If you defign to underftand the fecrets of your Enemy, and to know his order and condi- tion; you muft do as others have done, fend Embafladors to him, with wife and ex- perienced Soldiers in the Train, who may take their opportunity to view his Army, and confider hisftrength and weaknefsfo, as may give occafion to overcome him. Some have pretended to banifii fome of their Confidents, and by that means had information of his Enemies defig;ns. They are difcovered likewife fometimes by the taking of pri- foners: Marius whilft he was at War with the Cimhrinns, to feel the fidelity of the Gauls, (who at that time inhabited Lombardy, and [were in League with the Romans) fent to them two forts of Letters, one open, and the other fealed. In the Letters that were open, he writ that they (hould not open thofe which were fealed rill fuch a time as he dircded, before which time he fent for them again, and finding them open, he found he was to repofe no confidence there.
CHAP. XL Hoiv to rid ones felf of an Army that is prejfing upon ones heels.
Fair. CEvera! Generals having been invaded, and not marched their Army immediately ^ againft the Enemy, but made an inroad into his Country, and confirained him to return to defend it; and this way has many times fucceeded, beccaufe yours are flufii'd with vidory, and loaden with plunder, whilft the Enemy is terrified, and infteadof a hopeful vidory, liketogoby the lofs: fo that they who have ufed this kind of diverfion, have many times profpered. But this ispradicableonly to thofe whofe Country is ftronger than the Enemies Country; for if it be otherwife, that diverfion is pernicious. It a General beblock'd up in his Camp by the Enemy, he cannot do better than to propofean accord, or at leaft a truce with him for fome days, for that makes your Enemy the more negligent in every thing; of which negligence you may take your advantage, and give him the flip. By this way Silla difintangled himfelf twice, and cleared himielf of his Enemies; by the U u u fame 5o6 The Jn of WAR.
Book VI.
fame Artifice Ajdrubal extricated himfelf in Spain from the forces of Claudius Nero, who had block'd him up; it would likewife contribute much to the freeing a man from the power of the Enemy, to do fomething (befides what has been faid already) that may keep him in fufpence. And this is to be done two ways; by aflaulting him with part of your forces, that whilft he is imploy'd upon them, the reft may have time to pre- ferve themfelves. There is another way likewife, and that is by contriving fome new thing or other that may amufe or aftonifh the Enemy, and render him uncertairj which way he is to fteer: fo Hanibal krvcd Fabius Maximus when he had fbut him up on the mountains j for caufing little wifps of brufli-wood to be tied to the horns of fe- veral Oxen, he fet them on fire; and Fabius not underfianding the depth of the ftrata- gem, fuppofing it worfe than it was, kept upon his guard within his Camp, and fuffered him CO pafs.
CHAP. XII.
J^ow a wan may make a Prince's Favourite fufpe^eJy and divide his Forces* A General above all things is to endeavour to divide the Enemies Forces, cither by rendering his Confidents fufpicious; or by giving him occafion to feparate his Troops, and by confe<^uence weaken himfelf. The firft is be done by prefervmg the Eftares or Goods of thofe he has about him; as in time of War, to fpare ihcirHoufes, or Pofltflions; and returning their Children or Relations fafc, and withouc ranfom. You know when Hanibal burned all about Rome, he exempted what beionged to Fabius Max* imus. You know how Coriolanus coming with a ftrong Army to btiiegc Rome^ prefer- ved the PofTeflions of the Nobility. Metellus being at the head of an Army againil ^ugurtha, moved it to the Embalfadors which the Enemy fent to him, to aeliver up Jugurtha Prifoner, and writing Letters to them afterwards to the fame purpofc; ne con- tinued his Correfpondence till Jugurtha got the alarm, fufpeded his whole CounfeJ, and made them away after feveral manners.
When Hanibal was fled to Antmhus, the Roman EmbafTadorspradifed fo cunningly, that Antiochus grew jealous, and trufted him no farther.
