Like Newcastle in the mine area, Phoenix now be¬ came the centre of the strikers on the north coast, and was visited by hundreds of them who came there to seek advice as well as shelter. It therefore naturally attracted the attention of the Government, and the angry looks of the Europeans thereabouts. It became somewhat risky to live in Phoenix, and yet even children there accom¬ plished dangerous tasks with courage. West was arrested in the meanwhile, though as a matter of fact there was no reason for arresting him. Our understanding was, that West THE BEGINNING OF THE END and Maganlal Gandhi should not only not try to be arrest¬ ed, but on the other hand should, as far as possible, avoid any occasion for arrest. West had not therefore allowed any ground to arise for the Government to arrest him. But the Government could scarcely be expected to consult the convenience of the Satyagrahis, nor did they need to wait for some occasion to arise for arresting any one whose freedom jarred upon their nerves. The authority’s very desire to take a step amply suffices as a reason for adopt¬ ing it. As soon as the news of the arrest of West was cabled to Gokhale, he initiated the policy of sending out able men from India. When a meeting was held in Lahore in support of the Satyagrahis of South Africa, Mr G. F. Andrews gave away in their interest all the money in his posses¬ sion, and ever since then Gokhale had had his eye upon him. No sooner, therefore, did he hear about West’s arrest, than he inquired of Andrews by wire if he was ready to proceed to South Africa at once. Andrews replied in the affirmative. His beloved friend Pearson also got ready to go the same moment, and the two friends left India for South Africa by the first available steamer.
But the struggle was now about to close. The Union Government had not the power to keep thousands of in¬ nocent men in jail. The Viceroy would not tolerate it, and all the world was waiting to see what General Smuts would do. The Union Government now did what all governments similarly situated generally do. No inquiry was really needed. The wrong perpetrated was well known on all hands, and every one realized that it must be red¬ ressed. General Smuts too saw that there had been in¬ justice which called for remedy, but he was in the same predicament as a snake which has taken a rat in its mouth but can neither gulp it down nor cast it out. He must do justice, but he had lost the power of doing justice, as he had given the Europeans in South Africa to understand, that he would not repeal the £ 3 tax nor carry out any other reform. And now he felt compelled to abolish the tax as well as to undertake other remedial legislation. States amenable to public opinion get out of such awk¬ ward positions by appointing a commission which conducts SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA only a nominal inquiry, as its recommendations are a fore¬ gone conclusion. It is a general practice that the recom¬ mendations of such a commission should be accepted by the state, and therefore under the guise of carrying out the recommendations, governments give the justice which they have first refused. General Smuts appointed a com¬ mission of three members, with which the Indians pledged themselves to have nothing to do so long as certain de¬ mands of theirs in respect of the commission were not granted by the Government. One of these demands was, that the Satyagrahi prisoners should be released, and an¬ other that the Indians should be represented on the com¬ mission by at least one member. To a certain extent the first demand was accepted by the commission itself which recommended to the Government ‘with a view to enabling the enquiry to be made as thorough as possible’ that Mr Kallenbach, Mr Polak and I should be released unconditionally. The Government accepted this recom¬ mendation and released all three of us simultaneously (December 18, 1913) after an imprisonment of hardly six weeks. West who had been arrested was also released as Government had no case against him.
All these events transpired before the arrival of Andrews and Pearson whom I was thus able to welcome as they landed at Durban. They were agreeably surprised to see me, as they knew nothing of the events which happened during their voyage. This was my first meeting with these noble Englishmen.
