his ' 472 Book III. 2Vx Art of WA R. 473 . - — ' ^ his Cannon. This is moH; certain, your fraall Field-pieces, and your fmall fhot does more execution than your great pieces, againft which, the befl remedy is to come to handy-blows as foon as you can; and though in the firft fome men fell, (as be fure there always will,) yet a good General and a good Army are not to confi« der a particular lofs, fo much as a general; but rather are to imitate the Siviffeny who never refufed a Battle for fear of great Guns, but punifhed them with capital pu- nifhmenr, who for fear of them forfook their ranks, or gave any other fign or exprefli- on of fear. I caufed my artillery to be drawn off as foon as I had fired them, that they might leave the Field clear for my Battalians to advance; and I made no menti- on of them afterwards, as being quite ufekfs when the Armies were joined. You have faid likewife, that in refpcd of the violence and ittipetuofity of thofe Guns, ma- ny do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether ufelefs; and it feems by that, that the people of late have found out arras and orders which are fuffi- cient to fecure them: if you know any fuch thing, you will oblige me to impart it; for as yet I know none, nor can 1 believe that there's any to be found: So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do carry Corflets of Iron upon their breafts, and the horfe are arm'd Cap a piedy for feeing they condemn the anci- ent way of arming as ufelefs in rcfpeft of the Artillery, they may as well condemn what is praftis'd now-a-days. I would underftand likewife why the Sivijjevsj according to the cuflom of the ancients, make their Battalions to confift of fix or eight thoufsind foot; and why other Nations have imitated them, feeing that order is expos'd to the fame danger (upon account of the Artillery) as others are. I think it cannot eafily be anfwered, yet if you fhould propofe it to Soldiers of any judgment and experience, they would tell you firft, that they go fo arm'd, becaufe though their arms will not defend them againft great Guns, yet they will fecure them againfl fmall Shot, and Pikes, and Swords, and Stones, and all fuch Things. They would tell you likewife, that they keep that clofe order like the Swijjersy that they may more eafily engage the Enemy's i Foot, that they may better fuflain their Horfe, and put fairer to break them.
So that we fee Soldiers are afraid of many things befides Artillery, againft which they are to provide by their arms and their orders: from whence it follows, that the better an Army is armed, and the clofer and ftronger it is drawn up, the fafer it is, So that whoever is of that opinion, is indifcreet or inconfiderate: for if we fee that a fmall part of the Arms of the ancients which is ufed at this day, (as the pike,) and a fmall part of their order (which are the Battalions of the Swi/fers) have been fo ferviceable» and contributed fuch ftrength to our Armies, why may we not believe that the other Arms and orders which are laid afide, might have been as beneficial and ufeful? A- gain, had we no regard to the Artillery in placing our felves in that flrait clofe or- der like the Swrjfers, what other orders could make us more fearful.? No order certain- ly can make us more fearful of the Artillery, than that which keeps men firm" and clofe together. Befides, if 1 be not frighted by the Artillery of the enemy when I encamp before a Town, where they can fire upon me with more fecurity, becaufe I cannot come at them by reafon of the wall, nor hinder them but by my own Cannon, which will be a bufinefs of time; if I be not afraid, (I fay) where they can multiply their Shot upon me as they pleafe, why fhould I fear them in the Field where 1 can run ipon them, and poflefsthem immediately? So that I conc]ude,»Artillery in my opinion, is no fufficient impediment why we fhould not ufe the methods of our anceflors, and pradife their virtue and courage. And had I not difcourfed formerly with you about: this fubjeft, I fhould have enlarged more; but 1 fhall refer my felf to what I faid then. Lu'gi. We have heard (or at leaft it is our own faults if we have not) what you i have difcourfed about the Artillery; and that the beft courfe that can be taken againfl I it, is to make our felves matters of it with as much expedition as we can, if our Ar» I tny be in the Field, and drawing up ready to engage. Upon which I have one fcru- I pie, becaufe to me it feems pofTible that the Enemy may place his Artillery in the flanks of his Army, fo as that it might offend you more, and yet be more capable of being defended. You have made (if you remember) in the ranging of your Army for a Battle, a fpace of four yards from Company to Company, and another fpace of twenty yards from the Battalias to the Pikes extraordinary: if the Enemy fiiould draw up his Army in your own way, and place his Cannon in thofe intervals, I be- lieve from thofe places they might gaul you exceedingly, and with great difficulty, be- caufe you could not enter into the Enemies Body to poffefs them.
