to cast off the form it has in order to receive another, and so form does not remain permanently in a substance. M. aptly compares matter to a faithless wife, who, although not being without a husband, continually seeks another man in his place (Moreh, III, 8). The soul, according to Aristotle, is the form of the body which, as matter, has merely a potential- ity for existence. See supra, p. 37, n. 2. He says, "It must follow, then, that soul is substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having in it the capacity of life." (De Anima, II, 1, ed. Hicks, pp. 48 and 49). M. agrees with this, and says in Tesode ha-Torah, IV, 8. "The soul of all flesh is its form which God has given it." The human soul, however, needs in turn a form in order that it may become a reality. The soul's form is, as M. states here, reason (^3tf, ^pP, vovi), or more definitely the acquired reason (napan bst?; see Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., c. Ill; also p. 59, note E; p. 65 ff., especially p. 66), and it this that makes man what he is. Cf. Moreh, I, 7. "It is acknowledged that a man who does not possess this form, is no man."
2 See Moreh, I, 68; Scheyer, ibid., c. II, c. Ill, and especially Munk, Guide, I, pp. 304-308, note.
3 In Perek Helek, Seventh Article of Faith (Holzer, Dogmenlehre, p. 24; 46 I. Friedlaender, Arabic Writings of M., p. 32), M. mentions his intention of writing a Book on Prophecy and a Book of Harmony (ifflN PP3K "p'B^ •si 13 porno "i«w nNttan nans IN wro11 i»« rwnn wiTsa DK iDipe^), for the purpose of elucidating the exoteric lessons of the prophets and of the Midrashim. After having started, however, he abandoned this intention, and later incorporated the material for the Book on Prophecy in the Moreh, Part II, in chapters 32 to 48, and that of the Book of Harmony (HBD TTKIOTin) he scattered throughout the Moreh. See Moreh, I, Introd.; Bloch, Charakteristik und Inhaltsangabe des Moreh Nebuchim, in Moses ben Maimon, I, pp. 7, 8 and 15.
CHAPTER II CONCERNING THE TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL AND THE DESIGNATION OF THOSE FACULTIES WHICH ARE THE SEAT OF THE VIRTUES AND THE VICES t KNOW that transgressions and observances of the Law have their origin only in two of the faculties of the soul, namely, the sensitive 2 and the appetitive, and that to these two faculties alone are to be ascribed all transgressions and observances. The faculties of nutrition and imagination do not give rise to observance or transgression, for in connection with neither is there any conscious or voluntary act. That is, man cannot consciously suspend their functions, nor can he curtail any one of their activities. The proof of this is that the functions of both these faculties, the nutritive and the imaginative, continue to be operative when one is asleep, which is not true of any other of the soul's faculties.3 1 For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 102 ff.; Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XL VI p. 10; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 54 ff. On the title, see Hebrew text, c. II, p. 14, n. 1 and 2.
J In ascribing transgressions and observances to the faculty of sensation, M. differs from Aristotle who asserts that sense is the originating cause of no moral action, since brutes, too, are possessed of sense-, but are in no ways partakers of moral actions (Eth. Nic., VT, 2). M., however, draws a distinction between the sensitive faculty of man and that of animals. Sen- sation as applied to man and beast is a honionymous term, the sensitive faculty of man being different from that of all other animate beings. See supra, c. I, pp. 39 — 40.
