The same morning after the quarantine on the steam¬ ers had been removed, the reporter of a Durban news¬ paper had seen me on the steamer. He had asked me everything. It was quite easy to dispose of the charges against me to his satisfaction. I showed to him in detail that I had not indulged in the least exaggeration. What I had done was only my duty. If I had failed to discharge it, I would be unworthy of the name of man. All this appeared in the newspapers the next day. Sensible people among the Europeans admitted their mistake. The news¬ papers expressed their sympathy with the standpoint of the Europeans in Natal, but at the same time fully de¬ fended my action. This enhanced my reputation as well as the prestige of the Indian community. It was proved that the Indians, poor as they were, were no cowards, and that the Indian traders were prepared to fight for their self-respect and for their country regardless of loss.
Thus though the Indian community had to suffer hardship and though Dada Abdulla incurred big losses, the ultimate result, I believe, was entirely beneficial. The community had an opportunity of measuring their own strength and their self-confidence increased in conse¬ quence. I had a most valuable experience, and whenever I think of that day, I feel that God was preparing me for the practice of Satyagraha.
The events in Natal had their repercussion in Eng¬ land. Mr Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 58 SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA cabled to the Government of Natal asking them to prose¬ cute my assailants and to see that justice was done to me.
Mr Escombe, who was Attorney-General with the Government of Natal, called me. He told me about Mr Chamberlain’s cable. He expressed his regret for the in¬ juries I had sustained, and his pleasure that the conse¬ quences of the assault were not more serious. He added, “I can assure you that I did not at all intend that you or any other member of your communtiy should be injured. As I feared that you might possibly be hurt, I sent you word to say that you should land at night. You did not like my suggestion. I do not wish to blame you in the least that you accepted Mr Laughton’s advice. You were perfectly entitled to do what you thought fit. The Govern¬ ment of Natal fully accepts Mr Chamberlain’s demand. We desire that the offenders should be brought to book. Can you identify any of your assailants?”
I replied: CT might perhaps be able to identify one or two of them. But I must say at once before this con¬ versation proceeds that I have already made up my mind not to prosecute my assailants. I cannot see that they are at fault. What information they had, they had ob¬ tained from their leaders. It is too much to expect them to judge whether it was correct or otherwise. If all that they heard about me was true, it was natural for them to be excited and do something wrong in a fit of indignation. I would not blame them for it. Excited crowds have always tried to deal out justice in that manner. If any one is to blame it is the Committee of Europeans, you yourself and therefore, the Government of Natal. Reuter might have cabled any distorted account. But when you knew that I was coming to Natal, it was your duty and duty of the Committee to question me about the suspicions you entertained with regard to my activities in India, to hear what I had to say and then do what might appear proper in the circumstances. Now I cannot prosecute you or the Committee for the assault. And even if I could, I would not seek redress in a court of law. You took such steps as seemed advisable to you for safeguarding the interests of the Europeans of Natal. That is a political matter, A REVIEW OF THE EARLY STRUGGLE 59 and it remains for me to fight with you in the political field and to convince you and the other Europeans that the Indians who constitute a large proportion of the popu¬ lation of the British Empire wish to preserve their self- respect and safeguard their rights without injuring the Europeans in the least.”
Mr Escombe said, CCI quite understand what you say, and I appreciate it. I was not prepared to hear that you were not willing to prosecute your assailants. I would not have been displeased in the least had you prosecuted them. But since you have signified your determination not to prosecute, I do not hesitate to say not only that you have come to a right decision in the matter, but you will render further service to your community by your self-restraint. I must at the same time admit that your refusal to prosecute your assailants will save the Govern¬ ment of Natal from a most awkward position. If you so desire, the Government will see that your assailants are arrested, but it is scarcely necessary to tell you that it would irritate the Europeans and give rise to all manner of criticism, which no Government would relish. But if you have finally made up your mind not to prosecute, you should write to me a note -signifying your intention to that effect. I cannot defend my Government merely by sending Mr Chamberlain a summary of our conversation. I should cable to him a summary of your note. I am not, however, asking you to let me have the note just now. You had better consult your friends. Consult Mr Laughton also. And if after such consultations you still adhere to your resolution not to prosecute, write to me. But your note should clearly state that you, on your own respon¬ sibility, refuse to prosecute your assailants. Then only can I make use of it.”
