with equal intervals betwixt the one and the other) and the other two may remain behind at the fame diftance of forty yards. This is a form that may be ordered on a fiiddcn, and has fome refcmblance with the firft model of an Army which we re^ commended before; for though ir be ftreighter in the front, it is firmer in the flanks and by confeqnence ftronger. But becaufe the five Batralias in the rear have Pikes with them