As to the way of dividing the Enemy, there is not any more certain than to caufe an incurfion to be made upon his Country, that he may be confirained to leave the War, and go back to defend himfelf This was the way which Fabms ufed when he had an Army againfl him of French and Tufcans, Umbrtans and Sammtes. 'Titus Didius having a fmall Army in refpeft of the Enemy, expeding another Legion from Rome, which the Enemy was defirous to intercept, he gave out in his Army that the next day he would give the Enemy Battle, and ordered it fo, that certain Prifoners which he had in his Camp at that time, took their opportunity to efcape, and gave intelligence to the Ene- my that the Conful had given orders to fight; upon which news, that they. might noc leffen their Forces, they did not march againft the other Legion, and by that means it was preferved; fome there have been who, to divide or weaken the force of their Ene- my, have fuffered him to enter into their Country, and poffefs himfelf of feveral Towns, that by putting Garrifons into them, he may lellen his Army, and give them occafioti to attack and defeat him. Otiiers defigning againft one Province, liave pretended to invade another, and ufed fuch induftry in the bufinefs, that being entred unexpededly into that Country, they have conquered it before the Enemy had time to relieve it: for the Enemy being uncertain whether you will return back and invade the Country which you threatncd before, is conftrained to keep his Poft, and not to leave one place ro fecurc another, and it falls out many times that he is unable to defend either the one or the ptker.
CHAP.
The An of WA R.
507 CHAP. XIIL /» what manner [editions and mutinies in an Army are to he appeafed.
Fuhr. T>Efides what has been faid already, it is of great ufe and reputation to a Gene- ^ ral, if he knows how to compofe mutinies and diflentions in his Army. The beft way is by punifhing the Ringleaders j but then it is to be done fo neatly, that they may have their reward before they have news that it is intended. The way to do that is, if they be at any diftance, to fummon both nocent and innocent together, that they thinking chemfelves fafc, and not in danger of any punifhmenr, may not be refrafiory, and (land upon their guard, but put themfelvcs quietly into your hands to be punifhed. If they be prefent, and at hand, the General is to make himfelf as flrong as he can with thofe who are innocent, and others in whom he can confide, and then punifh as he thinks fit. When the quarrel is private, and among themfelves, the beft way is to expofe them to danger, and let them fight if they think good; for the fear of that does many times reconcile them. But above all things, there is nothing that keeps an Army io unanimous as the reputation of the General, which proceeds principally from his courage; for it is neither birth nor authority can do it without that.
The chief thing incumbent upon a General is to pay well, and puni/h wcllj for when- ever the Soldiers want pay, 'tis but reafonable that they fhould want punifliment; for you cannot in juflicc chailife any exorbitance in a Soldier, when you difappoint him of his pay; nor can he forbear fteah'ng, unlefs he be willing to ttarve: but if you pay, and do not punifh them, they are infolent again; and you will become defpicable in holding a Command that you are not able to manage; and by not maintaining your dignity and authority, of neceffity tumults and diforders muft follow, which will be the utter ruin of your Army.
How the Ancients relied much upon their auguries-, and other accidents.
F^z^**. 'T~*HE Generals of old were fubjeft to one moleftation, from which in our days we are exempt: and that is, how to pervert an ill augury, and interpret it to their advantage: for if an Arrow fell down in an Army: if the Sun or the Moon was eclipfed: if there happened an Earthquake, or it was the General's fortune to fall down, either as he got up on horfe-back, or difmountcd, it was look'd upon by the Soldiers as an ill omen, and was the occafion of fuch fear in them, that coming after- wards to a Battle, they were eafiiy beaten: and therefore the Generals in times paft, when fuch an accident happened, immediately gavefome reafon for it, and referred it to fome natural caufe, or eife wrefied and perverted it to their own profit and advantage.
Cafur paffing over into Africa^ tumbling down upon the ground as he came out of the Ship, grafping the grafs in his hands, he cryed out, T'eneo te 0 Africa; Africa you are mine^ for I hanj? you in tr-y hands. And fcveral others have given reafons (according to their o-vn intereft) for the Earthquakes and Eclipfes of the Moon: but in our days thele artifices cannot pafs, becaufe our men are not now fo fuperftitious, and our Re- ligion explodes fuch opinions as heathenifh and vain: but whenever we (liould be fo bhnd as to rcrJilimc thofe fuperflitions> we mull revive the cuftora of the An- cients.
U u u 1 CHAP.
The An of WA R.
Book VI.
CHAP. XV.
That we are not to figljt with an Enemy reduced to defpatr j and fever al arts that may he ufed to [ur prize them.