All three of us were disappointed upon our release. We knew nothing of the events outside. The news of the commission came to us as a surprise, but we saw that we could not co-operate with the commission in any shape or form. We felt that the Indians should be certainly allowed to nominate at least one representative on the commission. We three, therefore, upon reaching Durban, addressed a letter to General Smuts on December 2 1, 1913 to this effect: ‘We welcome the appointment of the commission, but we strongly object to the inclusion in it of Messrs Esselen and Wylie. We have nothing against them personally. They are well-known and able citizens. But as both of I If THE BEGINNING OF THE END them have often expressed their dislike for the Indians, there is likelihood of their doing injustice without being conscious of it. Man cannot change his temperament all at once. It is against the laws of nature to suppose, that these gentlemen will suddenly become different from what they are. However we do not ask for their removal from the commission. We only suggest that some impartial men should be appointed in addition to them, and in this connection we would mention Sir James Rose Innes and the Hon. Mr W. P. Schreiner, both of them well-known men noted for their sense of justice. Secondly, we request that all the Satyagrahi prisoners should be released. If this is not done, it would be difficult for us to remain outside jail. There is no reason now for keeping the Satya- grahis in jail any longer. Thirdly, if we tender evidence before the commission, we should be allowed to go to the mines and factories where the indentured labourers are at work. If these requests are not complied with, we are sorry that we shall have to explore fresh avenues for going to jail.5 General Smuts declined to appoint any more members on the commission, and stated that the commission was appointed not for the sake of any party but merely for the satisfaction of the Government. Upon receiving this reply on December 24, we had no alternative but to prepare to go to jail. We therefore published a notification to the Indians that a party of Indians courting jail would com¬ mence their march from Durban on January 1, 1914.
But there was one sentence in General Smuts’ reply, which prompted me to write to him again, and it was this: ‘We have appointed an impartial and judicial commission, and if while appointing it, we have not consulted the Indians, neither have we consulted the coal-owners or the sugar-planters.5 I wrote privately to the General, requesting to see him and place some facts before him if the Government were out to do justice. General Smuts granted my request for an interview, and the march was postponed for a few days accordingly.
When Gokhale heard that a fresh march was under contemplation, he sent a long cablegram, saying that such SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA a step on our part would land Lord Hardinge and himself in an awkward position and strongly advising us to give up the march, and assist the commission by tendering evidence before it.
We were on the horns of a dilemma. The Indians were pledged to a boycott of the commission if its personnel was not enlarged to their satisfaction. Lord Hardinge might be displeased, Gokhale might be pained, but how could we go back upon our pledged word? Mr Andrews suggested to us the considerations of Gokhale’s feelings, his delicate health and the shock which our decision was calculated to impart to him. But in fact these considerations were never absent from my mind. The leaders held a conference and finally reached the deci¬ sion that the boycott must stand at any cost if more members were not co-opted to the commission. We therefore sent a long cablegram to Gokhale, at an expense of about a hundred pounds. Andrews too concurred with the gist of our message which was to the following effect: cWe realize how you are pained, and would like to follow your advice at considerable sacrifice. Lord Hardinge has rendered priceless aid, which we wish we would continue to receive till the end. But we are anxious that you should understand our position. It is a question of thousands of men having taken a pledge to which no exception can be taken. Our entire struggle has been built upon a foundation of pledges. Many of us would have fallen back today had it not been for the compelling force of our pledges. All moral bonds would be relaxed at once if thousands of men once proved false to their plighted word. The pledge was taken after full and mature deliberation, and there is nothing immoral about it. The community has an unquestionable right to pledge itself to boycott. We wish that even you should advise that a pledge of this nature should not be broken but be observed inviolate by all, come what might. Please show this cable to Lord Hardinge. We wish you might not be placed in a false position. We have commenced this struggle with God as our witness and His help as our sole support. We desire and bespeak the assistance of elders as well as big men, THE BEGINNING OF THE END and are glad when we get it. But whether or not such assistance is forthcoming, we are humbly of opinion that pledges must ever be scrupulously kept. We desire your support and your blessing in such observance.5 This cable, when it reached Gokhale, had an adverse effect upon his health, but he continued to help us with unabated or even greater zeal than before. He wired to Lord Hardinge on the matter but not only did he not throw us overboard, but he on the other hand defended our standpoint. Lord Hardinge too remained unmoved.
I went to Pretoria with Andrews. Just at this time there was a great strike of the European employees of the Union railways, which made the position of the Govern¬ ment extremely delicate. I was called upon to commence the Indian march at such a fortunate juncture. But I de¬ clared that the Indians could not thus assist the railway strikers, as they were not out to harass the Government, their struggle being entirely different and differently conce¬ ived. Even if we undertook the march, we would begin it at some other time when the railway trouble had ended. This decision of ours created a deep impression, and was cabled to England by Reuter. Lord Ampthill cabled his congratulations from England. English friends in South Africa too appreciated our decision. One of the secretaries of General Smuts jocularly said: T do not like your people, and do not care to assist them at all. But what am I to do? You help us in our days of need. How can we lay hands upon you? I often wish you took to violence like the English strikers, and then we would know at once how to dispose of you. But you will not injure even the enemy. You desire victory by self-suffering alone and never trans¬ gress your self-imposed limits of courtesy and chivalry. And that is what reduces us to sheer helplessness.5 General Smuts also gave expression to similar sentiments.
