confided in me, to sanctity me" 6, "because ye rebelled against my order at the waters of Meribah"7, "because ye did not sanctify me".s All this (God said) although the sin of Moses consisted merely in that he departed from the moral mean of patience to the extreme of wrath in so far as he exclaimed, "Hear now ye rebels"9 etc., yet for this God found fault with him that such a man as he should show anger in the presence of the entire community of Israel, where wrath is unbecoming. This was a profanation of God's name, because men imitated the words and conduct of Moses, hoping thereby to attain temporal and eternal happiness. How could he, then, allow his wrath free play, since it is a pernicious characteristic, arising, as we have shown, from an evil psychic condition? The divine 1 Cf. Moreh, III, 36.
2 Cf. M.'s Commentary on Abot, V, 14 (Rawicz, Commentar, p. 100). See Eth. Nic., VII, 1, "it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike".
3 Job IV, 18. * Ibid., XXV, 4. * Eccl. VII, 20. • Num. XX, 12. i Ibid., XX, 24. s Deut. XXXII, 51. 9 Num. XX, 10.
68 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES words,,,Ye (Israel) have rebelled against me" are, however, to be explained as follows. Moses was not speaking to ignorant and vicious people, but to an assembly, the most insignificant of whose women, as the sages put it, were on a plane with Ezekiel, the son of Buzi.1 So, when Moses said or did any- thing, they subjected his words or actions to the most searching examination.2 Therefore, when they saw that he waxed wrath- ful, they said, "He has no moral imperfection, and did he not know that God is angry with us for demanding water, and that we have stirred up the wrath of God, he would not have been angry with us". However, we do not find that when God spoke to Moses about this matter He was angry, but on the contrary, said, "Take the staff...and give drink to the congregation and their cattle".3 We have, indeed, digressed from the subject of this chapter, but have, I hope, satisfactorily solved one of the most difficult passages of Scripture concerning which there has been much arguing in the attempt to state exactly what the sin was which Moses committed. Let what others have said be compared with our opinion, and the truth will surely prevail.
Now, let me return to my subject. If a man will always carefully discriminate as regards his actions, directing them to the medium course, he will reach the highest degree of per- fection possible to a human being, thereby approaching God,4 and sharing in His happiness. This is the most acceptable way of serving God which the sages, too, had in mind when they wrote the words, "He who ordereth his course aright is worthy of seeing the salvation of God, as it is said, 'to him that ordereth his course aright will I show, will I show the salvation of God!'5 Do not read wesam but wesJiam derek".6 Shumah means "weighing" ajid "valuation". This is exactly the idea which we have explained in this chapter.
This is all we think necessary to be said on this subject.
1 Mekilta to r6»3 (Ex. XV, 2). 2 See Moreh, I, 4, on the interpretation of Ex. XXIII, 8. 3 Num. XX, 8.
4 See below, c. VII, n. 5 a. On nearness to God (nimpnn), see Cohen, Charakteristik, etc., in Moses b. Maimon, vol. I, pp. 106, and 124.
OHAPTEE V CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF MAN'S PSYCHIC FACULTIES TOWARDS THE ATTAINMENT OF A SINGLE GOAL i As we have explained in the preceding chapter, it is the duty of man to subordinate all the faculties of his soul to his reason. He must keep his mind's eye fixed constantly upon one goal, namely, the attainment of the knowledge of God2 (may He be blessed!), as far as it is possible for mortal man to know Him. Consequently, one must so adjust all his actions, his whole conduct, and even his very words, that they lead to this goal, in order that none of his deeds be aimless, and thus retard the attainment of that end. So, his only design in eating, drinking, cohabiting, sleeping, waking, moving about, and resting should be the preservation of bodily health, while, in turn, the reason for the latter is that the soul and its agencies may be in sound and perfect condition, so that he may readily acquire wisdom, and gain moral and intellectual virtues, all to the end that man may reach the highest goal of his endeavors.