Fair. "II/Hen famine, natural neceflity, or human pafTion has bronght your Enemy to * ' fuch defpair, that impelled by that he marches Fiirioufiy ro h'ght with you, you muft keep within your Camp, and decline fighting as much as po/Iiblyyou can. The Lacedemonians afted in that manner againfl: the Mejfeni; Cafar did the fame againft A- frantus and Fetreius. When Fuhius was Conful againft the Ctmbrtansy he caufed his horfc to attack the Enemy for feveral days together j and obferving in what numbers they came forth to engage them, he placed an ambufh one day behind their Camp, cau- fed them again to be ad'auked; and the Cimbrinns ifluing forth in their old numbers to encounter them, Fuhius fell in the mean time upon their Camp^ entred it, and fack'd it. Some Generals have made great advantage (v/hen they lie near the Entmics Army) to fend out parties with the Enemies Colours to plunder their own Country; for the Enemy fuppofing them fupplies fent to relieve them, have ifi'ued forth to meet them, and aflift them to {)lunder; whereby they have been put todiforder, and given opportu- nity to the adverfary to overthrow them. Alexander of Epirus did the fame againft the Sclavonians, and Leptena the Syracujan againft the Carthaginians, and both with fuccefs: many have been too hard for their Enemies, by giving them opportunity of eating and drinking too much, making a fhew of being afraid, and leaving their Camp full of wine and provifionsj with which the Enemy having gorg'd himfelf without mtafure, the o- thers have fallen upon them with advantage, and put them to the fword. Tcmyns pro- vided fuch an entertainment for Cyrus; and 'Tiberius Gracchus regal'd the Spaniards in the fame manner: others have poyfoned their meat and their drink, to ruin the Enemy that waythc more eafily. I faid before, that I did not find it in anyHiftory that the Romans did ever in the night place any Centinels without their Camp, fuppoling they omitted it to prevent the mifchiefs that might enfoe; for it has been often feen that the Centinels which are placed abroad in the day time to hear and defcry the Enemy, have been the dcftrudiotl of thofe who have fent them; for being often times furprized by the Ene- my, they have been forced to give the fignal with which they were to call their own men, and they coming immediately according to the lign, have been all killed, or ta- ken prifoners.
To over-reach and circumvent an Enemy, it is good fometimes to vary your cuftom, that the Enemy depending upon it, may be disappointed and ruined. Thus it happen- ed with a General, who being accuftomed to give the fignal of the approach of the E- nemy in the night by fire, and in the day time by fmoke, commanded that they fhould make fmoke and fire together without intermiflion, and that when the Enemy came they fhould put them both out; the Enemy fuppofing he was not perceived, (becaufe he faw no fignal given) marched on in diforder, and gave -his Adverfary the vidory.
Memnon the Rhodian, defiring to draw his Enemy out of his ftrong hold, fent one by the way of a fugitive into their Army, with news that Memnon s Army was in a mutiny, and that the greateft part of them were gone from him; and to confirm it the more, he caufed diforders and tumults to be pretended in his Camp; whereupon the Enemy taking encouragement, advanced out of his hold to attack Afm«o«, but was cutoff him- felf- Befides the things above-mentioned, great care is to be had nevertobringyour Enemy to defpair. Cafar was very cautious of this in his War with the Germans, and opened a way for them, when he faw that not being able to fly, they muft of neccfUty fight, and that more couragioufly than otherwife; wherefore he chofe rather the trouble of purfuiiig them when they fled, than the danger of fighting them when they were for- ced to defend themfelves. LucuDus obferving a parry of his horfe going over to the E- nemy, caufed a Charge to be founded immediately, and commanded other parties lo follow them; whereupon the Enemy believing Lucullns intended to fight, lent out a party to charge thofe Macedonians who were running away,• and they did it fo efle- ctually, that the Macedonians were glad to ffand upon rhcir guard; by which means, of .fugitives intended, they became good Subjcds in fpijjhr of their teeths.
CHAP.
Book VI. The Art of IV A R, CHAP. XVI.
Hovo d fufpttled Town or Country is to he fecured^ and how the Peoples hearts are to he gained.