3 M. differs from al-Farabi who ascribes participation in moral and im- moral acts to all the faculties of the soul (rrtiTCDin rv6nnn, p. 35 ff.). The 48 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES As regards the rational faculty, uncertainty prevails (among philosophers) *, but I maintain that observance and transgression may also originate in this faculty, in so far as one believes a true or a false doctrine, though no action which may be de- signated as an observance or a transgression results there- from.2 Consequently, as I said above, these two faculties (the latter, however, does not consider nutrition to be one of the faculties. Abraham ibn Daud, including nutrition among the soul's faculties, allots to each a cardinal virtue (Emunah Ramah, III, p. 110). Aristotle excludes the imagination as one of the faculties directly affecting the performance of virtues, but considers it as producing movement through the agency of appetency (De Anima, III, 10). M., later, departs somewhat from the view he holds in the Perdkim regarding the imagination, and, in agreement with Aristotle, considers it to be bound up indirectly, through the appeti- tive faculty, with conscious activity (see Scheyer, ibid., pp. 98, and 105). This is the sense of the passage in Moreh, II, 4, where he states that animate beings move either by instinct (P3B considered equivalent to PO "niynttn), or by reason. Instinct he defines as the intention of an animate being to approach something agreeable, or to shun something disagreeable, as, for instance, to approach water on account of thirst, or to avoid the sun on account of its heat. He, then, goes on to say that it makes no difference whether the thing really exists or is imaginary, since the ima- gination of something agreeable or of something disagreeable likewise causes the animate being to move (Tin D"J SjmrY1 nwty noi 1J33 Nintf ntt JV&13 "O). Furthermore, in Moreh, II, 12, he declares that all defects in speech or character are either the direct or indirect work of the imagination (*?3 '3 \hy& nriN -jt?»3 IN pnsin bj?s Kin rmea IN -121:1 pnon). In regard to prophecy, M. lays great stress upon the imagination (ibid., II, 35), considering pro- phecy to be the most perfect development of the imaginative faculty. During sleep this faculty is the same as when it receives prophecy, except that when asleep the imagination is not fully developed, and has not reached its highest perfection. See supra, c. I, p. 41, n. 1.
2 Of. Moreh, II, 4, "But even a being that is endowed with the faculty of forming an idea, and possesses a soul with the faculty of moving, does not change its place on each occasion that it forms an idea; for an idea alone does not produce motion, as has been explained in (Aristotle's) Meta- physics. We can easily understand this, when we consider how often we form ideas of certain things, yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do so; it is only when the desire arises for the thing imagined that we move in order to obtain it." Cf. De Anima III, 10. The same thought is expressed in Eth. NIC. VI, 2, "And so since moral virtue is a THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— II 49 sensitive and the appetitive) alone really produce transgressions and observances.
Now, as for the virtues, they are of two kinds, moral and intellectual, with the corresponding two classes of vices.1 The intellectual virtues belong to the rational faculty. They are (1) wisdom, which is the knowledge of the direct and indirect causes of things based on a previous realization of the existence of those things, the causes of which have been investigated; 2 (2) rea- son, consisting of (a) inborn, theoretical reason, that is, axioms,3 (b) the acquired intellect,* which we need not discuss here, and disposition exercising choice, and choice is will consequent on deliberation, the reason must be true and the will right to constitute good choice, and what the reason affirms the will must pursue...But operation of the in- tellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result — i. e. exercised in moral action..." See Scheyer, ibid., p. 103 — 104; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 56, n. 2.
i Cf. Eth. Nic., (ofxrcu -finical and diavorjriKai) I, 11 (end); II, 1; VI, 2; Eude- mian Ethics, II, 1; Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XIV (nvnim ni!?jm nrmn rtbyti).
s Wisdom (n»3n), according to M., is used of four different things (Moreh, III, 54). It denotes (1) the knowledge of those truths which lead to the knowledge of God, (2) the knowledge of any workmanship, (3) the acquisition of moral principles, and (4) cunning and subtlety. In Moreh, I, 69, where M. demonstrates that God is the Primal Cause, in agreement with Aristotle (Physics, II, 7), he asserts that everything owes its origin to four causes, the substance, the form, the agens (^JHB), and the final cause (rpbsn). These are sometimes direct (D^"lp), and sometimes indirect (D^pim), though each in itself is a cause (rfov or mo, corresponding to Ar. <*-X* and *_-*-^«M>; alrla, atnov. Cf. Munk, Guide, I, p. 313, n. 1.)