I said: “I had no idea that you had sent for me in this connection. I have not consulted any one on the sub¬ ject, nor do I wish to consult any one now. When I decided to land and proceed with Mr Laughton, I had made up my mind that I should not feel aggrieved in case I was injured. Prosecuting my assailants is therefore out of the ques¬ tion. This is a religious question with me, and I believe 60 SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA with you that I shall serve my community as well as myself by this act of self-restraint. I propose, therefore, to take all the responsibility on my shoulders and to give you the note you ask for here and now.5’ I then obtained some blank paper from him, wrote out the desired note and handed it over to him.
CHAPTER VIII A REVIEW OF THE EARLY STRUGGLE Concluded The Work in England The reader has seen in the previous chapters how the Indians tried to ameliorate their condition and en¬ hanced their prestige. Side by side with the effort to deve¬ lop strength from within they sought such assistance as they could from India and England. I have dealt to some extent with the activities in India. It now remains to note what steps were taken to enlist support from England. It was essential, in the first place, to establish relations with the British Committee of the Indian National Con¬ gress; weekly letters with full particulars were therefore written to Dadabhai, the Grand Old Man of India, and to Sir William Wedderburn, the Chairman of the Committee and whenever there was an occasion to send copies of re¬ presentations, a sum of at least 10 pounds was remitted as a contribution towards postal charges and the general expenditure of the Committee.
I shall here place on record a sacred reminiscence of Dadabhai Naoroji. He was not the Chairman of the Com¬ mittee. It seemed to us, however, that the proper course for us was to send money to him in the first instance which he might then forward to the Chairman on our behalf. But Dadabhai returned the very first instalment sent to him and suggested that we should remit money, and address communications, intended for the Committee directly to Sir William Wedderburn. He himself would certainly render all possible assistance. But the prestige of the Committee would increase only if we approached A REVIEW OF THE EARLY STRUGGLE 61 the Committee through Sir William. I also observed that Dadabhai, though far advanced in age, was very regular in his correspondence. Even when he had nothing parti¬ cular to write about he would acknowledge receipt of let¬ ters by return of post with a word of encouragement thrown in. Even such letters he used to write personally, and kept copies of them in his tissue paper book.
I have shown in a previous chapter that although we had called our organization the ‘Congress,’ we never in¬ tended to make our grievances a party question. We therefore corresponded with gentlemen belonging to other parties as well, with the full knowledge of Dadabhai. The most prominent among them were Sir Muncherjee Bhow- nuggree and Sir W. W. Hunter. Sir Muncherjee was then a member of Parliament. His assistance was valuable, and he always used to favour us with important sugges¬ tions. But if there was any one who had realized the importance of the Indian question in South Africa before the Indians themselves and accorded them valuable support, it was Sir William Wilson Hunter. He was editor of the Indian section of the Times, wherein he discussed our question in its true perspective, ever since we first addressed him in connection with it. He wrote personal letters to several gentlemen in support of our cause. He used to write to us almost every week when some important question was on the anvil. This is the purport of his very first letter: “I am sorry to read of the situation there. You have been conducting your struggle courteously, peace¬ fully and without exaggeration. My sympathies are entirely with you on this question. I will do my best publicly as well as in private to see that justice is done to you. I am certain that we cannot yield even an inch of ground in this matter. Your demand being so reasonable, no impartial person would even suggest that you should moderate it.” He reproduced the letter almost word for word in the first article he wrote for the Times on the question. His attitude remained the same throughout, and Lady Hunter wrote in the course of a letter that shortly before his death he had prepared an outline of a series of articles which he had planned on the Indian question.