Accordingly, man will not direct his attention merely to obtain bodily enjoyment, choosing of food and drink and the other things of life only the agreeable, but he will seek out the most useful, being indifferent whether it be agreeable or not. There are, indeed, times when the agreeable may be 1 For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XL VI, pp. 2—13, and Rosin, Ethik, p. 105 S.
2 Cf. Ibn Baud, Emunah Eamah, III, and Moreh, III, 51. See I. Fried- laender, Der Stil des Maimonides, in Moses b. Maimon, I, p. 430.
70 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES used from a curative point of view, as, for instance, when one suffers from loss of appetite, it may be stirred up by highly seasoned delicacies and agreeable, palatable food. Similarly, one who suffers from melancholia may rid himself of it by listening to singing and all kinds of instrumental music, by strolling through beautiful gardens and splendid buildings, by gazing upon beautiful pictures, and other things that enliven the mind, and dissipate gloomy moods. The purpose of all this is to restore the healthful condition of the body, but the real object in maintaining the body in good health is to acquire wisdom. Likewise, in the pursuit of wealth, the main design in its acquisition should be to expend it for noble purposes, and to employ it for the maintenance of the body and the pre- servation of life, so that its owner may obtain a knowledge of G-od, in so far as that is vouchsafed unto man.
From this point of view, the study of medicine has a very great influence upon the acquisition of the virtues and of the knowledge of God, as well as upon the attainment of true, spiritual happiness. Therefore, its study and acquisition are pre-eminently important religious activities, and must not be ranked in the same class with the art of weaving, or the science of architecture, for by it one learns to weigh one's deeds, and thereby human activities are rendered true virtues. The man who insists upon indulging in savory, sweetsmelling and palat- able food — although it be injurious, and possibly may lead to serious illness or sudden death— ought, in my opinion, to be classed with the beasts. His conduct is not that of a man in so far as he is a being endowed with understanding, but it is rather the action of a man in so far as he is a member of the animal kingdom, and so "he is like the beasts who perish".1 Man acts like a human being only when he eats that which is wholesome, at times avoiding the agreeable, and partaking of the disagreeable in his search for the beneficial. Such conduct is in accordance with the dictates of reason, and by these acts man is distinguished from all other beings. Similarly, if a man satisfy his sexual passions whenever he has the desire, regardless i Ps. XLIX, 13.
of good or ill effects, he acts as a brute, and not as a man.1 It is possible, however, for one to shape one's conduct entirely from the point of view of utility, as we have stated, with no aim beyond that of maintaining the health of the body, or guarding against disease. Such a one does not deserve to be called virtuous, for, just as he strives for the enjoyment of good health, another like him may have as his aim the gratification of eating, or of sexual intercourse, none of which actions leads towards the true goal. The real duty of man is, that in adopting whatever measures he may for his well-being and the pre- servation of his existence in good health, he should do so with the object of maintaining a perfect condition of the instruments of the soul, which are the limbs of the body, so that his soul may be unhampered, and he may busy himself in acquiring the moral and mental virtues. So it is with all the sciences and knowledge man may learn. Concerning those which lead directly to this goal, there is naturally no question; but such subjects as mathematics, the study of conic sections,2 mechanics, the various problems of geometry,3 hydraulics, and many others of a similar nature, which do not tend directly towards that goal, should be studied for the purpose of sharpening the mind, and training the mental faculties by scientific investigations, so that man may acquire intellectual ability to distinguish demonstra- tive proofs from others, whereby he will be enabled to com- prehend the essence of God. Similarly, in regard to man's conversation, he should speak only of those things that will be conducive to the true welfare of his soul and body, or that will tend to avert injury from them, whether his words concern themselves with science, or virtue, or praise of virtue or of a virtuous man, or with censure of vice or of a vicious person; for to express contempt for those who are loaded with vice, or to i Cf. H. Deot, III, 2, and Moreh, III. 8, "Those who desire to be men in truth, and not brutes, having only the appearance and shape of men, must constantly endeavor to reduce the wants of the body, such as eating, cohabiting, drinking, anger, and all vices originating in lust and passion."