I need scarcely suggest to the reader that this was not the first incident of chivalrous consideration for others being shown by the Satyagrahis. When the Indian labour¬ ers on the north coast went on strike, the planters at Mount Edgecombe would have been put to great losses if all the cane that had been cut was not brought to the mill and SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA crushed. Twelve hundred Indians therefore returned to work solely with a view to finish this part of the work, and joined their compatriots only when it was finished. Again when the Indian employees of the Durban Municipality struck work, those who were engaged in the sanitary ser¬ vices of the borough or as attendants upon the patients in hospitals were sent back, and they willingly returned to their duties. If the sanitary services were dislocated, and if there was no one to attend upon the patients in hospitals, there might be an outbreak of disease in the city and the sick would be deprived of medical aid, and no Satyagrahi would wish for such consequences to ensue. Employees of this description were therefore exempted from the strike. In every step that he takes, the Satyagrahi is bound to consider the position of his adversary.
I could see that the numerous cases of such chivalry left their invisible yet potent impress everywhere, en¬ hanced the prestige of the Indians, and prepared a sui¬ table atmosphere for a settlement.
CHAPTER XLVIII THE PROVISIONAL SETTLEMENT The atmosphere was thus becoming favourable for a settlement. Sir Benjamin Robertson, who had been sent by Lord Hardinge in a special steamer, was to arrive about the same time that Mr Andrews and I went to Pretoria. But we did not wait for him and set out as we had to reach Pretoria on the day fixed by General Smuts. There was no reason indeed to await his arrival, as the final result could only be commensurate with our strength.
Mr Andrews and I reached Pretoria. But I alone was to interview General Smuts. The General was preoccupied with the railway strike, which was so serious in nature, that the Union Government had declared martial law. The European workmen not only demanded higher wages, but aimed at taking the reins of government into their hands. My first interview with the General was very short.
THE PROVISIONAL SETTLEMENT but I saw that he today did not ride the same high horse as he did before, when the Great March began. At that time the General would not so much as talk with me. The threat of Satyagraha was the same then as it was now. Yet he had declined to enter into negotiations. But- now he was ready to confer with me.
The Indians had demanded that a member should be co-opted to the commission to represent Indian interests. But on this point General Smuts would not give in. ‘That cannot be done,5 said he, eas it would be derogatory to the Government’s prestige, and I would be unable to carry out the desired reforms. You must understand that Mr Esselen is our man, and would fall in with, not oppose, the Government’s wishes as regards reform. Colonel Wylie is a man of position in Natal and might even be considered anti-Indian. If therefore even he agrees to a repeal of the £ 3 tax, the Government will have an easy task before them. Our troubles are manyfold; we have not a moment to spare and therefore wish to set the Indian question at rest. We have decided to grant your demands, but for this we must have a recommendation from the commission. I understand your position too. You have solemnly de¬ clared that you will not lead evidence before it so long as there is no representative of the Indians sitting on the commission. I do not mind if you do not tender evidence, but you should not organize any active propaganda to prevent any one who wishes to give evidence from doing so, and should suspend Satyagraha in the interval. I be¬ lieve that by so doing you will be serving your own interests as well as giving me a respite. As you will not tender evi¬ dence, you will not be able to prove your allegations as regards ill-treatment accorded to the Indian strikers. But that is for you to think over.’