Falf. Your fcruple is rational, and 1 will endeavour to difcufs it, or apply a remedy. I have told you that thofe Battalias are in continual motion, either for a battle or a march, and do naturally fo ftraighten and clofe themfelves, that if you make your intervals nar- rower where you place your Artillery, they will be clofed up in a ihort time, foas they will 1 Qji q 1*0^ The An of WA R. " Book III.
not be able to do any execution. If you make your diftanccs large, to avoid one danger, you incur a greater, by giving the Enemy opportunity not ouly to poflefs Iiimfelt of your Cannon, but to rout your whole Army. But you muft underftand it is impoflible to keep your Artillery among your Squadrons, efpecially thofe which are upon Carriages, becaufe being drawn one way, and their mouths lying the other, it is ncceflary to turn them before you can fire upon the Enemy,• and to turn them takes up fo much fpace, that fifty of thofe Carriages are enough to diforder a whole Army. So that it is necelFary the Artillery be placed without their Squadrons; and being fo, they may be attack'd, as is faid before. But let us fuppofe it might be placed within the fqua* drons, and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle, and that it ihould not hinder the clofing of their bodies, nor leave a way open to the Enemy. I fay, that even in that cafe the remedy is eafy, and that is by making fpaces and inter- vals in your Army for the bullets to pafs; by which means the fury of their Artillery will become vain: and it will be no hard matter to do this, becaufe the Enemy being defirous that it may be fecure, will place it behind in the fartheft part of the intervals, fo that to prevent their (hot from doing mifchief among their own men, it is necelfary that it pafs always in a right line, fo that by giving place on your fide, it is eafily avoided. For this is a general rule, we muft give place to any thing that we arc not able to refift, as the Ancients did to the Elephants and forked Chariots. I believe, and am affured that you think I have ranged the Armies, and won the day; yet let me tell you, (if what I have told you already be infufficient) it would be impofli- ble for an Army fo armed and ordered, not to beat in the very firft encounter any o- ther Army that fliould be arm'd and order'd according to the method of our times; which many times affords but one front, without any bucklers, and fo ill arm'd, chat they are not able to defend thcmfelves againft any Enemy that is near them.
And for their way of drawing up, they do it in fuch manner, that if they place their Battalias in the flank one of another, they make their Army too thin; if they place them behind one another, not having the way of receiving them into one another, they are all in confufion, and their ranks eafily broken. And though they give three names to their Armies, and divide them into three Bodies, the Van-guard, Battaile, and Rear-guard, yet they ferve only upon a march, and for diftindion of quarters; but in a Fight they are all at the mercy of fortune, and one fmall charge defeats the whole Army.
Luigi. 1 have obferved by the defcription of the Battle, that your Horfe were repul- fed by the Enemy's Horfe, and retired to your Pikes extraordinary, by whole afliftance they not only fuftained the enemy, but beat him back again. I believe as you fay, the Pikes may keep off the Horfe in a clofe and grofs body like that of the Swiz.z.ers; but in your Army you have but five ranks of Pikes in the front, and feven in the flank, fo that I cannot fee how your Foot fliould be able to fuftain them.
Fab. Though I told you formerly that in the Macedonian Phalanx fix ranks of Pikes could charge at one time, yet you mufl underfland, that if a Battalion of Swiz,z,ers (bould confifl of a thoufand ranks, there could charge at once not above four or five at the mod; becaufe their Pikes being nine yards long, and a yard and half is taken up betwixt their hands; fo that in the firfl ranks they have free fevea yards and a half. In the fecond rank (befides what is taken up betwixt their hands) a; yard and a half is confumed betwixt one rank and the other, fo as there remains buc fix yards that can be ufed. In the third rank for the fame reafons there remains buC four yards and a half; in the fourth, three yards; and in the fifth but one and a half- The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the Enemy, yet they ferve to recruic the firft ranks, as we have faid before, and are as a rampart and bulwark to the othec five. If then five of their ranks are fufHcient to fuftain the Enemy's horfe, why may not five of our's do as much, having other ranks behind to reinforce them, and give them the fame fupport, though their Pikes be not fo long? And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks fhould be thought too thin, they may be put into a fquare, and difpofed in the flank by the two Battalias which I place in the laft fquadron of the Army, from whence they may with eafe relieve both the front or the rear, and give Affiftance to the horfe as occafion requires.