3 See Sachs, Beitrage, vol. II, p. 78; and Rawicz, Commentar, p. 22.
72 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES depict their deeds as contemptible — if done for the purpose of disparaging them in the eyes of other men who may avoid them, and not do as they do — is indeed a virtuous duty. Does not Scripture say, "After the doings of the land of Egypt ye shall not do, and after the doings of the land of Canaan"?1 Also, the story of the Sodomites and all the passages occuring in Scripture, which censure those laden with vice, and represent their doings as disgraceful, and those passages which praise and hold the good in high esteem, endeavor, as I have said, to induce man to follow the paths of the righteous, and to shun the way of the wicked.
If man has this as his ideal, he will dispense with many of his customary deeds, and refrain from a great deal of ordinary conversation.2 He who follows this line of conduct will not trouble himself with adorning his walls with golden ornaments, nor with decorating his garments with golden fringe, unless it be for the purpose of enlivening his soul, and thus restoring it to health, or of banishing sickness from it, so that it shall become clear and pure, and thus be in the proper condition to acquire wisdom. Therefore, our Rabbis of blessed memory say, "It is becoming that a sage should have a pleasant dwelling, a beauti- ful wife, and domestic comfort";3 for one becomes weary, and one's mind dulled by continued mental concentration upon difficult problems. Thus, just as the body becomes exhausted from hard labor, and then by rest and refreshment recovers, so is it necessary for the mind to have relaxation by gazing upon pictures and other beautiful objects, that its weariness may be dispelled. Accordingly, it is related that when the Rabbis be- came exhausted from study, they were accustomed to engage in entertaining conversation 4 (in order to refresh themselves). From this point of view, therefore, the use of pictures and embroideries for beautifying the house, the furniture, and the clothes is not to be considered immoral nor unnecessary.
Know that to live according to this standard is to arrive at i Lev. XVIII, 3. » See S. Deot, II, 4, and 5, for a further discussion of this subject. 3 Sh.abbat, 25b.
a very high degree of perfection, which, in consequence of the difficulty of attainment, only a few, after long and continuous perseverance on the paths of virtue, have succeeded in reaching. If there be found a man who has accomplished this — that is one who exerts all the faculties of his soul, and directs them towards the sole ideal of comprehending God, using all his powers of mind and body, be they great or small, for the at- tainment of that which leads directly or indirectly to virtue — I would place him in a rank not lower than that of the prophets. Such a man, before he does a single act or deed, considers and reflects whether or not it will bring him to that goal, and if it will, then, and then only, does he do it.
Such striving does the Almighty require of us, according to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might",1 that is, with all the faculties of thy soul, each faculty having as its sole ideal the love of God.2 The prophets, similarly, urge us on in saying, "In all thy ways know Him",3 in commenting upon which the sages said, "even as regards a transgression (of the ritual or cere- monial law),"4 meaning thereby that thou shouldst set for every action a goal, namely, the truth, even though it be, from a certain point of view, a transgression.5 The sages of blessed memory, too, have summed up this idea in so feAv words and « Deut. YI, 5.
2 Cf. Moreh, I, 39 (end) which refers to this passage in the Perakim, and to the Mishneh Torah (Yesode ha-Torah, II, 2).
3 Prov. Ill, 6.
4 BeraJcot, 63a. This does not imply that the end justifies the means; that crime may be committed to bring about religious or charitable ends. It refers only to the violation of the ceremonial or ritual laws, as the breaking of the Sabbath, and eating on Yom Kippur, for the sake of saving life, etc. Cf. Ketubot, 5 a, "You must remove debris to save a life on the Sabbath"; and Shabbat, 30 b, ''Better to extinguish the light on the Sabbath than to extinguish life, which is God's light", etc. The distinction in regard to the various kinds of transgressions which M. makes below, Chapter VI, pp. 76—78, applies here. See Shemonah Perakim, ed. Wolf, 1876, p. 53, n. 5.
s Cf. M.'s Commentary on Berakot, IX, 5: 3Wn -W3 *p!r MBD pa!? ^33 jnn 12P31. Cf. also his Commentary on Abot, V, 20 (Rawicz, Commentar, p. 108), and Moreh, III, 22 (end).