Such were the suggestions of General Smuts, which on the whole I was inclined to receive favourably. We had made many complaints about ill-treatment of strikers by soldiers and warders, but the difficulty was that we were precluded by a boycott of the commission from proving our allegations. There was a difference of opinion SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA among the Indians on this point. Some held that the char¬ ges levelled by the Indians against the soldiers must be proved, and therefore suggested that if the evidence could not be placed before the commission, we must challenge libel proceedings by publishing the authentic evidence in our possession. I disagreed with these friends. There was little likelihood of the commission giving a decision un¬ favourable to the Government. Challenging libel proceed¬ ings would land the community in endless trouble, and the net result would be the barren satisfaction of having proved the charges of ill-treatment. As a barrister, I was well aware of the difficulties of proving the truth of state¬ ments giving rise to libel proceedings. But my weightiest argument was, that the Satyagrahi is out to suffer. Even before Satyagraha was started, the Satyagrahis knew that they would have to suffer even unto death, and they were ready to undergo such suffering. Such being the case, there was no sense in proving now that they did suffer. A spirit of revenge being alien to Satyagraha, it was best for a Satyagrahi to hold his peace when he encountered extraordinary difficulties in proving the fact of his suffer¬ ing. A Satyagrahi fights only for essentials. The essential thing was that the obnoxious laws should be repealed or suitably amended, and when this was fairly within his grasp, he need not bother himself with other things. Again a Satyagrahi’s silence would at the time of settlement stand him in good stead in his resistance to unjust laws. With such arguments I was able to win over most of these friends who differed from me, and we decided to drop the idea of proving our allegations of ill-treatment.
CHAPTER XLIX LETTERS EXCHANGED Correspondence passed between General Smuts and myself, placing on record the agreement arrived at as the result of a number of interviews. My letter dated January 21, 1914 may be thus summarized: ‘We have conscientious scruples with regard to lead¬ ing evidence before the commission as constituted -at pre¬ sent. You appreciate these scruples and regard them as honourable, but are unable to alter your decision. As, however, you have accepted the principle of consultation with the Indians, I will advise my countrymen not to hamper the labours of the commission by any active propa¬ ganda, and not to render the position of the Government difficult by reviving passive resistance, pending the result of the commission and the introduction of legislation dur¬ ing the forthcoming session. It will further be possible for us to assist Sir Benjamin Robertson who has been deputed by the Viceroy.
‘As to our allegations of ill-treatment during the pro¬ gress of the Indian strike in Natal, the avenue of proving them through the commission is closed to us by our solemn declaration to have nothing to do with it. As Satyagrahis we endeavour to avoid, as far as possible, any resentment of personal wrongs. But in order that our silence may not be mistaken, may I ask you to recognize our motive and reciprocate by not leading evidence of a negative chara¬ cter before the commission on the allegations in question?
‘Suspension of Satyagraha, moreover, carries with it a prayer for the release of Satyagrahi prisoners.
‘It might not be out of place here to recapitulate the points on which relief has been sought: 1. Repeal of the £ 3 tax; 2. Legalization of the marriages celebrated accord¬ ing to the rite of Hinduism, Islam, etc.; 3. The entry of educated Indians; SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA 4. Alteration in the assurance as regards the Orange Free State; 5. An assurance that the existing laws especially affecting Indians will be administered justly, with due regard to vested rights.
‘If you view my submission with favour, I shall be prepared to advise my countrymen in accordance with the tenor of this letter.5 General Smuts’ reply of the same date was to this effect: ‘I regret but understand your inability to appear before the commission. I also recognize the motive which makes you unwillling to revive old sores by courting libel proceedings before another tribunal. The Government repudiates the charges of harsh action against the Indian strikers. But as you will not lead evidence in support of those allegations, it would be futile for the Government to lead rebutting evidence in vindication of the conduct of its officers. As regards the release of Satyagrahi priso¬ ners, the Government had already issued the necessary orders before your letter arrived. In -regard to the grievan¬ ces summarized at the end of your letter, the Government will await the recommendations of the commission before any action is taken.5 Mr Andrews and I had had frequent interviews with General Smuts before these letters were exchanged. But meanwhile Sir Benjamin Robertson too arrived at Pretoria. Sir Benjamin was looked upon as a popular official, and he brought a letter of recommendation from Gokhale, but I observed that he was not entirely free from the usual weak¬ ness of the English official. He had no sooner come than he began to create factions among the Indians and to bully the Satyagrahis. My first meeting with him in Pretoria did not prepossess me in his favour. I told him about the tele¬ grams I had received informing me of his bullying procedure. I dealt with him, as indeed with every one else, in a frank and straightforward manner, and we there¬ fore became friends. But I have often seen that officials are apt to bully those who will tamely submit to them, and will LETTERS EXCHANGED 301 be correct with those who are correct themselves and will not be cowed down.