62 SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA I have mentioned the name of Shri Mansukhlal Nazar in the last chapter. This gentleman was deputed to Eng¬ land on behalf of the Indian community to explain the situation in detail. He was instructed to work with mem¬ bers of all parties, and during his stay in England he kept in touch with Sir W. W. Hunter, Sir Muncherjee Bhownu- ggree and the British Committee of the Indian National Congress. He was likewise in touch with several retired officers of the Indian Civil Service, with the India Office and with the Colonial Office. Thus our endeavours were directed in all possible quarters. The result of all this evid¬ ently was that the condition of Indians overseas became a question of first-rate importance in the eyes of the Imper¬ ial Government. This fact reacted for good as well as for evil on the other colonies. That is to say, in all the colonies where Indians had settled, they awoke to the importance of their own position and the Europeans awoke to the danger which they thought the Indians were to their predominance.
CHAPTER IX THE BOER WAR The reader has seen in the previous chapters what was the condition of the Indians in South Africa at the outbreak of the Boer War and what were the steps taken so far in order to ameliorate it.
In 1899 Dr Jameson carried out his raid on Johannes¬ burg in pursuance of the conspiracy which he had entered into with the owners of the gold mines. The conspirators had expected that the Boer Government would come to know of the raid only after they captured Johannesburg. Dr Jameson and his associates badly blundered in this calculation of theirs. They fell into another error when they imagined that even in case of the plot being discovered, untrained Boer farmers could do nothing < against sharp¬ shooters trained in Rhodesia. The raiders had likewise expe¬ cted that a large majority of the population of Johannesburg would receive them with open arms. Here too the good THE BOER WAR 63 THE BOER WAR 63 Doctor was reckoning without his host. President Kruger had full information beforehand. With great deliberation, skill and secrecy he made preparations to meet Dr Jameson and simultaneously arranged to arrest his fellow conspi¬ rators. Dr Jameson, therefore, was greeted by the Boers with gunfire before he had reached anywhere near Johan¬ nesburg. The Doctor’s party was in no position to try conclu¬ sions with the army which faced them. Arrangements were similarly complete for preventing a rising in Johannesburg. None dared raise their heads and the millionaires of Johan¬ nesburg were dumbfounded in consequence of President Kruger’s action. The result of his excellent preparations was that the raid was disposed of with a minimum of loss in men as well as money.
Dr Jameson and his friends, the owners of gold mines, were arrested and placed on their trial without delay. Some were sentenced to be hanged. Most of these convicts were millionaires; but the Imperial Government could do nothing for them, as they were guilty of a raid in broad daylight. President Kruger became an important man all at once. Mr Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent a humble cablegram to him, and appealed to his sense of mercy on behalf of the convicted magnates. President Kruger was perfect master of his own game. He had no apprehension of his independence being challen¬ ged by any power in South Africa. The conspiracy of Dr Jameson and his friends was a well-planned affair in their own eyes, but to President Kruger it seemed to be an act of insensate folly. He therefore complied with Mr Cham¬ berlain’s humble request and not only did not enforce the sentence of death against any of the convicts but granted them all full pardon and set them free.
But things could not go on like this for any length of time. President Kruger knew that the Jameson raid was only a minor symptom of a serious malady. It was impos¬ sible that the millionaires of Johannesburg should not endeavour to wipe out their disgrace by all means in their power. Again, nothing had been done to carry out the reforms for which the Jameson raid purported to have been orga¬ nized. The millionaires, therefore, were not likely to hold 64 SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA their peace. Lord Milner, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, had full sympathy with their demands. Mr Chamberlain, too, while expressing his appreciation of President Kruger’s magnanimity towards the Jameson raiders, had drawn his attention to the necessity for reforms. Every one believed that an appeal to the sword was inevi¬ table. The demands of the Uitlanders were calculated in the end to extinguish Boer domination in the Transvaal. Both the parties were aware that the ultimate result would be war, and both were therefore preparing for it. The war of words which ensued was worthy of note. When Presi¬ dent Kruger ordered out arms and ammunition, the British Agent warned him that the British would be compelled to bring troops into South Africa in self-defence. When British troops arrived in South Africa President Kruger taunted the British and pushed forward his preparations for war. Thus each side was protesting against the other’s activities and strengthening its own preparations.
