There is another very ufeful and ingenious way, and that is, by writing an ordinary Letter about your private affairs, and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be difcovered but by dippirtg it in- to other water, or by holding it to the fire; and by fo doing the Letters will be vifible. And this trick has beer^^^^y fubrilly pradifed in our times, in which a certain perfon having adcfire to fignifie a fecret to fome of his friends, and not daring to truft it to a mcflenger, he fent out Letters of Excommunication written very formally, but ipterlined as abovefaid, and caufed them to be fixed to the doors of the Churches, which being known to his friends by fome private marks, they underftood the whole bufinefs: and this is a very good way, for he who carries it may be deceived, and he that writes ic is in no great danger.
There are a thoufand other ways invented according to every man's fancy and wir. But it is much eafier to write to thofe who are block'd up in a Town, than for thofe who are befieged to write to their friends abroad, becaufe thcfe Letters cannot be con- veyed but by ibmebody who muft pretend to run away out of the Town, which is a hard and a dangerous thing, if the Enemy be any thing careful; but 'tis otherwife with Letters to be fent into the Town, for a man has a thoufand occafions to come into a Leaguer, where he may watch his opportunity, and flip into the Town.
C H A P. X* How to repair a hreachy and the way to defend it.
Fair. T)UT let us come now to the prefent way of beleaguering of Towns: I fay, that ^ if you be aflaulted in a Town that is not fortified with ditches on the infide, (as I have mentioned before) that your Enemy may not enter at the breaches which the Ar- tillery make, (for againft other breaches there is no remedy) it is necefiary whilfi: the Ar- tillery is playing, to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at leaft thirty yards wide, and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the Town, that it may make a good Rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch; and this work is to be carried on with fuch diligence, that when the wall falls, the ditch may be at leaft five or fix yards deep; and whilft they are at work to make this ditch, it is neceffary that they be fe- cured with two Cafemars, that may flank the Enemy in cafe he fhould endeavour to difturb them; and if the wall be fo flrong as to give you time to make your ditch and your Cafemats, that part \vW\cVi is battered will be the ftrongcft part about the Town; for that Rampart will be of the fame form and model which we propofed for Che ditch within. But where the v/all is fo weak as to allow you no time, then you muft fhew your courage, a.nd prefent yourftif br:ive!y arthe breach, your Soldiers well afmed, and with as muchchearfulnefsas ispofllhle, This way ofthrowing up new works was obferved by the Pifanswhen you beficgedi-S and they might do it well enough; for their walls were ftrong, which gave them time, and the earth good and proper for Ramparts; whereas had they wanted either of thofe convenience.^;, they muft of neccflicv have been loth It is wifdom therefore to make riiefc ditches round about the Town before there be any neceffity, as we faid before; for in that cafe you may expert the Enemy without fear.
CHAP, $i8 The An of WA R.
Book VII.
CHAP. xr.
. Of Mines.
Fair. 'T^HE ancients took feveral Towns by mining under ground, and that two ways, either by carrying their mines under ground into the Town, and enrring thereby, (as the Romans did when they took the City of Vejentum) or by undermining only the walls, and fo tumbling them down. At prefent this latter way is more ufed than the other, and renders thofe Towns which ftand high weaker than the reft, be- caufe more fubjed to bemin'd; and then adding but a good quantity of powder, which*- takes fire in an inftant, you do not only ruin the wall, but you open the very moun- tain, and cleave the works into pieces. The way^to prevent this, is to fortify in flat Country, and make the ditch which encompailes your Town fo deep, thnt the ene-' my may not dig under it without coming to the water, which is the beft defence a-' gainft mines. But if you be to defend a Town upon an eminence, your beft way will^ be to make feveral deep holes in the wall, that may give vent to the powder when the'' enemy fets it on fire.
There is another way likewife to prevent them, and that is, by countermining, if you find where the enemy mines; but 'tis a hard matter to difcover them, efpecial[y if you be befieged by a cautious enemy.
Cood Guards are always to he kept, and your Soldiers not to le divided.