We thus reached a provisional agreement, and Satya- graha was suspended for the last time. Many English fri¬ ends were glad of this, and promised their assistance in the final settlement. It was rather difficult to get the Indians to endorse this agreement. No one would wish that enthusi¬ asm which had arisen should be allowed to subside. Again whoever would trust General Smuts? Some reminded me of the fiasco in 1908, and said, ‘General Smuts once played us false, often charged you with forcing fresh issues, and subjected the community to endless suffering. And yet what a pity that you have not learnt the necessary lesson of declining to trust him! This man will betray you once again, and you will again propose to revive Satyagraha. But who will then listen to you? Is it possible that men should every now and then go to jail, and be ready to be faced with failure each time? With a man like General Smuts settlement is possible only if he actually delivers the goods. It is no use having his assurances. How can we any further trust a man who pledges his word and then breaks it?’
I knew that such arguments would be brought forward, and was not therefore surprised when they were. No matter how often a Satyagrahi is betrayed, he will repose his trust in the adversary so long as there are not cogent grounds for distrust. Pain to a Satyagrahi is the same as pleasure. He will not therefore be misled by the mere fear of suffering into groundless distrust. On the other hand, relying as he does upon his own strength, he will not mind being betrayed by the adversary, will continue to trust in spite of frequent betrayals, and will believe that he thereby strengthens the forces of truth and brings victory nearer. Meetings were therefore held in various places, and I was able at last to persuade the Indians to approve of the terms of the agreement. The Indians now came to a better understanding of the spirit of Satyagraha. Mr Andrews was the mediator and the witness in the present agreement, and then there was Sir Benjamin Robertson as representing the Government of India. There was therefore the least possible likelihood SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA of the agreement being subsequently repudiated. If I had obstinately refused to accept the agreement, it would have become a count of indictment against the Indians, and the victory which was achieved in the next six months would have been beset with various obstacles. The author of the Sanskrit saying, ‘Forgiveness is an ornament to the brave5, drew upon his rich experience of Satyagrahis never giving any one the least opportunity of finding fault with them. Distrust is a sign of weakness and Satyagraha implies the banishment of all weakness and therefore of distrust, which is clearly out of place when the adversary is not to be destroyed but to be won over.
When the agreement was thus endorsed by the Indians, we had only to wait for the next session of the Union Parliament. Meanwhile the commission set to work. Only a very few witnesses appeared before it on behalf of the Indians, furnishing striking- evidence of the great hold which the Satyagrahis had acquired over the community. Sir Benjamin Robertson tried to induce many to tender evidence but failed except in the case of a few who were strongly opposed to Satyagraha. The boycott of the commission did not produce any bad effect. Its work was shortened and its report was published at once. The commission strongly criticized the Indians for withholding their assistance and dismissed the charges of misbehaviour against the soldiers, but recommended compliance without delay with all the demands of the Indian community, such as for instance the repeal of the -£ 3 tax and the validation of Indian marriages, and the grant of some trifling concessions in addition. Thus the report of the commission was favourable to the Indians as predicted by General Smuts. Mr Andrews left for England and Sir Benjamin Robertson for India. We had received an assurance that the requisite legislation would be undertaken with a view to implement the recommenda¬ tions of the commission. What this legislation was and how it was brought forward will be considered in the next chapter.
CHAPTER L THE END OF THE STRUGGLE Within a short time of the issue of the report, the Go¬ vernment published in the official Gazette of the Union the Indians Relief Bill which was to effect a settlement of their long-standing dispute with the Indians; and I went at once to Cape Town where the Union Parliament sits. The Bill contained 9 sections and would take up only two col¬ umns of a paper like Young India. One part of it dealt with the question of Indian marriages and validated in South Africa the marriages which were held legal in India, except that if a man had more wives than one, only one of them would at any time be recognized as his legal wife in South Africa. The second part abolished the annual licence of £ 3 to be taken out by every indentured Indian labourer who failed to return to India and settled in the country as a free man on the completion of his in¬ denture. The third part provided that the domicile certi¬ ficates issued by the Government to Indians in Natal and bearing the thumb-impression of the holder of the permit should be recognized as conclusive evidence of the right of the holder to enter the Union as soon as his identity was established. There was a long and pleasant debate over the bill in the Union Parliament.