Luigi. Would you always ufe this order when ever you were to give the Enemy Battle?
Falf. No, by no means; for the form of your Army is to be changed, according to the fituation of the place, and the ftrength or number of the Enemy, as I (hall (hew by exam- ple before I finifti my difcourfe. But this form or model is recommended to you not as the beft, (though in cffeft it is fo) but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders, and by which you may underftand the other ways of drawing up an Army; for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is moft commonly founded. Only one thing I would 474 Book III.
The Art of W A R.
475 would prtis upon you to remember, and that is, That you never drawyoiir Army up fo, as Chat your front cannot be relieved by your rear; for whoever is guilty of that error, renders the greateft part of his Army unferviceablej and can never overcome, if he meets with the leaft oppofition and courage.
Luigi. I have a new fcruple that is rifen in my mind. I have obferved that: in the dif- pofing of your Battalias, you make your front of five Battalias drawn up by the fides one of another i your middle of three, and your rear of two; and I fliould think it would have been better to have done quire contrary; beeaufe in my opinion an Army is bro- ken with more difficulty, when the Enemy which charges itfinds more Firmnefs and Re- fiftance the further he enters it; whereas it feems to me, that according to your order, the l-arthcr he enters it, the weaker he finds it.
Fabr. If you remerabred how the Triarii (which were the third order of the Roman Lec;ions) confified only of <5oo men, you would be better farisfied, when you under- ftood they were placed always in the rear: for you would fee that I, according to that example, have placed two Battalias in the rear, which confifl: of poo men; fo that I choofe rather in my imitation of the Romans, to err in taking more men than fewer. And though this Example might be fufficicnt to content you, yet I fiiall give you the reafon, and it is this: The front of the Army is made thick ahd folid, beeaufe it is that which is to endure the firfl: fhock and infult of the Enemy; and being not to receive any recruits from elfewhere, it is convenient that it be well man'd, for a few would leave it too weak, and the ranks too thin. But the fecond Squadron, being to receive its friends into it, before it is to engage with the Enemy; it is necefiary that it has two great intervals, and by confequence muft confiftof a lefs number than thefirft: Forfhould it confift of a greater number, or be but equal to the firft, either there muft be no fpa- ces or intervals at all, which would occafion diforder; or by leaving of fpaces, they would exceed the proportion of the firft Squadron, which would make your Army look very imperfe<5i. As to what you fay touching the irtipreflion of the Enemy, that the farther he enters your Army, the weaker he finds it, it is clearly a miftake; for the E- nemy cannot engage the fecord body, before the firfi is fallen into it; fo that he finds the middle Battalion rather ftrongerthan weaker, being to fight both with the firft and fecond together. And ir is the fame thing when the Enemy advances to the laft Squa- dron; for there he has to encounter not only two frefh Battalias, but with all the Bat- talions united and entire: And beeaufe this laft Battalion is to receive more men, it it necefiary the diftancesbe greater, and by confequence that their number be lefs.
Luigi. I am very well fatisfied with what you have faid; but pray anfwer me this; If the five firft Batralias retire into the three Battalias which are in the middle, and then thofe eight into the two Battalias in the rear, I cannot conceive it poflible that the eight Battalias firft, and afterwards the ten, can be comprehended (vvhen eight or ten) iri the fame fpace as when they were but five.
Fabr. The firft thing I anfwer is this. That the fpace is not the fame; for the five Battalias in the front were drawn up with four fpaces in the middle, which wereclofed up when they fell in with the three Battalias in the midft, or the two in the rear. Be- fides there remains the fpace betwixt the Battalions, and that alfo which is betwixt the Battalias and the Fikes extraordinary j which fpaces altogether, do give them room enough.
To this it may be added, That the Batralias take up another place when they ard drawn up in order before their retreat, than they do after they are prefled; for in their retreat, they either contrad or extend their Orders. They open their Orders, when they fly: they contract them when they retreat; fo that in this cafe it would be beft to con- trad. Befides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van, having received the firft charge, are to fall back thorough the Battalias into the rear of the Army, and give way to the Scu- dati or Shields to advance; and thofe Pikes falling into the rear of the Army, may be ready for any Service in which their Captain fhall think fit to employ them; whereasi did they not retire after the Battle was joyned, they would be altogether ufelefs. And by this means the fpaces which were left to that purpofe, are hiadebig enough to receive all forces that are remaining. And yet if thofe fpaces were not fufficient, the flanks on both fides are men and not walls, which opening and enlarging their ranks, can make fuch diftances as will be able to receive them.