74 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONTDES so concisely, at the same time elucidating the whole matter with such complete thoroughness, that when one considers the brevity with which they expressed this great and mighty thought in its entirety, about which others have written whole books and yet without adequately explaining it, one truly recognizes that the Rabbis undoubtedly spoke through divine inspiration. This saying is found among their precepts (in this tractate), and is, "Let all thy deeds be done for the sake of God".1 This, then, is the thought we have been dwelling upon in the present chapter, and what we have said must be considered sufficient for the needs of this introduction.2 t 1 Abot, II, 12.
2 That is, the Shemonah Perdkim, which constitute M.'s introduction to his Commentary on Abot. See Introduction, p. 5.
H. Deot, III, 3 contains a summary of the contents of the latter part of this chapter.
CHAPTER VI CONCERNING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SAINTLY [OR HIGHLY ETHICAL] MAN AND HIM WHO [SUBDUES HIS PASSIONS AND] HAS SELF-RESTRAINT 1 PHILOSOPHERS maintain that though the man of self-restraint performs moral and praiseworthy deeds, yet he does them desir- ing and craving all the while for immoral deeds, but, subduing his passions and actively fighting against a longing to do those things to which his faculties, his desires, and his psychic dis- position excite him, succeeds, though with constant vexation and irritation, in acting morally. The saintly man, however, is guided in his actions by that to which his inclination and disposition prompt him, in consequence of which he acts morally from innate longing and desire. Philosophers unanimously agree that the latter is superior to, and more perfect than, the one who has to curb his passions, although they add that it is possible for such a one to equal the saintly man in many regards. In general, however, he must necessarily be ranked lower in the scale of virtue, because there lurks within him the desire to do evil, and, though he does not do it, yet be- cause his inclinations are all in that direction, it denotes the presence of an immoral psychic disposition. Solomon, also, entertained the same idea when he said, "The soul of the wicked desireth evil",2 and, in regard to the saintly man's rejoicing in doing good, and the discontent experienced by him, 1 On the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XLVI, pp. 13 — 14, and Rosin, Ethik, p. 92ff. See Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, p. 201 if., on Hasidut (Saintliness). Cf. Eth., Nic., VII, on Self-control.
» Prov. XXI, 10.
76 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES who is not innately righteous, when required to act justly, he says, "It is bliss to the righteous to do justice, but torment to the evil-doer".1 This is manifestly an agreement between Scrip- ture and philosophy.
When, however, we consult the Rabbis on this subject, it would seem that they consider him who desires iniquity, and craves for it (but does not do it), more praiseworthy and perfect than the one who feels no torment at refraining from evil; and they even go so far as to maintain that the more praiseworthy and perfect a man is, the greater is his desire to commit iniquity, and the more irritation does he feel at having to desist from it. This they express by saying, "Whosoever is greater than his neighbor has likewise greater evil inclinations".2 Again, as if this were not sufficient, they even go so far as to say that the reward of him who overcomes his evil inclination is commensurate with the torture occasioned by his resistance, which thought they express by the words, "According to the labor is the reward".3 Furthermore, they command that man should conquer his desires, but they forbid one to say, "I, by my nature, do not desire to commit such and such a trans- gression, even though the Law does not forbid it". Rabbi Simeon ben Gamaliel summed up this thought in the words, "Man should not say, 'I do not want to eat meat together with milk; I do not want to wear clothes made of a mixture of wool and linen; I do not want to enter into an incestuous marriage', but he should say, 'I do indeed want to, yet I must not, for my father in Heaven has forbidden it'".4 At first blush, by a superficial comparison of the sayings of the philosophers and the Rabbis, one might be inclined to say that they contradict one another. Such, however, is not the case. Both are correct and, moreover, are not in disagree- ment in the least, as the evils which the philosophers term such — and of which they say that he who has no longing for them is more to be praised than he who desires them but conquers 1 Prov. XXI, 15. 2 Siikkah, 52a. See Lazarus, Ethics, II, pp. 106—107. 3 Abot, V, 23.