When President Kruger had completed his prepara¬ tions, he saw that to delay any longer was to play into the hands of his enemies. The British had an inexhaustible supply of men and money. They could, therefore, afford to bide their time, gradually preparing for war and in the meantime ask President Kruger to redress the grievances •of Uitlanders, and thus show to the world that they could not help waging war as he refused to grant redress. Then they would enter the war with such grand preparations that the Boers could not stand the shock and would have to accept British demands in a spirit of humiliation. Every Boer man between eighteen and sixty years in age was a skilled fighter. Boer women, too, were capable for fighting if they chose. National independence had with the Boers all the force of a religious principle. Such a brave people would not suffer humiliation even at the hands of a world empire.
President Kruger had already arrived at an under¬ standing with the Orange Free State. Both the Boer republics followed an identical policy. President Kruger had not the slightest intention of accepting the British demands whether in full or even to the extent of satisfying THE BOER WAR 65 THE BOER WAR 65 the Uitlanders. Both* the republics, therefore, thought that war being inevitable, for them to give any more time to the British was only to give them a chance of advancing their preparations. President Kruger thereupon delivered an ultimatum to Lord Milner, and at the same time mobi¬ lized troops on the frontiers of the Transvaal as well as the Free State. The result of such action was a foregone conclusion. A world empire like the British would not take a threat lying down. The time limit laid down in the ultimatum expired and the Boers, advancing with lightning speed, laid siege to Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking. This great war thus broke out in 1899. The reader will remember that one of the causes of the war alleged by the British was the treatment accorded to the Indians by the Boers.
The great question, as to what the Indians in South Africa should do on* this occasion, now presented itself for solution. Among the Boers, the entire male population joined the war. Lawyers gave up their practice, farmers their farms, traders their trade, and servants left their service. The British in South Africa did not join the war in anything like the same proportion as the Boers. How¬ ever, a large number of civilians in Cape Colony, Natal and Rhodesia enrolled themselves as volunteers. Many distinguished English traders and lawyers followed suit. I now found very few lawyers in the court where I was practising as an advocate. Most of the senior members of the bar were engaged in war work. One of the charges laid against the Indians was, that they went to South Africa only for money-grubbing and were merely a dead¬ weight upon the British. Like worms which settle inside wood and eat it up hollow, the Indians were in South Africa only to fatten themselves upon them. The Indians would not render them the slightest aid if the country was invaded or if tbeir homes were raided. The British in such a case would have not only to defend themselves against the enemy but at the same time to protect the Indians. We Indians carefully considered this charg All of us felt that this was a golden opportunity for us to prove that it was baseless. But on the other hand the following considerations were also urged by some: 66 SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA “The British oppress us equally with the Boers. If we are subjected to hardships in the Transvaal, we are not very much better off in Natal or the Gape Colony. The difference, if any, is only one of degree. Again we are more or less a community of slaves; knowing as we do that a small nation like the Boers is fighting for its very existence, why should we be instrumental in their destruc¬ tion? Finally, from a practical point of view, no one will take it upon himself to predict a defeat for the Boers. And if they win, they will never fail to wreak vengeance upon us.”