8 Literally, first impressions (fiWBWin rflbSBflOn; Ar.!?lit!?N rtN^pJJD; apxai rQ>v airoSfiKT&v a&6fjMTa, intelligibilia prima), which are fundamental principles or axioms that would need no proof even though man were left in his primitive state (Moreh, I, 51), and which are explained by common sense. There are four kinds of knowledge which need no demonstration, one of them being the knowledge of axioms, as, for instance, that the whole is greater than a part, that two is an even number, that two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other (Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XIV), and that one cannot both affirm and deny a thing. See Scheyer, note to Moreh, I, 51. Cf. Eth. Nic., VI, 6 on Intuitive Apprehension; Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 16 — 17; and Munk, Guide, I, p. 128, n. 3.
* For the definition and description of the acquired intellect (HipiH bys or bSNin mpin hytl; Ar. IXSnoobN hpvhx, vow <?T«CT^OS), see Moreh, I, 72; I. T.
D 50 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES (c) sagacity and intellectual cleverness, which is the ability to perceive quickly, and to grasp an idea without delay, or in a very short time. The vices of this faculty are the antitheses or the opposites of these virtues.
Moral virtues belong only to the appetitive faculty to which that of sensation in this connection is merely subservient.1 The virtues of this faculty are very numerous, being moderation, [i. e. fear of sin], liberality, honesty, meekness, humility, contentedness, [which the Rabbis call "wealth", when they say, "Who is truly wealthy? He who is contented with his lot"2], courage, [faith- fulness], and other virtues akin to these. The vices of this faculty consist of a deficiency or of an exaggeration of these qualities.
As regards the faculties of nutrition and imagination, it can- not be said that they have vices or virtues, but that the nutri- tive functions work properly or improperly; as, for instance, when one says that a man's digestion is good or bad, or that one's imagination is confused or clear. This does not mean, however, that they have virtues or vices.
So much we wished to discuss in this chapter.
Glossary of Strange Words, sub voce (under D); Scheyer, ibid., pp. 17 — 19, 39—93; Munk, Guide, I, pp. 307—308, note; Rosin, Ethik, p. 57, n. 1; Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 11, n. 1; and idem, Miisa b. Maimtins eschatologische Gedanken, p. 13, etc.
2 Abot, IV, 1.
2 Abot, IV, 1.
THE ancients2 maintained that the soul, like the body, is subject to good health and illness. The soul's healthful state is due to its condition, and that of its faculties, by which it con- stantly does what is right, and performs what is proper, while the illness of the soul is occasioned by its condition, and that of its faculties, which results in its constantly doing wrong, and performing actions that are improper.3 The science of medicine investigates the health of the body. Now, just as those, who are physically ill, imagine that, on account of their vitiated tastes, the sweet is bitter and the bitter is sweet — and likewise fancy the wholesome to be unwholesome — and just as their desire grows stronger, and their enjoyment increases for such things as dust, coal, very acidic and sour foods, and the like — which the healthy loathe and refuse, as they are not only not beneficial even to the healthy, but possibly harmful — so those whose souls are ill, that is the wicked and the morally perverted, imagine that the bad is good, and that the good is bad. The wicked man, moreover, continually longs for excesses which are really pernicious, but which, on account of the illness of his soul, he considers to be good.4 Likewise, just as when i For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XL VI pp. 10—11; and Rosin, Ethik,p. 77 ff. A short summary is contained in H. Deot, II, 1.