Pabr. TT is a great thing in a General to know how to fecute a Town that you fuf- ped, cither after a Vidory or before; as feveral ancient examples do demon- ftrare. Pompey, being jealous of the Catimnfes^ beg'd of them that they would give en- tertainment to fome his fick men j and under the difguife of fick, fending ftout and valiant men, they fiirprizcd the Town, and kept it for Pompey. Publius Valerhis was diffident of the Epiduuni, and caufed a general indulgence to be given in one of the Churches without the Town; the people thronging thither for pardon, he fiiut the Gates upon them, and received none back again but fuch as he could truft. Alexander the Great being to march into Afin, and by the way fecure himfelf of Thrace^ carried along with him all the principal perfons of that Province, giving therti commands in his Army, and leaving the people to be governed by ihofe of their own condition ^ by which means he fatisfy'd all parties; the Nobility by paying them, and the Populace, by leaving no Governor that would opprefs them. But among all the ways wherewith the the people are to be cajoled, nothing goesfo far as examples of chaftity and juflice, as that or Scip:o in Spaitiy when he returned a beautiful young Lady to her Parents and Husband untouched; a pafTage that contributed more than his Arms to the fubduing of that Country. Cafar only for paying for the wodd which he caufed to be cut down to make Stoccadoes about his Camp in France, got fuch a name for his juftice, that it facilitated the Couquell of that Province. I know not now that there remains any thing to fay further about thcfe accidents; or that there is any thing which we have not al- ready examined. If theie be, it is the way of taking and defending of CTowns, which I am willing to fhew, were 1 fure I fliould not be tedious.
Battifta. Your civility is fo great, that it makes us purfue our defires without the leafl fear of prefumption; for you have offered us that frankiy^ which We fhould have been alharaed to have requefted. \Vc do afl'ure you therefore, you cannot do us a greater favour than to finifh this Difcourfe; but before you proceed, let me intreat you to re- folvc me, whether it be better to continue a War all Winter long (as they do now a* days) or carry it on only in the Summer, and in the Winter go to their Quarters.
CHAP. XVIL War is not to he continued in the Winter.
Fahr. /^Bferve, Gentlemen, had it not been for the prudence of Batti/lat a very conn- derable part of our Difcourfe had been omitted: I tell you again that the An- cients did every thnig with more prudence and difcretion than v/e, who, if we be defe- ftive in any thing, are much more in matters of War.
Nothing is more imprudent and dangerous for a General, than to begin a War in the "Winter; and he who is the aggreiibr is more liable to raifcarry, than he that is invaded. The reafon is this, all the induftry employed in Military Difcipline, confifts in prepa- ring your men, and putting them into order for Battle. That is ir at which a General is principally to aim, becaufe a Battle does commonly decide the bufinefs, whether it be loft or won. He therefore who knows beil how to put his Army in order, and he who knows beft how to prepare and equip them, has doubtlefs the advantage, and is in moft hopes to overcome. On the other fide, nothing is more inconfiftent with good order than fteep places, or cold rainy weather; for fteep places will not fuffer you to open or extend your ranks according to difcipline; cold and wet weather will not per- mit you to keep your men together, nor prefent them in clofe order before th^ Enemy j but conftrains you of neceffity to lodge them up and down afunder, without order, ac the mercy of all the Caftles, and Towns, and Villages that receive you; fo that all the pains you have taken to difcipline your Army, is (for that time) utterly ufelefs.
Do nor admire, if now adays wemake War in the Winter, for our Armies being with- out difcipline, it is no: to be imagined what inconveniences they fuffer by not being quar- tered 510 The Jrt of IT JR.
Book vn.
tercd together; for it troubles them not, that they cannot keep chofe orders, and ob- ferve that difcipline which they never had. Yet it ought feriouHy to be confidered what prejudice has followed upon encampments in the Winter: and it ought likewifeto be remembred that the French in the year 1503. were broken and ruined near Gariglmnoj ra- ther by the extremity of the weather, than the magnanimity of th^ Spaniard}, For as I told you before, the Invader is under greateft incommodity, as being more expofed to the weather in an Enemies Country, than at home: for to keep his men together, he is neccffitated to endure the cold and the rain; or to avoid it, to divide iu's men, which is mightily to expofe them. But he who is upon the defenfive part can choofehis place and his way, attended with frefii men, which he can join in a moment, and fall upon fome party of the Enemies with fuch fury, as they will not be able to endure the fhock- It was the weather therefore which difordered the French; and 'tis the weather that wiil always ruin any man that begins War in Winter, if his adverfary have any foare cfdif- cretion. He therefore who would have his force, his order, his difcipline, and his courage of no ufe or advantage to him, let him keep the Field, and carry on his War in the Winter: For tht Remans (who defired all thofe things in which they im- ployed their induftry and diligence fhould be ufeful to them) avoided the incommodities of Winter, as much as the afperities of the Alps, the difficulty of places, and whate- ver elfe might hinder them from /hewing their dexterity and courage. And thus much as to vour demand; we will difcourfe now of taking and deitntiing of Towns, and of their Natural and Artificial flrength.