Luigi. The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place ifi the flank of your Arrays when the Battalias in the front fall back into the Battalias in the middle, would you have them ftand firm, and continue, as two wings to the Army, or would you have them re- tire With the Battalias i If you were willing theyftiould, I do not fee how it is poflible, having no Battalias (with intervals) behind them to give them reception.
Qj3 q 2 476 The An bf WA R. Book III.
Fahfo If when the Enemy forces the Bactahas to retire, he does not prefs them too hard, they may ftand firm in their order, and flank the Enemy when the Battahas in the front are retired. But if they be charged (as may be reafonably expeded) and the Enemy be fo Ikong as to force the other, they may retire with them, and that with- out difficulty, though there be no Battalias behind with fpaces to receive them; for the Body in the midft may double to the right, and thruft one File into another, as we fliall fhew more at large when we fpeak of the manner of doubling of File?. "Tis true, to double in a retreat you mull take another way than what I have defcribed, for I told you the fecond rank was to enter into the firft, the fourth into the third, and fo on: But here in this cafe we muft not begin in the Front, but in the Rear, to the end that by doubling our tanks we may retreat, and not advance.
CHAP vm.
The Exercifes of an Army in general.
Fahrrr^ O anfwer now to whatever may be objeded againft my Battle, as I have drawn it up before you, I muft tell you again that I have ordered and engaged it in that manner for two reafons; one to fbew you how it is to be drawn upj the other to ftew you how it is to be exercifcd. As to the drawing up of an Army, I doubt not but you underftand it very well; and as to the exercifing, I muft tell you, it ought to be done as often as poflible, that the Captains may learn to keep their Companies in rhefe orders J for it belongs to every particular Soldier to keep the orders exad in every Bat- talia j and to every Captain to keep his Company exaft with the order of the wholfe Army, and know how to obey the Command of the General. It is convenient like- wife that they underftand how to joyn one Battalia with another, how to take their place in a moment J and therefore it is convenient that the Colours of each Company may have its number of Soldiers defcribed in it, for the greater commodity of command- ing them, and that the Captain and Soldiers may underftand one another with the more eafej and as in the Battalias, fo it is convenient likewife in the Battalions, that their numbers fhould be known, and defcribed in the Colonel's Enfign: That you ftould know the number of the Battalion in the left or righe^wing; as alfo of the Battalias in the front, or the middle, andfoconfequently of the reft. It is convenient likewife that there be degrees of Offices and Commands, to raife men as it were by ftepsf to the great ho- nours of an Army. For example. The firft degree fhould be File leaders, or Corporals; The fecond fhould have the command of fifty ordinary Velites; The third of a hundred, with the title of Centurion: The fourth ftiould command the firft Battalia; the fifth, the fecond; thefixth, the third; and fo on to the tenth Battalia, whofe place fliould be next in honour to the Captain General of the Battaltony to which command no perfon fliould be advanced, but he who has pafl'cd all thofe degrees. And becaufe befides thcfe Officers, there are thvee Coi^Jlabki or Commanders of the Pikes cxtraordinnry, and two of the Velites extraordinay, I did not much care if they were placed in the fame quality with the Captain of the firft Battaliay nor would it trouble mc if fix men more were preferred to the fame degree, that each of them might put himfelf forward, and do fome extraordinary thing to be preferred to the fecond Battalia. If then each of thefe Captains underftands in what place his Battalia is to be ranged, it muft necefi'arily fol- low, that at the firft found of the Trumpet ( the Standard beinj^ erecied ) the whole Army will fall into its place. And this is the firft exercife to which an Army is to be accuftomed, that is to fay, to clofe and fall in one with another; to do which, it is convenient to train them often, and ufe them to it every day.
Luigi. What mark and difference would you appoint for the Standard of the whole Army, befides the number defcribed as aforefaid?