3 Of. Pirke Mosheh, in Kobe?, II, 20b, WV D^lDl^sn 1BND »VT7i p nfffc ifi» •y\ "Vim nwa vsti.
* Aristotle, in discussing Pleasures (Eth. Nic., X, 5), says, "Yet in the case of human creatures they (pleasures) differ not a little; for the very same things please some and pain others; and what are painful and hateful n* 62 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES people, unacquainted with the science of medicine, realize that they are sick, and consult a physician, who tells them what they must do, forbidding them to partake of that which they imagine beneficial, and prescribing for them things which are unpleasant and bitter, in order that their bodies may become healthy, and that they may again choose the good and spurn the bad, so those whose souls become ill should consult the sages, the moral physicians, who will advise them against indulging in those evils which they (the morally ill) think are good, so that they may be healed by that art of which I shall speak in the next chapter, and through which the moral qualities are restored to their normal condition. But, if he who is morally sick be not aware of his illness, imagining that he is well, or, being aware of it, does not seek a remedy, his end will be similar to that of one, who, suffering from bodily ailment, yet continuing to indulge himself, neglects to be cured, and who in consequence surely meets an untimely death.
Those who know that they are in a diseased state, but neverthe- less yield to their inordinate passions, are described in the truthful Law which quotes their own words, "Though I walk in the stubbor- ness of my heart, in order that the indulgence of the passions may appease the thirst for them." * This means that, intending to quench the to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the case with sweet things; the same will not seem so to the man in a fever as to him who is in health; nor will the invalid and the person in robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with other things also." Cf., also, H. Deot, II, 1, "To those who are diseased the bitter tastes sweet and the sweet bitter. Some sick people, moreover, crave and long for food that is unfit to eat, such as dust and charcoal, spurning food that is bene- ficial, such as bread and meat, according to the intensity of their illness. Likewise, people whose souls are diseased desire and love evil character- istics, and hate the moral path, being loathe to pursue it, since, on ac- count of their illness, it is very difficult for them to do so. Thus, Isaiah says of such people, '"Wo unto those that say of the evil it is good, and of the good it is evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness, that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter' (V, 20). Concerning them it is also said that '(they are those) who leave the path of uprightness to walk in the ways of darkness' (Prov. II, 13)." i Dt. XXIX, 18.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— III 53 thirst, it is, on the contrary, intensifed. He who is ignorant of his illness is spoken of in many places by Solomon, who says, "The way of the fool is straight in his own eyes, but he who hearkeneth unto counsel is wise".1 This means that he who listens to the counsel of the sage is wise, for the sage teaches him the way that is actually right, and not the one that he (the morally ill) erroneously considers to be such. Solomon also says, "There is many a way which seemeth even before a man; but its ends are ways unto death".2 Again, in regard to these who are morally ill, in that they do not know what is injurious from that which is beneficial, he says, "The way of the wicked is like darkness; they do not know against what they stumble." » The art of healing the diseases of the soul will, however, form the subject-matter of the fourth chapter.
i Prov. XII, 15. J Ibid., XIV, 12.
» Ibid., IV, 19. Cf. jff. Deot, II, 1, "What is the remedy for those whose souls are diseased? Let them consult the sages who are the physicians of the soul, who will cure their disease by teaching them those character- istics by which they may return to the moral path, and recognize their evil traits. Concerning those who do not seek the sages in order to be cured, Solomon says, 'wisdom and instruction fools despise' (Prov. I, 7)". The conception of a spiritual healing originated neither with Aristotle nor with M. There are many biblical passages based on such a comparison with the healing art, as Jer. Ill, 22: D^niSltfD nEJiN; Hos. XIV, 5: nraitPfi «B1« Ps. XLI, 5: ~\h TiNton "O "PBi n«an«, etc. Rosin, Ethik, p. 78, n. 4, refers to similar passages in Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic literature.