I I THE Seventh CHAP. I.
How Toms or Caflles are to he fortified.
Valr, Y OU muft underftand that Towns and Caflles are ftrong two way<-, by Nature or by Arr. They are ftrong by Nature, which are encom- paflcd by Rivers or Fens, (as Mantua and Ferrara,) or feated upon fome Rock, or craggy Mountain (as Monaco, and Sanleo); for other places feated upon Mountains, if not difficult of accefs, are in our days rather weaker than otherwife, in refped of our Artillery and Mines; and therefore at prtfent be- ing to build a City, or ered a Fort that may be ftrong, we choofe to do it in a Plain, and fortify it artificially with Ramparts and liiflions,• and our firft care is to make the Walls crooked and retort, with feveral Vaults and places of receipt, t'^at if the Enemy attempts to api roach, he may beoppofed and repulfcd as well in the 6ankas the front: If your Walls be made too high, they are too obnoxious to the Cannon; if they be too low, they are eafily fcaled; if you make a Ditch bcloie the Wall, to make the Scalado more difficult, the Enemy %\\s it up (which with a grtat Army is no hard matter) and makes himfelf Mafter immediately. My opinion therefore is this, (but with lubmiffion to better judgments) that to provide againlt boch inconveniences, the beft way will be to make your Wall high, and a Ditch on the infide rather than with- out; and this is the ftrongeft way that you can build, bccaufc it keeps you both from their Artillery and affaults, and gives the Enemy no capacity of filling up the Ditch. Your Wall then is to be of the beft height you can contrive -. three yards thick at she Icaft to refift their Batteries; it is to have Towers and Bulwarks at the diftancc of e- vcry 200 yards. The Ditch within is to be thirty yards broad at leaft, and twelve in depth J and all the earth which ii taken out of the JDitch is to be thrown towards the Town, Book VII. The Art of fV A R. 511 Town, againft a Wall which is to be brought for that purpose from the botiom of rlie Ditch, and carried up a man's height above the ground, which-will make the D;rch more deep and fecure. Towards the bottom of the Ditch every two hundred yards, I would have a Cafement from whence the Artillery may fcour, and play upon any Body that lhall defcend. The great Guns which are ufed for the defence of a Town, are to be planted behind the Wall on the infide of the Ditch; for to defend the firfl wall. Falcons and fuch fmall Pieces are eafier managed, and do as good Execution. If the Enemy comes to fcale you, the height of the firft Wall defends you eafily: If he comes with his Artillery, he muft batter down the firfl: Wall, and when he has done that, it being natural in all Batteries for the Wall and Rubbifli to fall outward, there being no Ditch without to fwallow and receive it, the ruins of the Wall will encreafe the Depth of the Ditch, in fuch manner as that you cannot get forward, being obftruded by the Ruins, hindred by the Ditch, and interrupted by the Enemies great Guns within the Walls that do great (laughter upon you. Th6 only remedy in this cafe is to fill up the Ditch, which is very hard in refpeft of its dimenfions, and the danger in coming to it, the Wall being crooked, and vaulted, and full of Angles, p.mong which there is no coming without manifeft hazard, for the reafons abovefaid; and to think to march with Fag- gots over the ruins, and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing j fo that I conclude a City fo fortify 'd is not to be taken.
Battifla. If one fhould make a Ditch without, befide that within the Wall, would not your Town be the ftronger r Fabr. Yes, without doubt; but my meaning is, if one Ditch only be to be made, it is better within than without.
Batti/la. Would you have Water in your Ditch, or would you rather have it dry?
Fabr. Opinions are divided in that point; for Ditches with water are more fecure a- gainft Mines, and Ditches without are harder to be filled up: But upon confideration of the whole, I would have them without water, becaufe they are more fecure; for it has beenfeen, that the freezing of the Ditch in the Winter has been the taking of many a Town, as it happened at Mimndola when Pope JuUus befieged it: And to prevent Mines, I would carry my Ditch fo low, that whoever would think to work under it> Ihould cottfie to the Water. Caflles I would build ^as to my Ditches and Walls) in the fame manner, that they might have as much trouble who ftorraed them. But let me give one caution to any man who defends a City, and it is this, that he makes no re- doubts without, at any diftance from the Wall, and another to him that builds and for- tifies a Caftle, and that is, that he makes no works within for retreats in cafe the firfl: Wall be taken.