Fair. XJE who is befieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not furpriz'd in time of repofe ^ as after a ftorm, after the Guards are fet, (which is either at break of day, or at the fhutting in of the evening^ or efpecially whilft you are ac dinner, in which time many Towns have been taken, and many fallies have been made- to the deftruftion of the befiegers. Wherefore it is necefiary to be upon the Guard in' all quarters, and your men generally arm'd: and here I cannot omit to tell you, that no- thing makes a Town or Camp harder to be defended, than the dividing of your forces; for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleafes with all his Power at once, you muft be ready on all fides; and having parted your Forces, you will be forced to defend your felf with a part, and to keep the fame guards with the remainder when- ever the enemy allails you, as you Ihould have done when your whole Garrifon was together J which is a great difadvantage, for he can attack you with his whole power, when you have but a part of yours to defend yourfelf.
CHAP. XIII.
CHAP. XIII.
That when ones fees himfelf hlockd up on every fide, it is good to expofe ones felf noio and then, and of the advantages which have enfued.
Fair. TF he who is befieged be beaten confiderately, he is certainly loft; but the Be- ficgcr can only be repulfed: for which rCalon many who have been befieged (either in Camp or Town,) though they have been inferior in number, have nevcrthe- Jefs fallied with their whole force at a time, and been too hard for the enemy. Thus Marcelliis did at Nola; thus Cajar did in Frame, when his Camp was cncompalled with a vail number of Gauls, for finding he was not able to defend it, becaufc he muft di- vide his men into parties, and diftribute thtm round, and finding alfo that itanding within his lloccadocs he could not do fo much execution upon the enemy as he dcfired, he opened his Camp on one fide, and iffuin^ out of it with his whole force, charged the enemy with fuch fury and coutage, that he put them to the rout. Bcfidcs, the ob- ftinacy and refolution of tlie befieged does many times aftonift and terrify the enemy. PompeyhQW^ encamped againfl Cajart and Cafars Army in great diflrels for provifioris.
» Book VII. The Art of WAR. 519 Pornpey had prefenred him a piece oF Caf.r/s bread which was made oi herbs, and look'd upon as a very Ihange thing; Pompey hsivin^ viewed ir, commanded that ic fhould not be fhcv.'n in liis Army, left it fliotild difcourage them to confider the obfti- nacy of their Enemy. Nothing was more honourable to the Romans in their War with Hantbal than their conftancy, becaufe in the gieateft of tlieic diftrefs, and in the worft of their fortune, they never demanded peace, nor difcovcr'd any token of fear: on the contrary, when Hnmi-al was under their Walls, tliey fold the ground in which he was encamped, at an higher race than it would have been fold at another time: and they were lo true and firm in their enterprizes, tiiat they would not draw off from Capuazo defend their own City, though tiiey had an Army before that, when Hcinibal appeared before Rome.
1 am fenfible I have told you feveral things that you underflood, and perhaps confi- dered already; yet I have done it (as I faid before) by that means to give you a bet- ter compreheiiiion of rhe quality of this Army; and to fatisfy fuch (if there be any fuch herej as have no: had the opportunity to underftaud it fo well as you, I fuppofe now there remains nothing but that 1 give you fome general rules which are very obvious and common.
C H 7^ P. XV.
General Rules to he ohferved in Military Difcipline.
pair. 'TpHat which is beneficial to you, is prejudicial to your Enemy ^ atld that wliieh is beneficial to him, is prejudicial to you.
He who in War is moll vigilant to obferve the defigns and enterprizes of the Ene- my, and takes mofl pains in exercifing and difciplining his Army, fhall expofe himfelf to lefs danger, and have greater" probability of vidory.
Never bring your men to fight till you have fome jufl confidence in their courage, till you have feen them well arm'd, and well ordered j and never let them engage but when you find them chearful, and hopeful of fuccefs.
It is better to conquer an Enemy by hunger than fighting, in which lafl viftory, for- tune has more fhare than vertue or courage.
No refolution is fo likely to fucceed, as that which is concealed from the Enemy till it comes to be executed.
Nothing is of more importance in the whole Art of War, than to know how to cake advantage when it is offered.
Nature produces few perfons ftrong; but induftry and exercife makes many.
Order and difcipline is more available in War, than valour or force.
When any come over to your fervice from the Enemy, they are of great advantage to you, provided they be faithful; for it is more diminution to the Enemies flrength to have Soldiers revolt> than to have fo many flain, though the name of a fugitive is fuf- picious to new triends. and abominable to old.
It is better in the drawing up your Battalions for a Battle, to draw them- up witU referves, and place fuch behind the front as may fupply it upon occafion, than to en- large your front, and make as it were but one rank of your whole Army.