CHAPTER IV CONCERNING THE CURE OF THE DISEASES OF THE SOUL t GOOD deeds are such as are equibalanced,2 maintaining the mean between two equally bad extremes, the too much and the i To this chapter, in which the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean (Meffbrrp, balance) is applied to Jewish ethics, M. later supplemented H. Deot, I, 1—7; II, 2, 3, 7; and III, 1. Cf. Eth. Nic. II, 5—9; III, 8—14; IV. Although M. follows Aristotle in defining virtue as a state inter- mediate between two extremes, the too little and the too much, he still remains on Jewish ground, as there are biblical and Talmudical passages expressing such a thought. Such passages are Prov. IV, 26, "Balance well the track of thy foot, and let all thy ways be firmly right"; ibid., XXX, 8, "Neither poverty nor riches give thou unto me"; Eccles. VII, 16, "Be not righteous overmuch; neither show thyself overwise" (quoted in H. Deot, III, 1); etc. In Moreh, I, 32, M. interprets "neither show thyself overwise" and "To eat too much honey is not good" (Prov. XXV, 27) as a warning against attempting to exceed the limits of one's intellectual powers, and as an admonition to keep knowledge within bounds. In the Palestinian Talmud (Hagigah, II, 77 a bot.), there is found an interesting passage which sums up well the thought of this chapter, and it is curious that M. did not refer to it. It reads, "The ways of the Torah may be likened to two roads, on one of which fire and on the other snow is encountered. If one go along one path, he will be burned to death, and if he proceed along the other, he will perish in the snow. What, then, should one do? He must go between the extremes." A similar passage is found in Tosefta Hagigah 2 (cf. Yer. Hagigah, p. 20), "They make it incumbent upon man to go between the extremes, and not to incline to this side or to that." See, also, Sotah, 5 a, "he (the scholar) in whom there is pride deserves ex- communication, and also he in whom there is no pride at all." For a discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of the Meo^s, see Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. I, pp. 251 — 262. For that of M., see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XLVI, pp. 11 — 12; Rosin, Ethik, p. 26, n. 1; p. 79 ff.; Lazarus, Ethik, vol. I, Abhang XIV (Eng. ed. vol. I, p. 273 f.); Wolff, Acht Capitel, Introd., pp. XIII — XIV; Yellin and Abrahams, Maimonides, pp. 78 — 83; Cohen, Charakteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. Ill ff.; A. Lb'wenthal in JE., II, p. 101; Lewis, in Aspects of the Hebrew Genius, (London, 1910) pp. 82 — 83. On the mean in Jewish religious philosophy, see Rosin, Ethik, pp. 10, 12, 14, 19, 24; H. Malter, JQR (new series) vol. I, p. 160, n. 15.
* BMttTJ, the equidistant (equivalent to the Aristotelian foov, the exactly THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— IV 55 too little.1 Virtues are psychic conditions and dispositions which are mid-way between two reprehensible extremes, one of which is characterized by an exaggeration, the other by a deficiency.2 Good deeds are the product of these dispositions. To illustrate, abstemiousness is a disposition which adopts a mid-course between inordinate passion and total insensibility to pleasure. Abstem- iousness, then, is a proper rule of conduct, and the psychic dis- position which gives rise to it is an ethical quality; but inordi- nate passion, the extreme of excess, and total insensibility to enjoyment, the extreme of deficiency3, are both absoluteley pernicious. The psychic dispositions, from which these two extremes, inordinate passion and insensibility, result — the one being an exaggeration, the other a deficiency — are alike classed among moral imperfections.
Likewise, liberality is the mean between sordidness and extra- vagence; courage, between recklessness and cowardice; dignity, between haughtiness and loutishness4; humility, between arrogance equal, the normal, or equibalanced); cf. Moreh, II, 39, "It is clear, then, that the Law is normal (rPWfi) in this sense; for it contains the words, 'Just statutes and judgments' (Deut. IV, 8); but 'just' is here identical with 'equibalanced' (D^llW)."
i D'JttlO&n, the mean (Aristotelian ntvov). Nic. Eth., II, 6, "By an ob- jective mean, I understand that which is equidistant from the two given extremes, and which is one and the same to all, and by a mean relatively to the person, I understand that which is neither too much nor too little."