There was a powerful party among us which strongly advanced the above argument. I could understand it and allowed it due weight. However, it did not commend itself to me, and I refuted it to myself and to the community as follows: “Our existence in South Africa is only in our capacity as British subjects. In every memorial we have presented, we have asserted our rights as such. We have been proud of our British citizenship, or have given our rulers and the world to believe that we are so proud. Our rulers profess to safeguard our rights because we are British sub¬ jects, and what little rights we still retain, we retain because we are British subjects. It would Jbe unbecoming to our dignity as a nation to look on with folded hands at I ' aTnheT when ruin stared the British in the face as well as ourselves, simply becauie~They ill-treat usTiereT And such cnminarihaction could only aggravate our difficulties. If we missed this opportunity, which had come to us un¬ sought, of proving the falsity of a charge which we beli¬ eved to be false, we should stand self-condemned, and it would be no matter for surprise if then the English treated us worse than before and sneered at us more than ever. The fault in such a case would lie entirely at our door. To say, that the charges preferred against ourselves had no foundation in fact and were absolutely untenable, would only be to deceive ourselves. It is true that we are helots in the Empire, but so far we have tried to better our condition, continuing the while to remain in the Empire. That has been the policy of all our leaders in THE BOER WAR 67 India, and ours too. And if we desire to win our freedom and achieve our welfare as members of the British Empire, here is a golden opportunity for us to do so by helping the British in the war by all the means at our disposal. It must largely be conceded that justice is on the jside of the Boers. But every single subject of a state must not hope to enforce his private opinion in all cases. The autho- rities may not always be right, but so long as the subjects own allegiance to a state, it is their clear duty generally to accommodate themselves, and to accord their support, to acts of the state.
“Again, if any class among the subjects considers that the action of a government is immoral from a reli¬ gious standpoint, before they help or hinder it, they must endeavour fully and even at the risk of their lives to dis¬ suade the government from pursuing such a course. We have done nothing of the kind. Such a moral crisis is not present before us, and no one says that we wish to hold aloof from this war for any such universal and compre¬ hensive reason. Our ordinary duty as subjects, therefore, is not to enter into the merits of the war, but when war has actually broken out, to render such assistance as we possibly can. Finally, to suggest that in case the Boers won, — and a Boer victory was well within the range of possibility, — our last state would be worse than our first, and the Boers would exact frightful revenge, would be doing injustice to the chivalrous Boers as well as to our¬ selves. To waste the slightest thought upon such a con¬ tingency would only be a sign of our effeminacy and a reflection on our loyalty. Would an Englishman think for a moment what would happen to himself if the English lost the war? A man about to join a war cannot advance such an argument without forfeiting his manhood.”
I advanced these arguments in 1899, and even today I do not see any reason for modifying them. That is to say, if I had today the faith in the British Empire which I then entertained, and if I now cherished the hope, which I did at that time, of achieving our freedom under its aegis, I would advance the same arguments, word for word, in South Africa, and, in similar circumstances, even 68 SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA in India. I heard many attempted refutations of these arguments in South Africa and subsequently in England. But I discovered no ground for changing my views. I know that my present opinions have no bearing on the subject of this volume, but there are two valid reasons why I have adverted to the matter here. I have, in the first place, no right to expect that; the reader who takes up this book in a hurry will give it a patient and attentive perusal, and such a reader will find it difficult to recon¬ cile the above views with my present activities. Secondly, the underlying principle in the above arguments is Satya- graha, insistence on truth. That one should " appear to be as one really is and should act accordingly, is not the last, but the first step to practical religion. The building up of a religious life is impossible without such a foundation.
To return to our narrative.
My arguments commended themselves to many. The reader must not suppose that I was the only one to ad¬ vance them. Moreover, even before these views were set forth, there were many Indians who held that we should do our bit in the war. But now the practical question arose: Who would lend an ear to the weak voice of the Indians when there was raging this terrible whirlwind of war? What weight would this offer of help carry? None of us had ever wielded a weapon of war. Even the work performed by non-combatants in a war required training. None of us knew even how to march in step. It was no easy task to perform long marches with one’s baggage on one’s own shoulders. Again, the whites would treat us all as ‘coolies,’ insult us and look down upon us. How was all this to be borne? And if we volunteered for ser¬ vice, how could we induce the Government to accept our offer? Finally, we came to the conclusion, that we should make earnest endeavours to get our offer accepted, that the experience of work would teach us to do more work, that if we had the will, God would grant us the ability to serve, that we need not worry how we could do the work entrusted but should train ourselves for it as best we might, and that having once decided to serve, we THE BOER WAR 69