Fabritio. The Lieutenant General's Enfign fhould have the Arms of his General or Prince, and all the reft fhould have the fame Arms with fome variation in the Field or Colours, as the Prince fhall think beft; for it imports not much what their Colours are, fo they diftinguifh one Company from another. But let uspafs to the ocher exer- cife, in which an Army is to be train'd; that is, in its motions, to be taught how to march, advance, or fall back with exad diftance and time, and to be fure tiiat in their marches a juft order be obferved. The third exercife is, Teaching them to manage iheir Arms, and charge in fuch a manner, as tliat afterwards they maydoboth dextcroully when they come to fight; teaching them how to play their Artillery, and how to draw them Book III. l^he Art of TTA R. 477 them oft', when there is occafion; Teaching the Fielhes extraordinary to advance out of their places, and after a counterfeit charge, to retreat to them again: Teaching the firft Battalias (as if they were over-powered j to fall back into the intervals of the fe- cond; and all of them afterwards into the third; and having done fo, to divide again, and return to their old ports; in fhort, they are fo to be accuftomed in this exercife, that every thing may be known, and familiar to every Soldier, which, with continual pra- dice, is eafily obtained. The fourth exercife inftruds your Soldiers in the ufefulnefsof the Drums, and Trumpets, and Colours, informing them of the Commands of their Cap- tain, by the beating of the cne, the founding of the other, and the difplaying and flou- riftiing of the third: for being well ufed to them, they will underftand what they are to dp by them, as well as if they were direded by word of mouth. And becaufe the ef- fects of thefe Commands depend altogether upon thefe kind of founds, I fliall tell you what kind of Inllruments the Ancients made ufe of in their Wars. The Lacedamonians (it we may believe T'hucidides) in their Armies made ufe of the Flute, conceiving that Harmony more apt to infufe gravity than fury into their Soldiers. Induced by the fame reafon, the Carthaginians founded their charges upon the Harp; with which Inftru* ment they began the Fight. Aliate King of Ljdta, in his Wars made ufe of them both: But Alexander the Great, and the Romansy ufed Horns and Trumpets, fuppofing the clan- gor and noife of thofe Inftruments would enflame the courage of their men, and make them more valiant in Fight. But as in the arming of our Army, we have followed the way both of the Greek and the Roman; fo in the choice of our Inftruments of Intelligencej I would follow the Cuftoms both of the one Nation and the other. I would have therefore the Trumpets placed by the Lieutenant- General, as Inftruments not only proper to excite and enflame your Army, but fitter to be heard, and by confequence apter to de- rive your Commands than any of the other. The reft of thofe kind of Inftruments I would have placed about the Captains and Colonels of the Battalions: 1 would have al- fo a fmaller fort of Drums and Flutes, which fhould be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our Fights, but as our Tabors and Flageletsdoin our Feafts: The Gene- ral with his Trumpets ftould fignifie when his Army is to n^ake a ftand, when to ad- vance, when to wheel, when to retire, when to make ufe of the Artillery, when the fites extraordinary are to move, and by the variation of the founds, to direft his Army in all the Marches and Counter-marches that are generally ufed; and I would have the Trumpets followed afterwards by the Drums. And becaufe this exercife is of great confequence in an Army, it imports very much that it be frequently taught. As to the Horfe, they flioald have Trumpets too, but of a lefler and different found from thofe about the Lieutenant-General. And this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering and exercifing of an Army.
Luigt. I befeech you. Sir, let me not trouble you too much, if I defire to be fatisfied in one thing more; and that is, for what reafon you caufed your light Horfe and Velitei extraordinary to advance againft the Enemy with great fhouts and clamours, and cries j and when afterwards the Body and remainder of the Army came to charge, they did it with extraordinary filence.? I confefs I cannot comprehend the reafon, and therefore t beg your explanation.
Fabr. The opinions of the Ancient Generals have been different in that point, whe- ther an Enemy was to be charged filently and without noife, or with all the clamour could be made: The filent way is beft to keep your men firm in their orders, and to fignify the Commands of the General: but the obftreperous way is beft to excite the courage of your Soldiers, and difmay the Enemy: and becaufe I thought in both cafes there was fomething of advantage, I made ufe of them both, and caufed thofe to ad- vance tfrich clamour, and thefe with filence; for I cannot think that an univerfal and perpetual noife can be any advantage, becaufe it hinders orders from being derived, which is a moft pernicious thing: nor is it likely that the Romans nkd thofe fhouts after the firft fbock, for Hiftory tells us, that many times, by the exhortation and encourage- ment of their Officers, the Soldiers which were flying, were flopped, and rallyed, and difpofed immediately into new Orders, which could not be, where the Officers could not have been heard.
T HI< 478 The An of WA R.
THE Fourth BOOK.
C H A P. I.
The conJiJerations and fuhtleties to he ufed in the drawing up an Army to fght.
tuigi. EEing the Vidory has been fo honourably obtained under my Condud, I