He who underffands his own Forces and the Enemies too, can hardly mifcarry.
The courage of Soldiers is better than their number.
The fituation of the place is fometimes more effcdual than the courage of yout men.
New and unexpected things are an aftonifliment to fome Armies.
Your Soldiers defpife things that are common, and are weary of any thing that is tedious; 1 would advife therefore that by pickeeiing and little skirmifhes you acquaint your men with your Enemy before you bring them to Battle, He who purines an Enemy that is difordered, in diforder himfelf, fhall lc>fe the vi«' ftory he had gained, and perhaps give it to the Enemy.
He who makes not provifion of Victuals, will be beaten without a blow.
He who relies more upon his Horfc than his Foot, or his Foot than his Horfc, raufl accommodate himfelf to the place.
If you would know at any time whether you have any fpies in your Army, you have* no more to do but to command every man to his Tent.
D The Art of WA R. Book VII.
If you find the Enemy has any knowledge of your defigns, you mufl: change them. What you are to do, you may advife with many i what you are refolded to do, com- tnunicate with few.
When Soldiers are in their quarters, they are to be kept in order by fear and by punifli- ment; when in the field, with hopes and reward.
A good General never comes to a Battle but when ncceflity requires, or fome great advantage invites him.
You muft endeavour that your Enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your Army when you come to fight; and let your figure be what it will, be fure your firft Companies be fo ordered as that they may fall back into the fecond, and both in- to the third.
When you are engaged, never employ any of your Battalias about any thing but that to which you deputed them at firUj if you would avoid putting things into dif- order.
Sudden accidents are noteafily prevented; butthofe which are forefeen, are prevented without diffiaulty.
Men, Arms, Money and Provifions are the nerves of War; but the firfl two are raoft neceflary, becaufe Men and Arms will find Money and Victuals; but Money and Viduals can never find Men.
The rich Man unarm'd, is but a prey to the Soldier.
Ufe your Soldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or cloths.
This is as much as I can think fit to fpeab of in general, though I am fenfible other things would have fallen in well enough with my Difcouvfe As how and in what manner the ancients ordered their Squadrons; how they were habited, and how they exercifed them in feveral other things; and I could have added fcvcral particulars, which 1 have not thought neceflary at this rime, becaule you may know it your felf, and likcwife becaufe it was not my intention at firft to fhew you exadly how the ancienc Militia was conftituted, but how it was to be done in our times.
For this reafon I have thought itunneceflary to fpeakany farther of thofe kind of an* tiquities, than what might be ferviceable to this introdudion. 1 know likewife I might have inlarg'd my felf more about the exer:ifing of Horfe; and come afterwards to dif- courfe of Sea-fights, for to diftinguifli Militia's, their Armies at Sea, and Armies at Land; Armies of Foot, and Armies of Horfe; but of Sea difcipline I fhall not prefume to fay any thing, becaufe I know nothing of it: Ifhall leave that to be treated of by Ge- tiouefes or VeuetianSy who by their experience in that kind, have done very great things formerly. Nor (hall I fpeak any farther of Horfe than what I have faid before, becaufe they are not fo corrupt and diforderly. For if your Foot (which is the ftrength of aa Army) are well difciplin'd, and in good order, your Cavalry muft be good of neceffity.
CHAP. XVL The my to have many Horfe in your Country.
fahr, T Would however remember him who is defirous to fettle and eftablifh a good Militia in his Country, that to furnifli it handforaely with Horfe, he Ijbould do two things; one is, that he ftiould diftribute a certain number of good Stallions up and down, that the Countrymen may breed, and drive a Trade witirpoles and Colts, as you do in this Country with Calves and young Mules. The other is, that there might not want Chapmen for the Colts, 1 would oblige every man that keeps a Mule, to keep an Horfe; and he that would keep but one thing tor his Saddle, fhould be en- joyned to have it an Horfe; befides, 1 would conftrain every man that wore Cloth- cloths, to keep a Horfe in his Stable. g This order was taken not long' fince by a Prince of our times, and fuccceded fo well, that in a fliort time he had a moft excellent Cavalry. As to other things relating to Hor- fes, I refer you to what has been faid this day, and what has been pradifcd of old.
CHAP; / Book VII. The An of WAR. 521 CHAP. XVI.