8 Cf. ibid., "Virtue, then, is a disposition of the moral purpose in relative balance, which is determined by a standard, according as the thoughtful man would determine. It is a middle state between two faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side, and defect on the other; and it is so, moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other side exceed, what is right, both in the case of the emotions and the actions; but virtue finds, and, when found, adopts the mean." Cf. JET. Deot, 1, 4, and II, 2.
s ]lt?ion nspn, is the extreme of excess (Aristotle's vweppo\fy, and rrcpn pnKn the extreme of deficiency (ax«^w). Cf. H. Deot, I, 5; III, 1; pmnNl '31 p nnw vfyi "i»i hw »bv n» |nn«n inb, where ynnNn ns clearly means the extreme of the too little.
* See Hebrew text, c. IV, pp. 19—20, n. 17. On the gloss royiDtt nmni '31, introduced here in some Mss. and edd., see Hebrew text, c. IV, p. 20, note. This gloss seems to go back to Eth. Nic., II, 7, "He that is as he 56 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES and self-abasement; contentedness, between avarice and slothful indifference; and magnificence, between meanness and profusion. [Since definite terms do not exist in our language with, which to express these latter qualities, it is necessary to explain their con- tent, and tell what the philosophers meant by them. A man is called magnificent whose whole intention is to do good to others by personal service, by money, or advice, and with all his power, but without meanwhile bringing suffering or disgrace upon himself. That is the medium line of conduct. The mean man is one who does not want others to succeed in anything, even though he himself may not thereby suffer any loss, hardship, or injury. That is the one extreme. The profuse man, on the contrary, is one who willingly performs the above-mentioned deeds, in spite of the fact that thereby he brings upon himself great injury, or disgrace, terrible hardship, or considerable loss. That is the other extreme.1] Gentleness is the mean between irascibility and insensibility to shame and disgrace; and modesty, between impudence and shamefacedness.2 [The explanation of these latter should be may be called friendly, and his mean state friendliness; he that exceeds, if it be without any interested motive, somewhat too complaisant, if with such motive, a flatterer; he that is deficient and in all instances unpleasant, quarrelsome and cross."
1 The virtue which I. T. explains here, owing to the inadequacy of the Hebrew terms, is the one which Aristotle calls magnificence (I. T.'s llto 21?). The excess is want of taste or wdgar profusion (xhr\ 21B ynn11), and the defect paltriness (<"6i3n). See Eth. Nic., loc. cit. According to Aristotle, magnificence is a higher kind of liberality (niTIJ), and consists of the spending of money on a grand scale, with taste and propriety. It is prompted by a desire for what is noble, concerning itself with the services of religion, public works, and so forth. The vulgar man, whose object is ostentation, offends with excessive splendor, while the mean man, on the other hand, through timidity and constant fear of expense, even though he does expend large amounts, mars the whole effect by some petty charac- teristic of meanness (ibid., IV, 2). I. T. has, accordingly, incorrectly ex- plained the terms 21B 2^, ntei, and S&Tl 21b ]nn».
2 See JET. Deot, I, and II for a list and discussion of the virtues. Aristotle mentions and discussess the following virtues in Eth. Nic.; courage (II, 7, and III, 6 — 9), perfected self-mastery or temperance (II, 7, and III, 10—11), liberality (II, 7, and IV, 1), magnificence (II, 7 and IV, 2), greatness of soul (II, 7, and IV, 3), love of honor (II, 7, and IV, 4), THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— IV 57 terms, gleaned from the sayings of our sages (may their memory be blessed!) seems to be this. In their opinion, a modest man is one who is very bashful, and therefore modesty is the mean. This we gather from their saying, "A shamefaced man cannot learn".1 They also assert, "A modest man is worthy of Paradise"2, but they do not say this of a shamefaced man. Therefore, I have thus arranged them." 3] So it is with the other qualities. One does not necessarily have to use conventional terms for these qualities, if only the ideas are clearly fixed in the mind.4