* Sifra to Lev. XX, 26, and Midrash Yalkut to Wayikra, 226, although referred to as the words of R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
THE EIGHT CHAPTERS— VI, 77 his passion — are things which all people commonly agree are evils, such as the shedding of blood, theft, robbery, fraud, injury to one who has done no harm, ingratitude, contempt for parents, and the like. The prescriptions against these are called com- mandments (HlSfi), about which the Rabbis said, "If they had not already been written in the Law, it would be proper to add them".1 Some of our later sages, who were infected with the unsound principles of the Mutakallimun, 2 called these rational laws.3 There is no doubt that a soul which has the desire for, and lusts after, the above-mentioned misdeeds, is imperfect, that a noble soul has absolutely no desire for any such crimes, and experiences no struggle in refraining from them. When, how- ever, the Rabbis maintain that he who overcomes his desire has more merit and a greater reward (than he who has no temptation), they say so only in reference to laws that are ceremonial prohibitions. This is quite true, since, were it not for the Law, they would not at all be considered transgressions. Therefore, the Rabbis say that man should permit his soul to entertain the natural inclination for these things, but that the Law alone should restrain him from them. Ponder over the wisdom of these men of blessed memory manifest in the examples they adduce. They do not declare, "Man should not say, 'I have no desire to kill, to steal and to lie, but I have a desire for these things, yet what can I do, since my Father in heaven forbids it!'" The instances they cite are all from the cere- monial law, such as partaking of meat and milk together, wear- ing clothes made of wool and linen, and entering into con- 3 M. refers especially to Saadia who, in Emunot we-De'ot, III, 2, divides the divine commandments into rational (ni^3tf mSD), and revealed laws (nwo» niXB). See Scheyer, PsychoL Syst. d. Maim., pp. 24 and 106; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 503; Rosin, Ethik, p. 93, n. 5; Schreiner, Der Kalam, etc., pp. 13-14; Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 45, n. 1; Gold- ziher, Kitab ma'am al-Nafs, Berlin 1907, p. 22* f., and text p. 17, n. 6; and Cohen, Charakteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. 77 ff. M. refers also to Saadia in Moreh, I, 71:,D"«1pn ^t*0,tnit«n rttp^> p»n ntfi nbjrotf 71D1 D^NPBtsrn |D Dnynsn p ninp1? D^JP on. See Munk, Guide, I, p. 336, n. 1. On Saadia's relation to the Kalam, see Kaufmann, Hid., p. 3, n. 5, et al.
78 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES sanguinuous marriages.1 These, and similar enactments are what Q-od called "my statutes" (Tllpn), which, as the Rabbis say are "statutes which I (God) have enacted for thee, which thou hast no right to subject to criticism, which the nations of the world attack and which Satan denounces, as for instance, the statutes concerning the red heifer, the scapegoat, and so forth".2 Those transgressions, however, which the later sages called rational laws are termed commandments (filSfi), as the Rabbis explained.3 It is now evident from all that we have said, what the trans- gressions are for which, if a man have no desire at all, he is on a higher plane than he who has a longing, but controls his passion for them; and it is also evident what the transgres- sions are of which the opposite is true. It is an astonishing fact that these two classes of expressions should be shown to be compatible with one another, but their content points to the truth of our explanation.
This ends the discussion of the subject-matter of this chapter.
3 Of. Eth. Nic., V, 10, where the "just" is spoken of as of two kinds, the natural and the conventional, the former corresponding to "command- ments" (niSD), and the latter to "statutes" (D'pn). The former, says Aristotle, have everywhere the same force, while the latter may be this way or that way indifferently, except after enactment, being, in short, all matters of special decree, such as, for instance, the price of a ransom being fixed at a mina, or sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep, etc.