A General is to hiv^^t of himfelf and not follow altdgether the Pra^ices of his Predeceffors.
Fair. TyViT perhaps you would defire to know what part and qualifications there ^ ought to be in a General; and I will ("atisfy you in fliort, for I cannot make choice of a properer man, than he whounderftands all thofe things which I have recom- mended this day; and yet that would not be fufficient, unlefs he had abilities to invent fomething of his own; for never any man was Mafter of a Trade, who had no inven- tion of his own; and if invention be honourable in any thing, it is moft certainly in this: This is manifeft in all Authors, who have conftantly applauded all forts of in- ventions, how flight and inconfiderable foever, as appears by the great Charader they beftowed on Alexander the Great, for his wifdom in appointing a Cap to be put upon the top of a Launce as a fignal for the diflodging of his Army, rather than to do it by found of Trumpet as formerly, becaufe it imported him much that they fhould re- move privately. He was commended likewife for ordering his Soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee, as an expedient that v/ould make them receive the charge with the more ftrength and firmnefs; which invention got him the vidory, and occafioned him fo much honour, that all Statues erefled afterwards in his honour, were erefted in that pofture. But becaule it is time to conclude our difcourfe, I will leave where I began, to avoid the reproach which is incident to fuch perfons as when once draggled know not how to return.
CHAP. XVII. The Author returns, and with a Jhort Difcourfe concludes his Book.
Fair. TF you remember (Ccjimo) you told me, that you could not imagine the reafoil why in one place I ihould commend Antiquity, and blame thofe which would not imitate it in great things; and yet I have not imitated it my felf in my martial Affairs, in which I have taken much pains, and fpenc a great deal of my time.
To which I anfwer,' That men who are to execute any thing, are firft to learn which way it is to be done, that they may be afterwards the more able, when it comes to 6- peration. Now whether or no I underff and how to eftablifli a Militia according to the method of the Ancients, I leave you to judge, who have heard me difcourfe of it fo long; from whence you may imagine how much time has been fpent in thofe thoughts by me, what great defire I have had to bring them to effed, and whether I have alrea- dy, or ever may have occafion to do it. But to fatisfy you farther, and juffify myfelf^ I will give you the reafohs, and thereby obferve my promife in fome meafure, by fliew- ing you the conveniencies and inconvenienciesin fuch imitations. I fay th)6n, that no a- dion this day among men is more eafily executed according to the method of the An- cients, than military d;rcip]inej but it muff be among fuch Princes as are able to bring together 15 or 20000 of their own Subjeds, againit an Enemy. On the other fide, there is nothing more difficult, to fuch Princes as have not that convenience: And that you may comprehend ir the, better, you mufl underfland, that Generals are commended upon two feveral accounts; fome are famous for that with an Army ordered and prepared f^y their own natural difcipiine, they have performed great things j fo it was syirh mofl of the Roman Citizens, and others who had the command of Armies; whofe only task was to keep their Soldiers good, and condud them fecurely. Others have been not only to contend with and conquer the Enemy, but they were firfl to inftrud and exercife their Army; and thefe doubtlefs were wdrthy of more pt'aife than they who with their old and well experienced Soldiers performed fuch Exploits; Of thi^ fort was Pelopidas, Epamimndas, Ttellus, Hojlilius, Philip of Macedon, Cyrus King of Per- fa, and Gracchus the Roman: All thofe were forc'd to model and difcipiine their Ar- mies before they ventured them to fight; and all thefe were able to do it in refpcd of their own experience, and that they had Other Perfons which were able to exercife their Soldiers as they defired. Nor would it ever have been pQfTiblc that any 6f thofe Generals, how good and excellent foever, could ever have done any great thing in another* ProviriCe full of corrupt men, unlefs it had been accuf^omed to fome honeft Obedience. It Y y y is 522 The Art of IV A R. Book VII.
is not fufEcient then in Imly to underftand how to manage a Veteran Army; but you muft firft know how to make and prepare ir, and then how to govern and condudt it. Again, thofe who do this, muft be fuch Princes as have great revenues, and many Sub- jeds, in which number I am not to be reckoned, as one who never commanded, nor never can, unlefs it be foreign Forces under fome other Prince; inro which foreigners, whether it be poflible or not to infufe any of thefs things of which I have difcoiirfed, I leave to you to judge. How could I perfwade a Soldier of our days to carry more Arms than he was accuftomed, and befides his Arms, two or three days Provifion at his back, and a Spade or Pickaxe at his girdle? How could I prevail with him ro work or dig all day; to ftand all day to his Arms in counterfeit exercifes, that I m ight rely the more confident* ly upon him when he came to it in good earneft? How could i work upon him to abftain from play, lafcivioufnefs, blafphemy, and infolence, which is their pradicc every day? How long would it be before I could reduce them into fuch order, fuch dif- cipline, and awe, that if an Apple-tree was never fo full, and flood in the middle of their Camp, none of them fhould venture to touch it? As is many times read of the' . Roman Armies. What is itthati can promife them, that may make them cither fear me, or love me, when the War being ended, I fiiall have no farther ro do with them? How can I make them fenfible of fhamc, who have been born and bred without any? How Ihould they pay me a refped whom they do not know? By what God, by what Saint ihall I conjure them? By the Gods which they adore, or by the Gods which they blafpheme? Which it is they adore I cannot tell, but am fure they blafpheme them all. How can I exped they fhould keep their promife, which they do hourly defpife? Hovir- can they who pay no honour to God, exprefs any to men? What good difcipline then' are we like to imprint upon fo depraved a Mafs? If you objcft that the Swiz.zers and Spaniards are good Soldiers, I confcfs them much better than the Italians; but if you confider what I have faid, and the manner of proceeding of both thofe Nations, you will find them come fiiort in many things of the perfeftion of the Ancients. The Siotz,- z,ers are become good Soldiers by natural praftice of thofe things which I have recom- mended; and the Spaniards by neccflity; for tiicir Wars lying in Foreign Provinces, where they are conftrained to overcome or die, (becaufe they can never hope to get ofF by flying) are grown good, and yet their goodnefs is in many things defedive; for their excellence is only to ftand and receive the Enemy at pufh of Pike, and the Swords point,- befides, there is not any man among them fit to inftrud another in vyhat is jicr ceflary, much lefs if he be not of their own Country. But to return to our Italians, whd having wanted wife Princes, have not been capable of good orders; and having wanted chat necefllty which was incumbent upon the they have not taken it upofthemfelves, fo that now they are the fcorn and contempt of the world, not for any fault in the people, but in their Princes, who thertby have been chaftifed for their ignorance, and j'uftly punifhed forlofing their Territories fo ignominioufly, without any confider- able refinance. Will you fee that what I fay is true? Confider what Wars we have had in Italy fince the Expedition of Charles 8th, to this day: and although other Wars ren- dered Soldiers formidable and martial; thefe Wars, by how much they were more great, and more furious, by fo much both OfEcers and Soldiers became more diflblute and cowardly: And this muft neceffarily proceed from ill orders, which are not much better at this day; and the mifcry is, there was nor is none able to reform them: Do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to ttie Arms of the Italians^ but by this way that I have propofed, and by means of fuch Princes as have great Terri- tories there j for this form may be imprinted in men that are fimple, and plain, and one's own Subjeds, much fooner, thun in fuch as are lewd, and difordcrly, I and ftrangers. A good Sculptor never. expefts to make a good Statue out of i a piece of Marble that is mangled, and has been ill handled; but he will do well enough if it has never been touched. Our Princes in Iia/y, before they were fenfible of their Wars with the Northern Nations, believed it was enough for a Prince to know how to write a civil anfwer; how to dircd a Letter with all its Pundilio's; how to /he\fr himfelf witty and quick in his repartees; how to juggle, and difiemble; how to drefs him- [ fcif handfomly, and difpofe of his Jewels to the beft advantage; how to eat, and fleep j in more ftate and magnificence than other people; to have a thoufand dalliances and pleafures about him j to behave himfelf hai;ghtily, and extort from his Subjcds; to live an idlcnefs and eafe; ro difpofeof Military commands totheir Parafites; to defpife thofe who propofed any thing of Virtue; to require that their word fhould be like Oracles, and of as much authority, as if fpoken by God himfelf; to employ fuch as had no knowledge in affairs; to commit great things to thofe who duifl attempt nothing; to believe every thing immediately, without pondering and debating either their words or arguments that /jpoke thsHii aad ftveral other imperfcdions which hindered them from feeing that at lafl Book VII. The An of A R. 52